72 The fourth ground of appeal is in the following terms:
"That his Honour in directing the jury on the use to be made of the acts of the other co-accused as against the Appellant erroneously failed to properly distinguish between the evidence required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that an agreement in the form of a conspiracy existed as distinct from the facts needed to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the particular Appellant was party to the conspiracy charged."
73 With regard to this ground of appeal, it was contended that in the summing-up his Honour mainly concentrated on the evidence of each of the co-accused which could be used against the others, pursuant to the co-conspirators rule.
74 Reference was made to the direction at p 23 of the summing-up that evidence of the conduct and statements of others can be used for two purposes:
(i) to establish the existence of the agreement; and
(ii) whether a specific co-accused participated in it.
75 It was submitted that his Honour could have erroneously left the jury with the impression that there is only one test with two related purposes. It was submitted that with such "delicate and highly prejudicial evidence", his Honour should have directed the jury that the tests are twofold, namely:
(i) Are you satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was a conspiracy such as was charged? If so,
(ii) Are you satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the particular accused was party to the conspiracy charged?
76 It was submitted that this precise twofold direction should have been given because even if Miss Coates suspected there was an illegal agreement in the terms of paragraph (i) above, the jury could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, in the light of her explanations, that she was a party to the suspected conspiracy.
77 Thus, it was argued that his Honour should not have allowed the co-conspirators rule to be used against her because of the prejudicial effect of such evidence which in the circumstances outweighed its probative value.
78 Further, it was argued that the use of the co-conspirators rule may have also contributed to Miss Coates being attributed with far more knowledge than she actually had, as a matter of permissible evidence, in any illegality that was going on.
79 When one looks at the relevant evidence and the overall directions which his Honour gave in relation to conspiracy, which in my respectful view, were impeccable, there is no substance in the submissions which have been put.
80 If I may say so, the submissions which have been made under this particular ground and the same may be said of other grounds, fail to appreciate that it was open to the jury to reject Miss Coates' evidence. It was clearly open to them to assess her explanations as lacking credibility when considered in light of the objective evidence led by the Crown.
81 Again this is a ground of appeal to which rule 4 relates and I would refuse the appellant leave to argue this ground.
82 The fifth ground of appeal is in the following terms:
"That his Honour erred in the exercise of his discretion in refusing the joint defence application to discharge the jury when the co-accused John Williams, pleaded guilty in the absence of the jury and the indictment was accordingly amended, in that unfairness, particularly to this appellant, did occur."
83 It was submitted that in some cases, a co-accused "disappearing" from the dock, may not cause much prejudice to the remaining accused. However, in a case of conspiracy, and particularly one based wholly and squarely on circumstantial evidence, no amount of warning by the judge, it was submitted, could totally eliminate some of the potential prejudice and speculation.
84 In the particular case of Miss Coates, it was not just a matter of prejudice, it was submitted, but one of unfairness and so much so, that she is deserving of a new trial, unaccompanied for the whole of the prosecution case by the inclusion in the indictment of Mr Williams. The Crown evidence linked Miss Coates closely to Mr Williams, particularly as they were both intimately involved in the purchase of the iodine and, to a lesser extent, the laboratory equipment. Thus, when, without being given any reason, the jury were informed that Mr Williams was no longer involved in the trial, the inevitable inference was that he had changed his plea to guilty, and by reason of Miss Coates' close involvement with him in critical aspects of the Crown case, she too, the jury would infer was guilty. This situation was exacerbated, it was argued, by the Crown invoking the co-conspirators rule which had attracted, in the case against Miss Coates, considerable inculpatory evidence.
85 The learned trial judge was fully seized of all the nuances of this trial by the time that Mr Williams informed the Court that he intended to change his plea. It is apparent from his interlocutory judgment rejecting the application to discharge the jury that his Honour carefully considered the possibility of any prejudice flowing to the remaining accused after Mr Williams' departure. His Honour could see none.
86 His Honour gave the jury very careful directions directed to ensuring that the remaining accused suffered no prejudice as a result of Mr Williams' departure from the courtroom. His Honour stressed the fact that they must not speculate about the reason for his absence and stressed the important nature of that direction.
87 By this stage of the trial, two weeks of jury time had been occupied and considerable evidence had been led. There was therefore a distinct public interest in maintaining the trial process, if at all possible, without prejudice to the remaining accused. I am unable to accept that Miss Coates would have suffered any prejudice by reason of the events which occurred in this regard.
88 In my view it has not been demonstrated by Miss Coates that his Honour erred in the exercise of the discretion, which he undoubtedly had, to allow the appeal to proceed despite the plea of guilty being entered by Mr Williams at such a late stage in the trial. I would reject the fifth ground of appeal.
89 I turn then to the first and second grounds of appeal which are in the following terms:
"1. That the verdict of guilty against the Appellant is unsafe and unsatisfactory in that no jury acting on the directions as to favourable inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
2. That on the overall state and nature of the evidence against the Appellant for the charge of conspiring to manufacture methylamphetamine there was a miscarriage of justice."
90 In support of these grounds counsel for Miss Coates relied heavily upon the denial in evidence by Miss Coates, and in her ERISP, of any knowledge that the manufacture of methylamphetamine was being undertaken (as it undoubtedly was) in her premises. Further that she had given adequate explanations for what was contended to be evidence inculpating her in the conspiracy.
91 In summary it was contended that the highest point of the prosecution case, as it was presented before the jury and as it stood on appeal, is that of suspicion as against Miss Coates, or maybe naivety and stupidity, but not one of proving the requisite criminal knowledge or intent.
92 However, as Gibb CJ and Mason J pointed out in Chamberlain v The Queen (1985) 153 CLR 521 at 535, evidence may have a cumulative effect and it is the duty of the jury to consider all the facts together at the conclusion of the case. It is not appropriate to look at the evidence of each witness "separately in, so to speak, a hermetically sealed compartment": they should consider the accumulation of the evidence: see Weeder v The Queen [1979] Qd R 278 at 289.
93 In the instant case, when this injunction is applied, the Crown case against Miss Coates can be seen to be a powerful one indeed, particularly in the light of the co-conspirators rule. A particularly valuable piece of evidence led by the Crown was a video recording of the interior and exterior of the Luddenham premises taken on the evening of the arrest and the following morning. Still photographs taken from the video of incriminating material were also in evidence.
94 It is sufficient to say that the subject premises consist of an old fibro cottage located well away from other residences. The interior is small and the rooms interconnected in such a fashion that only minimal privacy could exist when more than one person was in the house. Of particular moment is the fact that the sunroom is connected to the kitchen. There is no door between the two rooms, only a curtain which can easily be pushed aside. The video demonstrates that the small sunroom was stocked with laboratory type utensils positioned in such a way that they were obviously being used in a manufacturing process. A large number of utensils containing chemicals and the like, appropriate to the manufacture of methylamphetamine, was clearly visible.
95 Miss Coates' assertions of ignorance collapse under this objective evidence together with her participation in the purchase, on two occasions, of large quantities of iodine.
96 I would reject the first and second grounds of appeal.
97 I would propose that Miss Coates' appeal against conviction be dismissed.
98 Insofar as Mr Murphy's appeal is concerned, I have already indicated that he did not wish to make any submissions to this Court. No written submissions have been filed on his behalf. Mr Murphy did not give evidence at the trial. A consideration of the whole of the evidence before the jury makes it abundantly clear that no question can arise as to his guilt.
99 Mr Murphy also took part in an ERISP at the Penrith Police Station on the night of 29 March 2000. In the interview he was asked if he saw anything in relation to the production of amphetamines. He said, "I think youse will make up your own minds, you know like, I can't deny what's been going on there. And, but I can't sort of throw the thrust of guilt on anyone but myself through knowing". Later in the interview the following exchange took place:
"Q 63. Would you, would it be true to say that you formed, (sic) that you had the knowledge that prohibited drugs were being manufactured on your premises but in his [the co-accused Williams] room or in his section ---
A. Now that's an incriminating thing ---
Q 64. Just after what you've told me just, just would that be a fair ---
A. Well yeah, if you want to say that, yeah that would be fair, statement."
100 Fingerprint analysis of items located inside the subject premises revealed Mr Murphy's left middle fingerprint on a glass beaker.
101 Mr Lamprati on behalf of the Crown has, in written submissions, identified critical aspects of the evidence inculpatory of Mr Murphy. It is not necessary to note the detail of those submissions. I would propose that Mr Murphy's appeal against conviction be dismissed.