In a number of authorities, the courts have made it clear that courts should pay regard to the commercial judgment of liquidators when considering compromises of claims or causes of action made by liquidators in respect of which compromises the approval of the court is sought. The Act and its predecessors, entrust to liquidators and administrators the conduct of liquidations and administrations, albeit subject to the ultimate supervision of the court. The court will generally defer to the commercial judgment of liquidators and administrators. In Re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 9 ACSR 83, Giles J said at 85-6:
In any application pursuant to s 377(1) [equivalent to Corporations Act s 477(2A)] the court pays regard to the commercial judgment of the liquidator: Re Chase Corp (Australia) Equities Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 1118. That is not to say that it rubber stamps whatever is put forward by the liquidator but, as is made clear in Re Mineral Securities Australia Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 207 at 231-2, the court is necessarily confined in attempting to second guess the liquidator in the exercise of his powers, and generally will not interfere unless there can be seen to be some lack of good faith, some error in law or principle, or real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct. The same restraint must apply when the question is whether the liquidator should be authorised to enter into a particular transaction the benefits and burdens of which require assessment on a commercial basis.
Put shortly, it is not the role of the court to make a commercial judgment for the liquidators or administrators or to substitute its judgment for their judgment. The court is not qualified to do so and it is not part of the judicial function to do so. Street CJ made this point in Re Mineral Securities Australia Ltd (in liq) [1973] 2 NSWLR 207 at 232:
When the court is required to pronounce upon the commercial prudence of a transaction, it enters upon a slippery and uncertain field. Apart from the lawyer's disclaimer of expert qualifications in matters of business prudence, the very process of litigation and the necessary limitations upon the scope of admissible evidence restrict the available material to far less than is necessary for the making of a commercial decision.
As I have pointed out earlier, although courts will not pronounce upon the commercial prudence of a particular transaction, they will act in an appropriate case to protect liquidators and administrators from claims that they have acted unreasonably in entering into particular transactions. That protection will remain so long as the liquidators or administrators have made a full and fair disclosure to the court of all facts material to the subject-matter under consideration: Re G B Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (in liq), above, at 679; Mentha v G E Capital Ltd (1997) 154 ALR 565 ; 27 ACSR 696 at 702.
In this consideration of relevant principles, I have considered the relevant principles as applying equally to court appointed liquidators and administrators appointed pursuant to Pt 5.3A of the Act.
There is a difference between court appointed liquidators and administrators appointed pursuant to the provisions of Pt 5.3A of the Act. Administrators are not officers of the court in the same way as court appointed liquidators are officers of the court. Part 5.3A of the Act enables an administrator of a company to be appointed by the company (s 436A), by a liquidator of a company (s 436B), by a person entitled to enforce a charge on the whole of the company's property (s 436C) and by the court where a company is under administration but no administrator is acting (s 449C(6)). There is a suggestion in some authorities that a voluntary liquidator not appointed by the court is not an officer of the court: Re London County Commercial Reinsurance Office [1922] 2 Ch 67 at 84; Re David A Hamilton & Co Ltd (in liq) [1928] NZLR 419 at 422, but see Re T H Knitwear (Wholesale) Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 371 at 377.