10 Again this reflected the statement of facts, which gave more detail of the search of the applicant's home including the finding of white powder in various places in four plastic capsules, one containing 9 foil packages, one containing a single foil package, and two each containing the powder apparently without foil packaging. An analyst's certificate also provided to his Honour indicated that the nine foil packages each contained 0.2 gm of heroin and the single foil package contained 0.1 gm of heroin.
11 The applicant gave evidence in which he described his drug habit and acknowledged in general terms "supplying drugs … on a low level" to finance his habit. His evidence included -
"Q. Do you say to the court that the supply offences that you have pleaded guilty to today were offences committed to enable you to maintain your own drug habit?
A. Yes."
12 It was clear that there was no dispute, and that his Honour accepted, that the heroin found in the applicant's possession was in part for his own use and in part for sale to others. But what was not clear was how much of that heroin was for sale to others or, apart from the sale of $400 worth of heroin on 7 November 1998 and possibly the sale of $50 worth on 12 May 1999, how much had been sold by the applicant to others. His Honour made no findings as to these matters. This gave rise to the error in the sentencing process.
13 The offences to which the applicant pleaded guilty were relevantly the supply of heroin. Supply included possession for supply, see the definition in s 3(1) of the Act. The effect of s 29 of the Act was that if the applicant had in his possession an amount of heroin not less than the trafficable quantity thereof, he was deemed to have the heroin in his possession for supply unless he proved that he had it in his possession otherwise than for supply. The trafficable quantity was 3 gms. From the acceptance that the heroin in the applicant's possession was in part for his own use, it followed that he had proved that he had the heroin in his possession in part otherwise than for supply, although there were no findings as to the amounts. Accordingly, s 29 did not operate to make all the heroin found in the applicant's possession, the two total amounts of 5.36 gms and 5.43 gms, possession for supply.
14 Count 1 rested on the admission of a sale of $400 worth of heroin on 7 November 1998. It was described in the record of interview as "Four deals at once, so that's what, $400", and the amount was not otherwise stated. The judge did not refer to this sale in his remarks on sentence. Count 2 rested on possession of heroin on 9 November 1998, but as explained in the preceding paragraph the amount deemed to be supplied was not established by the operation of s 29 of the Act. Count 3 rested on the sale of $50 worth of heroin on 12 May 1999, expressed in the statement of facts only as information received by the police. The record of interview in November 1998 had included as to the foils that "they're $50.00 each, so that's probably about, I dunno, point one in each one, might be a bit over", but this was not referred to in the remarks on sentence. As has been seen, and notwithstanding this, from the materials before his Honour it seems that a $50 deal was about 0.2 gm of heroin. Count 4 rested on possession of heroin on 13 May 1999, but again the amount deemed to be supplied was not established by the operation of s 29 of the Act.
15 Without findings as to the amount of heroin supplied as to each of the charges, the sentencing of the applicant miscarried. The penalty for an offence under s 23(1) is imprisonment for 15 years, a fine of $225,000, or both, giving an extended scale of criminality. As part of the exercise of placing the applicant's criminality at a point along the scale, it would ordinarily be necessary to find the amount of heroin involved as to each of the charges. The wrapped-up approach taken by his Honour of itself impeded proper consideration of the sentences to be imposed for each of the charges. That was exacerbated by the failure to find how much heroin had been supplied when some of the heroin was for the applicant's own use. In my view the necessity to find the amounts of heroin involved was present in this case.
16 R v Wong (1999) 108 A Crim R 531 was concerned with drug importation contrary to the provisions of the Customs Act 1901 (C'th). Spigelman CJ, with whom the other members of a five person bench agreed either absolutely or without relevant qualification, said at [130-131] -
"130 The legislature has made it clear, in providing for a gradation of penalties in the three relevant cases - less than a trafficable quantity, trafficable quantity and commercial quantity - that the amount of drugs is an important consideration in the sentencing exercise. This would in any event be suggested on the basis of first principles. The primary object of sentencing is the protection of the community. The adverse effects of drugs such as heroin and cocaine on the community are directly related to the quantity of drugs available in the community. Accordingly, quantity is an exceptionally important aspect of the objective seriousness of the crime.
131 Notwithstanding the significance of quantity, it is not determinative of the appropriate sentence. Other aspects of the crime, including objective and subjective considerations, remain relevant in the exercise of the sentencing discretion … ".
17 The Act gives similar, although not identical, importance to the amount of prohibited drug supplied. It distinguishes between supply simpliciter (s 25(1)) and supply of not less than a commercial quantity (s 25(2)). It provides for an increased penalty where a large commercial quantity is involved (s 33(3)), and by s 29 it creates a presumption in the case of a trafficable quantity. The amounts involved in the present case may not have been large, but it was evident that there could have been the supply of a fraction of a gram or, depending on the applicant's own use, of a number of grams in total. Even within the relatively small compass of such amounts, the adverse effects on the community of supply of heroin could be differently assessed when considering the seriousness of the offences.
18 Regrettably, the significance of findings as to the amounts of heroin involved does not seem to have been recognised when the applicant was sentenced. The trial judge appears to have accepted that the applicant's habit consumed between two hundred and three hundred dollars' worth of heroin a day. It may have been that a great deal of the heroin found in the applicant's possession was for his own use; on the other hand, it may have been that he would have sold a considerable amount of it to others in order to finance his habit. A finding as to an amount of the order of 0.2 gm could readily enough have been made in relation to count 3. A finding as to an amount of the order of 0.8 or 1.6 gm could have been made in relation to count 1. Findings in relation to counts 2 and 4 were not so obvious. But no findings were made. Instead, the applicant and the Crown allowed the judge to proceed, and the judge proceeded, in a way which left open that his Honour deal with the applicant as a supplier of over 5 gm of heroin in each of November 1998 and May 1999.
19 This points up an additional reason why findings were necessary as to the amounts of heroin involved. If the amounts were less than the indictable quantity of 5 gm the matters could have been dealt with summarily, with a lesser maximum penalty, unless the Crown or the applicant elected otherwise (see s 31 of the Act). Regard may be had to the potentially lesser maximum penalty in sentencing (see for example, R v Crombie (1999) NSWCCA 297 and R v Mason (2000) NSWCCA 82). In the absence of findings, when given the range of amounts in question the 5 gm cut-off could be important, a relevant sentencing consideration was passed over.
20 The sentences could not stand when there was this error in the sentencing process. Ordinarily this Court could not make findings in these circumstances, and remittal to the District Court for re-sentencing would be necessary. But the applicant was concerned that remittal to the District Court for re-sentencing would affect his classification and bring a more harsh existence in the prison system in the immediate future. The Crown appeared to recognise his concern. The hearing of the application was adjourned briefly so that inquiries could be made and consideration could be given to a means of overcoming the concern.
21 The course adopted was to invite this Court to re-sentence on agreed findings as to the amounts of heroin involved. In relation to counts 1 and 3 the agreement was upon amounts of approximately 1.6 gm and 0.2 gm respectively: the reasoning will be apparent from what has already been said. In relation to counts 2 and 4 the agreement was upon amounts of 3 gm, on the basis that the plea of guilty where the facts showed only possession of heroin necessarily meant that it was accepted that at least 3 gm of the heroin was for supply. In the circumstances, I consider that we should act on the agreed findings and re-sentence the applicant.
22 The applicant was born on 25 October 1958, and is now 41 years old. He has an extensive criminal history, dating from 1978. Apart from driving offences, it includes two offences of stealing other than car theft and three offences involving car theft, and in 1981 the offence of being accessory after the fact to armed robbery. It also includes offences of possession, use and supply of heroin in 1978, supply of heroin in 1980, possession of prohibited drugs in 1988 and 1989 and supply of prohibited drugs in 1989.
23 At the time of the offences in November 1998 the appellant was on a recognisance to be of good behaviour for 5 years following car stealing and larceny offences in 1996 and was serving a community service order following car stealing, larceny and resisting or hindering police offences in 1997. He was admitted to bail after being charged with the November 1998 offences, and was on bail when the May 1999 offences were committed.
24 As the judge observed, the applicant's record does not assist him. His commission of the offences while on recognisance and on bail can not be overlooked as aggravating factors.
25 The applicant gave evidence before the judge which, although his Honour did not say so expressly, appears to have been accepted. He said that he had been using heroin for many years but in the relatively recent past had managed to rehabilitate himself through the William Booth Clinic and then a half way house in Concord. Regrettably the applicant started using heroin again in 1998 when he found that his girlfriend had cancer. As has already appeared, he said that he sold heroin in order to maintain his own drug habit. The applicant gave evidence that he had not used heroin since he had been in custody, that he was trying to get off it when arrested in May 1999, and that he was taking action to try to cope with his drug addiction.
26 An affidavit before us on the application included that he had worked within the prison system when he could, had undertaken some courses, had received some drug and alcohol counselling and seen a psychologist, and now had a different attitude to gaol and to what he needed to do to get his life together once he was out of gaol. It included that he was determined to stay away from drugs, as he had done before, but that he knew how hard it was and that he had to learn how to deal with problems without going back to drugs.
27 It was submitted by the applicant that three particular considerations told in his favour.
28 The first consideration was said to be that he committed the offences in order to maintain his own drug habit, rather than purely for monetary gain. In R v Selim (NSWCCA, 19 May 1998, unreported) it was said that the criminality could be regarded as "on a lower level" when the drug offence was committed to feed the offender's addiction, and that approach appears to have been accepted in R v Markarian (NSWCCA, 1 October 1998) and R v Mason. I do not think such a bald proposition can have survived R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, see the extensive discussion in the judgments of Spigelman CJ at 382-6 and Wood CJ at CL at 387-98, notwithstanding that R v Mason post-dated that case. The offender's drug addiction may be a relevant matter, but it is not a mitigating circumstance and, in the words of Spigelman CJ at 386, "The concept that committing crimes in order to obtain moneys to buy an illegal substance is in some way less deserving of punishment than the commission of the same crime for the obtaining of moneys for some other, but legal, purpose is perverse".
29 The relevance of the applicant's drug habit is in relation to the second consideration, that the amounts of heroin involved were not large. They were not large because the applicant's purpose was to feed his own addiction. Further where the crime (here, supply of a prohibited drug) is motivated by the need to finance an addiction and steps are taken to deal with the addiction, it may increase the Court's confidence in the offender's rehabilitation. This is a relevant consideration in the sentencing process. In the present case it can be borne in mind that the applicant had for a time stayed off drugs, but had relapsed when placed under emotional stress: as he acknowledged in his affidavit, he had to learn how to deal with problems without going back to drugs. The amounts were all less than the 5 gm indictable quantity below which there could be summary disposal. But the amounts were not insignificant. An amount of 3 gm provided about fifteen deals, and although much less than the 250 gm regarded by the legislature as a commercial quantity was classified as a trafficable quantity.
30 The third consideration was said to be that the applicant had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity and had made ready admissions to the police, including of the supply of heroin on 9 November 1998 which was not otherwise known to the police. It was put to the judge, and his Honour seemed to have accepted, that there was contrition and a desire for rehabilitation. The affidavit earlier referred to supports that conclusion. It was suggested, to the contrary, that the applicant's co-operation was no more than recognition of the inevitable, and that acceptance of contrition had to be tempered in the light of the commission of the offences while on recognisance and on bail. There was nonetheless co-operation, and I consider that the judge's apparent acceptance of contrition and a desire for rehabilitation should be taken up in the re-sentencing.
31 The offences can and should be seen in context, that although the applicant was charged only with the specific offences the possession and deemed supply, and actual supply, of the heroin was part of an on-going activity. It was an activity in which the applicant engaged even after he was charged with the November 1988 offences. The particular features of this case are such that Judicial Commission figures do not provide any precise guidance, but they do indicate for pleas of guilty to supply of less than a commercial quantity of a prohibited drug that a minimum term in excess of 3 years is out of the ordinary.
32 Having regard to the connected series of crimes, it is appropriate to sentence the appellant to concurrent sentences, the longest term of which reflects the totality of criminality involved. Each sentence is to commence on 13 May 1999. I consider that special circumstances exist within the meaning of s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 justifying a variation of the statutory formula concerning the relationship between the term of the sentence and the non-parole period. The circumstances are the appellant's encouraging attempts at a rehabilitation and the desirability to ensure adequate supervision when he is released.
33 The sentences imposed below are quashed. In the respect of the first count, being a sale of 1.6 gm of heroin, the appellant is sentenced to a term of 2 years' imprisonment. In respect of the second count, which involved possession for the purpose of supply of 3 gm of heroin but which was committed when he was released on bail, taking into account the charges on Form 1, the appellant is sentenced to a term of 4 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years. The earliest date upon which the appellant will become entitled to be released on parole is 12 May 2001. In respect of the third count, which involved a single sale of 0.2 gm of heroin, the appellant is sentenced to a term of 6 months' imprisonment. In respect of the fourth count, being possession for the purpose of supply of 3 gm of heroin, the appellant is sentenced to a term of 2 years' imprisonment.
34 ADAMS J: I agree with Giles JA.