21 It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that given the historical range of sentencing for offences of this type, the overall sentence is too severe in circumstances where a plea of guilty had been entered, as here, at an early stage of the proceedings.
22 It was said that the sentencing statistics supported an argument that an overall sentence in this case exceeding eight years would be considered excessive.
23 It was argued that, allowing for a discount to the order of fifteen per cent for the pleas of guilty, his Honour should be taken to have started by fixing an appropriate penalty, reflecting the objective criminality of the offences, at about 11.5 years. A discount of about fifteen per cent would reduce this to an overall head sentence of ten years. In starting at a figure of this magnitude, therefore, his Honour started his calculations at too high a point and, finished up with an overall sentence which was outside that appropriate for the offences committed, given the historical pattern of sentencing.
24 It was argued that "very serious though the offences were they did not fit into the worst category of case," and an appropriate head sentence should not have exceeded seven years.
25 In support of the argument that these offences did not fall into a worst category of case, emphasis was placed (inter alia) upon the speed with which the robberies were carried out, and allegedly without infliction of extreme violence on staff and physical terror over a sustained period of time.
26 It is true that the offences were apparently in each case carried out with expedition but this may be accounted for by the professional manner in which they were executed and the understandable reluctance of members of the banks' staff to resist the demands which were made upon them. In three cases a pistol was involved and, in the fourth, a knife described as a Rambo style knife with a blade about 15 to 20 cm in length with a serrated edge.
27 In my view these offences clearly fell within "a worst category of cases" and the fact that no staff member was physically injured does not exclude, by any means, the possibility of a severe psychological reaction to some of them.
28 It is now well known that the major banks are required to have counsellors available at all times to assist bank staff who have been traumatised by armed robberies or robberies in company or (as in this case) a combination of both.
29 It is well established that sentencing for offences of this nature involves a significant deterrent factor.
30 A number of significant factors were also relied upon by the applicant including the fact that he co-operated with the investigating police after his arrest but not to the extent, perhaps understandably, of revealing the identities of his co-offenders.
31 It is not necessary to refer to the detail of the subjective material, although I do note that there was evidence that by reason of the applicant's physical and emotional health he will have difficulty in adapting to a long period of incarceration. The subjective aspects of the case were carefully considered by his Honour.
32 No dispute, as I have indicated, arises in so far as the three year period of supervision allowed by his Honour. However, it was contended that his Honour erred because it would appear that, having resolved that a three years supervision period was necessary, his Honour increased the head sentence in order to accommodate that need.
33 Senior counsel for the applicant submitted that his Honour should have fixed an effective head sentence of seven years, with a minimum term of four years and an additional term of three years.
34 A significant matter is that the applicant was on parole at the time he committed (with one exception) this serious regime of offences. It is now well established that the sentencing regime should mark the gravity of the applicant's conduct in abusing his parole: see, for example, R v Tran (1999) NSWCCA 109, para 15.
35 The applicant also suffers from the disadvantage of a history of prior serious criminal conduct.
36 Prior to counsel being retained for the applicant written submissions were filed by him with the Court.
37 I have given careful consideration to those submissions and the responses by the Crown to them.
38 In so far as the sentencing statistics are concerned, they really provide, at the most, marginal assistance in a case of this nature. The number of significant elements put the applicant in a very restricted class indeed. Firstly, there is the large number of subject offences, secondly, the fact that he has committed prior offences, thirdly, that (with one exception) he was on parole at the time of the commission of the subject offences and finally his age and the fact that he pleaded guilty.
39 The sentences were imposed prior to the judgment of the High Court in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 and, accordingly, the sentences were structured on the basis of the principle of totality.
40 I have little doubt that if his Honour had structured the sentences in accordance with the principles enunciated in Pearce that he would have achieved the same overall effect.
41 With regard to the paragraph in his Honour's remarks on sentence which I have quoted in paragraph 19 above, I do not think that what his Honour there said has the effect of impugning the overall sentence and minimum term which he imposed.
42 The statistics to which his Honour was referring related to a far broader class of cases than the subject case but, in any event, I cannot accept that his Honour was, in that paragraph, committing himself to an overall sentence (prior to applying a discount for the pleas of guilty) to the order of eight years.
43 Despite the forceful arguments by Mr G Nicholson QC for the applicant I am unable to discern any error in his Honour's reasoning. Further, I am unable to conclude, after balancing the objective and subjective circumstances, that the sentences were outside the discretion available to his Honour.
44 It is unnecessary to repeat that the offence of robbery, particularly in company and, or, with arms, is an offence of the utmost gravity: see R v Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R 23.
45 I would propose that the application for leave to appeal be granted bearing in mind the length of the sentences imposed, but that the appeal be dismissed.