Reeves v State of New South Wales

Reeves v State of New South Wales - [2010] NSWSC 611 - NSWSC 2010 case summary — Zoe

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The provision of occupational rehabilitation is an essential component in ensuring the health and productivity of the organisation's employees. " 42 Until final submissions the proceedings had been conducted on the basis that the Rehabilitation policy applied to Mr Reeves. It was certainly not suggested to Mr Reeves in cross examination that it was a policy which did not apply to him. That was a matter about which he could plainly have given evidence. He was the FEA staff officer responsible for monitoring implementation of such policies at the FEA. It was not suggested to him that there was a certain group of police officers, of which he was one, to whom the policy did not apply. Nor did the defendant call evidence from any other officer as to how this policy operated in the Police Service at the relevant time. The contemporaneous material suggested that it was a policy in general operation and one which the Police Service contemplated at the time applied to Mr Reeves. It was not, however, put into effective operation in his case. 43 It was argued by the defendant that the words emphasised 'This condition only applies to employees of the Police Service falling within the jurisdiction of the Workers Compensation Act 1987', meant that the entire policy did not apply to Mr Reeves. That Act did not apply to Mr Reeves. He was a contributor to the Police Service Superannuation Fund under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906, pursuant to which the Fund only applied to members of the Police Service who became a member before 1 April 1988. The definition of 'worker' in s 3 of the Workers Compensation Act 1983 expressly excluded such members. 44 I am satisfied that this view of the rehabilitation policy may not be accepted. The argument depends on the words 'This condition only applies to employees of the Police Service falling within the jurisdiction of the Workers Compensation Act 1987' being read as if they referred to the entire policy, rather than to a particular condition. Had that been intended, the words 'this policy' would undoubtedly have been used, rather than 'this condition'. They were not. The reason for that is apparent from the preceding words, which identify the condition to which reference is being made: "Participation in a rehabilitation programme is voluntary, however, employees must be aware that if they do not participate in an appropriate programme their weekly benefits payable under workers compensation may be reduced." 45 Thereby it is made apparent that employees who do not participate in an 'appropriate programme' might have their workers compensation benefits reduced. That was a reference to the provisions made in ss 38 and 38A of the Workers Compensation Act, in respect of employees unreasonably refusing work or rehabilitation training. That is a condition which did not apply to police officers such as Mr Reeves, who became members of the Police Service Superannuation Fund before April 1988 and who, accordingly, were not at risk of having their weekly workers compensation benefits reduced by a refusal to participate in a rehabilitation programme under those provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. 46 That the policy was, nevertheless, intended to apply to all of those working for the Police Service was apparent, even if refusal to participate in a rehabilitation programme could not carry with it the penalty imposed by ss 38 and 38A of the Workers Compensation Act. That conclusion is reinforced when consideration is given to the policy, read as a whole. 47 The policy referred to 'employees' and 'employees of the Police Service', at various points, a term not strictly accurate in the case of police officers. Nevertheless it plainly encompassed them, as well as the public servants employed in that Service. This was apparent from references made elsewhere in the policy to 'workers'; the health and safety committees established at Police District levels; employee representation from Patrols within the such Districts; and the role of local Commanders, Managers and Staff Officers. Nowhere in the policy was it suggested that it would not apply to police officers generally, or that it would not apply to any specified group of police officers, of whom Mr Reeves was one. 48 I am satisfied that the policy was one of general application which applied to Mr Reeves. That conclusion is consistent with other evidence, including documentary evidence produced by the Police Service itself. Indeed, part of the internal investigations conducted by the Police Service in 1998 into its treatment of Mr Reeves was concerned with repeated failures to adhere to this policy. The absence of any evidence led in the defendant's case to support the construction of the policy urged in only final submissions, also supports the view which I have reached on the terms of the policy itself.

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Mr Reeves' history in the Police Service 49 Mr Reeves' took sick leave in January 1997 and sought treatment for stress. At this time Mr Reeves was working very hard, as were other senior officers, who were having to dealt with the impact which the Police Royal Commission was having on the Police Service's ordinary operations. 50 Witnesses called by both parties gave evidence of the impact which the Police Royal Commission was having generally, as well as of the stark difference in Mr Reeves before and after he became involved in the Royal Commission in 1995 and was refused promotion to the position of Commander of the LEA in 1996. He was described as having transformed from an outgoing, cheerful and enthusiastic person, to one who was silent and withdrawn, increasingly embittered by what he perceived to have been a lack of support provided to him by the Police Service. Mr Reeves described his condition when he took sick leave as one where he was suffering nightmares; his memory and concentration was impaired; he dreaded going to work and was increasingly unable to do so; and his temperament and relationship with his family deteriorated. 51 The change in Mr Reeves flowed from the time that he was instructed to conduct an investigation into evidence given before the Royal Commission by a police officer, Detective Sergeant Haken. Mr Haken was a corrupt police officer who had 'rolled over' to the Royal Commission and had identified other corrupt police officers to the Commission. Officers identified by such witnesses included the Commander of the FEA, Chief Superintendent Lysaught. 52 The Police Service had decided to investigate Mr Haken's evidence, even though it was undoubtedly under ongoing investigation by the Royal Commission itself. It was Mr Reeves who was directed to undertake the Police Service investigation. It was this assignment which put Mr Reeves into a position where his integrity was called into question before the Royal Commission, when the investigation came to its notice. The investigation also came to be publicised as the result of evidence given by Mr Lysaught, in which he claimed an involvement in the investigation which he had not had. The result for Mr Reeves was that his integrity was also questioned by others, particularly other serving police officers, and later, the Police Board. In 1996 the Police Board refused his promotion to the LEA, not being satisfied as to his integrity. Mr Reeves was convinced that the result of his involvement in the Haken investigation was the loss of his reputation and the promotion to the LEA which he had achieved on merit in 1996 and the destruction of his career. 53 At the same time as these events were unfolding, Mr Reeves continued to work in the FEA staff officer role, where he had to monitor the welfare of other police officers involved in the Royal Commission. He himself did not receive such support. The medical evidence was to common effect. Mr Reeves sustained a serious psychological injury as a consequence of these events. Mr Reeves' involvement in the Police Royal Commission was the start of a series of ongoing stressors to which he succumbed. That psychological injury was exacerbated as these stressors continued to affect him and he was subjected to further stressors, when he came to feel that he had been abandoned by the Police Service, after he took sick leave in 1997.

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The impact of Mr Reeves' prior work 54 There was an issue between the parties as to whether Mr Reeves' prior work as a police officer had made him vulnerable to this injury. There was no question that he had been involved in a number of very serious incidents prior to 1994, which on the expert evidence were of such a nature that he was vulnerable to psychological injury at the time that they each occurred. While he exhibited symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ('PTSD') after those incidents, the view of the medical experts was that his was a very resilient character and he never developed the disorder, at least until after he became involved in the Royal Commission. He became preoccupied with memories of these earlier incidents, which had occurred many years before, and began suffering nightmares about them again. His resilience began to break down at that time. 55 It is necessary to say something about this earlier history, which was not the subject of much contest. 56 Mr Reeves commenced as a police cadet in 1970 at age 16. In that year he first injured his knee during the course of his duties. In the course of other duties he was exposed to decomposed bodies at the Glebe and Liverpool Morgues. This was a disturbing experience. It was in 1973, while a probationary constable, that Mr Reeves suffered his first serious injury during the course of his duties, when he was stabbed in the neck with a broken glass. This was a serious, life threatening injury. 57 In 1975, while a constable stationed at Green Valley Police Station on general duties, Mr Reeves was called on to recover the body of a child who had died from SIDS from a distraught father, who was refusing to hand the child's body to ambulance offers. During the course of the struggle the child's body fell to the ground. This was an extremely distressing experience and caused Mr Reeves to have perhaps the strongest and most long lasting reaction, before he succumbed to psychological injury in 1996. 58 In 1976, while still a constable, Mr Reeves attended the suicide of a young girl who had hung herself. This, too, was a disturbing incident. In 1979, Mr Reeves was seriously injured when assaulted from behind with an iron bar in an incident in which a man dived from a window. Again, a very distressing experience. 59 Mr Reeves was promoted to senior constable in 1982. That year, while appointed to the Tactical Response Group, he attended the Minda Detention Centre where he was assaulted. Later that year he attended an incident at a house where a mentally unstable male armed with a knife was threatening his mother. Mr Reeves was stabbed in the leg. These too were significant, distressing incidents. 60 In 1983, Mr Reeves passed the sergeant's examination and was transferred to the Organised Crime Squad and in 1986, to the State Drug Crime Commission (which later became known as the NSW Crime Commission). In 1988, Mr Reeves was promoted to detective sergeant and in 1989 he was transferred to the Drug Enforcement Agency ('DEA') Task Force No 1, where he filled a temporary vacancy as Investigations Co-ordinator. 61 Mr Reeves was promoted to detective senior sergeant in 1990 and was appointed Relieving Commander, Task Force No 1. Between 1989 and 1994, Mr Reeves was subjected to violence and threats by three criminals, Christie, Honeysett and Zizza, in a number of further distressing incidents. In 1990, he was appointed to head the NSW Crime Commission regional office at Wollongong and in 1992 was appointed as the Patrol Tactical Command at Wetherill Park Police Station. In 1993 Mr Reeves was appointed to the DEA and was seconded to the Casino Control Commission. 62 Mr Reeves' claims do not concern the various incidents in which he was involved prior to 1994. It was his case, however, that they made him vulnerable to the injury which he later sustained and were relevant to a consideration of the duty of care which the Police Service owed him.

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Adhere to the Agency anti-corruption plan." 64 The evidence was that the practical result of the establishment of the Police Royal Commission and its investigations and hearings was a lot of additional day to day work for senior police officers, including Mr Reeves. Senior officers were working long hours to deal with the impact which the Royal Commission was having on the day to day work of the Police Service, whose responsibilities to carry out its normal operations were not diminished by the Police Royal Commission proceedings. When not called on to acting in other higher positions, when those officers were called away to deal with the Royal Commission, Mr Reeves continued to perform his duties as the FEA staff officer. In that role he was responsible for other staff who were negatively impacted by the Royal Commission, some of them very seriously. 65 When the Royal Commission was established the Police Service established a Royal Commission Response Unit which had a welfare unit to look into the welfare of police who appeared before the Royal Commission. Mr Reeves was briefed on the establishment of this unit in his staff officer role. The nature of that role and whether Mr Reeves had gone beyond his functions in the work which he undertook, was in issue between the parties. 66 It was from this work that Mr Reeves had been taken to undertake the investigation which the Police Service's Royal Commission Response Team determined to undertake into Mr Haken's evidence. That investigation ceased, once Mr Lysaught was publicly questioned. He returned to his FEA work. 67 When giving evidence in the Royal Commission in 1996 Mr Reeves described his staff officer role at the FEA as including a welfare function and that he had considered himself equipped to undertake that function, before he was appointed to the position. In cross examination in these proceedings Mr Reeves agreed that his role was much broader than merely a welfare role, but it was his view that it was probably the most important of his principal duties at the FEA and that Mr Lysaught had directed him to look after the welfare of FEA officers. He explained that his role was to follow officers up to see if counsellors or Welfare had provided assistance and to provide support. He agreed that he had not given evidence before the Royal Commission of any difficulty in undertaking the welfare role he had there described. 68 Mr Reeves described his other duties as including management of the Agency; a limited involvement in budgets; overseeing rosters, postings and staffing levels; providing daily briefings to the Commander; and undertaking special inquires directed by the Commander, the Commissioner of Police or Internal Affairs. He explained that he regarded his rehabilitation duties as including counselling. He was obliged to refer officers who he identified as requiring assistance to the Welfare Branch, but there were problems on occasions when they did not follow up. He was cross examined at length as to the detail of the assistance which he provided to particular officers, including those who had become his friends, some of them his close friends. 69 Mr Reeves also described how some officers resisted further reference to the Welfare Branch, after its initial failure to follow up a referral and how he then tried to look after them himself. He explained how he perceived that to be a part of his role, as a relatively senior officer in the Police Service and that it was a role known to other senior officers at the FEA. The work which he was undertaking was the subject of discussion between him and other senior officers such as Mr Lysaught, Detective Chief Superintendent Steer and Detective Chief Superintendent Craig. He made regular reports on what he was doing at management meetings. 70 The FEA then had about 50 staff, 6 investigation teams and some lawyers. After Mr Lysaught was suspended, Mr Hansen and then Mr Speers were Acting Commanders. 71 Mr Reeves' duty statement obliged him to monitor the welfare needs of police officers and public service personnel. In cross examination, he explained how he would refer an officer to the Welfare Branch, how a case officer would be appointed who would open a file and would later discuss the officer's situation with him. He was not instructed or trained in how to undertake this duty, but plainly took this aspect of his work seriously and undertook it conscientiously. He came to the point where he was responsible for the welfare needs of 11 police officers, suffering from stress as the result of being adversely named before the Royal Commission, or experiencing personal or work related stress, as well as public service officers suffering from personal or work related issues. 72 Mr Reeves explained how he provided a shoulder to lean on, visited some officers at home, including one officer who attempted suicide, shortly after resignation and in the case of another, who did commit suicide. Mr Reeves then provided assistance to his family, including in relation to the funeral. Mr Reeves described how he began to find that this work got him down. His sleeping patterns were disturbed and he began to feel run down. It was not until a short while before he took sick leave, that Mr Reeves began discussing the difficulties he was experiencing with Mr Laney. 73 A number of officers who Mr Reeves had supported were called. Their evidence generally corroborated that of Mr Reeves. Some appreciated his support, others did not perceive that they had a need for his assistance, or perceived that what he was doing was to provide such assistance. 74 In issue between the parties was whether Mr Reeves did more than his role required of him, with the result, on the defendant's case, that what he did was voluntary and in the pursuit of friendship, more than his duties. It was the defendant's case that his obligation was only to refer people to counselling services as required and if performance deteriorated, to make a referral. There was a need to be vigilant and to speak to and listen to personnel who were having problems. Mr Reeves had the experience necessary to undertake such work and it was not foreseeable that it might result in him suffering psychiatric injury. 75 In his oral evidence Mr Laney explained that Mr Reeves had reported the welfare work which he had been undertaking at FEA management meetings during the Royal Commission. The place was then in turmoil and Mr Reeves had a lot of people to look after. He had also reported assisting officers outside the FEA. Mr Laney's evidence was that people were then grateful for the interest and help Mr Reeves was providing to those officers. Mr Steer gave similar evidence.

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The Haken inquiry 79 In 1995, Assistant Police Commissioner Donaldson directed Mr Reeves to assist Mr Finnane QC in the Royal Commission Response Team. It had been decided that the evidence given by Mr Haken would be investigated, so that evidence in reply could be prepared by the Police Service. 80 When they met, Mr Finnane asked Mr Reeves to obtain a statutory declaration from a named officer, as well as various documents. Assistant Commissioner Donaldson later directed Mr Reeves to interview Chief Superintendent Cluff, who provided him with a list of other police officers who might have information to provide. Mr Reeves subsequently spoke to Mr Lysaught, seeking approval for assistance to be provided to him by Sergeant Edgtton, to interview these identified officers. That approval was given and the interviews were pursued. 81 Mr Lysaught was called to give evidence before the Police Royal Commission on 18 September 1995. He had been identified as a corrupt police officer. As it turned out, so had Assistant Commissioner Donaldson. 82 The Royal Commission had become aware of the investigation being undertaken by the Police Service into Mr Haken's evidence. When giving evidence, Mr Lysaught was asked about his relationship with Assistant Commissioner Donaldson and his knowledge of the investigations being conducted by the Police Service in relation to Mr Haken. Mr Lysaught denied that he was corrupt, or that Assistant Commissioner Donaldson was corrupt. He claimed that it was he who had delegated the task of obtaining statements about Mr Haken to Mr Reeves. This evidence was inaccurate. Mr Lysaught was then questioned by Justice Wood about his relationship with Mr Reeves and the propriety of the investigation being undertaken into Mr Haken. 83 Mr Reeves learned of these developments that same day. He contacted Assistant Commissioner McLachlan, who was the Commander, Special Agencies responsible for the FEA and asked whether he should continue his investigations. He was directed to cease and to contact Mr Finnane, who was at police headquarters. He and Detective Senior Sergeant Edgtton then went to see Mr Finnane. Mr Reeves asked why the correct position about the investigations he was undertaking for the Police Service had not been advised to the Police Royal Commission. Mr Finnane had not been at the Royal Commission that day, but told Mr Reeves that he would raise the matter with the Commission and that nothing would reflect adversely on himself or Detective Senior Sergeant Edgtton. 84 That assurance was not made good.

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The media coverage of Mr Lysaught's evidence and its consequences for Mr Reeves 85 The work of the Royal Commission was under intense media scrutiny. On 19 September 1996, reports published in the media referred to Mr Lysaught's evidence and in an article published in the Sydney Morning Herald, Mr Reeves was described as 'Lysaught's lieutenant'. It was reported that the Police Board was meeting to consider Mr Lysaught's dismissal. Given the context, namely that Mr Lysaught had been identified as a corrupt police officer who had directed Mr Reeves to conduct an enquiry into Mr Haken's evidence, that Mr Reeves was portrayed in adverse terms in these reports may readily be accepted. That was certainly Mr Reeves' impression, as well as that of others, including other police officers who gave evidence in these proceedings. Mr Lysaught was soon afterwards dismissed. 86 The practical result for Mr Reeves was immediate and intense. He received numerous calls and enquiries about these reports from other police officers, friends and colleagues, who perceived his character and integrity to have been impugned. They asked him what he had been up to and if the reports were true. It must be accepted that Mr Reeves was very upset at these approaches. 87 The newspaper reports about Mr Lysaught concerned theft of drugs and money. Mr Reeves described being asked if he had been involved. He was asked if he was 'off', a term in use in the Police Service to describe a corrupt officer. Mr Reeves described other police officers refusing to speak to him, standing and leaving a lunch room when he entered, people laughing at his expense in public and calling out things like 'here comes Lysaught's lieutenant'. 88 Mr Reeves' evidence was that after 19 September there were other media reports linking him to the adverse remarks which the Royal Commission had made about the Police Service investigation into Mr Haken and Mr Lysaught. Footage was shown of Mr Lysaught and he attending an event some years earlier, when other reports were made in the media about Mr Lysaught. The repeated inference was that he was linked to police corruption. Mr Reeves found that he was ostracised by other police officers and was the subject of regular suggestions from acquaintances and police officers about his alleged corrupt conduct. 89 Mr Reeves' evidence was that it was from this time that he began suffering from anxiety and disturbed sleep; he also began ruminating about traumatic events in his earlier career and the lack of assistance which he had received from the Police Service, in relation to the aftermath of Mr Lysaught's incorrect evidence. 90 The expert evidence was all to common effect. These events were considerable stressors, which put Mr Reeves at increasing risk of psychological injury. The evidence showed that Mr Reeves began to display increasing signs of such an injury. 91 The evidence given by other police officers supported that given by Mr Reeves. Mr Greiss' evidence was that his concerns were assuaged by the explanation which Mr Reeves' gave him, but that he had been shocked by what he read, even though he knew Mr Reeves well, and did not know Mr Lysaught as well. The reports caused him to doubt Mr Reeves' integrity. Mr Steer gave similar evidence. Mr Reeves was concerned about his future in the Police Service, a concern which Mr Steer did not perceive to be unreasonable, given the atmosphere then surrounding the Royal Commission. 92 Mr Valente also came to have doubts about Mr Reeves' integrity, even though he had known him for many years. Mr Valente described the relationship between Mr Lysaught and Mr Reeves. Mr Lysaught had a manner that was unapproachable. Mr Reeves was the opposite and Mr Lysaught relied on Mr Reeves to virtually run the FEA. They were known to be close and that Mr Lysaught had a high opinion of Mr Reeves. He described the situation at this time as one where overnight, police officers stopped talking to each other, not trusting anyone. He had himself received five s 6 notices, which raised allegations which he believed were all baseless. He was never called before the Royal Commission and no evidence to substantiate the matters raised with him was led there. He said that in the circumstances, it was hard not to have doubts about other officers. Even though he had been good mates with Mr Reeves and he had never doubted Mr Reeves' integrity before, Mr Valente had also been mates with Mr Lysaught. The result which Mr Valente observed was that Mr Reeves changed overnight. Mr Reeves later came to believe that as a result of Mr Lysaught's evidence, his career was finished, when he did not receive the LEA promotion. 93 Mr Packer gave evidence of discussions amongst FEA officers of Mr Lysaught's evidence and their resulting reactions towards Mr Reeves. The evidence given by Mr Lysaught generated a lot of conjecture. Mr Packer described Mr Reeves as having had good relationships with everyone to that point and afterwards extreme concern, when officers distanced themselves. Mr Packer had known Mr Reeves for a long time, having known of him even at school. He saw a change in Mr Reeves, who became agitated, upset and concerned, having previously been a happy fun person. 94 Mr Edgtton's evidence was that at the time there were many conversations about Mr Reeves and the evidence which Mr Lysaught had given amongst police officers, in which Mr Reeves was spoken about adversely. Mr Edgtton spoke to Mr Reeves about his situation on more than one occasion. He was never called before the Royal Commission, even though he had also received a s 6 notice which concerned his involvement in the Police Service's investigation into Mr Haken. After Mr Reeves took sick leave, Mr Edgtton had various contact with him. He was very upset about the lack of support which he was receiving from the Police Service. Mr Edgtton's view was that the culture at the time was that seeking such help was perceived to be a sign of weakness. 95 Mr Laney also recalled Mr Reeves being labelled as 'Lysaught's lieutenant' after Mr Lysaught had given evidence before the Royal Commission. His impression was that Mr Reeves had been tainted by the association. Mr Reeves told him that Mr Lysaught's evidence was false and that he had been directed to undertake the investigation by Mr Finnane. He was 'filthy' about the inaccurate media reporting. There was no retraction by the Police Service and Mr Laney began to see a massive change. Mr Reeves began struggling, he was not the same man, he became forgetful, even forgetting officer's names. In retrospect he was suffering more turmoil than Mr Laney then thought. When he later failed to get the LEA promotion, Mr Reeves believed it was because of his association with Mr Lysaught. This played on his mind. 96 Mr Reeves' evidence that he was upset and humiliated by what resulted from his involvement in the Haken investigation may be accepted. He was stoic in the face of the difficulties which he undoubtedly then faced. While he spoke about his concerns with other senior officers, he did not seek to have his difficulties redressed, to pursue defamation proceedings against the media, or even to ask the Police Service's media unit to respond. Mr Reeves was content to accept Mr Finnane's assurance that there would be no negative consequences for him, as the result of the investigations he had been directed to undertake into Mr Haken, notwithstanding the day to day difficulties he had to contend with. 97 This seems an approach which can hardly be criticised. It was an approach consistent with the evidence of Mr Reeves as a successful, loyal, senior officer in the Police Service, supportive of the Royal Commission, as was Superintendent Hansen's evidence. 98 Superintendent Hansen was not an officer whose confidence in Mr Reeves was shaken by Mr Lysaught's evidence. Mr Hansen had recommended Mr Reeves for appointment to the FEA in September 1994, the year that agency had been created. In 1995, Superintendent Hansen was the staff officer to Mr McLachlan, then Commander of the Crime Agencies, which included the FEA and under it the LEA. He was not directly responsible for the supervision of any staff in that position, but was responsible to the Commander, acting as his 'arms and legs'. He then expected to have become aware if there were concerns about the welfare of senior officers, but was never informed that Mr Reeves was having difficulties coping, before he went on sick leave. 99 In September 1995, he acted as the head of the FEA after Mr Lysaught was called before the Royal Commission. Mr Reeves may have been relieving in another position at the time Mr Hansen worked at the FEA, they then had limited contact. He remembered that Mr Lysaught's departure upset people at the FEA. The atmosphere was difficult. In January 1996, Mr Hansen provided Mr Reeves with a reference for his application for promotion to the LEA Commander position. He then had no concerns about his capacity. He had a high regard for Mr Reeves and did not seek to distance himself, in the aftermath of the publicity about Mr Lysaught. 100 Mr Reeves continued with his work and in due course made an application for promotion to the LEA, which he expected would proceed normally. Mr Reeves was cross examined as to his expectation that the Police Service would publish a document about him, when the Royal Commission was ongoing. He said that he had that expectation, at the time that the damage was done, when he applied for the LEA position. 101 Mr Reeves explained that he had read the Sydney Morning Herald article where he was described as Lysaught's lieutenant and other articles. He had not read the transcript of the evidence which Mr Lysaught had given. He believed that the implication of the article was that he was corrupt, but he did not seek a retraction, although he may have discussed that possibility with a senior officer at the time, he was uncertain. Mr Reeves also agreed that he had the ability to contact the Police Media unit at the time, but did not do so. He had spoken to Mr Finnane, who gave an explanation to the Royal Commission and it wasn't until he applied for the LEA job, long afterwards, that Mr Reeves said that he came to realise that the incident would come back to haunt him. He believed that this was why he was rejected by the Police Board. He came to believe that Mr Finnane had not done enough, having later read the transcript of what he actually said before the Royal Commission. At the time he took Mr Finnane at his word, that nothing adverse would reflect on Mr Edgtton or himself.

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The Police Service's response to Mr Lysaught's evidence 102 Mr Finnane appeared before the Royal Commission on 19 September and provided a report of Mr Reeves' involvement in the investigation which the Police Service had undertaken into Mr Haken. He had with him a statement which Mr Reeves had been directed to provide. 103 Amongst other things Mr Finnane reported that he had spoken to Mr Crooke QC (counsel assisting the Royal Commission) about the Police Service investigation into Mr Haken; that there was no 'officially sanctioned unit within the Police Service which was vetting evidence at the Royal Commission', that he had met with Mr Reeves, but was puzzled by Mr Lysaught's evidence; Mr Finnane had never spoken to Mr Lysaught; Mr Lysaught had not been the cause of Mr Reeves seeing him; that had been as the result of a request made of Mr Reeves by Assistant Commissioner Donaldson; Mr Finnane and Mr Donaldson had been discussing Mr Haken and the officers and former officers who had come forward to the Police Service with information about him; Mr Donaldson had said that a police officer would be provided to go and speak to one of them; it was Mr Reeves who had gone to pursue that information; Mr Finnane had become aware that something broader had been undertaken and provided the statement from Mr Reeves and another officer, unsigned and prepared in haste, which explained what they had done; they would also be asked to provide a statutory declaration to the Royal Commission; Mr Reeves had spoken to Mr Finnane and he would be asked to also provide his duty book; Mr Reeves had spoken to certain officers and understood that what he was doing was at Mr Finnane's request; Mr Finnane did not himself know about the list of names which had been provided to Mr Reeves; Mr Reeves had only spoken in passing to Mr Lysaught, in order to tell him of the inquiry he was undertaking and that Mr Lysaught had approved, but had not given him any instructions in relation to the inquiry; Mr Lysaught's evidence was puzzling, he had nothing to do with the investigation; it was Mr Reeves who had sought assistance from another officer with these enquiries and had done so at Mr Donaldson's direction. 104 This explanation contradicted Mr Lysaught's evidence given the previous day, which Justice Woods described as Mr Lysaught having 'tasked Mr Reeves with that task'. Despite that explanation and while indicating that he was not criticising Mr Finnane, Justice Wood remained sceptical about the propriety of the investigation which had been undertaken into Mr Haken. He said:

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THE COMMISSIONER: Again, there is no complaint about that. It is merely a question of ascertaining whether Mr Lysaught knew about it." 108 What all of this exchange revealed was that the investigation undertaken by Mr Reeves was not as the result of an arrangement made between the Police Commissioner and the Royal Commission. Nor was Mr Lysaught involved. Mr Reeves' investigation had been devised by Mr Donaldson and Mr Finnane and was being pursued for the purpose of the Police Service preparing evidence to call in reply to that given by Mr Haken. 109 Unfortunately for Mr Reeves, Mr Finnane's explanation of Mr Reeves' work for the Police Service's Royal Commission Response Team in its investigation of Mr Haken's evidence received no media attention. The impression which earlier media reports had generated as the result of Royal Commission's concern that Mr Reeves had been involved in an investigation into Mr Haken which Mr Lysaught had instigated, was not corrected. The Police Service itself made no other public statement to explain the nature of the investigation it had determined to take into Mr Haken's evidence; the purpose of the investigation; or that Mr Reeves had been directed to undertake that investigation by Mr Finnane and Mr Donaldson. 110 The result was that the widely publicised evidence given by Mr Lysaught about Mr Reeves and the Haken inquiry remained uncontroverted, so far as other police officers and the wider community were concerned. When the Police Board came to consider Mr Reeves' promotion in 1996, this had adverse repercussions for Mr Reeves. 111 In his evidence, Mr Reeves said that he believed that he prepared a statutory declaration which he swore on 20 September in response to a s 6 notice, but he was in error in that recollection. Mr Finnane told the Royal Commission that he would obtain a statutory declaration from Mr Reeves. It predated the s 6 notice which Mr Reeves was later sent in October. In this declaration, Mr Reeves explained how he had come to be involved in the Police Service investigation into Mr Haken, as Mr Finnane had promised Justice Wood would be done. It was provided to the Royal Commission, but that did not alleviate the concern which had arisen about the Police Service investigation undertaken into Mr Haken and so a s 6 notice was issued. 112 In cross examination, Mr Reeves explained that he had asked Mr Lysaught's permission to use another officer to assist him in the investigation. While he gave his permission, Mr Reeves denied that this had involved Mr Lysaught approving the investigation. His evidence was that he needed Mr Lysaught's approval to use another FEA officer, but that it never entered his mind that Mr Lysaught was thereby approving of the investigation he had been directed to undertake by Assistant Commissioner Donaldson. That evidence must be accepted.

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Mr Reeves and the Royal Commission 113 The identification of both Mr Lysaught and Assistant Commissioner Donaldson as corrupt police officers who had a close association with each other, helps explain the Royal Commission's interest in the Police Service's investigation into Mr Haken and the scepticism with which Mr Finnane's explanation of the Police Service investigation was received by Justice Wood on 19 September and the Royal Commission's further investigations. 114 The Police Royal Commission pursued those investigations even after receipt of Mr Reeves' and Mr Edgtton's statutory declarations. It issued both Mr Reeves and Mr Edgtton with a s 6 notice. Mr Reeves was required to provide further information about the investigation and his relationship with Mr Lysaught. That information was provided and Mr Reeves was later called before the Commission. 115 Mr Reeves had also been served with a second s 6 notice about his involvement in Operation Azure, which had separately come to be investigated by the Royal Commission. This operation had earlier been repeatedly investigated by the Police Service and other bodies. It had involved the loss of some $340,000 in a drug buy/bust operation. Two people had been charged with and convicted of the theft of that money. There had never been any suggestion that Mr Reeves had been corruptly involved in the loss, nor was that suggested in the Royal Commission proceedings. 116 Mr Reeves gave evidence before the Royal Commission on 9 April 1996. In cross examination, he was asked about the Haken investigation, Mr Lysaught and his involvement in Operation Azure. He was not the case officer, but was part of the team involved in electronically monitoring the operation. He was examined as to whether there had been any negligence in the operation. It remained his opinion in these proceedings that there was no negligence in the conduct of that operation. The Royal Commission was investigating police involvement in the theft and Mr Reeves accepted that every officer involved had come under suspicion of corruption at some level. He accepted that he was not above suspicion, but understood that all investigations into the operation had cleared him of any involvement. 117 Mr Packer was the officer in control of Operation Azure and he was also called to give evidence about that Operation before the Royal Commission. The following week Mr Packer was called into the Crime Commission. He was then informed that he was not suspected of involvement in the theft of the missing $340,000, but the Crime Commission had received another reference to investigate the matter and he was to work in that investigation. The officers who were to be investigated were then identified. Mr Reeves was not one of them.

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... 126 The first complaint in relation to Mr Reeves had been made in 1983, by a person who claimed that he had paid Mr Reeves and another officer $1,500 to preclude the laying of criminal charges. The complaint was investigated in 1984 but not sustained. In 1985, a prisoner claimed to have been assaulted in 1984 by Mr Reeves and another police officer at a police station, as well as being threatened, forced to sign a statement and having personal property removed from his vehicle while in custody. He had been arrested in connection with setting a fire to a dwelling and was subsequently found, not guilty, due to mental illness. The complaint was investigated and found not sustained. The third complaint was made by another prisoner over the way in which a search warrant was executed at his home in 1987. No drugs were seized there, but a number of serious criminal charges were laid. After preliminary enquiry, no further action was taken. 127 Another complaint was made by another prisoner over delays in the return of personal property such as documents, a brief case and camera taken on his arrest in 1988. The investigation showed that property had been removed; that the prisoner was charged by Mr Reeves and that another officer had later attempted to return the property, at an appearance at the Hornsby Local Court. The prisoner had refused to accept the property. Its return was later ordered. The prisoner still refused to accept it when delivered to the Long Bay Correctional Centre. No further action was taken in relation to this complaint, after preliminary enquiry. The sixth complaint related to the same matter and was not pursued further. 128 The fifth complaint was made anonymously. It raised a conversation at a hotel between 'the boss of the drug squad' named as 'Bob Lisart' and his 'main help Steve', about drugs hidden in Mr Lysaught's office to be used to plant on people in order to extort money and benefiting from the protection of a judge, as well as a common practice amongst officers of confiscating money from drug dealers and payment of a share to Mr Lysaught, who paid a cut to his bosses for protection. In the investigation Mr Lysaught, then Commander of Task Force 1, denied involvement in such conduct. He had been the subject of a NSW Crime Commission enquiry in 1990. He explained to the investigator that drugs were kept on covert premises only in exceptional circumstances and that all monies on hand could be accounted for. He identified three members of his unit named Steve and stated that he had not frequented licensed premises with any of them. He identified his commanders as including Assistant Commissioner Donaldson and Judge Thorley, then Chairman of the Police Board and previously Chairman of the NSW Crime Commission. He also identified Mr Reeves as 'virtually his second in charge'. 129 Mr Reeves was then the Investigations Co-coordinator of Task Force 1. He denied any involvement in corrupt activity. He told the investigator that he was of the view that Mr Lysaught was held in high regard and restricted his social contact to the odd occasion he attended a bar at Task Force premises. The allegations were clearly viewed as allegations concerning Mr Reeves, but were found not sustained. The investigating Detective Inspector took the view that the allegations were vicious and unfounded and an attempt to undermine Superintendent Lysaught and those who worked under him. 130 While the Police Board had been satisfied with the s 94A report it received in 1994, in 1996 the Board was concerned that the s 94A report then provided did not deal with Mr Reeves' involvement in the Police Royal Commission. Given the terms of s 94A(3)(b), that was a proper concern. The report provided by the Police Service was deficient, because it made no reference to Mr Reeves having been called before the Royal Commission. The evidence does not disclose any basis on which Mr Reeves' involvement in that Commission might have come to the Board's attention, other than as the result of the publicity which Mr Lysaught's evidence had received. Understandably, given the sixth complaint dealt with in the s 94A report, the Police Board sought further information from the Police Service. 131 Material relating to the Royal Commission proceedings were then put before the Police Board. Only draft minutes of the meeting of the Board of 6 June 1996 were in evidence. No member of the Board was called. They indicated that the Board was unable to satisfy itself as to the merit of Mr Reeves for appointment to the position. The agenda item for the Board meeting showed that as well as the original s 94A report, the Board had before it transcript from the Royal Commission proceedings going to selection of personnel for FEA positions, the Haken allegations, Operation Azure and Mr Reeves' evidence. The alternatives noted were

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Detective Inspector Reeves has been adversely mentioned before the Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service. To ascertain the exact nature of the allegations made against Inspector Reeves, it would be appropriate for inquiries to be made with Mr. Michael Finnane, QC., counsel representing the Police Service at the Commission." 136 What was being referred to, when it was observed that Mr Reeves had been 'adversely mentioned' is not clear. He had certainly been called before the Royal Commission and had been questioned. In its written submissions the defendant suggested that it was Mr Reeves' cross examination in relation to Operation Azure, to which reference was being made in the s 94A report. While there was no suggestion that Mr Reeves' involvement in Operation Azure was corrupt, it had been suggested to him in his examination before the Royal Commission that there had been negligence and that this constituted an adverse mention. He had also been asked about Mr Lysaught and the Haken investigation. From these submissions it was apparent that even the defendant was unclear just what 'adverse mention' the Police Service was here advising the Police Board of. 137 Operation Azure was the failed buy/bust operation conducted in 1991 in which $340,000 had been stolen from the Police Service. Possible corrupt activity in that operation was being investigated. As the defendant accepted, it was not suggested to Mr Reeves that he had been involved in corruption. By the time this second s 94A report was provided, it was known that this was not suspected, given the further investigation which the Crime Commission was undertaking. A consideration of whether that Operation might have been negligently conducted was not what the Wood Royal Commission had been investigating. It had more serious concerns. The only sensible conclusion is that the adverse mention to which reference was being made in the s 94A report, was to Mr Lysaught and the Haken investigation. 138 Despite what the second s 94A report suggested, no enquiries were subsequently made of Mr Finnane, or anyone else involved in the decision to investigate Mr Haken's evidence. Mr Finnane was the obvious person to shed light on the 'exact nature of the allegations' made about Mr Reeves before the Royal Commission and what 'adverse mention' had been made of him. He could certainly have explained how it was that the Police Service had made the decision to investigate Mr Haken's evidence; who was involved in the decision; how Mr Reeves came to be directed to undertake that investigation and that Mr Lysaught had not been involved. No information about these matters was provided to the Police Board by the Police Service. 139 The evidence established that while it had provided the Board with extracts of material from the Royal Commission proceedings, when asked for further information the Police Service did not inform the Police Board of the position into which it had placed Mr Reeves in 1995, which had resulted in him being called before the Royal Commission to be questioned about Mr Lysaught and the Haken investigation. It just left the Police Board to make its own enquiries of Mr Finnane. This paid no attention to his role as counsel briefed by the Police Service to represent it before the Royal Commission. The Police Board was a separate statutory entity, a matter upon which the defendant relied in these proceedings. That Mr Finnane could have answered any questions which the Police Board had, absent specific instructions from the Police Service, is unlikely. The Police Service itself undoubtedly ought to have provided the information which the Police Board sought. 140 There was, however, an internal report prepared for the Police Board's consideration. It, too, recommended Mr Reeves' appointment. 141 This report reviewed the response which Mr Reeves provided to the Board by his solicitor's letter of 8 August 1996, in which his involvement in the Haken investigation was explained and it was protested that he had never engaged in any corruption. The report also reviewed Mr Reeves' integrity file, and the matters which had come before the Police Royal Commission. In relation to Mr Lysaught, it was noted that Mr Reeves' application for the staff officer position at the FEA had been supported by Superintendent Lysaught, who had encouraged his application, just as he had encouraged other officers. It was noted that Mr Reeves had not been singled out by the Royal Commission in this respect. In relation to the Haken investigation, reference was made to Mr Finnane's explanation that Mr Reeves believed that what he was doing was 'substantially at my request' and Justice Wood questioning the appropriateness of Mr Reeves and others collecting information on Mr Haken. No reference was made to Mr Reeves' statutory obligation to undertake the investigation he had been directed to pursue by the Police Service. Nor was any reference made to the obvious concern on the part of Justice Wood as to the investigation the Police Service had directed Mr Reeves to undertake. 142 As to Operation Azure, reference was made in this report to Mr Reeves' belief that the theft and subsequent laundering of the money involved was not as the result of corrupt conduct by police officers, but by the three men later convicted of offences in relation to that theft. Mr Reeves' role in the operation, where he was noted as having had 'some supervisory responsibilities', and the questioning in the Royal Commission of the quality of his contribution to the planning and management of the operation, were noted. It was also noted that Mr Reeves was not further cross examined about this matter. It was observed that Mr Reeves' evidence suggested that he had not exercised high level management skills in the Operation. Whether that was because of personal shortcomings, or poor practice generally, was said to be unclear. 143 The conclusion reached in the report was: "It is not possible to conclude that Reeves has behaved corruptly based on the information available.

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Inspector Reeves Section 94A Report does not reflect a pattern of behaviour sufficient to prevent his promotion. There are no sustained complaints and the two that concern corruption have been adequately explained." 144 The report was not accepted by the Police Board. 145 Again, only draft minutes of the meeting on 21 August were in evidence. They suggested that the Acting Commissioner briefed the Board on his discussion with the Acting Commander Special Agencies and Mr Crooke QC. Mr Crooke was one of the counsel assisting the Police Royal Commission. What Mr Finnane said to the Police Royal Commission on 19 September shows that he had discussed the Police Service investigation into Mr Haken with Mr Crooke, before he addressed the Commission. Plainly, a discussion with Mr Crooke was not an adequate way of obtaining an understanding of what had been decided and done by the Police Service Royal Commission Response Team, Mr Finnane and Mr Donaldson, in relation to the investigation of Mr Haken and what instructions Mr Reeves had been given. Who the Acting Commander Special Agencies was, is not clear. The evidence did not show that either that officer or the Acting Commissioner themselves had been involved in these matters. 146 It was the defendant's case that the Police Service putting material from the Royal Commission before the Police Board, as it did, was an adequate way of dealing with Mr Reeves' situation in the circumstances then confronting it. I am not able to accept that submission in the face of all of this evidence. The suggestion that the Board should make its own enquiries of Mr Finnane, rather than itself providing the information sought puts that conclusion beyond argument. The only inference available is that the Board's reservations about Mr Reeves integrity flowed from the report provided by the Acting Commissioner as the result of his discussions with the Acting Commander Special Agencies and Mr Crooke QC. No evidence was led as to what was reported. 147 Mr Reeves had a discussion with the Secretary of the Board, Ms Christopher, on 26 August 1996. From this discussion Mr Reeves understood that his promotion had been refused because of his association with Mr Lysaught and his role in the investigation into Mr Haken. This was later noted in Dr Lewin's' report to the Police Service. Ms Christopher was not called. The parties were unable to locate her. The defendant called evidence from no-one else, who could have shed light on the Board's concerns. The inference that Mr Reeves' understanding of what Ms Christopher told him accurately reflected the Board's concerns, is difficult to resist, given the evidence led in these proceedings. 148 The only other possibility flows from evidence that when Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application was later rejected by the Police Service, it was noted that Mr Reeves was then the subject of a current internal affairs inquiry, with results pending. This inquiry may possibly have been a matter brought to the attention of the Police Board, although that was not what the evidence suggested, nor was this what Mr Reeves was told. It was an inquiry which had emerged from the Royal Commission process, but also had come to nothing. 149 This inquiry had originally arisen from information received by the New South Wales Crime Commission during the course of the Royal Commission. There was a hearing conducted in February 1996. The source of the information was summonsed to appear before the Crime Commission. He was a criminal, who passed on information he claimed to have received from another criminal, Bill Bayeh. That information concerned, amongst many other things, that counsel assisting the Crime Commission, who was conducting the questioning, was 'going to get into trouble'; that there was something wrong at the Crime Commission; that Mr Bayeh had said that Mr Lysaught and Mr Reeves had been involved in taking money from the DEA, which had come from a drug dealer; and that counsel assisting was involved; and that the Crime Commission had covered it up. 150 The evidence was assessed and forwarded to the Royal Commission, which investigated the information. The informant gave evidence before the Royal Commission. An internal affairs investigation was considered by the Police Service in May 1996, but was not pursued because of the Royal Commission's consideration. In September 1996, advice was received that the Royal Commission had no objection to these matters being investigated by the Police Service. Advice had already been given that no investigations were to be pursued in relation to Mr Reeves. In November 1996 the Police Service determined to defer its enquiries. In August 1998, the Police Integrity Commission determined not to pursue these issues. In May 2000, the Police Service formally determined not to pursue any investigation. The allegations made in relation to Mr Reeves were never pursed by the Royal Commission, or anyone else. 151 Consistently with the advice to the Police Board in 1996 from the Royal Commission that it was not pursuing investigations in relation to Mr Reeves, he was later not adversely mentioned in the Royal Commission Report. The Royal Commission never came to the view that Mr Reeves was corrupt, nor did the Police Service itself. Unfortunately for Mr Reeves, on the material put before it, the Police Board was not content to act on the advice of the Royal Commission, or of the various recommendations which were made to it which were in evidence, which were all to positive effect. 152 The result was that Mr Reeves' promotion was not recommended by the Board. He was advised of the decision by letter of 27 August, the Police Board saying that it 'was unable to satisfy itself that you have the greatest merit for the position'. That was a curious form of words, for which there was no obvious explanation. Section 7A(2) of the Police Board Act required that the Police Board: "shall, of the applicants for appointment, prefer the applicant, whose merit is, in the opinion of the Board, greater than that of any other applicants." 153 The Act provided for a situation where the Board was confronted with applicants of equal merit, but not a refusal to make any appointment at all. 154 That the result was that Mr Reeves was devastated by the unexpected consequences of the Police Service's failure to deal with false impressions about his integrity which had resulted from publicity given to Mr Lysaught's evidence and to make good the promise which Mr Finnane had made him in relation to his pursuit of the Police Service's investigation into Mr Haken, may well be accepted. On the medical evidence it was this stressor, which finally led to the psychological injury which he sustained.

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The Police Commissioner's invitation 155 The Commissioned Police Officers' Association ('the Association') then pursued Mr Reeves' situation, making representations on his behalf. The Association wrote to Police Commissioner Ryan in September 1996. His intercession before the LEA position was readvertised was sought. The Association later advised Mr Reeves that he had not been promoted because of a problem with the Royal Commission, but its nature was not known. Commissioner Ryan then called for a submission, which Mr Reeves provided in November 1996. 156 At this time, Mr Reeves was acting in a higher position on a relieving basis. He was the Commander of Task Force Dorrigo at the Crime Commission, a joint FEA, Australian Custom Service, Office of State Revenue and NSW Crime Commission investigation. It is unquestionable that there cannot then have been any view seriously held amongst those responsible for that appointment, that Mr Reeves was a corrupt police officer, given the senior, high profile and responsible duties which he was assigned. 157 On Mr Reeves' evidence the Police Commissioner's invitation gave him great hope that his situation would be redressed. On the medical evidence it was support of the kind which he then required. His hopes were dashed. 158 The Police Board was disbanded in December 1996 and promotions then became a matter for the Police Commissioner himself. Again, most unfortunately for Mr Reeves, he never received any response to the submission which he had been invited to make by the Police Commissioner. The defendant led no evidence to explain what occurred. 159 The difficulties which the amendment to the Police Act posed for any direct appointment to the LEA position by the Police Commissioner at that time were however explained by the defendant in these proceedings. Given the Police Board's refusal to recommend Mr Reeves' appointment, the position had to be readvertised and another merit based process undertaken under the revised statutory scheme. 160 Had any such explanation, which could readily have been given, been forthcoming for Mr Reeves at the time, his increasing distress and difficulty in continuing to cope with his situation, may well have been redressed. The medical evidence was that had he then been able to achieve the LEA appointment, it was likely that he would have recovered. Regrettably, Mr Reeves was told nothing at all. 161 Mr Reeves came to believe that he had been written off by the Police Service and that officers senior to him in the Police Service had no concern about his wellbeing or future. In December 1996 he injured his knees. In January he took sick leave and sought treatment for his injury and his stress, at the urging of his wife and Mr Laney. 162 Mr Laney worked with Mr Reeves at the FEA. They had become friends and held the same rank. At the time Mr Laney regarded Mr Reeves as an outstanding officer, who was working long hours under considerable pressure. Mr Laney's assessment of the likelihood that Mr Reeves would have been promoted to the position of Superintendent, had he remained in the Police Force was high, given his experience in relieving in that position and his capacities. 163 While Mr Laney was aware of the injury Mr Reeves suffered to his knees in December 1996 on his observation, that problem was not affecting his ability to carry out his role at the FEA, or other more senior police work. Towards the end of 1996 Mr Reeves began to discuss his difficulties in coping with his duties and his distress over the failure to achieve the LEA promotion with Mr Laney, who observed that Mr Reeves was struggling at work. Up to that point Mr Laney had no idea that Mr Reeves was dealing with any psychological difficulties. He encouraged him to seek medical assistance, because of his changing behaviour. 164 Mr Steer's evidence was that he also noticed the change in Mr Reeves shortly before he went on sick leave. He was then the Chief Inspector in Charge of the Investigation Area and Acting Commander. It was he who later appointed Mr Laney to be the FEA contact with Mr Reeves and Mr Laney reported to him from time to time about that contact. 165 In cross examination Mr Steer also explained that Mr Reeves was an excellent officer with potential for promotion to the position of Superintendent. He was aware of the work which Mr Reeves had been undertaking in his staff officer role at this time and never suggested that he shouldn't be doing so, but he had not been aware of the extent of Mr Reeves' difficulties. 166 In January 1997, Mr Reeves took sick leave and sought treatment, having been feeling increasingly unwell for some time. He explained that by then he felt that he could not continue. He felt sick, he couldn't concentrate, he was being short with people, experiencing headaches and nightmares and overacting to noises and incidents. This was the first time that Mr Reeves had taken sick leave in about 15 years. Mr Reeves then expected that he would soon be able to return to work. He never did.

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The events up to the refusal of Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application 167 Mr Reeves made two hurt on duty applications in 1997 in respect of both his knees and his psychological condition. Those applications were rejected by the Police Service in 1998. 168 The Police Service's treatment of Mr Reeves after he took sick leave was viewed by the medical experts as presenting him with a series of ongoing stressors which affected the treatment which he received; which prevented his recovery from the injury which he had sustained before he took sick leave; and which contributed to the exacerbation of those injuries. The defendant led no evidence to explain its actions. The evidence suggested that the approach taken to Mr Reeves in this period may have been affected by a view that he was a corrupt police officer 169 Under the Police Service's policies, after 10 days sick leave its officers were referred to its Welfare Branch for assistance. Making such referrals was a part of Mr Reeves' duties as staff officer at the FEA. No such reference was made in relation to Mr Reeves. It was he who sought medical treatment for his knees and his stress and later pursued the Police Medical Officer, the Police Psychiatrist and the Welfare Branch for assistance, with very mixed success. With good reason, Mr Reeves came to believe that the Police Service had written him off. 170 Mr Reeves saw Dr Wong on 22 January 1997 when he was referred to a psychiatrist, Dr Westerink. This was the first time that Mr Reeves had ever received treatment for any psychological difficulties. Dr Westerink diagnosed PTSD. Mr Reeves saw Dr Wong again in February and on 3 March, Dr Westerink provided a report to the Police Service, requesting its authorisation to admit him as an inpatient for treatment of PTSD, if Dr Westerink deemed it necessary. The Police Service did not respond to Dr Westerink, nor made any approach, as it ought to have done under its policies, to Mr Reeves. 171 Mr Reeves saw Dr Westerink again on 11 March and in April, June and July. Dr Westerink provided a second report to the Police Service in May 2007, recommending Mr Reeves' medical retirement because of chronic PTSD caused by his work and precipitated by poor management and support and unfounded accusations. Given what followed, it is apparent that the Police Service did not accept Dr Westerink's diagnosis, or his opinions as to medical discharge. 172 Dr Wong also referred Mr Reeves to a number of specialists for treatment to his knees. He injured his knees further during a fall on stairs at his home in December 1997, when he made another hurt on duty application, which was also rejected in 1998. 173 Mr Reeves first saw the Police Medical Officer, Dr Sharp, on 18 July 1997. Mr Reeves recorded in his diary that Dr Sharp:

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"... was amazed that someone of my rank would think that the management of the Police Service really cared about us. He said what management spoke about was on the first floor, but what they really meant was basement level stuff. He said, 'The Police Service don't give a 'shit' about you." 174 Mr Reeves was distressed at this advice, but himself contacted the Welfare Branch on 28 July and 1 August 1997, but received no response. This was notwithstanding Dr Sharp having introduced Mr Reeves to Sergeant McCloskey of the Police Welfare Branch on 18 July and requesting that he be followed up. That Branch contains the Police Service's Rehabilitation Unit. 175 Mr Reeves saw Dr Sharp again later in July. Dr Sharp told him that it was a waste of time contacting him. He had left five messages about Mr Reeves and what he should do to rehabilitate him and had received no response. He would ring Mr Reeves when he wanted to see him again. Until his calls were returned, it was a waste of time for Mr Reeves to see him. Later that evening Dr Sharp called to advise that he had spoken to Assistant Commissioner Nixon, who had agreed to look into his case, but Mr Reeves never heard from her, or from Dr Sharp. 176 Dr Sharp discussed Mr Reeves seeing a psychologist. Mr Reeves later saw Mr Glancey. A referral letter from Dr Wong was in evidence. Mr Reeves' evidence was that it was Mr Glancey who suggested that the Police Service might pay for his treatment and he then approached the Police Psychiatrist, who approved some payment. Mr Glancey did not recollect this, but from his evidence, it appears that this suggestion might have come from his receptionist, when Mr Reeves first made his appointment. 177 The Police Psychiatrist, Dr Mutton certainly wrote to Mr Glancey on 13 October 1997 asking him to treat Mr Reeves, on the basis that the Police Service would pay for five sessions. The only other explanation which accounts for how that referral came to be made, is that it was Dr Sharp who approached Dr Mutton. In any event, Mr Reeves saw Mr Glancey on seven occasions in October, November and December 1997 and March 1998. 178 The Police Service led no evidence to explain why it paid for part of Mr Glancey's treatment, although in cross examination it was suggested to Mr Glancey that he had an arrangement with the Police Psychiatrist to see police officers who lived nearby his rooms, rather than have them travel to see the Police Psychologist. Mr Glancey did not accept that such an arrangement existed. What was done, however, accorded with advice earlier published to Police Officers in the Police News, that it would pay for some limited external counselling for those officers affected by their involvement with the Police Royal Commission. 179 The Police Service also referred Mr Reeves to Dr Lewin, another psychiatrist, for assessment of his hurt on duty claim. Dr Lewin saw Mr Reeves on 5 August 1997 and diagnosed that he was suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features, not PTSD. In Dr Lewin's report to the Police Service of 22 August, the cause of Mr Reeves' symptoms were identified as a marked preoccupation with how his promotion had been blocked, with an emotional reaction to the loss of his reputation and good name in the Police Service, also being a very major contributing factor. Workload and other matters which Mr Reeves had described were not regarded as predominant factors. Dr Lewin spent considerable time with Mr Reeves. He did not view hospitalisation as appropriate, but favoured a return to work, which they had discussed at length. Dr Lewin recommended to the Police Service that Mr Reeves continue treatment and that he be rehabilitated to work. 180 Mr Reeves was provided with a copy of Dr Lewin's report and not unnaturally, expected that the Police Service would then act in accordance with its Rehabilitation policy. Still, there was no contact made by the Welfare Branch and no attempt by the Police Service to pursue Mr Reeves' return to work, as the Rehabilitation policy required. It appears that having rejected Dr Westerink's opinion that Mr Reeves should be medically retired and having sought Dr Lewin's advice, the Police Service then also rejected his opinion that Mr Reeves should return to work. Nor was Dr Lewin's advice accepted as a basis on which Mr Reeves' hurt on duty claim could be approved. 181 The Police Service was then also considering Mr Reeves' hurt on duty applications in relation to his knees, about which it had received reports. It referred Mr Reeves to Dr Claffey, an orthopaedic surgeon, for assessment. In his 10 February 1998 report, Dr Claffey advised that Mr Reeves' PTSD was much more serious and important than his multiple knee injuries. Mr Reeves had told Mr Claffey that but for his psychiatric condition, for which he was under treatment, from the point of view of his knees, he could return to work. Dr Claffey advised that Mr Reeves' knee symptoms were not then gross; that arthroscopy of either knees was a clinical decision to be made by his treating doctors, but the more important condition was his PTSD. If that did not exist, Mr Reeves could return to moderate work of a graded nature. His prognosis depended entirely on his psychiatric progress, although his knees could become so painful that surgery might be required in time. Dr Claffey's view was that the injury sustained to his knees in December 1996 was also a hurt on duty incident to which the recommendation for arthroscopy related, but a fall at home on the stairs in December 1997 was not work related. 182 The Police Service also did not accept Dr Claffey's views. On 13 March 1998, Dr Claffey wrote again to the Police Service, answering a number of questions it had posed to him, having provided him with Dr Lewin's report. Dr Claffey advised that Mr Reeves' knee condition did not cause him to be unfit for police duty and that his recent absence was not due to aggravation of his work related knee condition. 183 Despite the advice which the Police Service had sought and received, Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application in relation to the psychological injury was refused on 26 February 1998, on the basis that his injury was not duty related. Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application in relation to the injury to his knees in December 1996 was refused in April 1998, on the basis that the injury was not duty related. The second application in relation to the 1997 fall at home was refused. 184 Under the Rehabilitation policy, rehabilitation did not depend on the assessment of a hurt on duty application, or even on the injury which kept a police officer from work being duty related, or a return to work. It depended on the officer's condition. Rehabilitation could be commenced before a police officer was fit to return to work, but involved obvious cost, which the Police Service had to meet under the policy. Despite this and despite the advice of Dr Lewin and Dr Claffey, no steps were ever taken by the Police Service to contact Mr Reeves, or any of his treating doctors, to explore rehabilitation or a return to work as the policy envisaged. 185 The refusal of Mr Reeves' psychological injury application rested on the view that Mr Reeves' symptoms came from an action which was considered by the Police Service to have been 'reasonable from the employer in terms of discipline, promotion under s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987'. In so far as that conclusion rested on Dr Lewin's advice, it took no account of the view expressed by Dr Lewin that Mr Reeves' symptoms had two bases, the first, a marked preoccupation with how his promotion had been blocked and the second, with an emotional reaction to the loss of his reputation and good name in the Service also being a very major contributing factor. An appeal against this refusal was lodged by Mr Reeves with the GREAT Tribunal, but was finally not pursued after Mr Reeves' medical discharge. 186 Section 11A came into operation by amendment of the Workers Compensation Act in January 1996. In final oral submissions the defendant raised the question of whether certain provisions of the Workers Compensation Act applied to Mr Reeves. This arose in the context of the question of whether the Police Service's rehabilitation policy applied to him. 187 In a joint memorandum filed after the conclusion of the hearing, the parties agreed that the Workers Compensation Act did not apply to Mr Reeves, but by reference to that legislation in other Acts which did apply to him, some definitions and terms of that legislation were used, including s11A. (See the definition of 'hurt on duty' used in the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act and the Police Service Regulation 1990 (regulation 98(2).) 188 Mr Reeves' hurt on duty claim sought sick leave benefits under the Police Service Regulation and medical, hospital and rehabilitation expenses under s 12D of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act. 189 It is relevant to observe at this point that it is evident that the Workers Compensation Act recognised that action taken by an employer in respect of promotion may give rise to psychiatric injury. Prior to the introduction of s 11A, such injury was compensable. After the introduction of s 11A, reasonable action taken by an employer in respect of promotion which resulted in injury, became non-compensable. It followed that in so far as Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application for psychiatric injury was concerned, what had to be considered by the Police Service in relation to Mr Reeves hurt on duty application was whether Mr Reeves' injury was caused by action taken by the Police Service with respect to his promotion to the LEA, which was reasonable. What action the Police Board had taken was not in question, s11A being concerned with actions of the employer. As the defendant argued in these proceedings, the Police Board was a separate legal entity with which s 11A did not concern itself with. 190 If the action taken by the Police Service had not been reasonable, or if the psychological injury had other work related causes not excluded by s 11A, as had been Dr Lewin's advice, as well as Mr Glancey's, then Mr Reeves' injury was compensable under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act. These matters were not considered by the Police Service. 191 It is apparent that in rejecting his hurt on duty application, no consideration was given as to what the Police Service had done in relation to Mr Reeves' promotion. Had such consideration been given, the evidence in this case suggests that there could have been no conclusion reached that its actions had been reasonable. 192 In this case there was no suggestion by the defendant that the other cause of Mr Reeves' injury, as identified by Dr Lewin, was not work related, or that it could be characterised as relating to 'transfer, demotion, performance appraisal, discipline, retrenchment or dismissal', the other matters falling within s 11A. Still, this aspect of Dr Lewin's advice was not considered, when it was determined that Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application should be refused, because of the action taken by the Police Board. 193 Even the view that the action taken in relation to Mr Reeves by the Police Board had been reasonable in terms of 'discipline, promotion', rested on a factual misunderstanding. It was understood that what the Police Board had done was to defer consideration of Mr Reeves' application for promotion to the LEA pending the Royal Commission Report. Had that occurred, it might have been reasonable, given what was undoubtedly a difficult situation confronting the Police Board at the time, in the face of the Police Service's approach to the information which it provided. It would have been to Mr Reeves' considerable advantage had that course been taken, as it seemingly was in other cases, because when it emerged in March 1997, the Royal Commission's Report did not call Mr Reeves' integrity into question. What had in fact occurred however, was that the Police Board had refused to recommend Mr Reeves' promotion to the Minister. 194 Had there been a deferral, the Police Commissioner, who by then had authority himself to make promotions, would have had the opportunity to consider that Mr Reeves was not adversely mentioned in the Report of the Royal Commission. 195 Regrettably for Mr Reeves, events overtook him. The Police Board was disbanded in December 2006 and promotion became a matter for the Commissioner. While the Police Commissioner had invited and received a submission from Mr Reeves in November, it is apparent that under the new legislative scheme, the Commissioner had no power to make the appointment, it already having been refused by the Police Board. A new application process was required under the statutory scheme. By then Mr Reeves was on sick leave and the Police Service was then restructured. 196 By the time that the possibility of Mr Reeves being rehabilitated to some position in that new structure came to be considered by the Police Service in 1998, albeit unbeknownst to Mr Reeves, the view reached was that there was no obvious position for him, to which he might be rehabilitated. Mr Reeves' views were not sought. Even if correct, the view then reached by the Police Service did not preclude the implementation of the rehabilitation policy. As Mr Peterson's investigation uncovered, seemingly as the result of ineptitude, inefficiency and miscommunication, Mr Reeves was left to languish and his situation received no positive attention, as the Police Service's own policies required. 197 Mr Reeves' evidence as to his extreme distress at his treatment by the Police Service when his hurt on duty application was refused and his resulting ill health must be accepted. His reaction is supported by the evidence of various medical practitioners and fellow police officers. 198 On 5 March 1998, Mr Reeves made application under s 10 of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act for medical retirement, classified as hurt on duty. He later withdrew that application, but it was then pursued by the Police Service.

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The events after the refusal of the hurt on duty application 199 Mr Reeves and his wife made repeated approaches to the Police Service for assistance and eventually, complaints about the way he had been treated and the lack of support which he had been given. The evidence showed concern by those with whom Mr Reeves had worked at the FEA, on which the defendant relied. Mr Laney had been appointed as the FEA's liaison with him when he took sick leave. On Mr Laney's evidence he had some contact with Mr Reeves during 1997 and more during 1998. 200 Mr Reeves' dissatisfaction was not with Mr Laney's contact with him, but with the failure of the Police Service to adhere to its welfare policies, so far as he was concerned; the repeated failure of the Welfare Branch to respond to his approaches, even after Dr Sharp had sought its assistance for him; the Service's repeated delays in dealing with his various applications; and overridingly, the events of 1995 and 1996 which had caused him to suffer a psychological injury. He was further distressed by the fact that despite the advice of medical professionals that his injuries had been caused by his work, in the main he himself had to fund the ongoing treatment which he obtained for that injury, given the refusal of his hurt on duty applications. 201 Throughout 1997 and increasingly in 1998, despite the ongoing treatment which Mr Reeves was receiving, he was extremely unwell, obviously so. His illness had a serious impact on his personal relationships, including with his family. It was in this period that Mr Reeves and his wife first became estranged. Later they separated and eventually divorced. The opinion shared by the experts was that the Police Service's failures during this period presented Mr Reeves with an ongoing series of stressors, in a long series of ongoing stressors which had their origins in the investigation he was directed to undertake during the Police Royal Commission. All of these stressors contributed to his psychiatric injury; his failure to recover from that injury despite ongoing treatment throughout this time; his application for medical discharge; and the resulting entrenchment of his illness.

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It is not known what this person was carrying in his hand and he is not able to be described any further. At the time of the incident he was standing in front of a motor vehicle however this is also not described." 204 The person fled when the sirens of an approaching ambulance became audible in the distance. Mr Reeves was thoroughly frightened by this encounter. In cross examination, he explained why he had difficulty in giving a clear description of the person who confronted him, having then been off sick for a considerable period and being in a state of shock, when confronted. Mr Reeves believed that this incident was connected with the evidence which he was about to give. 205 Mr Reeves asked for the assistance of the Police Service's witness protection unit. He had expected that the witness protection people would come to see him. This was assessed by Mr Laney as not being necessary. Mr Reeves did not himself approach that Unit and did not think that would have been the logical thing for him to do. He was sick and expected to receive help. He was told that patrols would be arranged to go past his house, but was never informed that this had actually been implemented. He later complained to Mr Laney, but was told the decision had been made not to bring in the witness protection people. 206 Mr Laney prepared a report which was provided to Sergeant Fairhall at the Welfare Unit and asked him to contact Mr Reeves. Sergeant Fairhall then contacted Mr Reeves at Mr Laney's request and went to visit him. They discussed the refusal of his hurt on duty applications in respect of his knees. Sergeant Fairhall visited him on 19 March and again on 16 April. 207 Mr Laney contacted the State Protection Unit but the view was taken that there was not sufficient threat for Mr Laney to be provided with special protective measures. The information which Mr Reeves had provided was too vague to justify witness protection. Mr Laney visited Mr Reeves on 13 March, to discuss him giving evidence at the trial. 208 On 13 March, Mr Reeves also spoke to Mr Glancey for about 15 minutes and saw him again on 16 March and in April. On 26 March, he saw Dr Westerink. A copy of Dr Westerink's letter to Dr Wong was provided to the Police Service. 209 The steps taken by the Police Service, did not alleviate Mr Reeves' fright over what had occurred. On the medical evidence he was very significantly affected at the time, with the result that he became so unwell, that he was unable to give evidence at the trial and he was excused.

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"8. I said to this person, "What are you's(sic) up to?" He said, "What the fuck's it got to do with you?" I said, "I am a police officer, we've had a lot of trouble around the canteen and I suggest you and your mates go home." He did not answer. I then turned to walk back to my vehicle at which time I felt two sharp stings to my right upper arm. I turned around and saw the same asian male with a syringe in his hand. As soon as I turned, he ran away towards the other side of the oval. I commenced to chase this person, however my right knee locked and I couldn't go any further." 211 A COPS record was created and Mr Reeves was taken to Liverpool Hospital. He also received treatment from Dr Tsang. On 6 May he spoke to Mr Laney and on 7 May Mr Laney visited and took hurt on duty forms to the then FEA staff officer Mr Trebley. On 11 May, Sergeant Fairhall called and visited on 20 May. Mr Reeves saw Mr Glancey on 11 May and then repeatedly in May to November. He also repeatedly consulted Dr Tsang. 212 Mr Reeves was even more severely affected by this incident, which resulted in him experiencing very distressing symptoms over an extended period, while undergoing monitoring of his blood at an outpatient clinic over a period of about 6 months. While there were differences in the opinions expressed by the medical experts, it was the opinion of Dr Tsang, who then treated Mr Reeves that he then developed PTSD. During the concurrent evidence it became apparent that there was a consensus that this incident was of a kind which made it a possible trigger for PTSD. Whether or not Mr Reeves then developed that disorder, or whether his serious and increasing symptoms were an aggravation of his existing psychiatric injury remained the subject of some disagreement amongst the experts. 213 Mr Reeves' memory of what occurred after this incident was not good. He remembered speaking to Sergeant Fairhall, who advised him that his file had been sent to Assistant Commissioner Nixon, but he was not aware of the needle stick injury. The expert evidence was that his underlying illness, as well as the trauma of the incident itself, would have affected his perceptions of the assistance which he then received.

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Whether he should continue to receive treatment until all matters are resolved with a possible return to work or be medically discharged I am unable to determine." 215 Mr Reeves spoke again to Dr Sharp on 29 August 1998. Mr Reeves' evidence was that Dr Sharp then promised to speak to the head of the Welfare Branch Assistant Commissioner Nixon, about his situation. He heard nothing. 216 A note on Mr Reeves' file dated 9 September 1998, indicated, that Dr Sharp did not then support Mr Reeves' medical discharge. He plainly still hoped for a return to work, but observed that Mr Reeves was unlikely to return to work in the short term; that he had another appointment with Dr Lewin and that 'rehab is not strictly on the agenda at this time, but will advise if so.' 217 Mr Reeves saw Dr Lewin again in September 1998. In his report of 18 September Dr Lewin confirmed his diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features, but still expressed the opinion that there was no permanent psychiatric condition. Total incapacity for 3 months and ongoing treatment and a graded return to work were recommended. 218 On the documentary evidence, unbeknownst to Mr Reeves, the Police Service did then consider the possibility of his return to work. On 16 September, Inspector Dimnock, Manager Human Resources wrote to the Director Health and Workplace about Mr Reeves' rehabilitation, discussing the formation of the new Commercial Crime Agency ('CCA'), which had replaced the FEA, and what had happened to Mr Reeves' former position of staff officer of the FEA, in a re-organisation which had involved external recruitment. A graded rehabilitation to the CCA was not regarded as appropriate, because duties commensurate with Mr Reeves' rank could not be provided and it was thought that there was little prospect of him obtaining a permanent position at the CCA. Rehabilitation in 'any area where there is a reasonable prospect of eventual permanent placement' was supported.' This consideration appears to have led nowhere, despite Dr Lewin's September report, which suggested that rehabilitation should have been pursued, or Dr Sharpe's views. There was never any approach to Mr Reeves about the possibility of rehabilitation. 219 On the evidence of the experts an attempt at rehabilitation was a lost opportunity, which could have been of real assistance to Mr Reeves' recovery, had it been pursued when Dr Lewin, Dr Claffey and Dr Sharp suggested it. This was consistent with the Rehabilitation policy's emphasis on return to work as a priority 'which must be given to an early, safe return to suitable duties/employment following injury or illness in a manner consistent with all relevant factors including medical opinion.' 220 Given the poor state of Mr Reeves' health in the latter half 1998, prospects of successful rehabilitation had by then plainly become much more limited. Certainly none of his treating doctors ever certified him as being fit for a return to work in the Police Service. Fitness for involvement in a return to work programme was, however, a different matter, as Dr Tsang explained in his evidence. His view was that rehabilitation should have been attempted and would have assisted in preventing Mr Reeves' illness becoming permanent. While unfit for work, Mr Reeves was not unfit for rehabilitation. 221 Dr Morse and Dr Lewin had similar views. Dr Morse gave evidence of the devastating impact of Mr Reeves' complex feelings of abandonment on his psychiatric disorder and the profound impact which offers of support and rehabilitation could have had. He drew an analogy between rehabilitation after knee surgery, at the same time as ongoing treatment. While a patient might never totally recover in terms of residual psychiatric symptoms, rehabilitation could lead to an eventual return to work. 222 That evidence was entirely consistent with the rehabilitation policy's emphasis on return to work by participation in an occupational rehabilitation programme enabling the work force to be rejoined in a staged return to normal duties, and where that was not possible, for training for other positions within the Police Service, or where that was not possible, for a return to a meaningful and fulfilling role within the community, assisted by appropriate agencies. The Policy encouraged all employees suffering a work-related injury or illness to participate in the programme. The process was initiated by the employee making contact. Despite repeated contact by Mr Reeves, the process was simply not initiated. 223 Mr Reeves was extensively cross examined as to contact which he received at various times from officers including Mr Laney, Sergeant Edgtton and Sergeant Fairhall and the treatment which he received, which never resulted in him being pronounced as fit for a return to police duties, In re-examination Mr Reeves explained that he had expected intervention and support from the Police Service, including the organisation of a structured rehabilitation programme, to have him return to work. The treatment which he received was never directed to workplace rehabilitation, as he understood it. 224 Mr Reeves was never assessed by his treating practitioners for a return to work, either in the Police Service, or elsewhere. This was a matter of considerable ongoing distress for Mr Reeves, who, given his role as a staff officer, well understood that the Rehabilitation policy should have been implemented and was aware of the examining doctors' recommendations that it should be. 225 The Policy referred to the appointment of Rehabilitation Co-coordinators in each Region of the Police Service, who acted as the 'focal point for all contact, liaison and review with injured employee, his/her certifying doctor or other health professions. Staff Officers Personnel and workplace Commanders/Managers and rehabilitation providers'. Who the officer for Mr Reeves' region was, is unclear. Whoever it was, this role was not carried out. The assistance and contact which that officer was to provide Mr Reeves was not forthcoming.

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The Police Service's internal investigations of its treatment of Mr Reeves 226 Mr Reeves' deteriorating condition and the Police Service's treatment of him, led Mrs Reeves to complain in 1998. The Police Service Employee Assistance Policy contemplated that assistance would be provided to the families of injured police officers when sought. Given Mr Reeves' condition and the effect it was having on his family, it is not surprising that Mrs Reeves turned to the Service for help and eventually complained. 227 The result was that in 1998 the Police Service conducted two investigations into its treatment of Mr Reeves. The two investigations resulted in surprisingly different conclusions. 228 The first complaint was made to Assistant Commissioner Nixon, the head of the Welfare Branch on 27 March 1998. The second was made to Commissioner Ryan on 19 August 1998. Mrs Reeves' complaints were also considered by the NSW Ombudsman, who took the view that they were an internal police matter. 229 Mr Tiltman, the Acting Executive Director Human Resources and Development responded to Mrs Reeves' complaint to Assistant Commissioner Nixon by letter of 1 June 1998. Mr Tiltman then advised that his investigation had shown that 'normal processes' had been followed in relation to Mr Reeves. He explained that Dr Westerink's reports had been referred to the Police Medical Officer; that Mr Reeves had been reviewed by both the Police Medical officer and the Police Psychologist Dr Mutton, who had referred him to Mr Glancey; and that Sergeant Fairhall from the Rehabilitation Unit had made regular contact with Mr Reeves. He said that Dr Lewin's report had been sought and his recommendations had been considered by the Manager of the Rehabilitation Unit and by the Police Medical Officer. This was why Mr Reeves had been referred to Mr Glancey. Assistant Commissioner Nixon had also been contacted by Dr Sharp in late August or early September 1997. Dr Sharp had informed her of Mr Reeves' situation and she had made enquiries with the Human Resources Command and with Internal Affairs and was satisfied that his case was being handled 'appropriately'. Assistant Commissioner Nixon considered that her intervention was not required or warranted. A request had, however, been made to expedite his application for medical discharge. That expedition was not forthcoming. 230 Quite understandably, given the evidence in these proceedings, Mrs Reeves was dissatisfied with this response. The report was inaccurate in a number of respects. Assistant Commissioner Nixon's conclusions and Mr Tiltman's advice were contrary to what the second investigation later uncovered and to the evidence in these proceedings. Mrs Reeves approached the Police Commissioner with her concerns. On 28 August Mrs Reeves was advised that the matters she had raised in her complaint to the Police Commissioner were being investigated. That investigation was conducted by the Acting Director, Employee Relations, Mr Peterson. 231 Mrs Reeves was advised by Mr Tiltman in January 1999, that Mr Peterson had concluded that while 'there is no evidence of any deliberate attempt to treat Mr Reeves unfairly or unjustly, he points out that given the delays and poor internal communication processes that prevailed, both of you could have reasonably perceived this to be the case'. Mr Titman also advised: "I am not satisfied with the manner in which Mr Reeves' case has been dealt with and I have taken steps to ensure that procedures are reviewed, with a view to ensuring the necessary improvements are effected. Please accept my apology for any inconvenience or distress caused to both Mr Reeves and yourself.

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You have also noted your concern about the information that I provided to you in my previous letter of June 1998. Given Mr Petersen's detailed investigation and consequent findings, I am satisfied that my response of 1 June 1998, while it was based on the information made available to me at that time, did contain inaccuracies and was indeed inadequate. As that letter was signed on the first day that I took up relieving duties in this position, I can only suggest that my desire to expedite the reply to you, took precedence overt a thorough check of the information that had been provided to me. For this I offer you my sincere apology. 232 In February 1998, Mr Reeves rang and spoke to Mr Allen, then his case officer in the Workers' Compensation Branch, and told him that he had still received no contact. Mr Allen said that it was the longest period he had heard of an officer receiving no contact. Mr Allen later that day advised that a report from Internal Affairs was required and he had sent requests in December and January which he would follow up; that a report from Dr Lewin had been missed and that a report from Mr Glancey was awaited. Later Mr Allen advised he had spoke to Internal Affairs and that his s 181 was clear and that a confirming report should be faxed that day. (The reference to s 181 was a reference to the Commissioner confidence provisions of the Police Service Act.) 233 Mr Reeves sought and was provided with a copy of Mr Peterson's report on 8 March 1999. Mr Reeves described his reaction to the advice. He felt shocked and depressed. He approached the Commander, Welfare but received no response. Given Mr Peterson's findings, that Mr Reeves came to conclude that he had a proper foundation for his belief that he had been 'written off' by the Police Service and had been inadequately supported in his ongoing endeavours to deal with his illness, was not surprising. 234 Mr Peterson identified numerous deficiencies in how the Police Service had dealt with Mr Reeves to that point. They included: - a 19 month delay in the Workers' Compensation section dealing with his hurt on duty application; - inappropriate form letters being sent to him, which did not deal with his circumstances; - failures by the Welfare Branch to respond to approaches from Mr Reeves and Dr Sharp; - a failure to deal with Dr Lewin's recommendation that Mr Reeves be given a rehabilitation programme, with the result that the question of rehabilitation was not addressed; - Mr Reeves' familiarity with Police Service policies meant that he would have expected contact and discussion of rehabilitation and that the failure to respond to Dr Lewin's report, even if rehabilitation was not then appropriate or possible, reinforced his view that it should have been discussed with him. There was an onus to respond to Dr Lewin and to inform Mr Reeves of what, if any, action was intended as a result; - failures to advise Mr Reeves of decisions made in relation to his claims, he being advised that he was the longest officer off on sick report without any contact; - Mr Reeves' first contact from the Welfare Branch was after some 14 months, on 11 March 1998, after he was threatened near his home. The trigger was Mr Reeves approach to Inspector Laney at the FEA and his approach to the Welfare Branch. Numerous other earlier triggers which should have resulted in contact by the Welfare Branch with a police officer absent for a long time, with known depression and anxiety problems, had not been responded to; - There was no regular contact with Mr Reeves and an absence of welfare support. It was understood by the Personnel Co-coordinator at the time that Mr Reeves did not want contact with the Police Service, but this itself should have resulted in a liaison link with the Psychology and Welfare sections. By way of contrast to this claimed understanding, Mr Reeves was known to have been frequently pursuing the outcome of his claim with the Workers Compensation Branch, advising that he was dissatisfied with the long delays in the provision of any response to his claims; - there was a failure to deal with complaints made by Mrs Reeves and approaches from Mr Reeves; - Mr Reeves ought to have pursued his appeal rights to GREAT in relation to his rejected hurt on duty claim; - there had been a delay of six months from Mr Reeves submitting a medical certificate from Dr Wong and making a hurt on duty claim, before he was seen by the Police Medical Officer. Mrs Reeves' complaint that it was known during this time that Mr Reeves had a psychological condition and had contemplated suicide on a number of occasions, without action being taken by the Police Service, had foundation; - failures by Internal Affairs in 1997 and 1998 to respond to repeated requests for information as to the outcome of investigations into Mr Reeves; - a failure to wait upon a report sought by the Police Service from Mr Glancey, before making the decision to refuse Mr Reeves' hurt on duty claim. The approach taken did not make sense; - while there were delays, omissions and possible errors of judgment which could have resulted in Mr Reeves feeling vilified, they were not intended to vilify or victimise him. There had been a combination of inadequate systems, procedures and human judgment/failings; - Mr Reeves' temperament when dealing with staff in relation to his case was found to have been less than conducive to a co-operative and supportive response. It was human nature to be unresponsive in the face of aggression, anger and ridicule;

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The Police Service's actions after Mr Peterson's report 235 Mr Reeves had made his application for medical discharge in March 1998. It was later withdrawn, but was proceeded with by the Police Service, despite Mr Peterson's report. It was not until June 1999 that Mr Reeves was discharged. 236 While there were certainly improvements in communication from the Police Service after Mr Peterson's report, there were ongoing delays and other problems. The Police Service did not review its earlier refusal of Mr Reeves' hurt on duty claim. Evidently the view taken was that it was a matter for Mr Reeves to pursue his GREAT appeal, notwithstanding how he had been dealt with and the nature of his illness. 237 Mr Reeves was cross examined as to contact which he received after he went on sick leave from Mr Laney, Sergeant Edgtton, and Mr Steer on one occasion. His memory was that there was limited contact in 1997, which Mr Laney confirmed in his evidence, but he could not recall Mr Edgtton contacting him about his welfare, or Mr Steer. The evidence suggested that Mr Reeves' memory was affected by the severity of his illness during 1998. After Mr Peterson's report, contact between Mr Reeves and the Welfare Branch certainly improved. The head of that Branch, Inspector Graham visited and spoke to Mr Reeves on a number of occasions. 238 The defendant relied on Mr Laney's contact with Mr Reeves, to counter the complaint that the Police Service did not provide Mr Reeves with necessary support. When he reported sick, the FEA management team decided that Mr Laney would be the FEA's contact with him. Mr Laney spoke to him and visited and in April 1997 wrote to the Workers' Compensation Unit about him. 239 Mr Laney explained however that in 1997 and 1998 his was not a welfare role. He had no training or skills in such matters, but he had concerns about Mr Reeves' welfare and when he contacted him about FEA work matters, they also discussed his health. They had become friends in the course of their work. He had some contact with Mr Reeves in 1997 after he went off on sick leave, it became greater in 1998. In cross examination, he agreed that he never performed a welfare role for Mr Reeves, of the kind which Mr Reeves undertook as staff officer at the FEA. Nor was he ever involved in any structured welfare programme provided to Mr Reeves. 240 Mr Laney did report his observations of Mr Reeves to senior officers at the FEA. In 1998, he also contacted the Police Psychologist and Sergeant Fairhall about Mr Reeves. He was then concerned that to that time, Mr Reeves had not received any contact from the Welfare Branch, despite the assistance said to be available to officers in cases of illness or injury, or career crisis from welfare officers under the Employee Assistance Programme. Nor had there been any rehabilitation programme instigated, matters about which Mr Reeves was bitter. Mr Laney only learned later that Mr Reeves was paying for his own medical treatment. His evidence was that he had probably not taken as much interest at the time, as he should have. He spoke both to Mr Reeves and his wife about the lack of support being provided by the Police Service. He never really thought about trying to suggest a return to work in 1997, he didn't spend enough time with Mr Reeves. In 1998 he thought that Mr Reeves was just not well enough to consider work. 241 In Mr Steer's understanding, Mr Laney maintained contact with Mr Reeves, visiting him, bringing him mail and monitoring his welfare, in order to provide him any assistance which he required. That was not Mr Laney's evidence. In April 1997, Mr Laney submitted a report to the Worker's Compensation Section, supported by Mr Steer in which he advised that the purpose of his contact was to provide Mr Reeves with mail and correspondence. That was confirmed by Mr Laney in cross examination. 242 Mr Steer had never himself referred Mr Reeves to Police Welfare or Psychology, because he perceived that to be the responsibility of others. He was not aware of the unit established to assist officers experiencing problems when brought before the Royal Commission. He could not remember any assistance which was offered to Mr Reeves at this time. He described the times as unsettling. 243 Contrary to Mr Steer's impression and consistently with Mr Laney's evidence, Mr Peterson's investigation revealed that until the 1998 incidents Mr Reeves' repeated approaches to the Welfare Branch resulted in no response or support being provided, other than the payment for five of Mr Glancey's consultations. Not even Dr Sharp's repeated approaches resulted in assistance being provided. In November 1997, Mr Steer wrote a letter supporting Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application, advising that on many occasions Mr Reeves had spoken of being victimised due to his past association with Mr Lysaught. Mr Reeves had himself openly supported the Royal Commission in identifying corrupt officers and supporting those willing to give evidence. For his part Mr Steer was unable to then comment as to whether "Inspector Reeves' condition was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by or on behalf of the Police Service with respect to his promotion". 244 Detective Sergeant Edgtton also maintained contact with Mr Reeves and initially encouraged him to return to work. It was he who advised Mr Reeves of times that he was to see Dr Lewin and drove him to an appointment in 1997; made enquiries of him about sick leave and annual leave entitlements in November 1997 and 1998; discussed an upcoming trial with him in March 1998 and discussed 'welfare issues' with him in March, April, May and July 1998. Sergeant Fairhall's contact with him also then began to increase with the March and May 1998 incidents. 245 There was evidence from the medical experts that apart from the problems caused by his psychological injury, Mr Reeves had become extremely angry about his treatment by the Police Service and that this had impacted on his condition. There was nothing surprising about that reaction. Mr Reeves undoubtedly had a proper foundation for his anger, given the failure of the Police Service to adhere to its policies, to provide him support which he was seeking from the Welfare Branch, or to deal with his complaints. On the medical evidence, this was undermining the treatment which Mr Reeves was receiving. It was Mrs Reeves' persistence, in the face of Mr Reeves' serious illness, which led to the eventual belated alteration in the Police Service's approach and eventually Mr Peterson's report. 246 In the face of this report, as well as other evidence, it may not be concluded that this was a situation where Mr Reeves' perception as to his treatment by the Police Service did not reflect reality, as was suggested by the defendant in examination of some of the medical experts. There it was put in cross examination, that there were some people 'for whom you just can't do enough'. 247 That was a surprising approach in the face of Mr Peterson's report. On its own internal investigations, it was apparent that what the Police Service had done in respect of Mr Reeves fell far short of the support which even its own internal policies envisaged would be provided. This remained so, even when repeatedly approached by Mr and Mrs Reeves for assistance, at a time when Mr Reeves' serious condition was known, when various doctors were suggesting that support should be provided and his distress was readily apparent to those who were dealing with him. Even Dr Sharp's assistance did not help him get a response envisaged by the Police Service's own policies. 248 The evidence suggested that Mr Reeves' treatment might have been the result of an ongoing view prevailing within the Police Service that Mr Reeves was a corrupt police officer. That certainly occurred to Dr Sharp, who persisted with his enquiries, to the point of establishing for himself that Mr Reeves had the confidence of the Police Commissioner, but writing in July 1998 that 'This took some time to obtain this information'. 249 This is a comment which must also be understood in a particular statutory context. In 1996 the Police Act was amended by the insertion of Part 9 Division 1B, Summary removal of police officers in whom Commissioner does not have confidence. Thereby, pursuant to s 181D of the Act, the Commissioner was given power to remove a police officer from the Police Service if 'the Commissioner does not have confidence in the police officer's suitability to continue as a police officer, having regard to the police officer's competence, integrity, performance or conduct'. This was a new power given to the Commissioner to deal with what the Police Royal Commission had uncovered. 250 That what Dr Sharp learned in 1998, namely that Mr Reeves had the Commissioner's confidence, was ever conveyed to Mr Reeves, is not apparent. Had that been the case, no doubt the defendant would have led the relevant evidence. On the medical evidence, for someone in Mr Reeves' condition, it was undoubtedly very important information, for a number of obvious reasons. Not the least of these was the possibility of that expression of confidence assisting him in a recovery from his ongoing psychiatric illness. 251 Throughout 1998 Mr Reeves was receiving ongoing treatment for his psychological condition from his psychologist Mr Glancey and his psychiatrist, Dr Tsang. Mr Reeves' treatment by Dr Tsang and Mr Glancey continued until 2000. He was also being treated for his knee injuries.

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Mr Reeves' condition after his discharge 254 Mr Hammond, the joint chairman of the Western Suburbs District Rugby League Football Club and a former police officer gave evidence that he had read derogatory articles about Mr Reeves in 1995. He did not meet Mr Reeves until some years later, when he was doing some volunteer work at the Club, which had between 200 and 300 members. In 2005, the general manager position of the Club fell vacant and the Board decided to fill the position on a temporary basis, during a restructure. He spoke to Mr Reeves, who he understood had been advised by medical practitioners to attempt to return to the work force. He was given the position, which he occupied until mid-1996. 255 Mr Hammond initially thought that Mr Reeves was a good fit for the role, but found that Mr Reeves had problems carrying out his duties. He was forgetful and had difficulty in performing in the role. He became withdrawn if the Royal Commission was raised with him. By Christmas 2005, he was having problems dealing with staff over insignificant matters which ought not to have rattled someone with his background. He eventually took time off, because he was not coping and despite trying to work through his issues, he left the position. He tried to dissuade Mr Reeves, the Club regarded him as a person who could be a valuable asset, but he was struggling in dealing with people and couldn't cope. 256 In cross examination, Mr Hammond agreed that the position was one of trust and would not have been given to Mr Reeves, if doubts as to his integrity had been held. Mr Hammond had recommended Mr Reeves for the appointment, despite his understanding of what he had read in the press about him. 257 Mr Stephens, a long time friend of Mr Reeves, who was involved in the Cabramatta Rugby League Football Club, a licensed Club where Mr Reeves was a board member, gave evidence that he, too, had read the press article about Mr Reeves in 1995 and that despite his knowledge of Mr Reeves as a hardworking and honest police officer, his impression at the time was that Mr Reeves was involved in corruption. That day when at the Club with a group of others, he called out in jest to Mr Reeves 'here comes Lysaught's lieutenant'. Mr Reeves later explained that he was totally innocent of any corruption and that it had been taken out of context. The adverse impression Mr Stephens formed of Mr Reeves was nevertheless reinforced by seeing Mr Reeves on television in the company of Mr Lysaught. This was a matter of discussion amongst people at the Club at the time. Mr Stephens' impression was that Mr Reeves' was not believed and that he was affected by this. He went into his shell and wasn't doing the job that he had done before. He later resigned from the Board of the Club, which he now rarely attended, although he continued to provide volunteer assistance with golf bookings, which didn't require his attendance at the Club. 258 In cross examination, Mr Stephens explained that Mr Reeves did not resign until 2004 and stood for re-election four times after 1995. Mr Stephens was himself now a board member and agreed that it was a position of considerable trust. He had voted for Mr Reeves when he had stood for election. Mr Stephens had plainly overcome his doubts about Mr Reeves' integrity.

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Mr Reeves' knees 259 It was the defendant's case that Mr Reeves psychological condition was partly the result of the condition of his knees and that attention would have to be paid in any event to the state of his knees in assessing damages. 260 Mr Reeves injured his knees on a number of occasions prior to the injury which he suffered in December 1996, while playing touch football at work. He first injured his knee in 1971 while playing football for the Police in a mid-week match. He received treatment from the Police Doctor and finished playing the season. In 1973 he was run over by a car while attending an accident scene. He had a left forefoot fracture which was treated at Liverpool hospital but recalled no injury to his knees. He recovered and continued playing football for the Police, suffering occasional injuries, including a knee injury which required surgery to his left knee in 1980. He had other later injuries including assaults and being thrown down some stairs. 261 Over the years his knees swelled up from time to time, hurt and were locking, but he was largely able to perform all of his duties. In 1990 he was diagnosed with arthritis in both knees. When he took sick leave in 1997 after injuring both knees in December 1996, his knees were swollen, it is possible that they were locking, he was having trouble with agility and moving around. In 1997 he had another fall, injuring his knees again. There were further problems with pain, swelling, grating and locking. He had problems getting up from a squat and even from a sitting position. He occasionally took pain relief. In April 1998 he was certified unfit for duty for a time because of his knee problems. 262 Mr Reeves' medical discharge in 1999 was determined partly on the basis of these injuries to his knees. 263 Mr Reeves was extensively cross examined as to matters such as the history of the injuries to his knees; the treatment he had received at various times; the distances he had to walk at work; the degree of agility which his work at the Police Service required of him, before he went on sick leave; his fitness for work at various times, given the then condition of his knees; whether the condition of his knees prevented him from working; the current condition of his knees and the pain management which they required. 264 Mr Reeves denied that in January 1997 the condition of his knees prevented him from performing the work of staff officer in the FEA. That evidence must be accepted, in the face of the medical evidence. 265 Mr Reeves had been seen by a number of orthopaedic surgeons, including Dr Dave, Dr Claffey and Dr Sorrenti. Their reports were in evidence. Dr Sorrenti performed bilateral knee arthroscopies in February and April 2000. 266 Dr Coolican and Dr Stephenson were retained to review the condition of Mr Reeves' knees. They were called to give concurrent evidence. 267 From their reports it was evident that they agreed that Mr Reeves suffered from bilateral medial compartment arthritis, more severe in the left leg than the right, as a consequence of a series of events associated with his police career. They agreed that the arthritis was a consequence of a series of events, some of which were associated with his police career. 268 Their concurrent evidence made it apparent that Mr Reeves: - had pain and stiffness in his knees, restriction of motion which impaired activities such as running, excessive stair climbing, prolonged bending, squatting and walking over uneven ground. - would have good and bad days, weeks and months, with his condition going downhill over time. - is likely to suffer further deterioration and become more symptomatic over time.

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269 Mr Reeves was aged 54 years and there would be deterioration to age 65. An osteotomy was recommended in the near future, in order to lessen pain, lessen the rate of wear and to improve symptoms and to delay the need for a knee replacement to about 68 to 70. When it was required would depend on when the symptoms and pain got him down. This depended on Mr Reeves' pain tolerance and discomfort. His symptoms would be episodic, depending on activity undertaken. Without an osteotomy a knee replacement would be required in his early 60s. 270 Depending on the technique used, an osteotomy would at best require hospitalisation of about a week, then rehabilitation and about a 3 month recovery on light work, if working for an organisation like the Police Service, with full recovery in 6 to 9 months. They would be done sequentially. Knee replacements involved similar hospitalisation and recuperation times. Knee replacements were likely to require revision after about 10 years, depending on the age at which the first replacement occurred and the active use made of the knees thereafter. 271 Both Dr Coolican and Dr Stephenson were of the view that Mr Reeves could have continued to perform his FEA work, which was managerial in nature, in 1997 to 2010, given the state of his knees, although he would have had some days when he could not have coped, because of pain typical of osteopathic. Such symptoms are variable and episodic and people differ as to what they can tolerate, before they decide that they have had enough. 272 As to the future, an osteotomy, or knee replacement would reduce pain levels and if he got a good result, he would be able to perform the work, or at least work which was confined to the office, where he could sit down for most work, getting up and moving around from time to time, until age 65. As he got older, there would be more days when he couldn't cope. Leaving the office and getting in and out of cars would get harder over time. He could perform an administrative/supervisory role, but not active police duties. 273 Mr Reeves would have difficulties with activities around the house which involved climbing stairs, lifting bricks or rocks, gardening and home handyman type work. He might be able to so some of them, some of the time, but bilateral osteotomy reduced this possibility, but an osteotomy or knee replacement would permit better function, so as to permit lawn mowing. The nature of Mr Reeves' psychiatric injury and the treatment which he received 274 There was no issue that Mr Reeves had sustained a psychological injury, but disagreement as to the nature of his condition, whether an anxiety/depressive type illness or PTSD. Psychiatry is not an exact science. Whatever his injury was, Mr Reeves was acutely affected when he first took sick leave; there was some improvement during 1997 but treatment undermined by ongoing stressors; further injury, or an exacerbation in 1998; some subsequent improvement, but no complete recovery. Mr Reeves' condition is now chronic.

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The evidence of Mr and Mrs Reeves 275 Mr Reeves was cross examined as to his condition when he first went on sick leave and the purpose for which he sought treatment, which he then agreed was in order to get cured and to be rehabilitated back to being a police officer. Mr Reeves also agreed that while Dr Westerink had certified him as unfit throughout the time that he was treating him, he then thought that he might be able to return to restricted duties, or a lesser role in the first instance. He was hoping that the treatment he was receiving was directed to getting him back to work. He had a similar goal when later being treated by Dr Tsang, but did not agree that was what Dr Tsang was trying to do, when he came to treat him in 1998, after he was stabbed. He was aware that Dr Tsang never said that he was fit to return to police work. 276 As to Mr Glancey, Mr Reeves regarded his role as more of a counsellor, to help work through issues which he had. Mr Reeves also hoped that with his assistance, his condition would improve, so that his health would get better and he could go back to work. Mr Reeves did not agree that his health never recovered sufficiently for a return to work. He said he did not know what might have happened, had the Police Service intervened, as it should have done. He himself later tried to return to work for a period at the Leagues Club, a job with less pressure than police work, but he failed. 277 Mrs Reeves' evidence was that before 1994, Mr Reeves had been involved in a number of incidents at work, which had resulted in him being distressed at home, having nightmares, his behaviour changing to moodiness and aggression, and binge drinking with other police officers. These situations had always resolved, with Mr Reeves apologising and returning to normal. 278 After his involvement with the Royal Commission his behaviour altered quite suddenly. Beforehand he was busy at work and very tired. Afterwards he was very, very distressed because of the perception that he was corrupt. Mrs Reeves described him as 'absolutely raving'. Mr Reeves was receiving constant phone calls at home. Footage of him in Mr Lysaught's company was shown on television, which made matters worse. He had had a high opinion of Mr Lysaught and was completely taken aback by the revelations about his corruption. Mr Reeves complained that other officers were avoiding him at work. He became very stressed, jumpy, irritable, disinterested in family life, snappy and argumentative, unable to relax and he stopped socialising. He was waking from sleep, yelling and having nightmares. He became reluctant to go to work, lost interest in family life and his keen interest in gardening. He began forgetting things and leaving to go to work, later and later. His behaviour was just not him. 279 Mrs Reeves urged him to seek treatment, which he obtained after he took sick leave. Mr Reeves had rarely taken sick leave to that time, continuing to work even if unwell. His spirits lifted after he had made his report to the Police Commissioner, but when he received no response, he was shattered. Mrs Reeves' concerns led her to make a number of complaints about the Police Service's treatment of Mr Reeves. After he took sick leave he was upset by many things. He believed that the only reason he was not promoted was the Royal Commission. He was upset by the refusal of his hurt on duty application and felt abandoned by the Police Service. 280 Mrs Reeves also described Mr Reeves distressed state after he was stabbed in 1998. Despite the treatment which Mr Reeves received, his state had led to their separation some years ago.

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The evidence of treating and consulting doctors 281 Mr Reeves' GP, Dr Wong, first reported to the Police Service in March 1997 that Mr Reeves was suffering from anxiety depression from his police work and that he was receiving treatment from Dr Westerink. He had also referred him for investigation of the condition of his knees by various orthopaedic surgeons. He was co-ordinating the treatment which Mr Reeves was receiving with a view to getting him better and returning him to work. He had never referred Mr Reeves for specialist rehabilitation, in his experience such providers did not treat psychological conditions such as those which Mr Reeves was suffering, rehabilitation was pursued once an employer or insurance company approached, in order to have an assessment for rehabilitation undertaken. Throughout 1997, Dr Wong assessed Mr Reeves as unfit for work. He was never approached about any rehabilitation of Mr Reeves. 282 The psychiatrist who initially treated Mr Reeves, Dr Westerink, advised the Police Service in March 1997 that he was treating Mr Reeves for PTSD and associated major depression. In May he advised that he should be medically retired and sought approval for inpatient treatment at the PTSD unit at St John of God Hospital, but there was no response from the Police Service. Dr Westerink explained that Mr Reeves' major stressor was then the Police Department's lack of support. He was aware that rehabilitation was proposed in August 1997, by Dr Lewin, but without adequate treatment, he was doubtful that there would have been a good response. If Mr Reeves had then received the support of the Police department, however, there would have been considerable improvement. Dr Westerink recommended retirement because Mr Reeves was totally unsupported by the Police Service and he needed appropriate treatment. 283 Dr Westerink agreed that Mr Reeves' perception that he was not being supported might have been skewed by his depression, which fluctuated. Nevertheless, that was not what caused his illness, which was precipitated by his earlier difficulties with the Police Service. Dr Westerink's opinion was that inpatient treatment would have been more intense and helpful to Mr Reeves, in his condition in 1997. His depression had improved somewhat by May 1997, as the result of treatment, but his PTSD had not. 284 Dr Westerink also agreed that the purpose of the treatment was to get Mr Reeves better and to get him back to work. He did not think there could have been rehabilitation back to the Police Service. 285 Dr Lewin took a different view to that reached by Dr Westerink advising the Police Service in August 1998 that Mr Reeves was suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features. PTSD was unlikely, but not beyond the realms of possibility. Alcohol abuse was also noted. Dr Lewin noted that he had spent considerable time with Mr Reeves, discussing his condition, Dr Westerink's advice and his future, including a return to work with the Police Service. He recommended that while he was still somewhat disabled, with a great deal of motivation and good will, Mr Reeves would be fit to commence a graded return to work programme, which would require a supportive environment and consideration of Mr Reeves' concerns about his good name and reputation. 286 The Police Service did not accept Dr Lewin's advice. It was not acted on, although Mr Reeves was supplied with a copy of Dr Lewin's report, which he discussed with Dr Sharp, who also favoured rehabilitation. 287 In a second report of September 1998, Dr Lewin noted advice from Mr Egan of the Police Integrity Commission Liaison Unit that Mr Reeves 'was not adversely mentioned to substantial extent at the Royal Commission'. He described Mr Reeves as then being intensely distressed and with a range of anxiety and depressive symptoms, diagnosing adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features (features of anxiety and depression) with a number of post-traumatic symptoms of anxiety as well. He was also intensely angry. Dr Lewin did not then find any specific condition which would constitute a permanent medical impairment. He recommended that Mr Reeves' fitness be reassessed in three months. He was then unfit for work, but rehabilitation should be reconsidered at a later stage. Dr Lewin wanted to discuss the rehabilitation options available. Again, the Police Service did not follow this up. 288 In his evidence, Dr Lewin explained that at the time he saw Mr Reeves in 1998, he was very angry about his treatment and that was why he did not think rehabilitation could be attempted at that point. In 1997, he diagnosed a reactive condition, which was generally short lived, in the content of indefinable stressors, over months or weeks rather than years. It was common for there to be more than one contributing factor. There were then feelings of sadness, confusion, shame and anger about the treatment which he had received. His memory of their interview in 1997 was that Mr Reeves was proud of his record as a police officer and wanted to continue. Dr Lewin thought in that context, a structured rehabilitation programme should be attempted, step by step, with caveats. 289 Dr Lewin explained that these caveats were support provided by his managers; not dismissing his fears about his good name, or his sentiments, depression and anxiety; lifestyle interventions to address his drinking issues; and listening to his wife's advice, so that he could derive emotional support from his family and ongoing counselling. At work he considered that some sort of responsible work was required. 290 Dr Lewin also explained that on the history which Mr Reeves had given in relation to the slurs on his character, he could very much understand its impact on Mr Reeves. In further cross examination, Dr Lewin agreed that in the absence of some retraction from the Police Service, Mr Reeves' fears about his reputation would remain. It followed that if the source of his anger could not be addressed, it would have been more difficult for a rehabilitation programme to succeed. Dr Lewin agreed that it was not possible to say that a return to work programme would have succeeded, if attempted. 291 The treating psychologist Mr Glancey advised the Police Service in March 1998 that Mr Reeves had been referred to him for treatment of PTSD. His view was that Mr Reeves had symptoms of PTSD, but diagnosed an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. He was not able to resume his duties with the Police Service and if compelled to return to work, increased mental disturbance would follow, including the prospect of aggressive and perhaps violent behaviour. In a report of June 1998, it was his view that the dynamics of his present relationship with the Police Service was entirely responsible for his mental disturbance. His mental health would be best served by a rapid resolution of his workers' compensation claim. A severing of ties with the Police Service increased the likelihood of rehabilitation outside the service. 292 Mr Glancey agreed in cross examination that Mr Reeves' perceptions of the Police Service may not have reflected reality and that depression could alter a person's perception of reality. He took the view that had he had contact from the Police Service, he may have been persuaded to a different view. Mr Glancey understood that Mr Reeves had not received any contact at all. 293 Mr Glancey explained that his treatment was directed to addressing Mr Reeves' depression, with the hope that he would return to work. Initially he had a reactive disturbance to recent developments in his life, he was acutely disturbed. He hoped that with improvement in the depression, Mr Reeves would be better able to consider his relationship with the Police Service or requirement and a future outside it. He never considered Mr Reeves as fit to return to the Police Service and thought that a rehabilitation programme to any work in 1998 would have been premature. Mr Glancey provided him with assistance after the March and May 1998 incidents, but they were difficult to treat, being based in reality. 294 In re-examination, Mr Glancey explained that Dr Sharpe's advice to Mr Reeves in 1997, that 'The Police Service don't give a shit about you' was totally consistent with his impression that Mr Reeves had not had contact from the Police Service. 295 Dr Tsang explained in oral evidence the treatment which he had given Mr Reeves and explained that at the time he first saw him, the trauma of the two 1998 incidents was so great that he didn't attend to his knee problems, or explore the psychological implications of those injuries. He explained that he had agreed with Dr Westerink's diagnosis of PTSD when he saw Mr Reeves in 1998, but he had not diagnosed that himself, for structural reasons associated with the DSM IV criteria. This, in his view, precluded other diagnoses once PTSD had been diagnosed. In his opinion PTSD did not adequately describe all of Mr Reeves' condition. Dr Tsang explained that this difficulty would be overcome by the shortly to be published DSM V criteria. He also explained that PTSD symptomatology could develop decades after past trauma. 296 Dr Tsang's opinion was that the medical model involved three stages: primary prevention, such as vaccination, to prevent a disorder developing; secondary intervention to provide early treatment when a disorder has developed; and tertiary rehabilitation, to prevent complications and disability, after a disorder had developed. In Mr Reeves' case, Dr Lewin's recommendation of rehabilitation in August 1997 was appropriate. Treatment before he had left work would have been best, but the failure of the Police Service to respond to his contact throughout 1997 left Mr Reeves despairing about rehabilitation. The offer of such rehabilitation in 1997 may have prevented the development of further disability and a better response to treatment being received. Without employer support any successful rehabilitation programme was almost impossible. 297 Dr Tsang accepted in cross examination that feeling supported was a subjective thing and that his opinions rested on the history Mr Reeves gave. That history depended on Mr Reeves' perceptions and the pressure he was under from being named in the Royal Commission, having his promotion rejected and believing that he had no future in the Police force. He agreed that 'for some people you can't do enough' and the perception that Mr Reeves was not given enough support, could merely be the result of the pressures he was under. 298 Dr Tsang also agreed that Mr Reeves had been referred in part to Dr Lewin for assessment of whether he should be involved in a rehabilitation programme, while he was being treated by Dr Westerink, who had assessed him as unfit for work. Dr Lewin assessed him as fit for rehabilitation in August 1997. He was also assessed as unfit for the normal activities of a police officer due to knee pain from January to November 1997. Dr Tsang was of the view that this did not mean he was not fit for a rehabilitation programme. That would require a rehabilitation assessment. The Police Service was a huge organization with many types of work and roles. A rehabilitation programme would involve the rehabilitation provider and the Police Service discussing whether anything could have been done to get him back to the Police Service. Treating doctors could not know what happens in the workplace, what work was available and what retraining was possible. Rehabilitation required both medical and occupational assessments. In re-examination, he said that being assessed as unfit for work meant that Mr Reeves required treatment, not that he was unfit for it and that in his view rehabilitation should have been attempted in 1997. 299 Once Dr Tsang saw Mr Reeves, he had applied for a discharge and rehabilitation to the Police force was not then considered. The treatment which Mr Reeves was receiving from him and Dr Westerink was directed to getting Mr Reeves better and to rehabilitate him in terms of ordinary living and the workplace. In his view, while Dr Westerink had the view that he should be medically retired, the Police Service should have done what usually happened in a workplace, discussed that opinion with the treating doctor, to explore whether there was nothing which could be done to allow occupational rehabilitation. 300 Dr Tsang commenced treating Mr Reeves in April 1998. He first saw Mr Reeves after he had been confronted by the assailant on Menangle Rd in March 1998 and he next saw him after he had been stabbed by a syringe in May 1998, at which point he described Mr Reeves as being in a state of crisis. In his September 1998 report to the Police Service, Dr Tsang explained his diagnosis that Mr Reeves was suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features including depression and anger, together with PTSD symptoms associated with the two incidents earlier that year. Alcohol abuse was then under control. 301 Dr Morse had assessed Mr Reeves in 2001, when he diagnosed PTSD caused by the two incidents in 1998, which was by then chronic. There was also marked depression and anxiety, low self-esteem and a sense of helplessness and despair. Dr Morse was present when Dr Tsang gave his evidence. He agreed that in 1997, it was very important for Mr Reeves' emotional health to be supported by the Police Service through contact from appropriate people, as well as medical treatment and assurances that whatever happened in the future, he would be judged impartially. A rehabilitation programme as Dr Lewin recommended would have been very appropriate and would have resulted in a better outcome. There was a complex interaction of feeling not supported and abandoned with his feelings about himself, which had led to depression and anxiety and the treatment recommended would have had a profound positive effect. 302 In cross-examination he agreed that he could not say what the degree of positive effect would have been, had rehabilitation been attempted. While Mr Reeves may not have been able to return to the Police Service, he may have been able to return to other forms of work. When Dr Morse saw him in 2001 he was profoundly depressed, angry, had cognitive impairment, difficulties relating to people and was drinking to excess. He wasn't capable of much other work. 303 Dr Morse explained that a rehabilitation programme prepared a person for return to the workplace, but did not require the person to be physically and mentally well enough to work, before it commenced. Occupational rehabilitation could not begin if the person was too depressed, anxious and withdrawn to be involved in rehabilitation activity such as group therapy or gym work, but that could be undertaken before work was attempted. This may or may not result in sufficient recovery to permit a return to work. In Mr Reeves' case, in 1997 he would have found it difficult to return to the Police Force, but that did not mean that rehabilitation would not have led to a return to other work, even given his knee complaints. From Dr Morse's understanding the overwhelming factor in Mr Reeves having difficulty in working for the Police Force at that time was his anxiety and depression.

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The experts' joint report 304 The medical experts who gave concurrent evidence, Professor McFarlane, Dr Phillips, Professor Bryant and Dr Brown, agreed in the joint report that before Mr Reeves began work as the FEA staff officer in 1994, he had experienced anxiety levels in response to certain events experienced during the course of his police work, but had developed no disorder. His personality, which had obsessive, narcissistic characteristics, could predispose him to stress, but the traumatic events to which he had earlier been exposed in his career had not caused any disorder. While there was no agreement as to whether exposure to these prior traumatic events had left him vulnerable to later injury, it was common ground that he had suffered very significant psychological injury in the aftermath of the Police Royal Commission. 305 It was agreed in the joint report that Mr Reeves had then developed an anxiety or depressive disorder. At the time of the Royal Commission he would also have met criteria for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse. Constitutional factors, workplace stressors and the culture of the Police Service contributed to the development of this condition, which was exacerbated by the Police Royal Commission. Alcohol abuse subsided by 1998. His anxiety, depressive condition worsened in 1998, after the March and May incidents. There were symptoms of PTSD afterwards, but no common view amongst the experts that PTSD was then developed. Professor McFarlane was of the view that PTSD did develop and Drs Phillips, Brown and Professor Bryant were of the view that it was an adjustment disorder/major depressive disorder. 306 During the concurrent evidence the question of a person exposed to a major stressor becoming sensitised to further stressors was discussed, as was Mr Reeves' personality traits. My conclusions from this evidence are that: - Before 1994 Mr Reeves had been exposed to at least two traumatic stressors of very high order, which had resulted in symptoms which had resolved. It is normal to experience distress in response to life events, including having nightmares. That may not evidence illness. The more stressful the event, the more likely that there will be a response, but not every individual reacts in the same way to the same stressors. Nevertheless, stressful experiences may predispose, or make a person vulnerable to experiencing further symptoms, when exposed to later stressors. Even if a disorder is not developed, that does not mean that the person was unaffected. There is, however, a difference between becoming symptomatic and developing a disorder.

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307 Alcohol abuse was discussed during the concurrent evidence. It was observed that Mr Reeves had stopped drinking when he realised how deleterious it was to his health. The experts spoke of their experience with police culture and other police officers solving psychological problems of distress, by retiring to the pub at the end of the day for group therapy process with other officers, to share feelings. This was transiently effective, but led to long term problems with alcoholism. It should be observed that this evidence was supported by that given by a number of the police officers who gave evidence as to their experiences in the Police Service. 308 During the concurrent evidence the question of PTSD was explored in the context of whether the evidence at trial had provided information satisfying diagnostic criteria for that illness. Neither Professor Bryant nor Dr Brown diagnosed PTSD at any stage. Dr Phillips thought it more likely, in view of the evidence received at trial, that Mr Reeves had developed PTSD after the needle stick injury in 1998. That evidence had confirmed Professor McFarlane in his view that PTSD had resulted. Professor Bryant and Dr Brown agreed that the needle stick injury was a sufficient stressor for the development of PTSD, but remained of the view that Mr Reeves had not developed that disorder. 309 The time that Mr Reeves developed a disorder was also discussed. Dr Brown was of the view that Mr Reeves' distress about the Royal Commission did not result in a disorder until the refusal of his promotion. It was the common view that this was the worst of the stressors to which Mr Reeves was then subjected. 310 It was agreed in the joint report that it was the perceived taint to his reputation by the Police Royal Commission, compounded by his lack of promotion, which caused or materially contributed to Mr Reeves' condition. His personality style was highly dependent on his good reputation. If there had been factual slurs made about Mr Reeves in the media, their retraction would have had a partial amelioration of the stress which he suffered as a consequence. There was a view that some management intervention on his behalf may also have had a partial benefit, but there was disagreement as to the level of positivity which would have been achieved and a view that stress debriefing would not then have proven useful, in Mr Reeves' circumstances. 311 During the concurrent evidence the causal effect of Mr Reeves' involvement in the Royal Commission was discussed. My conclusions from that evidence were:

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The defendant's duty of care 329 Questions of duty of care and foreseeability of injury are necessarily intertwined. Given the issues here lying between the parties it is helpful to discuss them separately, albeit at the risk of some repetition. 330 In this case these questions must be approached against the background of the evidence that by 1995 the Police Service had given considerable attention to the risks of psychological injury to which police officers might be subjected. In evidence was the September 1992 Report of the Police Service's Task Force Alpha. That Task Force was established to analyse the Service's management of violence related hazards operating within the police environment. The Report looked at the nature and extent of physical risks in policing, and related occupational health and safety risks. It involved in depth interviews and surveys with over 2,000 at risk police officers, as well as an extensive literature review. The Task Force identified a wider class of stressors, finding that police officers were more concerned about lack of support from supervisors and formal complaints by the public, than they were about the physical risks of their work, which were not generally the issues which officers reported as stressing them the most. 331 The Report reviewed extensive research literature on police officer stress. 1981 research had identified, as defined by the perceptions of officers, that the 25 most critical life events included possibilities which were emerging directly for police officers, including Mr Reeves, as a consequence of the Royal Commission. They included dismissal from the force (no 2); suicide of an officer who is a close friend (no 5); passed over for promotion (no 11); and internal affairs investigation against an officer (no 23). Other stressors which had earlier impacted on Mr Reeves, but which he had previously been able to deal with, without injury, such as personal involvement in a shooting incident (no 15) and response to a scene involving the accidental death of a child (no 21), were also there identified. 332 The Report also referred to 1991 research which identified the most traumatic events for police officers in order including, death or injury to a child in particularly tragic circumstances; an incident leading to strong emotional reaction; an incident which left the officer at risk of contracting an infectious disease such as AIDS or Hepatitis B; injury to a colleague in the line of duty; and an incident in which an offender threatened the officer with potentially deadly force. The major themes identified were death of a colleague, violent injury or the threat of it; promotional difficulties, internal investigations and its possible consequences; incidents involving the death of a child, removal of human remains, involvement in police corruption and the possibility of contracting a fatal disease. 333 Obligations such as those imposed on the Police Service by legislation such as the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 and the Workers Compensation Act and the 1992 findings of the Alpha Task Force explain why the Police Service established various policies proactively directed to identifying and addressing risks to the health and safety of its police officers. 334 The Police Service thus had various policies in operation directed to matters such as identifying police corruption - the Internal Witness Support Policy; policies about on the job training in how to deal with stress; the Healthy Lifestyle Policy, providing free health assessments for police officers; the Employee Assistance Programme, providing support and counselling for police officers and their families in seven sections: welfare; rehabilitation; medical; psychology; dependence resource (drug and alcohol); occupational health and safety and workers compensation; a Critical Incident Stress Policy; a Firearm Incident Policy and a Rehabilitation Policy. 335 At the time of the Police Royal Commission the Police Service recognised that members of the service involved in its investigations and hearings, as well as their familles, could be caused considerable distress. Royal Commission hearings were conducted in public and were the subject of intense public interest, media scrutiny and concern amongst police officers. The Police Commissioner made statements to police officers about the Royal Commission, advising them that they would be fully supported with appropriate counselling. An article explaining this support was then published in the Police News, advising those who needed support to approach the Welfare section or the Psychology Section and that the Police Service would also pay for external counselling on a limited basis, for those who felt uncomfortable using Police Service counsellors and psychologists. A special unit was established which maintained records of officers called before the Royal Commission and the assistance provided to them. 336 This proactive approach was consistent with the 1992 findings of the Alpha Task Force, that police officers tended to deny the possibility of stress occurring, even though the reality was that stressful experiences were thrust upon them as a part of their job. This meant that organisational intervention was essential:

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"... partly as a direct support to officers under stress, partly as a means of teaching officers individual skills to cope with the effects of stress and partly to strengthen social support networks (through such strategies as increasing spouse understanding of police work, making sure that there is an understanding supervisor, and developing a peer counselling network)." 337 It was also recognised by the Task Force that negative consequences of stress could include the development of physical disorders; impaired work performance and low morale; and emotional and personal problems resulting in divorce, alcoholism and even suicide. The Report also noted past ambivalence amongst police officers about counselling. Confession of stress was seen as tantamount to personal weakness and once known, was believed to jeopardise promotion. It was noted that there was then increasing acceptance of counselling as an appropriate means of managing stress and that police officers needed to be taught how to recognise when they needed help, and where they should go to access it. 338 Evidence given by various officers was consistent with these Task Force findings. Even senior officers took the view that seeking counselling portrayed weakness which could impact promotion. The Police Service was undoubtedly aware of these beliefs in 1995. Mr Reeves' appointment to the FEA as its staff officer, was a part of the proactive approach then being adopted to ensure that officers identified as being at risk of psychological injury received appropriate support from a senior officer and were referred for assistance in accordance with operating policies. The rehabilitation policy thus required such staff officers to seek employee participation in rehabilitation programmes. The establishment of a case management file by the Rehabilitation Co-coordinator was provided for. The identification of suitable duties in the workplace depended on accurate assessment of medical conditions and prognosis for recovery. This also required consultation with Local Commanders/managers. This role increased for Mr Reeves during the Royal Commission process. 339 In Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; (2001) 207 CLR 562 the High Court observed at 576:

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Mr Reeves' duties as a police officer and his involvem e nt in the Royal Commission 346 The way in which the Police Service responded to the Royal Commission was a political matter in respect of which it owed police officers no duty of care. Nevertheless, there can be no question that in all of the work which it required Mr Reeves to perform, including that of staff officer of the FEA and in the investigation which it instigated into Mr Haken's evidence before the Royal Commission, the Police Service did owe Mr Reeves a duty of care. The evidence showed that the Royal Commission had various impact on Police Service operations and the duties which police officers there required to perform. That did not dilute the duties which police officers were owed. 347 What happened to Mr Reeves in 1995 when he was required to undertake the Haken investigation lies at the heart of the contest here between the parties. That resulted in Mr Reeves himself coming to the attention of the Royal Commission. The circumstances were unquestionably rather unusual. 348 The Police Service could not control what the Police Royal Commission did or what publicity its activities received. As the defendant argued, this was a highly charged and difficult situation, political in the sense discussed in New South Wales v Rogerson [2007] NSWCA 346; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-926 at [22] - [24]. The decision not to give any further explanation into the decision to investigate Mr Haken's evidence after Mr Lysaught's evidence had received extensive publicity, but Mr Finnane's explanation had received none, was no doubt a decision influenced by political factors and constraints. These were matters about which the Police Service was undoubtedly aware and could have dealt with in a number of ways, as it wished, consistently with the legislative scheme. 349 The evidence showed that Mr Reeves was then respected as a police officer of the highest integrity. The result of the investigation which he was directed to undertake into Mr Haken's evidence, for the purpose of the evidence in reply which the Police Service later proposed to call before the Royal Commission, changed that situation to Mr Reeves' considerable detriment, finally at the cost of his health. 350 The defendant's case was that it owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in relation to the Royal Commission's work, or what occurred to him as the result of being called before the Commission. It was Mr Lysaught, not the Police Service, who gave evidence before the Royal Commission about the investigation in which Mr Reeves was involved. The result was that Mr Reeves' reputation was impugned by the publicity which Mr Lysaught's evidence received and he was himself then called before the Royal Commission. The Police Service owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in relation to any of these matters. 351 The case so advanced may not be accepted. What the defendant's arguments overlook is the duty of care which the Police Service owed Mr Reeves in relation to the duties which it required him to undertake and which he had a statutory obligation to pursue. It had itself already identified the psychological risk to which police officers would be subjected, if their integrity was called into question when called before the Royal Commission. That risk was perceived to be so significant that a special welfare unit had been established to support such officers, which was required to maintain records of those called before the Royal Commission and the assistance they were provided. It was a part of Mr Reeves' duties as FEA staff officer, to monitor such police officers but he himself was not the subject of such monitoring, even when it was the Police Service itself which brought him to the Royal Commissioner's adverse attention. 352 It was the Police Service itself which decided to investigate the evidence which Mr Haken had given before the Royal Commission, in order that its response could be prepared, without the Police Commissioner first making an arrangement with the Royal Commission about that inquiry. It was this decision which brought Mr Reeves to the attention of the Royal Commission and called his integrity into question. That was why Mr Reeves received 'adverse attention' from the Royal Commission, when it became aware of the Haken investigation. That was one of the things about which Mr Lysaught came to be asked, when he was called before the Commission. 353 The Haken investigation was plainly viewed as inappropriate. Mutual arrangements had earlier been made between the Royal Commission and the Police Commissioner in relation to the investigation of other matters being dealt with by the Royal Commission. This investigation was undertaken at the direction of Mr Finnane and Mr Donaldson. It was evident that there was suspicion that it resulted from the activities of corrupt police officers, a suspicion which was pursued by Justice Wood when he questioned Mr Lysaught. Given the relationship which existed between Mr Lysaught and Mr Donaldson, who himself was identified as a corrupt police officer, the reason for this questioning is apparent. There was no suggestion that Mr Reeves had any knowledge of these matters, but that he also became the subject of suspicion as a result, is apparent. 354 The day after Mr Lysaught gave his evidence, when Mr Finnane appeared to explain what the Police Service had done, the Royal Commission's view that the investigation was inappropriate was revealed. Despite Mr Finnane's explanation, its suspicions were then pursued, with very detrimental consequences for Mr Reeves. 355 Justice Wood's questioning of Mr Lysaught received considerable media interest. That also proved to be to Mr Reeves' detriment, through no fault of his own. He was portrayed as having an involvement in an investigation which Mr Lysaught wrongly claimed to have undertaken. While Mr Finnane explained that this was not so, his explanation received no publicity. 356 Mr Finnane offered to provide a statutory declaration from Mr Reeves to explain to the Royal Commission his role in what the Police Service had undertaken. Thereby, his involvement in the Royal Commission was clearly sealed. Soon afterwards Mr Reeves was issued with a s 6 notice and he was called before the Commission. 357 That the Police Service owed Mr Reeves a duty of care in relation to the duties which it had given him in connection with its appearance before the Royal Commission, cannot be doubted. There can also be no doubt that it was by its actions that the Police Service brought Mr Reeves to the Royal Commission's adverse attention and put his integrity into doubt. 358 In coming to this conclusion it may not to be overlooked that Mr Reeves' association with Mr Lysaught and Mr Donaldson was itself the result of the Police Service's ongoing failures. The Police Service had appointed Mr Lysaught to head the FEA in 1994 and earlier, to occupy the senior position which he held at the DEA, where Mr Reeves had first met him. Mr Reeves reported to Mr Lysaught in both agencies. Assistant Commissioner Donaldson had been appointed to even higher office. Police officers such as Mr Reeves, who were appointed to positions in which they had to report to corrupt officers more senior to them, can hardly be thought to have put themselves into that situation. The very point of the establishment of the Royal Commission was to deal with the failure of the Police Service itself to deal with this problem. 359 So far as Mr Reeves was concerned, his position was that dictated by s 201 of the Police Service Act 1990. As Gummow and Hayne J observed in Fahy at [71] :

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The consequences of the duties Mr Reeves was given, including in relation to the promotion process 361 The Alpha Report had made it apparent that allegations of corruption placed Police Officers under considerable stress. This was, no doubt, part of the explanation for the Police Service response to the establishment of the Royal Commission. Police officers were to be subjected to a very public investigation of such allegations, allegations which it was known were sometimes made maliciously by criminals. What the Police Service thus faced included the possibility that it would have to support officers who were not corrupt, but who became the subject of investigation and were thereby detrimentally affected. 362 In Mr Reeves' case, Mr Lysaught's evidence generated considerable media attention. There was no publicity given to Mr Finnane's explanation of Mr Reeves' situation. The suggestion that Mr Reeves had been involved in an investigation which Mr Lysaught, a corrupt police officer, had undertaken into a Royal Commission witness thus remained publicly uncontradicted. Notwithstanding this situation and despite having set up mechanisms to support police officers who came to the attention of the Royal Commission, they were not implemented for Mr Reeves. He had to continue his work of monitoring and supporting other police officers involved in the Royal Commission, but received no such support himself. 363 For his part Mr Reeves had accepted Mr Finnane's assurance that there would be no negative consequences for him from Mr Lysaught's evidence and so he made no complaints, even though there were ongoing, difficult repercussions from the situation into which he had been placed by the Police Service, particularly at work. Mr Finnane's assurance was not made good, either immediately when Mr Reeves was the subject of humiliating treatment by other police officers with whom he worked and later, when the Police Board came to question Mr Reeves' integrity and the information which the Police Board sought of it. 364 Undeniably the decision made to refuse to recommend Mr Reeves' appointment to the LEA to the Minister, was that of the Police Board pursuant to the statutory process established by the Police Board Act. That was not a decision which the Police Service could control. What it could control was the actions which it took, given the consequences which had resulted from the decision to conduct the Haken enquiry. 365 The way in which Mr Reeves was being treated at work was no secret and not something from which the Police Service was removed. The FEA was described as being in chaos after Mr Lysaught was identified as a corrupt officer involved in an investigation into a Royal Commission witness and suspended. Mr Reeves was suspected by other officers of being involved in corruption. The Police Board's later decision to refuse Mr Reeves the LEA promotion resulted from a process from which the Police Service was not removed. To the contrary, having provided an insufficient s94A report to the Police Board, the Police Service became directly involved when the Police Board sought further information from it about Mr Reeves being called before the Royal Commission. The Police Service not only then provided a second s 94A report, but also other information. 366 In that situation, that the Police Service owed Mr Reeves a duty of care in respect of the actions which it took must be accepted. 367 It was the Police Service itself which had put Mr Reeves in the position where he had come to the adverse attention of the Royal Commission because of the duties which it had assigned him, in order that it could advance its case before the Royal Commission, with the result that his integrity was called into question by the Royal Commission and by other police officers. While the Police Service did not itself publicise Mr Lysaught's evidence, it was aware of the consequences of the duties it had assigned Mr Reeves. Even so, when it provided the Police Board with further information, it provided no frank account of how it had caused Mr Reeves to come to the adverse attention of the Royal Commission. That it owed a duty to Mr Reeves in the circumstances which arose, must be accepted.

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Contempt of the Royal Commission and the creation of precedents 368 Mr Reeves being adversely affected by these events was entirely predictable. Nevertheless it was the defendant's case that it was not a matter for it to protect Mr Reeves' reputation from defamatory publications and their consequences. His remedy lay in defamation. It had no duty to protect him from the consequences of the publicity which Mr Lysaught's evidence received. 369 It was also argued that the defendant could have been liable for contempt of court if it had published statements concerning Mr Reeves, which could have been seen as interfering with the conduct of the Royal Commission, in the sense of detracting from the status and authority of the Commission's proceedings. Statements of his innocence fell within the scope of that concept (see Director of Public Prosecutions v Wran and Anor (1987) 7 NSWLR 616 at 627.) 370 These submissions must be considered in context. The view taken by the Police Service at the time it instigated the investigation into Mr Haken's evidence was that it involved no contempt of the Royal Commission. When the media reports inaccurately portrayed Mr Reeves' involvement, reflective of Mr Lysaught's evidence and no publicity was given to Mr Finnane's explanation, how the Police Service responded was a matter for it. The Royal Commission had made no orders under s 127 of the Royal Commission (Police Service) Act in relation to these matters. 371 Undoubtedly, once Mr Reeves' situation at work became apparent, with the consequences which Mr Reeves and other witnesses described, the Police Service had a duty of care towards Mr Reeves. Had it wished to do so, the Police Service could have informed other officers of the accurate position, namely that Mr Reeves had been required to undertake an investigation into Mr Haken's evidence, which had not been instigated by Mr Lysaught. This could not conceivably have involved any contempt of the Royal Commission. An accurate statement about the investigation which the Police Service had undertaken, would have of itself supported Mr Reeves. 372 The defendant argued, nevertheless, that against the background of the Royal Commission and the level of corruption which had then obviously been demonstrated at very high levels of the Police Service, it would have set a dangerous precedent for the Commissioner of Police, or some other senior officer, to commit himself to making statements about the integrity of a particular officer, while the Royal Commission was still conducting its enquiry. The result would have been other officers making similar demands. 373 There was no evidence that any other police officer was placed into the position in which the Police Service had placed Mr Reeves. What this submission overlooked was that it was the Police Service which had put Mr Reeves into this very difficult situation, different to that of other officers who came to the attention of the Royal Commission. It was undoubtedly also a difficult situation for the Police Service, given the extraordinary decision which it had made, to investigate Mr Haken's evidence. The consequences of that decision were no doubt not only problematic for Mr Reeves. The defendant led no evidence about these matters, but from the evidence and the submissions advanced it appears that the result, seemingly, of a concern not to create precedents, the Police Service did nothing to assist Mr Reeves with the stressful situation in which he had been placed at work, when Mr Lysaught's evidence was publicised, but Mr Finnane's explanation was not. Taking steps to deal with the way in which Mr Reeves was being treated at work could not conceivably have involved any contempt of the Royal Commission. Nor could the provision of accurate information to the Police Board.

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Intersection between the claimed duty and the law of defamation 374 In Sullivan v Moody, the High Court had to consider the existence and nature or scope of a duty of care in a novel case, where, the fathers of children who had been examined for sexual abuse sued for damages in negligence in the conduct of those examinations. No duty of care was found to exist, even though the foreseeability of harm flowing from want of care exercised in the examination of the children was accepted. It was observed that foreseeability of harm alone was not a basis upon which a duty of care could be found. Attention also had to be given to the need to preserve the coherence of other legal principles, or of the statutory scheme which governed the relationship. An intersection between the law of defamation, available to resolve the competing interests between the parties as to the communication of information by the respondents to the appellants and third parties, was concluded in the circumstances there arising to have the result that no duty of care existed in relation to the communication of the information in question. 375 In this case, while a general duty of care to Mr Reeves was acknowledged, the complaints advanced were argued by the defendant in part to be complaints concerned with the communication of information about the Police Royal Commission by the media. It was argued that the defendant owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in relation to such communications. His remedy in relation to such communications lay in the law of defamation. 376 I am not able to accept that submission. The media portrayal of Mr Reeves' involvement in the investigation into Mr Haken's evidence was known to the Police Service to be false. That was what Mr Finnane told the Royal Commission. While the false report had received significant publicity, the correction did not. 377 While it may be accepted that the Police Service owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in relation to publicly given to Mr Lysaught's false evidence, that it owed Mr Reeves no duty in relation to what it had done to bring him to the adverse attention of the Royal Commission, where his integrity was called into question, does not follow. Nor does it follow that it owed him no duty of care in relation to the position he was placed in at work with other police officers and the treatment which resulted. The conduct of other police officers was under its direct control. 378 That there would be stressful consequences for Mr Reeves of having his integrity called into public question before the Royal Commission, was foreseen. The Police Service itself put Mr Reeves into that position, with the result considerable damage to his reputation amongst other serving police officers, which finally left him in a situation where his integrity came to be called into question by the Police Board. That was a situation into which the Police Service itself had placed Mr Reeves, a senior, long serving police officer to whom the Police Service had an ongoing duty of care. 379 These are circumstances far removed from those considered in Sullivan v Moody. Here there was no intersection between the law of defamation and the duty of care which the Police Service acknowledged that it had to Mr Reeves in relation to the duties which it required him to undertake. The circumstances are more akin to those considered in Spring v Guardian Assurance PLC [1995] 2 AC 296; [1994] 3 ALL ER 129, where a duty of care was accepted as falling on an employer who provided a reference in respect of an employee. That situation was also accepted as one not concerning damage to reputation and questions of defamation, but rather one where the law of negligence demanded that reasonable care in preparation of the reference be taken. (See Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; 198 CLR 180 at [269] - [271]). In Stewart v Ronalds and Another (2009) 259 ALR 86; [2009] NSWCA 277 it was observed by Hodgson JA:

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After the promotion was refused - alleged inconsistency with the hurt on duty scheme 381 It was the defendant's case that the Police Service owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in respect of the way in which it dealt with him after his promotion was refused by the Police Board. That included how it treated him while he was absent on sick leave, when its policies envisaged that he would be supported in various ways, which were not forthcoming. In relation to rehabilitation, the defendant's case was that such a duty would be inconsistent with the administration of the hurt on duty scheme established under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act and the Workers Compensation Act. 382 I am unable to accept the defendant's arguments. That the Police Service owed Mr Reeves a duty of care, when the Police Commissioner invited him to make a representation about the Police Board's rejection of his promotion application must be accepted, in the circumstances in which he had been placed. Having failed to give him any reply, that the Police Service owed him a duty of care when he took sick leave in order to obtain treatment for the stress to which he was succumbing, must also follow. 383 The defendant relied by analogy on State of New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235; (2002) 60 NSWLR 371, where intersection between the law of negligence, judicial review of administrative action and the law of contract, as modified by statute with respect to wrongful dismissal, was considered to argue that it owed not such duty. There the complaint related to the failure to provide a safe system of work of investigation and decision making with respect to procedures for discipline and the termination of employment under the Teaching Services (Education Teaching Service) Act 1980 and the Teaching Services (Education Teaching Service) Regulation 1994. It was concluded that close consideration had to be given to this statutory scheme and whether or not the claimed common law duty was inconsistent with it. It was concluded that a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the claimed duty did not exist, was the view that the effect of imposing civil liability was to distort the focus of the statutory scheme, (at [93]). 384 To my mind the claimed distortion does not here arise. The defendant conducted its case, up until final submissions, on the basis of an admission that its rehabilitation policy applied to Mr Reeves. The admission was properly made. That policy was provided by the defendant in answer to a subpoena requiring the production of the policies which applied to Mr Reeves prior to his medical discharge. He was then the FEA staff officer. It was his understanding that the policy applied to him. The failure to apply it was a matter of ongoing complaint. Other policies envisaged that support would be provided to police officer's families. Mr Peterson's investigation of Mrs Reeves' complaints supported Mr Reeves' understanding that the rehabilitation policy applied to him. 385 Mr Peterson concluded that Mr Reeves had a proper foundation for various of his complaints, including in relation to rehabilitation. The evidence also showed that rehabilitation was recommended by the Police Service's medical advisers, consistently with the rehabilitation policy. While their advice was not taken up, at no time was it ever suggested that the rehabilitation policy did not apply to Mr Reeves, or that Dr Westerink's views precluded implementation of the policy. To the contrary, albeit belatedly and without consultation with Mr Reeves, as ought to have occurred under the policy, the possibility of rehabilitation was finally explored by the Police Service in the latter half of 1998, but was not pursued as it ought to have been. While Dr Westerink did not consider a return to police work a possibility, a return to other work, as the policy also envisaged, was. 386 That there is no inconsistency between the duty of care claimed in respect of the rehabilitation policy and other welfare policies and the hurt on duty scheme administered by the Police Service under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act is apparent. They are each concerned with supporting injured police officers in a return to work. 387 The rehabilitation policy did not confine itself to rehabilitation to the officer's former position, or to even work in the Police Service. Section 11A of the Workers Compensation Act, which applied to Mr Reeves as the result of provision made in the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act, and on which reliance was placed by the Police Service in refusing Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application for psychological injury, itself encompassed the possibility of such a return to work. 388 On the evidence rehabilitation, so that there can be a return to work, can commence with rehabilitation undertaken before any return to work is attempted and on return, does not necessarily involve a return to the former position, particularly in the first instance. Section 11A of the Workers Compensation Act expressly deals with reasonable action taken by an employer with respect to transfer and employment benefits, amongst other matters. Section 11A provided that: "11A No compensation for psychological injury caused by reasonable actions of employer

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(b) court proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of the claim until subsection (7) is complied with." 389 Section 11A thus itself contemplated actions taken by an employer in facilitating a return to work under a rehabilitation programme, by transfer to a position with appropriate duties for the injured employee. It may be that the rehabilitation policy which facilitated this was an employment benefit for Mr Reeves, even if not a term of his contract of employment, as was also argued. It is unnecessary to decide this question. 390 It follows that under the hurt on duty scheme established by the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act, consistently with s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act, reasonable actions taken by the Police Service in relation to the implementation of the policy, including transferring a police officer to other work, did not provide a basis for compensation for psychological injury which might result. Liability for unreasonable actions remained. 391 For the Police Service s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act reinforced what the Alpha Report had earlier shown as to risks of injury to which police officers could be subjected by various types of stressors. 392 The Police Service had devised a rehabilitation policy which applied to officers such as Mr Reeves, which accorded not only with the provisions of s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act and the hurt on duty scheme under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act, but also with its obligations under other legislation such as Occupational Health and Safety Act. 393 That can not have removed or diminished the duty of care which it owed Mr Reeves, as to the provision of support while he was absent on sick leave. It was well understood that the absence of such support increased the likelihood of psychological injury. That was the purpose for which the Police Service had implemented a range of welfare policies, namely to provide injured officers and those at risk of injury with support. 394 Contrary to the defendant's argument, it is apparent as a matter of logic that there was no inconsistency or conflict between the Police Service's duty of care in relation to the implementation of its rehabilitation and other welfare policies and the hurt on duty scheme. Each contemplated that rehabilitation would be pursued, with the aim of an eventual return to work, within the Police Force, or outside it. Similarly, neither inconsistency, nor distortion of the focus of the statutory scheme could result from the imposition of the civil liability claimed in relation to the failure to provide the support contemplated by policies such as the rehabilitation policy. Each is concerned with the Police Service taking available steps to support injured police officers who need rehabilitation and to ensure that they are not further injured, by a withholding of such support. 395 Mr Peterson's investigations and the failures which were then uncovered amply revealed the Police Service's failure to implement its policies, inconsistently with its duty of care to Mr Reeves and the hurt on duty scheme itself. The defendant also argued that the refusal of Mr Reeves' hurt on duty application and the claims made for meeting the cost of his treatment, were appropriate responses, given the Police Service's obligations to assess hurt on duty claims which police officers make. 396 The submission overlooked a number of things revealed by the evidence. Firstly, that consideration of the application was inordinately delayed, without apparent good reason, as Mr Peterson's investigations showed. Secondly, that when consideration was given to the hurt on duty application, the Police Service ignored Dr Lewin's and Mr Glancey's advice as to the causes of Mr Reeves' psychological injury and that even in relation to the consideration given to the refusal of Mr Reeves' promotion, in respect of which the Police Board's approach was considered by the Police Service to have been reasonable, the decision rested on a factually inaccurate understanding of what the Police Board had done. It also gave no consideration to what the Police Service itself had done in relation to the promotion application, that being the focus of s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act on which reliance was placed. That required a consideration both of the information which the Police Service had provided to the Police Board when sought of it and later, after the promotion had been refused, the Commissioner inviting a representation from Mr Reeves about his promotion, but failing then to respond to it. No consideration was given to whether these actions were reasonable in the circumstances. Plainly they were not. 397 The defendant also relied on State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12; (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-826, where the Court of Appeal had to consider a case where a police officer had developed PTSD after being shot at during a siege. The trial judge had concluded that the NSW Police were aware that the officer may have required welfare assistance and that there was an obligation, if not to refer the respondent for mandatory counselling, to at least notify the Police Welfare Branch and have an officer attend and provide the necessary assistance. The existence of that duty was not challenged on appeal. What was in issue was whether there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of psychiatric harm in relation to the incident; whether the NSW Police had breached their duty of care; and whether the breach caused any loss to Mr Burton. On appeal it was concluded that the risk was foreseeable, there had been a breach and the officer was deprived of a chance for a better outcome. 398 In my view the obligation recognised in Burton in relation to the respondent's welfare policy is no different to that claimed in this case in relation to the defendant's other policies, including the rehabilitation policy. 399 The defendant also relied on Rogerson, where the Court of Appeal concluded that a failure to take action on a trivial complaint which required no response under s 139 of the Police Service Act was a decision for the Police Commissioner and his delegates and not a matter for courts. By way of contrast, Mr Reeves' complaint was not a complaint about the conduct of a particular officer, but a complaint about the failure of the Police Service to adhere to its welfare pollices. When investigated by Mr Peterson the complaint was not found to be trivial, but rather serious and substantiated. Unlike Rogerson, the conclusions reached by Mr Peterson evidenced breach of duties which the Police Service owed Mr Reeves. 400 I am satisfied that the Police Service owed Mr Reeves a duty of care in relation to the way in which it dealt with him after he took sick leave, when it was known that he had suffered a psychological injury and required the support which the Police Service's policies envisaged would be given to police officers in such a situation, including in relation to rehabilitation. It owed him a duty of care to ensure that he received such support.

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The incidents in March and May 1998 401 It was the defendant's case that because Mr Reeves was on sick leave when these incidents occurred, the Police Service owed him no duty of care, relying on Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 All ER 238. He was then acting as a private citizen. The submission may not be accepted. 402 While absent on sick leave Mr Reeves was still a serving police officer. Police officers have powers and duties which they may exercise, even when off duty, by virtue of their office, both at common law and under statute. They also have a discretion as to when to exercise such powers (see State of NSW v Tyszyk [2008] NSWCA 107). Being absent from duty on sick leave is undoubtedly a matter which would influence a police officer's decision as to whether or not to exercise such a function or power, in particular circumstances which prevent themselves. 403 The prevention and detection of crime is what lies at the heart of a police officer's powers and duties, as does dealing with breaches of the peace. In March 1998 Mr Reeves was accosted in a context which he believed was connected with the evidence he was about to give in a drug trial, even though he was then on sick leave. That undoubtedly involved a breach of the peace, in the way discussed in State of New South Wales v Kuru [2007] NSWCA 141; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-893 where Ipp JA said at [149]: "A breach of the peace occurs when an act "either actually harms a person, or in his presence, his property, or is likely to cause such harm, which puts someone in fear of such harm being done": R v Howell (Errol) [1982] QB 416 at 427 per Watkins LJ, in delivering the judgment of the English Court of Appeal. This statement of the law was followed by the English Court of Appeal in Addison v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2004] 1 WLR 29 at 30 to 31. See also Nicholson v Avon [1991] 1 VR 212 at 222." 404 This no doubt explains why the Police Service accepted the hurt on duty applications which Mr Reeves made in relation to this incident and that which occurred later in May 1998. Then Mr Reeves accosted people he thought were breaking into a building. Neither was unconnected with his police work. A serving police officer may deal with offenders whom they encounter, even when not on duty. The Police Service did not relieve Mr Reeves of that duty while on sick leave, at a time when it was known that he was already seriously ill and consequently known to be at risk of further psychiatric injury. 405 It follows that Mr Reeves was also owed a duty of care in the circumstances which arose in March and May 1998.

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The staff officer duties 414 The evidence was that the Police Royal Commission had an extraordinary impact on the operations of the Police Service and its officers, in a variety of ways. Not only were corrupt officers thereby investigated, identified and publicly exposed, even at the highest levels of the Police Service, many other officers became involved in the Royal Commission's investigations and hearings. 415 The evidence showed that at a practical level, the Police Service still had to continue conducting its normal operations, notwithstanding the disruption caused by its officers, including senior officers, being interviewed, called before the Royal Commission and providing other assistance. A direct consequence of this for other serving officers, including Mr Reeves, was that they were required to work long hours and to act in other senior positions, while the occupants of those positions were involved with the Royal Commission. As a result senior officers such as Mr Reeves were working under difficult conditions. 416 Mr Reeves, as the FEA's staff officer, also had to contend with an increasing workload in his normal duties, as the direct result of the Royal Commission, because he had to deal with those officers adversely affected by their involvement in the Royal Commission. The Police Service had recognised that officers were thereby put at risk of psychological injury. It had told officers they would be supported and had established a special welfare unit to provide such support. Because of his role Mr Reeves was particularly aware of these initiatives, involved in their implementation and in the provision of support to affected officers and their families. 417 Consistently with his general approach to his duties, Mr Reeves undertook this aspect of his work conscientiously. Mr Reeves was not then perceived by the Police Service as acting beyond his duties. His work was known and appreciated. Unsurprisingly some officers, such as Mr Monaci, Mr Davis and Detective Senior Sergeant Krawczyk, required less assistance than others. Mr Reeves reported his ongoing activities at staff meetings of senior FEA officers. He was friends with some of those whom he assisted, such as Mr Packer. He even assisted some officers not then at the FEA, including Mr Valente, while he was on sick leave. 418 The evidence showed that the monitoring role which Mr Reeves was performing was not necessarily wanted or even understood by those for whom he was responsible. Mr Packer, who Mr Reeves went to see after he went off work in April 1996, for example, did not perceive Mr Reeves as providing him with any such assistance, although he conceded that Mr Reeves had probably contacted him in the performance of his role as staff officer. This attitude was consistent with the evidence of the medical experts that those suffering from psychological injury are not themselves necessarily best placed to recognise their need for help or treatment, or to seek it. This no doubt helps explain the creation of the staff officer role. 419 Mr Packer was of the view that he had not ever received welfare assistance from the Police Service and had not discussed it with Mr Reeves, even though the records showed that when he went on sick leave, he had undertaken to make contact with Welfare and he had been directed to see the Psychologist Jan Westerink, by Assistant Commissioner Nixon. He did so, but did not return to see her. In cross examination, Mr Packer explained his sceptical view of welfare available from the Police Service and the professionally damaging consequences for a police officer who sought it. That attitude was consistent with the findings of the Alpha Report, with the evidence of other officers such as Mr Laney and the evidence of the consequences for Mr Reeves of his pursuit of such help. 420 It was an attitude on Mr Packer's part which, no doubt, reflected his history in the Police Service. He was involved in a serious incident in 1984 at the Spit Bridge in which a number of hostages had been taken and in which his partner was shot and he shot the assailant. It was Mr Packer's belief that his distraught reaction to that incident and the assistance which he sought in its aftermath had impacted negatively on his promotion within the Police Service. He also gave evidence of having been involved in another later shooting incident and being unable to speak to anyone senior to him about his reactions. 421 That Mr Packer's impressions were an accurate reflection of what occurred to him was undoubtedly possible, given other evidence about attitudes in the Police Service at the time. So far as these proceedings are concerned, however, what Mr Packer's evidence showed was that even those with whom Mr Reeves was friends and who he was attempting to deal with in the performance of his staff officer duties, did not necessarily welcome or understand what he was doing. Consistently with the views expressed by the medical experts, this cannot have been an easy role. 422 The evidence showed that Mr Reeves also discussed with Mr Packer his own involvement in the Police Royal Commission. That is not surprising, given that they were friends, worked together and that Mr Packer was also given a s 6 notice in relation to his connection with Mr Lysaught and in relation to Operation Azure. Mr Packer had driven Mr Lysaught to the Royal Commission on the day that he was called to give evidence. Mr Packer was the officer in control of Operation Azure. Mr Packer later made a hurt on duty application and eventually retired from the Police Service, after giving evidence before the Royal Commission about that Operation, learning that he was to be involved in another investigation into that Operation and that he would also again be called to give evidence in Supreme Court proceedings about the Spit Bridge incident, in which, once again, he would have to relive that incident. 423 Mr Reeves also found being called before the Royal Commission personally distressing, but still he had to assist other officers also affected by their involvement before the Royal Commission, in his role as staff officer. 424 On the evidence it must be accepted that it was foreseeable that Mr Reeves was thereby put at risk of injury. This was not, as the defendant argued, a case like that dealt with by the High Court in Koehler. There is no question that Mr Reeves agreed to perform the staff officer duties and that he did so without any difficulty, or complaint, until his own involvement in the Royal Commission. The decision in Koehler hinged on two factors. Firstly, that the applicant had agreed to perform the duties in question and the second, that there was no reason to suspect that the appellant was at risk of psychiatric injury (at [27]). That is not this case. 425 Despite having recognised that involvement in the Royal Commission put officers at risk of injury, having itself required Mr Reeves to undertake an investigation which called his integrity into question and bought him to the adverse attention of the Royal Commission, evidently no thought was given by the Police Service to the impact which his own resulting involvement in the Royal Commission might have on Mr Reeves' performance of what was no doubt an increasingly challenging role in the staff officer position. The kind of support which Mr Packer received when called before the Royal Commission, for example, was not given to Mr Reeves. 426 That Mr Reeves himself being called before the Royal Commission gave the Police Service reason to suspect that his staff officer duties might place him at risk of injury must be accepted. Mr Reeves had the task of monitoring the welfare of those who came before the Royal Commission. Some officers were very detrimentally affected. One committed suicide, another attempted it. When the head of the FEA was identified as corrupt and those who worked with him came under investigation, others at the FEA were affected, including Mr Reeves himself. What's more, in his case, that was the direct result of the Police Service itself instructing Mr Reeves to conduct the Haken inquiry. 427 While I do not take the view, on the evidence, that the staff officer role was the major cause of the injury which Mr Reeves suffered, that it was a contributing factor which the Police Service should have foreseen, must be accepted. 428 As Dr Phillips explained, the problem for Mr Reeves was not the making of enquiries of other officers as to whether assistance or referral was required, it was the response which his enquiries engendered, which Mr Reeves could not control and which had the capacity to do him harm, particularly once he himself had became embroiled in the Royal Commission. 429 Over time, Mr Reeves became increasingly affected by this aspect of his work. He perceived that his role was to provide welfare support to the officers whom he was assisting. One FEA officer committed suicide during this period. Mr Reeves later spoke at his funeral. It was the defendant's case that this was not his role and that he had gone beyond what his position description required of him. There was, however, no evidence called from any police officer, especially not any officer senior to Mr Reeves, to suggest that this was a perception held by the Police Service at the time. The evidence of those who were called was to the contrary, namely that Mr Reeves' efforts in this role were reported and were appreciated by other senior officers. 430 Mr Reeves had not been given any training for these functions. The view of the medical experts was that Mr Reeves may have become over involved in welfare duties, beyond his job description. There was no evidence to that effect given by any member of the Police Service. Nor was there any suggestion that his performance of this task had any negative effect on any of his other duties. To the contrary, until those duties came to overwhelm him, after his own involvement in the Royal Commission, he was highly regarded for his work. The medical experts certainly had the view that the role had a deleterious effect on Mr Reeves and that there was training which he could have been given, in boundary management, for example, which might have had some beneficial effect which would have assisted him to resist injury. 431 It was also argued by the defendant that because of Mr Reeves' personality, even if given training he would still have become over involved in distressing events, particularly with his friends. I do not accept that submission in the face of the evidence of Mr Reeves' success in his career in the Police Service. Had his personality been such that he was incapable of adhering to training which he was given, that career would not have flourished as it did. On the evidence it would have been consistent with Mr Reeves' character; his success to that point and his further ambitions, to adhere to such training, had he received it. 432 It was apparent that there was training, support and assistance which the Police Service could have provided Mr Reeves but did not. I am satisfied that it was shown to have been reasonably foreseeable that absent such measures being taken, that Mr Reeves might suffer the injury which he sustained.

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434 This submission and others like it highlight a real difficulty inherent in the defendant's case. 435 Officers such as Superintendent Hansen, Mr Steer and Mr Laney, who all worked with Mr Reeves at the FEA gave evidence of Mr Reeves in only the most glowing of terms, as did the other officers who had worked with him. Written references were all to similar effect. 436 That Mr Lysaught had been appointed to the position of Commander of the FEA, even though he was corrupt, was not the result of anything which Mr Reeves did or failed to do. Mr Reeves sought appointment to the FEA staff officer position, a promotion which he achieved on merit and to which he successfully resisted a challenge before GREAT. In 1994, Mr Lysaught supported him in that application, as he had supported the application of other officers appointed to the FEA and as Superintendent Hansen had supported Mr Reeves in his application to the FEA in 1994 and the LEA in 1996. Mr Reeves had met Mr Lysaught when he worked with him at the DEA. They had developed a good working relationship. Mr Lysaught appears to have relied on him and valued his work. That was consistent with the evidence of Mr Reeves' success in his career. That his qualities were appreciated by a police officer who proved to be corrupt, did not suggest that Mr Reeves was himself corrupt, or that he knew about Mr Lysaught. The evidence suggested that he did not. 437 That Mr Reeves was promoted to positions where he was required to report to a corrupt commander, was not as the result of his failings. Responsibility for this situation lies with the Police Service. It was, after all, the failure to identify and deal with officers such as Mr Lysaught that the Police Royal Commission was established to deal with. 438 That Mr Reeves came to be involved in the Police Royal Commission, when it became aware of the Police Service investigation into Mr Haken's evidence was again not the result of his actions, or decisions. Decisions made by the Police Service placed Mr Reeves into the undeniably stressful situation of having his integrity called into question before the Royal Commission, as the result of the investigation which he had a statutory obligation to undertake. That was a situation which could be foreseen to have put him at risk of injury. 439 It was the defendant's case that it was not responsible for the evidence which Mr Lysaught gave before the Royal Commission; his evidence may not have been strictly inaccurate and that it owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in respect of that evidence. 440 It may be accepted that the Police Service could not foresee or control what evidence a corrupt police officer such as Mr Lysaught might give, when called before the Royal Commission. It may also be accepted that the Police Service could not control what publicity his evidence received, although it was well aware of the media interest in the Royal Commission proceedings. What it did by way of response to developments before the Royal Commission which impacted its police officers was, however, entirely within its control. 441 Thus it was that Mr Finnane advanced an explanation to the Royal Commission of the investigation which the Police Service had instigated and Mr Reeves' involvement. In the face of that explanation and Mr Reeves' evidence, it may not be accepted that Mr Lysaught gave truthful evidence. To the contrary, as Mr Finnane submitted to the Royal Commission, it was inaccurate. It was the Police Service, not Mr Lysaught who had determined to undertake the Haken investigation and had instructed Mr Reeves in its pursuit, through Mr Donaldson and Mr Finnane. 442 The Police Service could not control what publicity events before the Royal Commission received. It was undoubtedly aware that Mr Finnane's explanation received none. In these circumstances, that it was foreseeable that the consequence of not explaining even to other police officers or the Police Board how Mr Reeves had come to have his integrity called into question before the Royal Commission, as the result of the duties which the Police Service gave him when it decided to investigate Mr Haken's evidence put him at risk of injury, must be accepted. Not only was that foreseeable, it had been foreseen and steps had been taken to provide support to police officers who found themselves in that situation. That support was not provided to Mr Reeves even when he was adversely affected at work. That too made the risk of injury foreseeable.

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2.2 The consequences of the Police Service's Haken investigation for Mr Reeves 443 When it became apparent that the Royal Commission proposed to pursue Mr Reeves in its investigation of the conduct of the Haken investigation, having put him in that position, the Police Service plainly had a duty of care to support him, given its earlier recognition that being called before the Royal Commission put police officers under stress which they might require assistance with. The Police Service had established a Unit to provide such assistance. None was provided to Mr Reeves. 444 That the Police Service investigations which Mr Reeves was required to pursue; how that investigation was later perceived by the Royal Commission when it became known and the result, being called himself before the Commission where his integrity was called into question, might be personally stressful and put Mr Reeves at risk of injury was readily foreseeable and, indeed, foreseen. 445 Mr Reeves was not present when Mr Lysaught gave evidence before the Royal Commission, he was advised by someone else that the investigation which he was undertaking had been raised and criticised. He then spoke to Mr Finnane, as he was instructed to do. Mr Reeves assured him that he would give the Royal Commission an explanation and that there would be no adverse consequences. 446 Mr Reeves did not read Mr Lysaught's evidence. He was affected by how he was then portrayed in the media the next day and subsequently and how this portrayal was perceived by others, as reflecting his involvement in Mr Lysaught's corrupt activities. The defendant submitted that in the circumstances it was not 'reasonable' for Mr Reeves 'to have been adversely affected by being named'. 447 The submission may not be accepted in the face of the evidence of other police officers and other witnesses as to their reaction to these events. They, too, understood the implication that Mr Reeves was corrupt. Mr Reeves' evidence that other officers as well as members of the wider community reacted in a way which had distressing results for him must be accepted. The medical experts certainly accepted that his reaction was real and an understandable one, given his personality and the position into which he had been placed. 448 A concern on the part of the Police Service not to create precedents may have been understandable, but provides no answer to the question of whether it was foreseeable that by withholding necessary support from Mr Reeves, given the position it had placed him in at work, where other officers understood he was corrupt, he was put at risk of psychological injury. That was unquestionably the case. Given the evidence of the atmosphere at the FEA at the time and how Mr Reeves was then treated by other officers, who shunned him, that cannot seriously be doubted. Having foreseen the difficult situation which would result for officers whose integrity was called into question by the Royal Commission, that the Police Service became aware of the situation which resulted for Mr Reeves cannot be doubted and yet he was provided no support. It must be concluded that it was foreseeable that thereby he was placed at risk of injury. 449 There was no evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that the Police Service was also aware of the difficult ramifications of what was occurring in Mr Reeves' outside life. That it was foreseen that there could be such repercussions, however, must be accepted, given the steps taken by the Police Service to provide police officers and their families with support, if they sought it.

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The failed LEA promotion application 450 As the defendant argued, it owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in the administration of the statutory procedures for promotion (see Rogerson at [26] per Handley JA). That the Police Service owed Mr Reeves no duty of care in respect of its involvement in his promotion application may not be accepted. This was a merits based system of promotion which, for officers of Mr Reeves' level of seniority, depended in part on the Police Service providing the Police Board with information about serving police officers who were applicants for promotion. The Police Service was, undoubtedly, obliged to provide accurate information under the statutory scheme. 451 In Mr Reeves' case the evidence showed that the information which was provided was incomplete. The s 94A report made no mention of Mr Reeves being called before the Royal Commission, as it ought to have done. That was widely known, in circumstances where it was also known that his integrity had been called into question, because of his involvement in the Haken investigation. Unsurprisingly the Police Board sought further information from the Police Service about those matters and the Police Service responded. 452 It was at that point that the Police Service failed in the duty which it owed Mr Reeves. What was required was a frank and accurate account of what it had done in relation to the investigation of Mr Haken's evidence and how that had resulted in Mr Reeves' integrity being called into question. Merely providing, as it did initially, extracts from parts of the evidence and transcript from the Royal Commission and later making a suggestion to the Police Board that it should itself speak to Mr Finnane about these matters, did not satisfy that duty. At the least an explanation from Mr Finnane should have been obtained and provided. That would have revealed, amongst other things, the assurance which he had given Mr Reeves as to the consequences of his involvement in the investigation. 453 The defendant submitted that the information put before the Police Board and Mr Reeves' response to the Board's invitation to make representations to it, put 'everything that it could have received to enable it to make a proper determination of Mr Reeves' involvement with the Police Royal Commission and other matters'. That submission may not be accepted. The crucial ingredient missing was an accurate and fair account from the Police Service as to its part in Mr Reeves' integrity being called into question before the Royal Commission. Had that been forthcoming, it would have necessarily supported Mr Reeves' submissions. 454 While the Police Service was undoubtedly not responsible for how Mr Reeves had been portrayed in the media, the way in which his integrity had come to be called into question was not a matter about which it had no concern or involvement. As became entirely apparent when the Police Board sought information about why Mr Reeves had been called before the Royal Commission, in the circumstances the Police Service had a duty to act in support of Mr Reeves, by providing an account of what it had done, which had resulted in his integrity being called into question. 455 That it was foreseeable that Mr Reeves was at risk of injury from a failure to provide such an account, must be accepted. 456 Had the Police Service provided an accurate account, as it ought to have done, rather than merely suggesting that enquiries might be made of Mr Finnane, it is difficult to see that the conclusion which the Police Board finally reached, would have been arrived at. 457 The evidence suggested quite a departure from the process which the legislative scheme envisaged. Being dissatisfied with the s 94 report it had been provided, the Police Board embarked on its own investigations, firstly obtaining further information from the Police Service, then calling for a response from Mr Reeves, then a further s 94A report and then making its own further enquiries. In the second report the Police Service suggested that the Police Board make its own enquiries of Mr Finnane, rather than, even then, itself providing an account of what it had done. Instead of pursuing that line of enquiry the Police Board sought information from others, seemingly not in a position to give it an account of what the Police Service had done. The result was that no account from either Mr Finnane, who in reality appears to have been the only available source of information as to what had occurred, or the Police Service was ever provided to the Police Board. 458 At this time, it was apparent that neither the Royal Commission, nor the Police Service itself was pursing any concerns with Mr Reeves' integrity. To the contrary, Mr Reeves was then heading an important investigation at the Crime Commission. 459 The Crime Commission material to which the defendant made reference in its submissions, had earlier been referred to the Royal Commission, which had considered it and had already advised the Police Board that it was not pursuing any further investigations in relation to Mr Reeves. Nor did the Police Service pursue them. There was no suggestion that the Police Service had any other information which called his integrity into question. 460 In these proceedings the defendant called no evidence to explain the decisions which led to Mr Reeves being assigned to investigate Mr Haken, or the decisions made as to the information provided to the Police Board. The inference that such evidence would not have assisted its case is unavoidable. As the result of the Police Service's approach, the Police Board remained sufficiently uncertain about Mr Reeves' integrity, that instead of awaiting the Royal Commission report, an option which it had, it refused his appointment. On the evidence the basis for that conclusion rested on the failure to put frankly before the Board the circumstances in which the Police Service had put Mr Reeves into the position where his integrity came to be questioned before the Royal Commission. The result was that the Police Board's concerns about the Haken investigation and Mr Lysaught's remained and Mr Reeves' promotion was refused. 461 I am satisfied that it was entirely foreseeable in the circumstances that Mr Reeves was put at risk of injury by the Police Service's actions in relation to the information it provided about Mr Reeves. The evidence of the medical experts was that In the face of the stressors with which he had already been dealing to this point, it was this experience which finally overwhelmed Mr Reeves. This was not a trivial stressor. The risk of injury which materialised was one which brought the career of a long serving, successful police officer who the defendant accepts was not corrupt to an end.

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4.1 Other stressors and the Police Service's conduct towards Mr Reeves after the failure of the promotion application 462 The ongoing media coverage of the Royal Commission included repeated use of footage of Mr Reeves in company with Mr Lysaught, at an earlier Police Service function. This could clearly not be controlled by the Police Service. That Mr Reeves suffered as a result may be accepted, as did his children at school, itself another stressor for Mr Reeves. These were also matters not within the Police Service's control. 463 What was entirely within the control of the Police Service was what it did itself. It was argued for the defendant that once Mr Reeves' promotion application was rejected by the Police Board, 'there was nothing the Police could do.' The evidence showed that the Police Service in fact did then act. That no doubt reflected a recognition that Mr Reeves required the support which the Association was urging on his behalf. Mr Reeves was invited to make a representation to the Police Commissioner about his situation. He did, but was never given a response. 464 The Police Service having determined to act as it did, the defendant must accept the consequence of its failure to respond to Mr Reeves' submission. No questions of coherence with other laws can conceivably arise at this stage. It was the defendant's case that what the Police Commissioner did at this point was not done in accordance with any statutory scheme. To the contrary, it was said to be inconsistent even with the amendments later enacted to the Police Act which permitted the Police Commissioner to make appointments direct. 465 No evidence was led as to the purpose of the invitation extended to Mr Reeves or why he was given no response. Having extended it, however, that there was a duty of care owed to Mr Reeves must be accepted and that it was foreseeable that by failing to give Mr Reeves any response at all, he was put at further risk of injury, is unquestionable. 466 On the medical evidence this was a failed opportunity which still might have averted Mr Reeves succumbing to the stressors he was being relentlessly subjected to, in the way that he did. Both Mr Reeves and Mrs Reeves described his relief at receiving this opportunity and his despair when he was given no response. It was entirely foreseeable that having made this invitation and Mr Reeves responding to it, the failure to deal with it put him at further risk of psychological injury. 467 At this stage, given the impending amendment to the legislation, this invitation provided an opportunity to the Police Service to support Mr Reeves through what would have been entirely apparent, namely that it had placed him into an extremely stressful situation. Had even the explanations which were forthcoming in these proceedings been then provided, Mr Reeves' resilient character might have helped him to deal with his situation and to make a further application for promotion under the new regime. 468 Undoubtedly, he would then have had good prospects, given that it was later revealed that he in fact had the Commissioner's confidence. At this time, instead of being supported and relevant information being provided to him, in response to the submission invited of him, he was told nothing. By this time the stress he was under was apparent to other senior police officers. Both Mr Laney and Mr Steer noticed his situation; he was speaking about his concerns about his treatment and his difficulties at work and at home. There can be no question that it was foreseeable that he was then at risk of injury, if not already succumbing to such injury.

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4.2 Failure to implement various policies after Mr Reeves took sick leave 469 The evidence showed that Mr Reeves was suffering from the effects of various stressors during 1996, before he went on sick leave in January 1997. Even before he himself appreciated that he needed help, his wife and Mr Laney were discussing his developing problems in coping with those stressors with him and encouraging him to seek help. Once he took sick leave, his injury soon came to the express attention of the Police Service. Its subsequent actions and whether it was foreseeable that they gave rise to a risk of injury, or its exacerbation, must be considered against its undoubted knowledge that he was then suffering from a psychological injury which had its origins in his involvement with the Royal Commission, an involvement which had resulted from acts which the Police Service itself had taken. 470 There was evidence that another officer took over Mr Reeves' duties as staff officer at the FEA after he took sick leave. That officer did not ensure that Police Service policies were implemented so far as Mr Reeves was concerned. Nor did Mr Laney, or anyone else. 471 Beforehand, even when Mr Reeves began to show signs of succumbing to the stressors to which he was being subjected, the Police Service took no steps to ensure that he had the support which such policies envisaged. Even after he took sick leave, he was not given the assistance of the Welfare Branch, even when he repeatedly sought that assistance himself and when Dr Sharp sought to have it provided to him. The Police Service's policies were simply not implemented, so far as he was concerned. 472 The documentary evidence and the evidence of officers such as Mr Laney, Mr Edgtton, Mr Steer and Mr Greiss made it apparent that it was not their role to provide Mr Reeves with the support which these policies envisaged that he would receive from the Police Service. The support which was forthcoming was provided much later, by Sergeant Fairhall of the Welfare Branch. Mr Petersons's investigation and the shortcomings it uncovered showed the deficiencies which the Police service itself accepted had occurred. No evidence was called from either Mr Peterson or Sergeant Fairhall. It is apparent that their evidence could not have assisted the defendant's case. 473 Nor was Dr Sharp called. He too would have been able to shed some light on the Police Service's acts and omissions, including the failure to implement aspects of various of its policies, including the Employee Assistance Policy. Nor did the defendant call evidence from anyone else in a senior position in the Police Service at the time, in order to explain its approach to Mr Reeves in relation to the matters here in issue. 474 It was the defendant's case that the allegation that adequate rehabilitation was not provided to Mr Reeves, so as to allow him to remain in employment with the Police Service, had its genesis in Dr Lewin's report. The submission may not be accepted. That allegation had its origins in what the Rehabilitation policy itself provided. Dr Lewin recommended its implementation, but the Police Service did not act on the recommendation, or the policy, or on the later recommendation of other doctors. 475 It was also the defendant's case that it was the result of Mr Reeves' treating medical practitioners certifying him as unfit for work which resulted in the policy not being implemented. That submission may also not be accepted. The policy did not operate in the way argued by the defendant. 476 Mr Glancey's evidence was that when he saw Mr Reeves he was acutely disturbed. That accorded with Dr Westerink's evidence. He was not then psychologically fit to return to work at the Police Service. The policy dealt with such a situation and still it was not acted upon by the Police Service, even when advised by Dr Lewin, that in his view, efforts at a return to work should be pursued. 477 The evidence was that Mr Reeves himself repeatedly sought the implementation of the policy. He became angry about his treatment by the Police Service. 478 It is unarguable in the face of this evidence that it was foreseeable that the Police Service's failure to implement policies designed to assist and support officers at risk of psychological injury, or suffering from such injury, was itself an approach which put a staff officer such as Mr Reeves at risk of injury. In terms of the approach discussed in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt, it is simply not arguable that the defendant could not have foreseen that this conduct itself involved a risk of injury, or at least an exacerbation of the injury which Mr Reeves had already sustained. 479 Contrary to the case advanced for the defendant, that Mr Reeves was being treated by psychologists and psychiatrists was not the complete answer. Undoubtedly the policies envisaged that such treatment would be obtained, but they also envisaged support being given by the Police Service itself. Some support was undoubtedly provided by Mr Laney and Sergeant Edgtton and eventually Sergeant Fairhall, and the head of the Welfare Branch, but not the support of the Welfare Branch which the Police Service had determined by its policies that its police officers would receive immediately that they became ill. Denying that support to Mr Reeves, in circumstances where he was left with the impression that he had been abandoned and written off by the Police Service, given its conduct and what he was told by Dr Sharp, unquestionably made it foreseeable that thereby he was put at risk of psychiatric injury.

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483 'Nothing' is a fair description of what the Police Service did to deal with the stressors to which Mr Reeves was being subjected, for a considerable time. Was the Police Service's initial response and what was done when that approach altered in 1998, the response which a reasonable person would have made in the circumstances? 484 The Police Service had foreseen that police officers called before the Police Royal Commission were at risk of suffering psychological injury. In considering what a reasonable person in the position of the Police Service would have done, when Mr Reeves' integrity was called into question as the result of the Police Service's investigation in relation Mr Haken's evidence, regard must be paid to the role which the Police Service itself played in the events which brought him to the attention of the Police Royal Commission. That role was considerable, as were its consequences for Mr Reeves. 485 The Police Service had established policies designed to support officers who found themselves in that situation. There was plainly a need to act consistently with those policies. That necessity became more acute, when it became apparent that Mr Reeves' promotion application was being derailed by his involvement in the Police Royal Commission, to his considerable distress. Once Mr Reeves took sick leave, there was an even more acute need to provide the support he was seeking, which Police Service policies envisaged that he would be given. 486 Before Mr Reeves took sick leave he was performing the staff officer role and referring officers who needed help to the Welfare Branch for assistance. No one performed that role for him. He did not himself perceive that he needed help, before he took sick leave, even though on Mr Laney's evidence, he was becoming noticeably stressed by what he was himself undergoing. This stress escalated when his application for promotion came to be considered by the Police Board, as Mr Steer noticed. A reasonable person in that situation would have referred Mr Reeves for assistance before he took sick leave. 487 There can also be no question that a reasonable person when confronted with the risk of injury to which Mr Reeves was increasingly being exposed, would have been frank as to the true nature of Mr Reeves' role in the investigation which the Police service had instigated into Mr Haken. Such an explanation could not have involved any contempt of the Royal Commission. Indeed the Police Service gave such an explanation to the Royal Commission through Mr Finnane, which made no order precluding that explanation being publicised. 488 The Police Service had a Media Unit which could have been utilised, as well as an internal newspaper. Indeed the defendant suggested that Mr Reeves himself could have utilised the services of the Unit to correct the inaccurate portrayal of his role or he could have instigated defamation proceedings. An explanation could have been given direct to police officers with whom Mr Reeves had to work. It could certainly have been given to the Police Board. There was no evidence led as to why such steps were not taken. 489 Section 11A of the Worker's Compensation Act, which applied to Mr Reeves, expressly contemplated that a person could be psychologically injured when unreasonably passed over for promotion. That this was a known stressor is also apparent from the Alpha Report. 490 Mr Reeves himself accepted that Mr Finnane's assurance that there would not be adverse consequences for him, would be made good. A reasonable person, in my view, would have taken steps to seek to ensure that this assurance was made good, at least when the Police Board sought information about Mr Reeves' involvement in the Royal Commission. At that point, a reasonable person would have provided a fair and accurate account of crucial matters within the Police Service's knowledge, rather than simply directing that enquiries be made by the Board of Mr Finnane. 491 Before he took sick leave in 1997, with the assistance of the Association, Mr Reeves sought assistance from the Commissioner. Having invited a submission, a reasonable person in the Police Service's position would have ensured that a response was provided. 492 Once Mr Reeves took sick leave a reasonable person would have ensured that applicable welfare policies were adhered to; would have responded to the repeated approaches which Mr Reeves made; and to the advice given by Dr Sharp that he required welfare assistance; and to the advice of Dr Lewin, Dr Sharp and other medical practitioners, that rehabilitation should be attempted.

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493 Mr Petersons' investigations revealed the Police Service's failures. His conclusion was that Mr Reeves' treatment was not deliberate. Whether that assessment was accurate, was not explored in these proceedings. It is sufficient to observe that this investigation amply revealed that the approach adopted is not one that any reasonable person would have chosen, when it was apparent that not only was Mr Reeves at risk of injury, he was already injured. 494 When Mr Reeves was involved in the incidents which occurred in March and May 1998, it was well known to the Police Service that he was already suffering from a psychological injury, even though there was disagreement as to its nature. He had long been receiving treatment for that injury, without recovery. That reflected the ongoing stressors to which he was being subjected, which undermined that treatment. While the nature of Mr Reeves' injury was not agreed amongst the doctors then consulted, and Mr Glancey there was no disagreement as to its cause. Responsibility for that injury had still not been accepted by the Police Service, but that Mr Reeves was particularly vulnerable to further psychological injury was apparent. 495 When Mr Reeves was threatened one evening by a man near his home in March 1998, he was shortly due to be called as a key prosecution witness in a drug trial. There is no question that Mr Reeves then received much greater support from the Police Service than he had received to that time. Mr Reeves sought, but was not provided with the support of the Police witness protection unit, that being viewed as unnecessary in the circumstances. Mr Laney believed that arrangements had been made for patrols in the vicinity of his home, but Mr Reeves was not advised by the Police Service that such patrols had been implemented. Mr Reeves' belief that he had not had the necessary support which he ought to have received from the Police Service, was thereby reinforced, although it may be that his perceptions were then affected by the serious effects which this incident had on his health, given the condition he was already suffering from. 496 Mr Reeves' obvious vulnerability to further psychological injury at this point, no doubt explains why the Police Service accepted his hurt on duty applications for this incident. On balance, I have concluded that the approach then adopted to Mr Reeves was a reasonable one. It is undeniable that he was seriously frightened, for good cause. Nevertheless, Mr Reeves not only continued to have access to psychiatrists and psychologists, who treated him, but also welfare and other support from the Police Service, which had previously been absent and he was excused from giving evidence at the trial. 497 No doubt the Police Service could have done more. Nevertheless, I accept Mr Laney's evidence that the assessment then made was that in the circumstances, witness protection was not required and what was done accorded with what the circumstances reasonably required. 498 In May 1998, Mr Reeves was stabbed twice with a syringe, putting him at risk of having contracted a number of serious, blood carried diseases, including aids. He was treated at Liverpool Hospital and faced six months of ongoing testing, to ascertain whether he had been infected. The result was a significant further injury or exacerbation of his existing injury. The description given by Dr Glancey and Dr Tsang of Mr Reeves' state at that point put this beyond question. Again, that he was particularly vulnerable to psychiatric injury at this point was entirely apparent. There can be no question that the further psychological injury or exacerbation which he then suffered was foreseeable, even if the situation with which Mr Reeves was confronted when absent on sick leave was not. 499 Again, understandably, his hurt on duty application was accepted and he was provided with support from the Police Service which had previously been denied him. I accept that the response in the circumstances was a reasonable one. Mr Reeves continued to receive treatment and received support from the Police Service Welfare Branch and Mr Laney. That it was support which could not do much more for Mr Reeves, than the treatment which he was receiving, in the unfortunate situation in which he found himself must be accepted. That the response provided was reasonable in the circumstances, must also on balance be accepted.

[187]

Causation 500 It was the defendant's duty to take reasonable care to avoid exposing Mr Reeves to unnecessary risks of injury: Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301. In State of New South Wales v Seedsman [2000] NSWCA 119; (2000) 217 ALR 583 at [33], it was observed: "It is well established that the Court is entitled to draw inferences as to causation simply from a sequence of events. As Rich ACJ said in a frequently cited passage: "I do not see why a court should not begin its investigation, i.e., before hearing any medical testimony, from the standpoint of the presumptive inference which this sequence of events would naturally inspire in the mind of any common-sense person uninstructed in pathology." ( Adelaide Stevedoring Co Limited v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538 at 563)." 501 The Police Royal Commission was a very public departure from the ordinary way in which allegations of corruption had been investigated in the past by the Police Service itself, overseen by the Ombudsman. That system was found to have been inadequate, with the result that the Royal Commission was given an extraordinary brief. It was an investigation of unanticipated outcome, uncovering as it did corruption at the highest levels of the Police Service. That becoming involved in the Royal Commission might be very stressful for a police officer, cannot be doubted, the more so if the officer was not corrupt, but whose integrity nevertheless came into question. This was a risk which the Police Service had itself identified. 502 Common sense dictates that corrupt police officers identified in such a broad ranging inquiry, might seek to shelter their activities. One obvious way by which that could be done, would be by seeking to associate themselves with police officers who were not corrupt. This, it would seem, is what Mr Lysaught did when claiming an involvement in the investigation which Mr Reeves was undertaking. The Royal Commission was also pursuing evidence from known criminals. This too carried with it the obvious risk that police officers who were not corrupt, might be targeted by such people in their evidence. 503 No doubt these were possibilities which the Royal Commission had to guard against, as did the Police Service, involved as it was in the Royal Commission proceedings, as well as continuing to undertake its normal operations. 504 The defendant made abundantly clear that it was not a part of its case that Mr Reeves was a corrupt police officer. That the result of his appearances before the Royal Commission and its aftermath was very stressful, putting him at risk of psychological injury and foreseen to be so, may not be doubted. Mr Reeves makes no complaint about being called before the Royal Commission in relation to Operation Azure. He accepted that the Royal Commission was investigating any corruption in that operation and that his role would have been considered in that context. On the evidence it appears that in the light of the numerous preceding investigations, Mr Reeves had never been under real suspicion. As Mr Packer was soon informed at the Crime Commission, such suspicions were held about other officers. 505 It was the decisions which the Police Service made which brought Mr Reeves to the adverse attention of the Royal Commission. It was the Police Service which did nothing to correct the impression of the Haken investigation which Mr Lysaught's evidence generated amongst other police officers, with very detrimental consequences for Mr Reeves at work. It was the Police Service which did not provide the Police Board with a fair and accurate account of what it had done to bring Mr Reeves to the adverse attention of the Royal Commission; It was the Police Service which failed to ensure that Mr Reeves received a response to the submission which the Police Commissioner had invited. It was the Police Service which failed to ensure that Mr Reeves received welfare support when he required it, and sought it and when others pursued it on his behalf. 506 On the evidence it must be accepted that it was the acts and omissions of the Police Service which caused both Mr Reeves' injury and later exacerbated it and undermined the treatment he himself was obtaining. 507 The 1992 report of the Alpha Task Force had identified that allegations of corruption were significant stressors for police officers. The Police Commissioner had himself advised police officers that it was recognised that involvement in the Police Royal Commission could be a stressful experience, which could put police officers at risk of injury. Active steps were thus taken to address this risk, by alerting police officers to the assistance available to them from the Welfare Branch, if they felt that they needed it and urging them to avail themselves of that help. 508 That invitation was also underpinned by the duties given to police officers such as Mr Reeves, who as staff officer of the FEA was responsible for implementation of Police Service policies, such as the rehabilitation policy. The Police Service did not expect that affected officers themselves would necessarily identify and act on their need for help, without assistance. It was a part of the duties of the staff officer position to refer any police officer who appeared to be at risk of injury from the stress of involvement in the Police Royal Commission, to the Welfare branch for assistance. On the evidence, Mr Reeves performed that role even for police officers who did not believe themselves to require such assistance, yet when he needed such help, it was denied. Commonsense unarguably leads to the conclusion that the injury was caused by the Police Service's acts and omissions.

[188]

Novus actus interveniens 509 The defendant argued nevertheless, that the events of March and May 1998 were such that they elevated Mr Reeves' stress levels to such a point as to preclude him from returning to work, at least for some time. He was then thought to have developed PTSD. Those incidents were outside the control of the Police Service and rendered him unfit to return to work. 510 These incidents thus constituted a novus actus interveniens, that is a supervening event, for which the defendant was not legally responsible. They severed the causal link between its negligence and Mr Reeves' injury, so as to render it not liable for the injury. (See Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 at 357-8). 511 I am unable to accept this argument. At best the evidence would lead to the conclusion that the Police Service was not responsible for the exacerbation of the injury from which Mr Reeves was already suffering in March or May 1998, or the further injury which then resulted for a time, before abating. While Mr Reeves was unquestionably injured by these events, he had already been seriously injured. By March 1998 his existing condition was already very entrenched, when he was further affected by what then occurred. His condition became even worse after the May 1998 incident, when he was in crisis, as Dr Tsang explained. Mr Reeves' ability to deal with those stressors, given his difficulty in perceiving support which he then did receive from the Police Service, as the result of the illness from which he was already suffering, was adversely affected. Even so, Mr Reeves recovered substantially from the very distressing symptoms which he suffered in the immediate aftermath of these incidents, but he has never recovered his health. 512 As was argued for Mr Reeves, the breaches of the duty of care which preceded these two incidents, had each made a material causative contribution to the underlying injury which the experts all agreed Mr Reeves had already sustained before the 1998 incidents and which he continues to suffer. That illness itself made him more vulnerable to what he encountered in 1998. The defendant remains liable for the whole of Mr Reeves' injury, unless it untangles what was causative. As McHugh J discussed in Henville v Walker and Another [2001] HCA 52; (2001) 206 CLR 459:

[191]

"6. For the purposes of the law of negligence, the question whether the requisite causal connection exists between a particular breach of duty and particular loss or damage is essentially one of fact to be resolved, on the probabilities, as a matter of common sense and experience ((9) See Fitzgerald v. Penn [1954] HCA 74; (1954) 91 CLR 268 at 277-278; March v. Stramare (E and M.H.) Pty. Ltd. [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506 at 515, 522-523; Bennett v. Minister of Community Welfare [1992] HCA 27; (1992) 176 CLR 408 at 412-413, 418-419, 428.). And that remains so in a case such as the present where the question of the existence of the requisite causal connection is complicated by the intervention of some act or decision of the plaintiff or a third party which constitutes a more immediate cause of the loss or damage. In such a case, the "but for" test, while retaining an important role as a negative criterion which will commonly (but not always always) exclude causation exclude causation if not satisfied, is inadequate as a comprehensive positive test ((10) See, e.g., March v. Stramare (E and M.H.) Pty. Ltd. (1991) 171 CLR at 515-519, 522-524). If, in such a case, it can be seen that the necessary causal connection would exist if the intervening act or decision be disregarded, the question of causation may often be conveniently expressed in terms of whether the intrusion of that act or decision has had the effect of breaking the chain of causation which would otherwise have existed between the breach of duty and the particular loss or damage. The ultimate question must, however, always be whether, notwithstanding the intervention of the subsequent decision, the defendant's wrongful act or omission is, as between the plaintiff and the defendant and as a matter of common sense and experience, properly to be seen as having caused the relevant loss or damage. Indeed, in some cases, it may be potentially misleading to pose the question of causation in terms of whether an intervening act or decision has interrupted or broken a chain of causation which would otherwise have existed. An example of such a case is where the negligent act or omission was itself a direct or indirect contributing cause of the intervening act or decision. It will be seen that, on the plaintiff's evidence, the present was such a case." 514 In this case the evidence is that even without the incidents which occurred in 1998, Mr Reeves' illness was entrenched. It affected his ability to deal with these stressors as he had been able to in the past. The experts' view was that the most significant stressor of all that he had been confronted with as the result of his involvement in the Royal Commission was the loss of the LEA position, in the absence of the Police Service's support. How he was further treated subsequently entrenched that illness and reduced the effectiveness of the treatment which he received. While Mr Reeves was even more acutely ill in the aftermath of the 1998 incidents, he recovered from the extreme symptoms which he then suffered, which suggested PTSD. He has not, however, recovered from his underlying anxiety and depressive condition. While he is clearly an extremely resilient man, his resilience was so affected by the injury which he had earlier received, that he has not been able to recover his health from that ongoing condition, caused as it was by the Police Service's failures. It follows that the defendant's argument must in this respect be rejected.

[193]

Contributory negligence 518 The defendant relied on Mr Reeves' alleged failure to take available steps to help himself. In final submissions the defendant conceded that while contributory negligence was still pressed, the claim had become marginal in light of the evidence. 519 Given the evidence of the steps which Mr Reeves took to deal with the situation in which he found himself, including by seeking, obtaining and paying for various treatment in January 1997 and subsequently, I have come to the view that the cross claim has no foundation. The evidence as to the approach adopted by the Police Service and its failure to assist Mr Reeves in the way various of its policies envisaged, despite his repeated approaches to the Police Service seeking its assistance, reinforced this conclusion. The concurrent evidence given by the medical experts showed that they had come to a commonly held view that while Mr Reeves could have benefited, had he received earlier treatment and greater support, the steps which he took himself were appropriate in the circumstances in which he found himself. 520 On the evidence of officers such as Mr Packer and Mr Laney, that Mr Reeves did not act earlier to seek help was not surprising. Despite what the Alpha Report had shown, in 1996 the attitude of senior serving police officers was still that seeking such assistance was not done. In Mr Packer's experience it had been a career limiting move. Mr Laney's evidence was that these attitudes did not change until the late 1990s. Up until then, stressful incidents were dealt with by having a drink with other officers and talking through the problems. Mr Reeves certainly confided in Mr Laney in 1996. His attitude being a somewhat different one, no doubt reflective of his role in the staff officer position, he also sought the support offered by the Police Service through various of its policies, but such support was not forthcoming. 521 The opinion of the experts was that Mr Reeves had a personality which well suited him to police work. This was described as an obsessive, narcissistic personality, by which the experts did not mean that Mr Reeves suffered from any disorder. To the contrary, they explained that such characteristics made him a person who had a desire to help others and who worked hard in order to excel at his work, to the point of personal detriment in his relationships with his family. These characteristics also, however, made him vulnerable to psychological injury from the ongoing stressors to which he was subjected, during the course of the Police Royal Commission and its aftermath. 522 To that time Mr Reeves had proven to have a most resilient personality. He had been involved in a number of stressful incidents of a kind which police officers have to deal with in the course of their work and which, on the evidence of the experts, were of a kind which could have resulted in the development of PTSD. Mr Reeves developed some of the symptoms of that disorder on a number of occasions before 1994, after these traumatic experiences. They included disturbed sleep and distressing nightmares which persisted and recurred for varying periods of time. These symptoms always resolved over time, without Mr Reeves ever developing the disorder. Mrs Reeves particularly remembered that to have been the case after the incident involving the baby who had died, when Mr Reeves had to wrestle the dead body from the grieving father, who could not give it up to ambulance officers. The body dropped to the ground in the struggle. Mr Reeves suffered nightmares about this incident for some months and they recurred months, and even years later, in the aftermath of the Royal Commission. 523 Mr Reeves' ability to deal with such traumatic events accorded with the expert evidence that not all police officers who are the subject of physical attack, or who are called on to deal with other stressful incidents while performing their duties, suffer physical or psychological injuries as a result. Prior to 1994, Mr Reeves also sustained a number of physical injuries, some of which were serious or life threatening and required his hospitalisation. They made him vulnerable to psychological injury such as PTSD, but it was not an injury to which he succumbed, at least until the needle stick injury in May 1998. Even then, he was fortunate to have recovered substantially from the very distressing symptoms which he suffered in the immediate aftermath. His was a very resilient personality, but not so resilient as to permit a complete recovery from the adjustment and depression disorders, to which he had earlier succumbed, in the aftermath of his involvement with the Royal Commission. 524 Prior to January 1997, Mr Reeves took no sick leave for any psychological injury, distress or stress and sought no medical or other assistance for such injury or difficulty. He went on to have a very successful career as a police officer. Although he was not successful in achieving every promotion for which he applied over the years, and was subjected to an unsuccessful challenge by another officer before GREAT in relation to his 1994 appointment to the FEA position, his career prospered rapidly. That reflected the quality of his work and character, to which other witnesses attested. 525 It was during 1995 and particularly 1996 that Mr Reeves began experiencing difficulty coping with his work. He had a heavy workload, partially as a result of the effects of the Police Royal Commission, which disrupted the normal operation of the Police Service, when numerous senior officers were called before the Commission and he was called upon to act in their roles. In his position of the FEA staff officer, Mr Reeves was also performing a welfare role for other police officers for which he had received no training and which he also came to find time consuming and stressful. He was also upset and concerned about how he had come to be involved in the Police Royal Commission, as the direct consequence of following instructions to undertake the investigations which Assistant Commissioner Donaldson and Mr Finnane had directed. That work had wrongly been portrayed in the media and Mr Reeves came to believe that he had been inadequately supported by the Police Service about these matters, at work and in his application for promotion to the LEA. The result was that he lost a promotion which he had believed he had won on the merits. 526 The Police Service had foreseen that its officers were at risk of injury from their involvement in the Royal Commission, yet when it was Mr Reeves who succumbed to what the experts agreed were a series of very significant stressors, he was not supported as he ought to have been. The failure to provide that support itself was a matter which the Police Service should have foreseen involved a risk of injury to Mr Reeves. 527 That support was not forthcoming even when a dramatic and noticeable change in Mr Reeves' ordinary demeanour and ability to perform his work without difficulty, became apparent. Mr Reeves went from being an outgoing cheerful leader of his men, to someone who was withdrawn and silent. He began experiencing increasing problems with his memory, his concentration and his ordinary enthusiasm for his work. He experienced increasing difficulty in motivating himself even to go to work. His problems impacted his home life and his relationship with his family. 528 These were growing difficulties which he discussed with his wife and at work with Mr Laney, who urged him to take sick leave. Mrs Reeves and Mr Laney corroborated Mr Reeves' account. Mr Laney explained that at the time he had not fully appreciated the extent of Mr Reeves' problems. On Mr Laney's evidence and that of other police officers, this was a chaotic time at the FEA. Mr Reeves' activities in supporting officers involved in the Royal Commission were well known to the senior officers at the FEA. He made reports about that work at staff management meetings. There was no question that what he was doing was beyond his role. His efforts in supporting other officers, including officers outside the FEA were known and appreciated. 529 It was also suggested that Mr Reeves ought himself to have approached the Police Media Unit after the adverse publicity which he received, following Mr Lysaught's evidence in the Police Royal Commission, in order to have Mr Finnane's explanation of his role brought to public attention. I am unable to accept that submission. While Mr Reeves was cross examined as to the possibility that he could have approached this Unit for assistance, a possibility which he accepted, the defendant led no evidence from which it might be inferred that such an approach would have had any positive response. 530 That seems unlikely in the extreme. Whoever was responsible for the operation of the Police Media Unit during the Police Royal Commission, it must have been a senior officer. Given the course taken by the Police Service, there must have been a decision made not to take any steps to publicly counter the false evidence given by Inspector Lysaught about the investigation which the Police Service had initiated into Mr Haken, even after Mr Finnane's explanation to the Royal Commission received no press coverage. That this approach would have been altered, had Mr Reeves raised his concern with the Media Unit seems improbable, given the evidence of the approach which the Police Service adopted in the face of Justice Wood's concern about the investigation it had instigated into Mr Haken. The Police Service did not even publish anything in its internal newsletter, 'The Police Service weekly' about its decision to undertake an investigation into Mr Haken. That would certainly have been an available step, consistent with a desire to keep police officers informed about the Police Service's involvement in and approach to the Royal Commission, or to support Mr Reeves with the problems he was facing at work. 531 Had it been a real possibility that an approach from Mr Reeves would have received a positive approach from the Police Media Unit, for instance by release of a press release to explain that he had been carrying out his lawful duties, no doubt the defendant would have led such evidence. 532 I am satisfied, for these reasons, that it may not be concluded that there was contributory negligence on Mr Reeves' part.

[195]

"Although the aim of the court in awarding damages is to make good to the plaintiff, so far as money can do, the loss which he has suffered, it is obvious that it is impossible to assess damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life by any process of arithmetical calculation." 534 In this case it is unnecessary to come to a conclusion as to whether Mr Reeves had PTSD, as was the opinion of Dr Westerink and Professor McFarlane. All medical experts agreed that he suffered symptoms of PTSD after the May 1998 incident, at least for a time, even if it was not fully developed; that he had earlier contracted a serious adjustment disorder and depression, before he took sick leave, as the result of his work and how it came to the attention of the Royal Commission; what occurred in its aftermath, including the loss of his promotion to the LEA; and that his treatment by the Police Service subsequently had entrenched that illness and reduced the efficacy of the medical treatment which he received. The illness is now chronic. Mr Reeves is unable to return to police duties as a result and he also attempted and failed to pursue a working life outside the Police Service. 535 There was a disagreement as to whether Mr Reeves could return to any form of work in future, given his ongoing psychological condition, which has waxed and waned, and now remains, at most, in the moderate range. The evidence shows that he pursued various volunteer work while sick, that up until 2004 he was director of a licensed Club and that in 2005 he took up an opportunity to work as the Secretary of another Club. He was unable to continue. Mr Reeves' persistence in continuing with his voluntary work, including his directors duties and his attempt at paid work outside the Police Service in the face of his serious psychological condition, was consistent with the experts' evidence of his resilient character and underlying personality traits. The experts disagreed as to the prospect of Mr Reeves engaging in further work, with Dr Brown most strongly of the view that he has the capacity to engage in office work in the longer term. Professor McFarlane and Dr Phillips strongly disagreed and Professor Bryant's views supported those of Dr Brown. 536 Dr Brown's views are based on developments in treatments which Mr Reeves hasn't received and his character traits. Regrettably, it must be concluded, however, in the face of all of the evidence, that such views are not a basis on which it may be concluded that there is at this late stage, a real likelihood that Mr Reeves will recover from his chronic condition, so as to realistically permit such a working life in future. 537 Mr Reeves' failure in his endeavours to work outside the Police Service, in the face of his character and personality traits, supports the conclusion that whatever residual capacity he now has, it should be taken into account as part of normal vicissitudes. That conclusion is also supported by Dr Athanasou and Ms Elder's reports, which are referred to below. On the evidence it must be accepted that Mr Reeves' illness is entrenched and his prognosis is poor, even though there has been improvement since the extreme illness he had to deal with in 1998. That is reflective of his underlying resilience and determination to deal with his situation. Still, his attempts at work in the supportive environment in which that occurred, failed. There is no basis for concluding that further attempts elsewhere would now succeed. 538 Mr Reeves' illness not only affected his ability to work, but also had serious consequences for his personal and family relationships. Before he acquired these conditions, Mr Reeves had no pre-existing psychological injury. He was a resilient man who had repeatedly recovered from serious traumas to which he was exposed in his career, which had put him at risk of developing PTSD. While he experienced distressing symptoms, he always recovered. That situation is long gone. Mr Reeves achieved rapid career progression and had sound prospects of further promotion and a future in the Police Service. He had a happy family life, occupied a senior position, was widely respected and had acted at the level to which he was seeking promotion in the LEA, including shortly before he took sick leave. He has been deprived of that life and his future aspirations. 539 That was not the result of the injuries to his knees, as the defendant submitted. While undoubtedly painful, Mr Reeves managed that condition, even when he performed paid work outside of the Police Service. On his evidence it must be concluded that his knee condition would not have precluded him from continuing with his work, or even with work outside the Police Service. 540 The defendant contended that Mr Reeves should be awarded general damages of $120,000: $100,000 for the past and $20,000 for the future. Mr Reeves claimed $180,000. 541 The defendant also argued that it would be considered that Mr Reeves' condition in part arose out of events which were statute barred and life events. I do not accept this argument. The expert evidence was to contrary effect. While exposed to a number of serious incidents prior to 1994 which had the potential to result in psychological injury, Mr Reeves had a resilient character, he coped with each of these traumatic events without sustaining any injury. The experts were not even of a common view that these events had predisposed him to the injury which he suffered and which is now entrenched. He even managed to overcome the extremely debilitating symptoms from which he suffered in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 events, but not his health. 542 As to life events, I am satisfied that they are adequately comprehended in the usual deduction for vicissitudes. 543 Having weighed the various matters in issue between the parties I have concluded that damages of $150,000 should be awarded on this head.

[197]

Past economic loss 545 The method of calculation of damages was largely agreed. The plaintiff's claim extended from the date of his retirement to date, on the basis of total or substantial incapacity for work, in accordance with Mr Katehos' calculations. They were based on various assumptions which had regard to Mr Reeves' past experiences, some of which were to the plaintiff's benefit, for example above base wage earnings to which Mr Reeves may have been entitled when acting in higher relieving duties, as he was often engaged on before he took sick leave. Allowance had also been made for vicissitudes, in relation to various of the calculations. 546 Mr Katehos' evidence was not the subject of challenge, other than certain exploration of his calculations in cross examination. That cross examination explained the approach he had adopted to various calculations, assumptions made and how vicissitudes were dealt with. 547 For its part the defendant claimed that the state of Mr Reeves' knees had an impact on his ability to work and that it would be concluded that he would have retired before age 65. The evidence does not support the defendant's approach. 548 At the time that Mr Reeves took sick leave, he was capable of performing his duties, so far as his knees were concerned. While he injured his knees in 1996 and again in 1997, he sought and obtained treatment. The advice given to the Police Service in 1997 by Dr Claffey was that from the point of his knees, he was capable of returning to work. That advice was consistent with the work which Mr Reeves later performed outside the Police Service and with the evidence of Drs Stephenson and Coolican. He would be physically capable of office based managerial police work. Mr Reeves would have received sick leave for any time off work for such treatment, had he remained with the Police Service. While Mr Reeves would have good and bad days, he would be able to continue until the pain from his knees became sufficient for him to seek treatment. He has not yet reached that point, although he contemplates having such surgery. Osteotomy in each knee would then provide pain relief and an increase in function, in which event he would not require knee replacement surgery until after his 65th birthday and retirement from the Police Service. 549 It follows that problems with Mr Reeves' knees can form no part of an assessment of past economic loss. 550 I also accept Mr Reeves' case on loss of promotional opportunities. I do not accept that Mr Reeves' cross examination in the Royal Commission in relation to the possibility of any negligence in Operation Azure and Mr Reeves thereby contributing to the $340,000 loss sustained by the Police Service, would have resulted in him being promoted no further. Given the senior role which he was undertaking when he went on sick leave, the case so advanced may simply not be accepted. It is inconsistent with Mr Reeves' history, both before and after he gave evidence before the Royal Commission. 551 I am satisfied that Mr Katehos' calculations must be accepted.

[198]

Future economic loss, superannuation and non renewable benefits 552 Mr Reeves' calculations were conducted on the basis that he would retire at age 65 and that he would achieve a certain promotion. The defendant argued he would have retired between 58 and 60. On the evidence, I accept that a basis for the calculations advanced for Mr Reeves has been made out. 553 Mr Reeves had been successful in pursuing his ambitions prior to his failure to achieve the promotion to the position of the Commander of the LEA, a promotion which had also been achieved on merit. He had acted in positions at that rank, before he took sick leave. The evidence of other police officers including those called in the defendant's case also supported the view that this rank was well within Mr Reeves' capacity and one which he was likely to achieve. 554 I accept Mr Reeves' evidence that he would have worked as a police officer to age 65, but for his psychological injury. The evidence shows that the state of his knees would not have precluded him from performing the work of a senior police officer occupying a managerial role, even though he requires ongoing treatment. Such treatment is available; Mr Reeves would have been entitled to pursue it, while taking sick leave; he intends to have it and if he does, the experts were of the view that he could continue to age 65, albeit with some discomfort. The level of discomfort which a person can tolerate varies. On the evidence Mr Reeves has high tolerance levels. In the circumstances, it must be concluded that he would have had treatment which would have permitted him to continue working as he intended. 555 It was submitted for the defendant that in his report, Dr Athanasou, who conducted a vocational assessment of Mr Reeves in 2007, had suggested that Mr Reeves had a retained earning capacity. This report noted amongst other things, that Mr Reeves 'would not present as very employable'. Problems with personal adjustment were noted. Dr Athanasou's report was prepared on the basis of an assumption that in theory Mr Reeves still had some residual capacity. While the medical experts had divided views about this, I have concluded in the face of all of the evidence that there is regrettably, no real basis for that conclusion. All that Dr Athanasou could see, was a potential for a limited range of part-time occupation at a lower skill level, but that Mr Reeves' personal adjustment problems made even this problematic. He concluded that it would be difficult for even that potential to be exercised meaningfully exercised. That view must be accepted 556 Mr Katehos was cross examined as to the reliance which he placed by way of assumption on a document emanating from another organisation, Rainmaker, which had been commissioned by Furzer Crestani to provide figures as to long term credit ratings, assessed across the superannuation industry, not specifically related to the State Superannuation Scheme of which Mr Reeves was a member. The approach adopted was to look at a number of factors, over a long period of time, to arrive at an average. Mr Katehos had relied on the results of this research in his calculations and had assumed for that purpose that the report was correct. I accept his evidence as to the validity of the approach adopted to determining a reasonable long term credit rating. 557 Mr Katehos' calculations on these heads must be accepted.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Reeves

Respondent/Defendant:

State of New South Wales

Legislation Cited (1)

Ombudsman Act 1974(NSW)

Cases Cited (47)

CITATION : Reeves v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 611 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina [1986] HCA 20; (1986) 160 CLR 301 Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Limited v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258; (2009) 259 ALR 616 Director of Public Prosecutions v Wran and Anor (1987) 7 NSWLR 616 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 422 Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 All ER 238 Henville v Walker and Another [2001] HCA 52; (2001) 206 CLR 459 Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Limited [2005] HCA 15; (2005) 222 CLR 44 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu & Anor; ISS Security Pty Ltd v Naidu & Anor [2007] NSWCA 377; (2007) NSWLR 471 New South Wales v Fahy [2007] HCA 20; (2007) 232 CLR 486 New South Wales v Rogerson [2007] NSWCA 346; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-926 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; 198 CLR 180 CASES CITED : Reeves v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 1138 Reeves v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 857 Reeves v State of New South Wales (unreported, Hislop J, 13 November 2007) Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; (2001) 207 CLR 562 Spring v Guardian Assurance PLC [1995] 2 AC 296; [1994] 3 ALL ER 129 State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12; [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-826 State of New South Wales v Kuru [2007] NSWCA 141; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-893 New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235; (2002) 60 NSWLR 371 State of New South Wales v Seedsman [2000] NSWCA 119; (2000) 217 ALR 583 State of NSW v Tyszyk [2008] NSWCA 107 Stewart v Ronalds and Another (2009) 259 ALR 86; [2009] NSWCA 277 Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35; (2002) 211 CLR 317 Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40

JUDGMENT 1 HER HONOUR: Mr Reeves was medically discharged from the Police Service of New South Wales ('Police Service') in June 1999, after some 29 years service. These proceedings were brought in 2000 pursuant to the Crown Proceedings Act 1988. Mr Reeves seeks damages for psychological injuries which he suffered during the course of his work as a police officer. Changes made to the common law by the Civil Liability Act 2002 do not apply in this case. 2 Mr Reeves' discharge followed five hurt on duty applications made in 1997 and 1998. Two related to injuries to his knees and three to psychological injuries. Four of these claims were accepted by the Police Service, as injuries for which it had responsibility, but one was not. That claim related to the psychological injury which later became the subject of these proceedings. 3 Mr Reeves claims that this injury was the result of his police work in 1995 and 1996 during and in the aftermath of the Police Royal Commission, while he was working at the Fraud Enforcement Agency ('FEA') as its staff officer. The consequence was that he was not promoted to the position of Commander of the Licensing Enforcement Agency ('LEA'), a promotion which he achieved on merit in 1996. Mr Reeves seeks damages in respect of this psychological injury in these proceedings. His case is that this injury was either exacerbated, or that he was further injured, during the period in which he was absent from his duties on sick leave from January 1997 to his discharge in 1999. 4 Mr Reeves had been seriously injured at work on a number of occasions prior to 1994, but his case does not rest on those injuries. Various interlocutory judgements have been given, which explain how it is that Mr Reeves' claims came to be advanced in relation only to the injuries which he suffered after 1994. (See Reeves v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 1138; Reeves v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 857; Stephen Anthony Reeves v State of New South Wales (unreported, 13 November 2007, Hislop J). Mr Reeves' history of service is nevertheless necessary to consider, in order that the matters over which the parties joined issue may be resolved.

The Statutory Scheme governing Police Officers 33 As Gummow and Hayne JJ discussed in New South Wales v Fahy [2007] HCA 20; (2007) 232 CLR 486 at [18], any consideration of this claim must begin with a consideration of the nature of the relationship between the parties, controlled as it was by the provisions of the Police Act 1990. 34 Section 8 of the Police Act provided that subject to the direction of the Minister the Police Commissioner was responsible for the management and control of the Police Force. This included its effective, efficient and economical management of the functions and activities (s 8(2). Section 8(3) permitted the Commissioner to "classify the various duties that members of the NSW Police Force are required to perform and allocate the duties to be carried out by each such member" and to issue, amend and revoke instructions given to members of the Service, as to the management and control of the Service. 35 Section 201 provided that a police officer who neglected or refused to obey any lawful order or to carry out any lawful duty as a police officer, was guilty of an offence. 36 The enactment of the Royal Commission (Police Service) Act did not alter this statutory scheme, although on the evidence it had a considerable impact on the Police Service and its operations. 37 By s 6 of that Act, police officers could be required to produce a statement of information to the Royal Commission. Failure to comply with a s 6 notice was an offence. The Royal Commission had the power to require documents to be produced to it and to have persons appear before it to give evidence. It had wide powers of search and seizure through a system of warrants. Privileges, such as the privilege against self incrimination, were abrogated by the legislation. The Commission had the power to take evidence in secret and to restrict publication of evidence given before it. Section 27 provided:

[1995] HCA 5

[2007] NSWCA 141

(1986) 160 CLR 301

(2009) 259 ALR 616

(1987) 7 NSWLR 616

(2005) 223 CLR 422

(2001) 206 CLR 459

(2005) 222 CLR 44

(1995) 182 CLR 1

(2007) 232 CLR 486

(2001) 207 CLR 562

(2002) 60 NSWLR 371