The legal principles applicable to an appeal of this kind
24 The reference by the Minister under s 474C(1)(b) was a reference of "the whole case" to be dealt with as an appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912.
25 In Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510 Barwick CJ (with whom McTiernan, Stephen and Jacobs JJ agreed) at 514 commented as follows in regard to a reference of "the whole case" by the Attorney General of Victoria:
"As the Full Court was required to treat the reference to it under s 584 as an appeal, it was bound in dealing with it to act upon legal principles appropriate to an appeal. Thus, although all the material supporting the applicant's petition formed part of the whole case to be considered by the Court, the ordinary principles as to admissibility of evidence must be applied in the consideration of that material …"
26 In Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 (at 311 to 312) it was said by Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Mason CJ and Brennan J agreed) that, when a case is referred under s 21(A) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Western Australian equivalent of s 454C(1)(b) of the Crimes Act), ordinarily it is the duty of the Court of Criminal Appeal to pronounce upon the whole case as presented and the whole case "must be passed upon by the application of legal principles appropriate to criminal appeals".
27 In the present case, however, the parties have agreed that, in effect, this Court is required to pass judgment only upon the issues as agreed. That agreement which, as I have said, was sensibly arrived at by the parties, takes the matter out of the ordinary "whole case" rule as expressed in Ratten v The Queen and Mickelberg v The Queen.
28 Ordinarily, in a case of this kind, there is a contest as to whether the new evidence to be led is "fresh". In the present case the parties agreed that the evidence to be led was fresh and no issue arose in this respect.
29 In Ratten v The Queen Barwick CJ said that the use that may be made of fresh evidence differed, depending upon whether the appellant claims a verdict of acquittal as of right, or seeks merely the ordering of a new trial. Where the Court concludes that, as the result of fresh evidence, it has a reasonable doubt as to guilt, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal as of right: R v Pedrana [2001] NSWCCA 66. The appellant did not, in these proceedings, contend that the fresh evidence entitled him to an acquittal as of right.
30 The appellant, rather, sought to bring himself within the second situation referred to by Barwick CJ in Ratten v The Queen, namely, where an appellant does not submit that the verdict should be quashed without more, but contends that he or she is entitled to a new trial by reason of the fresh evidence and argues that, as a matter of discretion, a verdict of acquittal should be entered. In regard to that situation Barwick CJ (at 519) said
"[T]he court must as before deciding the credibility and the cogency of the fresh evidence in order to determine whether, when the fresh evidence, if believed by the jury, is taken with the evidence given at the trial in that sense most favourable to the accused which reasonable men might properly accept, it is likely that a verdict of guilty would not have been returned. In considering the material before it for this purpose, the element of credibility will be satisfied if the court is of opinion that the evidence is capable of belief and likely to be believed by a jury. The court in this instance will not be directly acting upon its own view of the evidence but rather upon that view most favourable to an appellant, which in the court's view a jury of reasonable men may properly take. … In the situation with which I am presently dealing, namely of fresh evidence not claimed to establish innocence but to be of such credibility and cogency as to be likely to influence a jury away from a verdict of guilty, it is what a reasonable jury might reasonably make of this evidence which is the dominant consideration".
31 In Mickelberg v The Queen at 273 Mason CJ said the following concerning the second situation referred to by Barwick CJ in Ratten v The Queen:
"It is established that the proper question is whether the court considers that there is a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant had the fresh evidence been before it at the trial. This test was endorsed by four of the five Justices in Gallagher v The Queen [(1986) 160 CLR 392]. Deane J and I [at 402] considered that the test was best expressed in those terms."
32 In the circumstances of this appeal it is the test so expressed by Mason CJ that has to be applied.
33 Should this Court, after applying that test, come to the conclusion that the appellant is entitled to a new trial, it will then be required to address the discretionary question whether an acquittal should be ordered. As I observed in R v Pedrana:
"This would depend on whether any circumstances exist that might render it unjust to the appellant to make him or her stand trial again (remembering, however, that the public interest in the proper administration of justice must be considered as well as the interests of the individual accused): King v The Queen at 427 and 433; Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627 at 630. Should the interests of justice require than an appellant not stand trial again, the Court, as a matter of discretion, will enter a verdict of acquittal: Spies v The Queen (2000) 74 ALJR 1263 at 1283."
The objection to the evidence of Messrs Westwood and Holland
34 The fresh evidence that the appellant sought to lead was that of John Alexander West, a handwriting expert. The Crown sought to rely on the evidence of two other handwriting experts, Paul Denison Westwood and Neil William Holland, to rebut the evidence of Mr West. Mr Neil SC, senior counsel for the appellant, objected to the respondent leading this evidence in rebuttal.
35 The Court dismissed the objection and indicated that it would give reasons for its decision when delivering its reasons in regard to the appeal itself. I proceed now to set out my reasons for joining in that decision.
36 In Ratten v The Queen the High Court approved the procedure that had been followed by the Victorian Full Court in hearing the appeal in that case. That procedure is apparent from the following remarks of Barwick CJ at 520:
"The Full Court received oral evidence both from the appellant and from the Crown: it allowed cross-examination of the witnesses produced by the appellant and the Crown. The Court's course in doing so, was challenged by the appellant. But in my opinion the Full Court was not in error in the course it took. In the first place the Full Court was entitled and indeed bound to satisfy itself whether, upon all the material available to it, there was such doubt as to the guilt of the applicant as would make the maintenance of the jury's verdict a miscarriage of justice. In the second place, in the alternative situation in which a new trial was sought, the court had to satisfy itself as to the credibility and cogency of the fresh evidence in order to decide whether, if it were believed, it was likely to bring about a different verdict".
37 The same issue was raised in Mickelberg v The Queen (unreported, CCA Supreme Court of Western Australia, 12 February 1999) where the Court (Malcolm CJ, Ipp and Wheeler JJ) said:
"When additional evidence is adduced on behalf of an appellant, the Court will be entitled to receive other evidence which 'tends to support, contradict or weaken the new evidence or the inferences which might be drawn therefrom" ( Ratten v The Queen at 518 per Barwick CJ). To the extent that the other evidence bears directly upon the additional evidence adduced by an appellant, in the sense of contradicting or explaining it, it will be admissible as it would assist in assessing 'the cogency' of that evidence".
38 The evidence of Mr Westwood and Mr Holland tended to contradict or weaken the fresh evidence of Mr West. On that basis, I concluded that the respondent was entitled to adduce it.