Re the Adoption of BAEH [2019] NSWSC 214

The Involvement of Barnardos

1. The Principal Officer, Barnardos, is a delegate of the Secretary by virtue of an order, given under the hand of the Secretary, pursuant to s 206 of the Act. Under s 206(2)(a), the Principal Officer may be conferred with any of the functions delegated to the Secretary by the Minister, or, under s 206(2)(b), any of the Secretary's other functions under the Act or the regulations. In addition, the Principal Officer may be given all of the powers of the Secretary. Relevantly, included in the powers listed in s 10 of the Act, the Principal Officer is given the ability to make an application for orders to be made for the adoption of a child, in this case, BAEH.
2. Pursuant to orders made by the Children's Court of New South Wales at Parramatta, on 31 January 2014, the Minister for Family and Community Services ("the Minister") was granted sole parental responsibility for BAEH. Barnardos is also a designated agency under s 139 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) ("the Care Act") and has delegated parental responsibility for BAEH, including case management and supervisory responsibility for her out-of-home care placement.
3. Barnardos offers a range of services to children in need of care, including temporary and long term foster care placement. It also offers, under the Find-a-Family program, an integrated service of permanent family care and adoption, to children who have been permanently removed from their birth families by the Courts. Children are referred to Barnardos Find-a-Family by the Department of Family and Community Services ("the Department").
4. Children who are placed in Barnardos' foster care placements are allocated a Case Manager. The role of the Case Manager includes visiting the child's placement on a regular basis, spending time with the carers and the child to ensure that the placement is adequately meeting the child's needs, obtaining updates from the carers on the child's progress, and exploring with the carers how they are managing and if any extra support (emotional or practical) is required. Depending on a child's age and maturity, the Case Managers also spend time alone with the child to explore the child's feelings and sense of happiness within the placement. The Case Managers also have ongoing contact with the child's parents in order to provide them with information as to the child's wellbeing, to discuss any concerns that have been identified and to schedule contact visits and Case Review meetings.
5. In the case of BAEH, day to day responsibility for the casework was managed by Barnardos' Case Managers, Ms X Alvarez, between November 2013 and 20 July 2016, and by Ms J U Norderyd since then.
6. Ms J E Atkinson, who is one of the witnesses in this case, is a Regional Manager employed by Barnardos. She commenced her employment with Barnardos in November 2015, having previously been employed by Plymouth Local Authority, Children and Young People Services, in the United Kingdom, for 15 years. She has experience working within the field of child protection and has 9 years' experience working within Permanency Services, in both fostering and adoption in the United Kingdom. She has a BA (Hons) Humanities Degree and a Masters' Degree in Social Work. She has continued with post graduate studies and has completed a number of training courses involving children. She is a member of the NSW Committee on Adoption and Permanent Care, a non-profit organisation comprising membership from government and non-government agencies, support groups, and individuals, who are interested in, involved in, or affected by adoption and permanent care. She is certainly well qualified.
7. Ms Atkinson affirmed one affidavit made on 28 March 2017 that I have read. I shall refer to this affidavit later in these reasons.
8. Ms Norderyd is a Senior Case Manager, Adoption, at Barnardos Find-a- Family. She commenced with Barnardos in November 2014. She is an authorised person for the purposes of s 91(2A) of the Act, being a suitably qualified person employed, or nominated, by an approved organisation, to prepare reports in accordance with s 91 of the Act. She has 20 years' experience as a social worker both within the non-government sector as well as at the Department. She too is well qualified.
9. She affirmed five affidavits that I have read. I shall refer to the contents of these affidavits later in these reasons.

The Evidence

1. The Secretary's application was supported by: 1. An affidavit affirmed 23 March 2017, by Ms Norderyd, to which affidavit was annexed a confidential report, dated 21 March 2017, prepared under s 91 of the Act. The report was based upon interviews with RGT, with VEH, with CMAM, and with other interested persons. I shall refer to this report in detail later in these reasons. 2. An affidavit, affirmed 28 March 2017, by Ms Atkinson. In preparing her affidavit, she gave evidence that she had access to the Department's records in relation to BAEH. Exhibited to her affidavit, and marked Ex. JA1, was a folder of documents, comprising 384 pages, being copies of the documents to which she referred in that affidavit. It is this affidavit, and the exhibit to it that has much of the factual information to which reference will be made. 3. Four further affidavits, one affirmed on 21 July 2017, the second on18 January 2018, the third on 30 October 2018, and an affidavit of service affirmed 18 August 2017, of Ms Norderyd, as a Senior Case Manager, Adoptions, Barnardos Australia. 4. Two affidavits of CMAM, the first affirmed 24 July 2017 and the second on 31 October 2018. 5. Four affidavits, both from each of two different referees, attesting to the good fame and character of CMAM. 6. An affidavit of service affirmed on 16 February 2018, of Ms G S Bromwich, solicitor.
2. Naturally, none of the deponents was cross-examined.
3. For his part, VEH relied only upon four affidavits affirmed 29 January 2018, 15 February 2018, 2 July 2018 and 31 October 2018, respectively. He also relied upon three affidavits of YM, one sworn 2 July 2018, the second affirmed 31 October 2018, and the third affirmed 13 November 2018. YM has been in a relationship with VEH since about April 2017. Neither was cross-examined.

Service of Documents

1. In an affidavit affirmed on 18 August 2017, Ms Norderyd stated that: "6. On 25 July 2017, [D K] Berry, Principal Officer of Adoptions at Barnardos Australia signed two separate Notice of Application for Adoption Orders and Dispense with Consent Orders addressed individually to [VEH] and [RGT] ("the Notice Document"). 7. On 31 July 2017, I personally served the Notice and a copy of the signed Adoption Plan on [RGT] at her home address at … Campsie. I handed the Notice documents to [RGT] and she accepted them. I had not previously met the mother, however she confirmed her identity and I was able to recognise her from photographs of her that I had seen previously…. 8. On 15 August 2017, I personally served the Notice and a copy of the signed Adoption Plan on [VEH] outside … Bridge Street, Glebe, where we had pre-arranged to meet. I handed the Notice documents to [VEH] and he accepted them. I have previously met the father on a number of occasions during the course of my case management of [BAEH]…"
2. In an affidavit affirmed on 16 February 2018, Ms Bromwich, a solicitor employed in the office of the Crown Solicitor, sent two letters, in identical terms, one by express post and one by registered post to RGT. In the letter, it was confirmed that RGT had been personally served with notice of the proceedings on 31 July 2017; that VEH was contesting the proceedings, and that the matter had been listed on 29 November 2017. A copy of the directions made was provided and RGT was informed that the matter was listed again, for a preliminary hearing, on 5 March 2018. It was suggested that RGT attend. In addition, there was sent with the letter two brochures, published by Legal Aid NSW, entitled "Are there court proceedings for the adoption of your child" and "When kids in care are adopted - Information for birth parents". Ms Bromwich confirmed that both letters were delivered on 4 December 2017.
3. RGT did not appear at the preliminary hearing or otherwise.
4. On 7 August 2014, RGT was personally provided with the Mandatory Written Information on Adoption and the Instrument of Consent. On 8 March 2016, VEH was personally provided with a copy of the Mandatory Written Information on Adoption. Thus, there has been compliance with s 59(1) of the Act (ensuring that a person whose consent to an adoption is needed before an adoption order can be made is given the mandatory written information before the person consents or refuses consent to the adoption).
5. I have earlier referred to the evidence of RGT being told of the hearing dates. As is obvious, she did not appear at the hearing.

Other Formal Matters

1. Before an adoption order can be made in New South Wales, the Court must be satisfied that a number of other procedural factual safeguards required by the Act have been met.
2. I shall refer to the formal matters that are required by the Act, by reference to the facts of this case, as there is no dispute about them: 1. BAEH was less than eighteen years of age when the Summons was filed, and she still is: s 24(1)(a) of the Act. 2. CMAM is resident and domiciled in the State of New South Wales: s 23(2)(b) and s 27(1) of the Act. She is an Australian citizen. 3. The application for the adoption order has been made in accordance with the Act solely on behalf of one person, CMAM: s 23(1) of the Act. 4. CMAM meets the age requirements prescribed by the Act: s 27(2)(a) of the Act. 5. CMAM is an authorised carer. The Dictionary to the Act, relevantly, defines "authorised carer" as including any person who has care and responsibility for a child under out-of-home care arrangements made under the Care Act. Section 135A(1) of the Care Act, relevantly, provides that "statutory out-of-home care is out-of-home care that is provided in respect of a child or young person for a period of more than 14 days, pursuant to a care order of the Children's Court". She had been approved as a long term permanent carer. 6. BAEH was placed into the care of CMAM on 27 November 2013, when she was 2 years old. BAEH has been in the care of CMAM continuously since then. 7. There are four affidavits attesting to the good fame and character of CMAM: s 27(1)(b) of the Act. 8. On 24 January 2013, CMAM submitted an Expression of Interest to adopt and on 7 June 2015, she signed an application form to adopt BAEH pursuant to s 43 of the Act. 9. From April to July 2013, CMAM was assessed to determine her suitability to be approved to adopt pursuant to s 45 of the Act. 10. In March 2014, CMAM attended a Transition to Adoption Training Seminar, organised by Barnardos, which covered a number of topics relating to the application for adoption. 11. CMAM has been selected according to the requirements of the Act. She is of good repute and is a fit and proper person to adopt BAEH, as required in s 27(1)(b) of the Act. 12. Each of VEH and RGT has been provided with a copy of the Mandatory Written Information in regard to the adoption, as required by s 59 of the Act. 13. Consent to the adoption must be given by every person whose consent is necessary, unless that consent has been, or should be, dispensed with: s 90(1)(d) and s 52 of the Act. That consent has not been given by either VEH or RGT. 14. For the purposes of s 87 of the Act, the application is made by the Secretary. The Secretary has consented to the adoption order being made for BAEH, as required by s 52(a)(iii) of the Act. The Minister, who has parental responsibility, has, by an authorised delegate, consented in May 2015. 15. The Court may not make an order for the adoption of a child unless a report in writing concerning the proposed adoption has been provided to the Court: s 91(1) of the Act. I have referred to that report having been annexed to an affidavit of Ms Norderyd, earlier in these reasons. 16. BAEH is not an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child. 17. BAEH has an established relationship with CMAM.

Uncontested Background Facts

1. A comprehensive account of the history is contained in the affidavits read in the case for the Secretary. It is not necessary to repeat all of that history. The following facts are clearly established.
2. BAEH was born in Canterbury Hospital and is currently 7 years old. Her Birth Certificate identifies her parents as RGT and VEH. (DNA testing has confirmed that VEH is her father.) She is the only child of RGT and VEH.
3. RGT was born in December 1971 and is now 47 years of age. She is of Anglo-Australian ethnicity and of the Church of England faith.
4. RGT has 6 other children, being, ST, who was born in July 1991; CT, who was born in January 1993; RhT, who was born in December 1994; DT, who was born in September 1997; RyT, who was born in October 2000, and IT, who was born in July 2015.
5. The Department's records reveal that RGT has a current partner, WA. Not very much is known about him.
6. VEH was born in Melbourne, Victoria, in May 1976, and is currently 42 years of age. He is of Lebanese ethnicity and of the Catholic Maronite faith. He is currently in good health, and is not suffering from any disease or physical disability. He has no other children.
7. CMAM was born in March 1965 and is currently 53 years of age. She is of Italian ethnicity and of the Catholic faith. She has no children. She is not in a current relationship.
8. It is not necessary to set out all of the details relating to the child protection history in relation to BAEH. It is fair to say, however, it is lengthy and detailed.
9. BAEH was assumed into the care of the Minister on 28 November 2011. After 5 days in hospital, she was discharged and placed with Barnardos Temporary Family Care foster carers.
10. An Interim Parental Responsibility Order was granted on 31 January 2012.
11. At about this time, VEH began to demonstrate a commitment towards BAEH. He began to make efforts to address his long standing alcohol and cannabis dependence and commenced attending contact visits with her. Regrettably, a short time later, having undergone urinalysis, he tested positive for cannabis and a proposed application for restoration of BAEH to his care was withdrawn.
12. On 23 September 2013, the Children's Court made a final determination that there was no realistic possibility of restoring BAEH to VEH's care. (There was an application by VEH's mother to be considered as BAEH's carer, but this was not recommended.) Consequently, the Department proposed that BAEH be placed in an appropriate long term placement with an authorised carer.

The Birth Parents

1. RGT and VEH had shared a troubled and turbulent history. There is said to be a history of drug and alcohol abuse and some domestic violence between them. In addition, each has some criminal history.
2. There appears to be no dispute that VEH has a positive, and important, relationship with BAEH. VEH, consistently, has maintained contact with her since the removal.

The Child - BAEH

1. BAEH has been developing well and does not appear to have had any significant health concerns.

The Adoption Plans

1. Section 46 of the Act, relevantly, provides: "46 What is an adoption plan? (1) An "adoption plan" is a plan agreed to by two or more of the parties to the adoption of a child that includes provisions relating to: (a) the making of arrangements for the exchange of information between the parties in relation to any one or more of the following: (i) the child's medical background or condition, (ii) the child's development and important events in the child's life, (iii) the means and nature of contact between the parties and the child, and (b) any other matter relating to the adoption of the child. (2) Without limiting the matters for which an adoption plan may make provision: (a) it may set out the ways in which the child is to be assisted to develop a healthy and positive cultural identity and for links with that heritage to be fostered, and (b) it may provide for the giving of certain financial and other assistance as referred to in section 201. (2A) A birth parent who has not consented to the adoption of a child (a "non-consenting birth parent") is, as far as possible, to be given the opportunity to participate in the development of, and agree to, an adoption plan in relation to the child. (2B) A non-consenting birth parent who agrees to an adoption plan is, for the purposes of sections 47, 48, 50, 51 and 90, to be treated as if the non-consenting birth parent were a party to the adoption of the child. …"
2. Section 90(1)(h) of the Act requires, in the case of a child (other than an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child) that the culture, any disability, language and religion of the child and, as far as possible, that the child's given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties have been taken into account in the making of any adoption plan in relation to the adoption.
3. Section 90(2) of the Act provides that the Court may not make an adoption order if the parties to the adoption have agreed to an adoption plan unless it is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the plan are in the child's best interests and are proper in the circumstances. Thus, it is necessary to consider this aspect also.
4. I am satisfied that each of RGT and VEH, being a birth parent who has not consented to the adoption of BAEH, has been given the opportunity to participate in the development of, and agree to, an adoption plan in relation to her.
5. Counsel for the Secretary submits that the arrangements for contact between BAEH and each of her birth parents under the Adoption Plans is appropriate and proper in the circumstances, as each broadly reflects contact arrangements which have been in place for some time; that each provides for contact at a frequency that has been working; that each allows flexibility in timing of contact; each also allows for future telephone contact and contact by electronic communication; that each specifies a minimum level of contact that is, in all the circumstances reasonable; and each provides for continued contact between BAEH and her siblings of the half blood.
6. Counsel for the Secretary submits that in these ways, each proposed amended Adoption Plan, in all of the circumstances, will promote the best interests of BAEH. I respectfully agree.

The Name of the Child

1. In the event that an adoption order is made, the Secretary seeks an order that the name of BAEH be changed to BAEHM.
2. On the making of an adoption order, the names of the child are to be approved by the Court, as set out in s 101(1) of the Act. Before any orders are made as to a child's name, the Court must consider any wishes expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the Court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's wishes: s 101(2) of the Act.
3. In this case, BAEH has indicated she would like to take on the surname "M". For example, in September 2017 she was happy to explain to the caseworker that her name would be "BM" after an adoption order and asked the caseworker whether she will come and see her after the adoption. She was excited and asked if the caseworker would bring a cake.
4. The Secretary seeks orders that BAEH take on CMAM's surname and that her given names be "BAEH". In circumstances where the application is made by one person, and where BAEH has demonstrated some insecurity over the years, the use of the same surname as CMAM will further foster an enduring and tangible family connection between adoptive mother and daughter. As such, it is in BAEH's best interests.

The Legal Framework Regarding Adoption - Statutory Framework and Principles

1. I shall not repeat what I wrote in Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71. I have set out the statutory framework and principles in relation to adoption in some detail in that case.
2. I shall not deal in this part with the parts of the Act to which reference has already been made.
3. Section 32(1) of the Act requires the Court, when making an adoption decision, to also take into account, amongst other things, the culture, language and religion of the child and the principle that the child's given name, identity, language and cultural and religious ties should, as far as possible, be preserved.
4. Section 52 of the Act relevantly provides that the Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age unless consent has been given by each parent of the child, and any person who has parental responsibility for the child. However, s 54 of the Act provides that consent is not required under s 52 if, relevantly, the requirement for the consent has been dispensed with by the Court: s 54(1)(a) of the Act.
5. Section 67(2) of the Act further provides that the Court must not make a consent dispense order unless satisfied that to do so is in the best interests of the child. Thus, the Court must regard the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout the child's life as the paramount consideration.
6. The relevant circumstances in this case, in which the consent of VEH and RGT can be dispensed with, if that is what is required, are limited by s 67(1)(d) of the Act. Section 67(1)(d) provides that the Court may make a consent dispense order dispensing with the requirement for consent of a person to a child's adoption, if an application has been made to the Court for the adoption of the child by one, or more, persons, who are authorised carers for the child, that the child has established a stable relationship with those carers, and the adoption of the child by those carers will promote the child's welfare.
7. Section 70(1)(b) of the Act permits the Court to make a consent dispense order in conjunction with an adoption order.
8. BAEH was placed with CMAM in November 2013 and has lived with her, continuously, since that time. VEH and RGT have had contact with BAEH since her removal but have not held the position of parental responsibility. Although the parental responsibility is formally held by the Secretary, it has been practically exercised by CMAM.
9. As I have stated, CMAM is an authorised carer for the purposes of the Act. Further, there is evidence that BAEH has established a stable relationship with her. Accordingly, it is appropriate, and in the best interests of BAEH to dispense with the consent of the birth parents, and it is desirable to make a consent dispense order, notice of the application having been given to each of VEH and RGT at least 14 days prior to the order being made: s 72(1) of the Act.
10. The Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child unless the Court is satisfied of a number of matters. Section 90 of the Act relevantly provides: "(1) The Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child unless the Court is satisfied: (a) that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, and (b) that, as far as practicable and having regard to the age and understanding of the child, the wishes and feelings of the child have been ascertained and due consideration given to them, and (c) if the prospective adoptive parent or parents are persons other than a step parent or relative of the child-that the prospective adoptive parent or parents have been selected in accordance with this Act, and (d) that consent to the adoption of the child has been given by every person whose consent is required under this Act or that consent has been, or should be, dispensed with, and… … (h) in the case of a child (other than an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child)--that the culture, any disability, language and religion of the child and, as far as possible, that the child's given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties have been taken into account in the making of any adoption plan in relation to the adoption. (2) The Court may not make an adoption order if the parties to the adoption have agreed to an adoption plan unless it is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the plan are in the child's best interests and are proper in the circumstances. (3) The Court may not make an adoption order unless it considers that the making of the order would be clearly preferable in the best interests of the child than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child."
11. On the making of an adoption order, the existing parental responsibility for the adopted child (including the Minister's parental responsibility under the Care Act) ceases to have effect: s 96(1)(a) of the Act.

Determination

1. In the circumstances, restoration is clearly to be assessed as at the date of the hearing, according to the paramount consideration of what is in the best interests of BAEH. It is my view that there is no realistic possibility of restoration of BAEH to either of RGT or VEH, on the facts. As I noted earlier in these reasons, VEH seems to have accepted this.
2. Even though restoration of BAEH to either RGT or VEH is not, in the present case, an option, it does not automatically follow that there should be an adoption order made. The Court must be satisfied that this proposed course is truly in the best interests of BAEH, and that the making of such an order is clearly preferable to any other: s 90(1)(a) and s 90(3) of the Act.
3. Ms Atkinson and Ms Norderyd have both provided an opinion that adoption would be in the best interests of BAEH. This evidence, prima facie, indicates that adoption would be preferable, without the stigma and uncertainty attached with the maintenance of the status quo, in which CMAM would continue to care for BAEH, but be faced with a potential application for restoration sometime in the future.
4. Whilst CMAM did not give oral evidence, from what I have read about her, she appears to be compassionate and loving, and perfectly capable of parenting BAEH, and caring for her financially and emotionally. BAEH has been in her care for some years, indeed, since BAEH was two years old, and this is also extremely relevant in assessing the bond BAEH has with CMAM.
5. In addition, for the purposes of s 90(1)(b) of the Act, albeit her young age, there is evidence to indicate BAEH has expressed she wants to live with CMAM. BAEH calls CMAM "Mummy".
6. For the purposes of s 90(1)(c) of the Act, CMAM is an authorised carer selected in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
7. I have already set out my reasons that the arrangements proposed in the Adoption Plans are in the best interests of BAEH, and are proper in the circumstances: s 90(2) of the Act.
8. I shall mention the other options briefly. I have considered a parental responsibility order in favour of CMAM, without adoption; leaving in place the status quo, with the Minister continuing to have parental responsibility and BAEH remaining in the care of CMAM; and, at least theoretically, deferring making a decision about adoption.
9. A parental responsibility order in favour of CMAM would have some, but not all, of the benefits of adoption. In particular, such an order would alleviate the requirement for the intervention of the Department in significant decisions about BAEH. However, such an arrangement would last only until BAEH attains 18 years of age, and, importantly, it would not confer the benefits of adoption, namely, permanence, security, stability, and lifetime membership in the adoptive family.
10. Additionally, a parental responsibility order can be varied (although, usually, a significant change of circumstances is required for this to occur), and while such an order gives a carer the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, it does not sever the legal relationship between the child and their birth parents. Conversely, an adoption order is permanent, which will provide a significant source of continuity throughout the lifetime of BAEH.
11. Another option I have considered is to maintain the status quo, which would involve BAEH continuing to reside with CMAM as her carer, while remaining under the parental responsibility of the Minister. BAEH would continue to be in "out-of-home" care, with the consequence that departmental approval would be required for significant decisions concerning her care and welfare until she attains 18 years of age. I do not think that taking this course is in the best interests of BAEH.
12. Further, I consider that to defer the final determination of the adoption application until BAEH is older would not benefit her, the birth parents or CMAM. Any emotional anguish, stress and uncertainty, for all parties, would simply continue until such time the matter was determined. Furthermore, to take this course would be inconsistent with s 8(1)(e1) of the Act, namely the principle that "undue delay in making a decision in relation to the adoption of a child is likely to prejudice the child's welfare".
13. On the evidence, I am of the view that adoption is clearly in the best interests of BAEH now, and in the future, and that it is the clearly preferable course to take above all others that I have mentioned. CMAM has provided BAEH with a loving and supportive relationship for almost her entire life, and they have shared a stable relationship with each other for some years. It is my view that adoption will enhance the sense of belonging and permanence of BAEH in relation to CMAM and the adoptive family, and that such an order will promote the welfare of BAEH.
14. For these reasons, the Court will also make the consent dispense order in respect of each of VEH and RGT.
15. The name change that is proposed for BAEH involves a change of her surname, from that of VEH, to that of CMAM. The change of surname will avoid BAEH being questioned and reminded of her adoption as she grows older, and will contribute to her sense of belonging and identity as a member of CMAM's family.
16. CMAM has agreed to retain the family name of the birth father in BAEH's name, which will continue her connection to her paternal family. Such a connection to her biological heritage may be of some importance to BAEH as she grows older. The retention of BAEH's first names, "BA", will provide a similar connection to RGT, who, presumably, participated in choosing those names for BAEH.
17. Lastly, I note that agreement was reached that the Adoption Plans in respect of each of VEH and RGT be registered, and accordingly, I propose to approve the registration of each Adoption Plan.
18. In the circumstances, and using the initials used in these reasons, but noting that in the orders as entered, the full names of the relevant parties will have been included, the Court: 1. Orders pursuant to the Act, s 67(1)(d), that the consent of the child's birth mother, RGT, be dispensed with. 2. Orders pursuant to the Act, s 67(1)(d), that the consent of the child's birth father, VEH, be dispensed with. 3. Orders pursuant to the Act, s 50(1) and s 50(3), the Maternal Adoption Plan (being Ex. MAP1) signed by the proposed adoptive parent and a delegate of the Secretary on 29 October 2018, be registered. 4. Orders pursuant to the Act, s 50(1) and 50(3), the Paternal Adoption Plan (being Ex. PAP1) signed by the child's birth father, the proposed adoptive parent and a delegate of the Secretary on 3 December 2018, be registered. 5. Makes an order for the adoption of BAEH in favour of the adopting parent, CMAM, and approves the name "M" as the surname and "BAEH" as the given names of the child BAEH.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 06 March 2019