22 There is no occasion to lead evidence of the accused's involvement in the shooting of Bilal Razzak in order to avoid the jury being required to determine the facts in issue with respect to the shooting at Farouk Razzak in a vacuum. Evidence of the accused's alleged role in the shooting of Bilal Razzak in June 2001 does not illuminate the relationship between the accused and Farouk Razzak in a way that is relevant to any fact in issue in respect of the Condell Park offence. The circumstance that members of the Darwiche family entertained hostility towards members of Razzak family does not to my mind assist in determining that this accused was one of the two shooters involved in the attack on Farouk Razzak.
23 One of the bases on which the Crown pressed for the admission of the evidence of the accused's involvement in the shooting of Bilal Razzak was that it would enable the jury to assess the evidence of Farouk Razzak, which includes his initial denial that he was the victim of the offence and that the circumstance that he only came forward with his complaint after the killing of Ali Abdul Razzak. In the Crown's submission it was open to it to prove the history of violence between the Darwiche and Razzak familles, including the shooting of Bilal Razzak, since it was capable of explaining Farouk Razzak's asserted fear of nominating the accused and Adnan Darwiche as having shot at him. A person may well respond to being shot at repeatedly by two men using high powered weapons with a reaction of fear and panic. I am not persuaded that it is open to the Crown to prove that the accused had committed a violent offence against another member of the Razzak family two years and two months before the subject shooting in order that the jury might assess Farouk Razzak's evidence in its proper context. The risk that the jury would reason that the Crown case on the Condell Park count was proved because the accused was a person with a propensity to shoot people seems to me to be high.
24 The Crown served a notice pursuant to s 97 of the Evidence Act dated 22 December 2005. By that notice the Director indicated the present intention of the prosecution to adduce evidence of tendency, at the accused's trial with respect to the offence of shooting with intent to murder Farouk Razzak. The notice does not identify the tendency either to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind, which the Crown proposes to establish. It does identify, by reference to a number of statements in the Crown brief, the material that is proposed to be led. In the course of oral submissions the Crown identified the particular tendencies that it is sought to establish as follows:
To possess firearms;
To attack members of the Razzak family;
To shoot people in public areas.
25 Evidence of the conduct of a person or a tendency that a person has or had is not admissible to prove that the person has or had the tendency if the court thinks that the evidence would not, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the parties seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. If the court is persuaded that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value it is necessary in a criminal proceeding where it is evidence that is adduced by the prosecution to consider the provisions of s 101(2) which provides that such evidence cannot be used against the accused unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have upon him.
26 Probative value means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. The fact in issue is whether the Crown has established that the accused was one of the two persons who shot at Farouk Razzak on 27 August.
27 In forming a judgment as to whether the evidence that the accused was a party to the shooting of Bilal Razzak on 17 June 2001 would, having regard to other evidence to be adduce by the Crown, have significant probative value, it is to be borne in mind that the evidence is in dispute. Proof of the accused's commission of the Bankstown offence turns on satisfaction of the reliability of a single witness as to identification. While it may be that evidence which is in dispute may, when taken with other evidence, possess the quality of significant probative value for the purpose of s 97, I am not persuaded that this is such a case.
28 Proof that the accused was in possession of a firearm on an occasion two years and two months before the subject offence does not to my mind establish a tendency to possess firearms. Even if it did have the capacity to establish that tendency it would still be necessary to consider whether proof of the tendency had significant probative value for the purposes of s 97. In the circumstances of this case the tendency to possess firearms, not being the same firearm as that use by the assailants in the Condell Park offence, to my mind does not have significant probative value.
29 Proof that the accused was criminally complicit in the shooting of Bilal Razzak in that he acted as a lookout while his co-offenders shot Bilal Razzak in the bedroom of his home does not seem to me capable of establishing a tendency to shoot people in public areas.
30 Proof that the accused was criminally complicit in the shooting at Bilal Razzak, taken with the statement said to have been made at the meeting "I'll kill all Razzaks" may, with the evidence to be adduced of the identification by Farouk Razzak (that the accused was one of his assailants) establish a tendency to attack members of the Razzak family. However, I return to the circumstance that the evidence of the accused's involvement in the Bankstown offence is disputed. "Significant" in the context of the threshold posed by s 97 means of consequence or importance: R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 459 at 459; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356; R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702. The challenged evidence of Jamal Razzak that he identified the accused as present with a rifle or machine gun acting as a look-out in June 2001 when Bilal Razzak was shot, when taken with the evidence to be adduced in support of the Crown case on the Condell Park offence does not impress me as being possessed of significant probative value. If I am wrong in coming to this conclusion I would, in any event, hold that the evidence of the Bankstown offence could not be used against the accused to establish the tendencies to act in the way the Crown particularises. Section 101(2) requires the court to balance the probative value of the evidence against any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused and to determine that the probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect the evidence may have upon the accused: R v Ellis [2003] NSWCCA 319; 144 A Crim R 1 per Spigelman CJ at 19.
31 In the context of a case in which the Crown in written submissions has referred to a history of "tit for tat" shootings between members of the Darwiche family and their associates and members of the Razzak family and their associates, the capacity of evidence that the accused was involved in the shooting of Bilal Razzak in June 2001 to rationally affect the assessment of the probability of him being one of the shooters in August 2003 in the Condell Park offence is, in my view, not great. The probative value of the evidence of the accused's involvement in the Bankstown offence is as I have observed lessened by reason that it is in issue. I do not consider the probative value to substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect that the admission of the evidence may have on the accused. One prejudicial effect that I identify is that at a joint trial of the Bankstown and Condell Park offences each of the disputed identifications (made by a single member of the Razzak family) may gain strength from the fact of the identification made in the other case. This would involve an impermissible process of reasoning but one that I consider a jury would be likely to engage in.
32 I am not of the opinion that the evidence of the Bankstown offence is admissible in the Crown case in support of the count charging the Condell Park offence. In light of the Crown's concession, this disposes of the application that I grant leave to substitute an indictment charging the accused with both offences.
33 The Crown seeks to substitute an indictment charging the accused in addition to the count of shooting at Farouk Razzak with intent to murder (an offence provided by s 29 of the Crimes Act) with an alternative count of maliciously discharging a loaded firearm with intent to do grievous bodily harm to Farouk Razzak (an offence provided by s 33A of the Crimes Act). The accused does not consent to the leave sought. Mr Doris acknowledged that he suffers no prejudice in the conduct of the accused's case by reason of the grant of the leave. The Crown seeks to rely on an alternative count in the event that the jury are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was one of the shooters, but is not satisfied of proof of the specific intent for the offence charged under s 29. I consider the Crown's application to be a reasonable one and that leave should be granted.
ORDERS