BURLEY J:
1 On 24 November 2021, I made an interim control order against the respondent, Alo-Bridget Namoa, under s 104.4 of the Criminal Code (contained in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)), giving ex tempore reasons that were later published as Read v Namoa [2021] FCA 1486 (Read v Namoa (No 1)). The control order regime is described in those reasons. The applicant, Superintendent Nicholas Read of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), has elected to seek to confirm the interim control order. A hearing for that purpose took place today, 2 December 2021.
2 Ms Namoa does not oppose the order and appeared at the application represented by a legal advisor.
3 Section 104.14 of the Code governs the confirmation of an interim control order. That section only applies if, in accordance with s 104.14(1A):
(a) an interim control order is made in relation to a person; and
(b) an election is made under section 104.12A to confirm the order; and
(c) the issuing court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that section 104.12 and subsection 104.12A(2) have been complied with in relation to the order.
4 An affidavit of service, affirmed by Senior Constable Aydin Ozden and dated 1 December 2021, was read in court. It sets out the steps that have been taken to serve Ms Namoa with copies of documents relevant to the present application and to explain those documents to her.
5 I am satisfied by the contents of Mr Ozden's affidavit that the requirements of s 104.12 of the Code have been met, which requires the interim control order to be personally served on the respondent by a member of the AFP who must provide an explanation as to the effect of the interim control order, and to inform the respondent of related information as required by s 104.12(1)(b). I am also satisfied by the affidavit evidence before me, which includes the affidavit of Superintendent Read sworn on 12 November 2021 and read during the interim control order application and again during this application, that the applicant has elected to confirm the interim control order and given written notification to this Court of that election, and that a member of the AFP has personally served upon the respondent a copy of that election notification and related documents in accordance with s 104.12A(2)(a)(i)-(iii).
6 Although Ms Namoa was entitled to produce evidence and make submissions at the confirmation hearing in accordance with s 104.14(1)(c), she has elected not to do so, other than to confirm that she does not oppose the making of the order.
7 Section 104.14(7)(c) gives the Court the power to confirm an interim control order without variation. Two conditions must be met. Both are set out in s 104.4(1) of the Code. The first is that the Court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that one of seven alternatives is met, including relevantly "(iv) that the person has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation…or a terrorist act" (s 104.1(1)(c)(iv)). The second condition is that "the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on the person by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of: (i) protecting the public from a terrorist act; or (ii) preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act" (s 104.4(1)(d)(i)-(ii)): see also Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307 at [480] (Hayne J). I concluded at the interim control order hearing that both of these conditions were met at that time.
8 As noted above, in addition to the affidavit of Senior Constable Ozden, the same materials are before me as were on 24 November 2021 when I made the interim control order.
9 I remain satisfied that both of the conditions for the exercise of the power to confirm the interim control order identified above have been met. Specifically, as I noted in Read v Namoa (No 1), I am satisfied that the respondent has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, meeting the criterion in s 104.4(1)(c)(iv). I am also satisfied that each of the prohibitions and restrictions imposed upon the respondent by the interim control order meet the requirements of s 104.4(1)(d) because they are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act, or preventing the provision of support for the facilitation of a terrorist act: see Read v Namoa (No 1) at [14]-[25].
10 I am therefore able to confirm the ICO.
11 In reaching that conclusion I am required to consider the original interim control order request and the evidence and submissions made at the confirmation hearing, including taking judicial notice of the fact that the original request was made in particular terms. I note that I may only take action on evidence adduced and submissions made at the confirmation hearing, which is what I have done: see s 104.14(3) and (3A) of the Code.
12 It is important to observe, for completeness, that a confirmation hearing, unlike an interim control order hearing, is not interlocutory. The maximum duration for which a confirmed control order may be made is 12 months from the day upon which the interim control order is made which means that the confirmed control order will expire on 23 November 2022.
13 I will therefore make orders in accordance with the draft orders that have been submitted to the Court prior to the hearing today.
I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Burley.