(1) The Financial Members of the Association shall be entitled to exclusive access to use the following Leisure Club Lot Facilities:
(i) gymnasium
(ii) tennis court; and
(iii) childrens play area
The Financial Members of the Association (and their invitees, but only in the company of a Financial member) shall have access to the above Leisure Club Lot Facilities from 7.00am to 9.00pm seven days a week, or otherwise as determined by the Association.
The Committee shall determine:-
(a) the issuing of access keys to members of the Association for the above Leisure Club Lot Facilities; and
(b) the extent to which other parts of the Leisure Club Lot are available to members.
Members of the Association must not behave (and must take all reasonable steps to ensure that their invitees do not) in a manner likely to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of other members of the Association or the public lawfully using the Leisure Club Lot Facilities.
(2) The building on the Leisure Club Lot known as The Winderhouse Hall is available for hire to members of the Association and members of the public. The Committee shall appoint such Manager as it so determines to regulate and control the letting and use of The Winderhouse Hall as provided in Rule 15.
(3) Members of the Association and members of the public shall have access to the gardens and view the shaft enclosure situated on the Leisure Club Lot in the manner determined by the Committee.
(4) Non-Member Proprietors are not entitled to access to the Leisure Club Lot.
(5) The Committee and the Council shall jointly undertake an annual review of community use of The Winderhouse Hall and in particular review and report to the Committee on:
(a) community access to The Winderhouse Hall; and
(b) the fee structure for uses of The Winderhouse Hall.
41. Use of Leisure Club Lot and Leisure Club Lot Facilities
Subject to rule 40, persons using the Leisure Club Lot and Leisure Club Lot Facilities must not:
(a) create any noise on the Leisure Club Lot that is likely to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the Leisure Club Lot by members of the Association or the general public;
(b) obstruct lawful use of the Leisure Club Lot or any of the Leisure Club Lot Facilities.
(c)
(i) damage any lawn, garden, tree, shrub, plant or flower being part of or situated on the Leisure Club Lot; or
(ii) use for his or her own purposes as a garden any portion of the Leisure Club Lot.
(d) allow any child of whom the member of the Association has control to play within the childs play area, tennis court or gymnasium unless accompanied by an adult exercising effective control.
(e) deposit or throw on Leisure Club Lot any rubbish, dirt, dust or other material likely to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the members of the Association's lawful use of the Leisure Club Lot and Leisure Club Lot Facilities."
5 The Defendants contend that they were entitled to resign as members, because there was nothing in the constitution of the Plaintiff Association that prevents that conduct, and they rely upon the decisions in Finch v Oake [1896] 1 Ch 409 (cited with apparent approval by Windeyer J in Marks v The Commonwealth of Australia (1964) 111 CLR 549 at 571) and Elmawey v Adelaide Mosque Islamic Society of South Australia Inc, Supreme Court of South Australia, Williams J, 3 December 1997, not reported), at 9 to 10 in the Austlii print out. The Plaintiff contends that upon the proper construction of its constitution, resignation was effectively prevented.
6 I think it is established that, if the Rules of an Association do not make any provision to the contrary, a member might resign unilaterally, perhaps even by implication by not complying with his or her obligations as a member for a significant period: In re Sick and Funeral Association of St John's Sunday School, Golcar [1973] 1 Ch 51 at 61-63.
7 If the membership of an Association does not expose the member in question, or other members, or other people to possible adverse consequences, it is sometimes easy to infer from the terms of the constitution of the Association that there is no rule preventing a member from resigning, but if the cessation of membership might produce adverse consequences to others, then the proper construction of the rules might more easily lead to the conclusion that the rules do prevent, or inhibit resignation. This is, perhaps, no more than to say that it is necessary to construe the words of the constitution in their context.
8 Thus, in Field v Battye [1939] SASR 235, Murray CJ at 240-244 and Richards J at 245-248 found that the Rules in question there, properly construed, did prevent a member from resigning; and they came to this conclusion, in part, by considering what would be the consequences of resignation, and what was the deemed intention of those who drafted the Rules.
9 In the present case it seems to me that, upon the proper construction of the Plaintiff's constitution, a member who is a "proprietor" as described in Rule 1(c) has no right to resign. Rule 2(b)(i) is not drafted entirely felicitously, but when read in the context of the Rules generally, I think it should be taken to constitute a prohibition against resigning. Such a member can only cease to be a member upon death, bankruptcy, dissolution, or by ceasing to be the registered proprietor of a Lot. Rules 3, 4(5), 5, 18, 31 and 40-41 seem to me to point particularly in this direction: Proprietor members have rights that they may exercise, to the exclusion of others; the provision of the facilities to enable those rights to be exercised costs money; that money comes mostly from members, but also from the fees charged pursuant to Rule 31(1)(b); and the amounts due from members to the Plaintiff are secured by charges upon the land owned by the various members, which charges may be enforced by the Plaintiff: see Rule 18.
10 Next, the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff, as a stranger to the contract between FAI General Insurance Ltd and the Defendants, could not enforce that contract. I do not accept that the principle invoked is applicable. Rather, the question now is whether, the Defendants having become members of the Plaintiff Association, they are entitled to resign.
11 The Defendants then submitted that the dispute was not justiciable, since it involved the internal affairs of a voluntary association. I do not think that this principle is applicable either: The Plaintiff has property, namely the Leisure Club lot, and the effect of the Plaintiff's constitution is to give to Proprietor members rights in relation to that lot. To fund this use of that lot, the constitution also imposes liabilities upon Proprietor members, and imposes charges over the property of the Proprietor members. The constitution was drafted so as to create legal relations between the Proprietor members, and between them and the Plaintiff. See generally Cameron v Masters (1934) 51CLR 358 at 370-371.
12 Finally, the Defendants relied upon an argument concerning the heritage value of the buildings on the Leisure Club lot, said to be the reason why the transaction was structured in the way described. I do not think that this circumstance is relevant to the issue to be decided.
13 I make declarations in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Summons, and order the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff's costs.