"Entitlement to vote at the meeting is governed by s 198 of the Act. Subject to the section, every creditor is entitled to vote at the meeting...': s 198(1). A creditor is not entitled to vote in respect of an unliquidated or contingent debt or a debt the value of which is not ascertained: s 198(2). For the purpose of enabling a creditor to vote, a debt that is certain but is payable in the future shall be deemed to be payable at the time of the meeting: s 198(3). A creditor is not entitled to vote unless he has made known to the chairman particulars of his debt: s 198(4). On behalf of the applicant, it is submitted that, on its true construction, s 198(1) confers a right to vote upon only those creditors who are entitled to prove' under the deed of assignment.
...
I cannot accept the applicant's ... contention.
It is true that it has been held that a reference in bankruptcy legislation to a creditor' generally means a person entitled to prove in the bankruptcy: see Grave v Bishop (1855) 25 LJ Ex 58; Wood v De Mattos (1865) LR 1 Ex 91; Re Poland (1866) LR 1 Ch App 356 (but see Hoggarth v Taylor (1867) LR 2 Ex 105); Re Ward; Ex parte Hammond and Son v Official Receiver and the Debtor [1942] 1 CR 294. But the meaning of the term must depend upon its particular context. In the present case, the context strongly suggests that, subject to the specific exceptions mentioned in s 198 (eg s 198(2)), a creditor is entitled to vote notwithstanding that, on technical grounds, the proof' of his or her debt may be rejected in whole or in part. The evident object of s 198 is to establish a simple, practical procedure to enable the chairman to determine who can vote and, if so, for what amount. Because of time constraints, it was no doubt thought undesirable that the chairman should have to enter upon an investigation into the technical questions which could well surround such an inquiry into whether a debt should be admitted to proof'. By s 198(4), a creditor is not entitled to vote unless he or she has made known to the chairman particulars of his or her debt. This is a practical safeguard designed to ensure that, for instance, frivolous claims cannot give any right to vote. Moreover, by virtue of s 198(2), no vote is available in respect of unliquidated or contingent debts or in respect of debts the value of which is not ascertained. On the other hand, future debts, if certain, qualify under s 198(3). Thus s 198 reveals on its face a legislative intention to establish a code that, with certain defined exceptions, gives a creditor a right to vote notwithstanding that further investigation may reveal that his claim should not be admitted to proof'."
[See also Re Dingle at 486,7]
I respectfully agree with his Honour's construction. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that Avokah Irrigation was a "creditor" within the meaning of s 198. Although subject to the rule against double proof in respect of payment to it of any dividend it was, unless disentitled pursuant to the appellant's second submission, a creditor entitled to vote at the meeting.
INVALIDITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE RECEIVER
The second submission depends upon the invalidity of the appointment of the receiver, Mr Dennis, to Avokah Irrigation. This invalidity was dealt with by his Honour in his reasons. It arose from a failure to comply with certain stipulated requirements of his appointment under the relevant deed. The reasons are unchallenged and there is no need to set them out afresh. It is clear that the invalidity was of a technical kind and was capable of being cured. It would seem to have been cured by the time of the hearing before his Honour insofar as the first respondent, in those proceedings as in this appeal, is described as "Avokah Irrigation Pty Limited (Receiver and Manager Appointed)". It is accepted, however, that at the time of the meeting Mr Dennis' appointment was invalid, although this fact was not then realised by him or anyone else. The meeting proceeded on the basis that he validly represented Avokah Irrigation and held a valid proxy from it to vote against the resolution.
Notwithstanding this, the appellant submitted that the invalidity of the appointment has the effect of destroying the respondents' claim that the resolution that Loeskow execute the Deed of Arrangement was not carried as a special resolution. It will be remembered that such a resolution must be passed by a majority in number and at least three fourths in value of the creditors present personally, by attorney or by proxy at a meeting of creditors and voting on the resolution. The appellant asserted that, because of the invalidity of the appointment, Avokah Irrigation was not "present personally, by attorney or by proxy" at the meeting.
The appellant referred, in the first place, to the nature of the hearing provided for by s 222(1) of the Act, asserting that it was a re-hearing by the Court rather than a mere review of the chairman's decision on the material before him at the meeting. This being so, it was incumbent upon the Court to have regard to material placed before it, even if such material was not before the chairman. In the present case, of course, the relevant material was the information relating to the then invalidity of Mr Dennis' appointment. It was also submitted, in this context, that the respondents, as applicants before his Honour, bore the onus of proof of establishing that the relevant resolution had not been carried as a special resolution. Reliance was placed upon a number of authorities to which I shall make brief reference.
In Re Tregonning; Ex parte Friends' Provident Life Office (1983) 74 FLR 327, Fitzgerald J dealt with an application under s 222 of the Act in which an order was sought declaring void a Deed of Assignment. The application was brought by Friends' Provident on the basis that it was relevantly a creditor whose right to vote at the meeting approving the Deed of Assignment had been wrongly excluded by a ruling of the chairman. The chairman had refused to allow Friends' Provident to vote on the basis of material placed before him by the debtor and his solicitor to the effect that the debtor had a defence to the claim which "was not frivolous or trivial', and that if any amount was owing it was certainly less than the amount claimed'". At the hearing before Fitzgerald J his Honour admitted evidence which had not been available to the chairman and which, in his view, clearly established the existence of the debt. He found that Friends' Provident "was at all material times a creditor of the debtor in the sum ... claimed in [its] proof of debt". His Honour held, on the basis of this finding, that Friends' Provident had locus standi to bring the application under s 222(1). He gave the following reasons (at p 331):-
"Although the power to determine the rights of persons to vote at meetings of creditors under Pt X and the amounts of the debts in respect of which they are entitled to vote is given by s. 201 of the Act to the chairman of the meeting and s. 225 gives evidentiary effect to a certificate in respect of the chairman's decision, the decision is not
entirely beyond question. Notwithstanding that there may perhaps be room for argument based on the definition of special resolution' in the Act if it is applicable, it has been accepted without question that a declaration such as is sought in this case is appropriate if a creditor entitled to vote was improperly excluded from voting when the vote, if cast against the resolution, would have resulted in its defeat: see Re Segal; Lensworth Finance Ltd v. Segal and Ward (1975) 45 F.L.R. 85 at 91, 93 per Riley J.; Re Levy; Ex parte Scholefield Goodman and Sons Ltd (1980) 50 F.L.R. 99 at 115 per Bowen C.J.; Re Moloney; Ex parte Field (1981) 51 F.L.R. 31 per Lockhart J. It seems that the exclusion of such a creditor from the vote means that there has been no valid special resolution and, accordingly, that the deed was not entered into in accordance' with Pt X: see s. 222(1)."
A similar view was reached by Beaumont J in Zantiotis. A Full Court of this Court held to the same effect in Re Dingle at 484. The Court's jurisdiction to reconsider a chairman's ruling on a creditor's right to vote is, thus, fully established.
It is also clear that, on such a reconsideration, the Court may have regard to material not before the chairman. As already indicated, this was the view of Fitzgerald J in Re Tregonning. It was so held by Heerey J in Re McLean; Ex parte Friends' Provident Life Office (1992) 36 FCR 502 at 510. The matter is placed beyond doubt by the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Re Dingle where the Court said (at 486):-
"... when the Court is called upon to determine whether a person is entitled to vote as a creditor, it must act on the material before it; it is not limited to the material before the trustee or chairman: see Re Tregonning; Ex parte Friends' Provident Life Office (1983) 74 FLR 327 at 330 and Re McLean; Ex parte Friends' Provident Life Office (1992) 36 FCR 502 at 510. Moreover, it is not sufficient that the creditor merely demonstrate a prima facie or arguable case."
It is clear, also, that a person claiming to be a creditor wrongly excluded from voting bears the ordinary civil onus of establishing these matters before the Court. In Dingle, the Full Court said (at 488):-
"We think Drummond J was correct when he said that the issue that he had to determine, in order to grant the relief sought, was whether Westpac was in fact a creditor of the debtors in the amount claimed. The trustee's determination at the meeting gives rise to the case; but it is irrelevant to its resolution. The Court must decide, for itself, the question of Westpac's entitlement to vote; and it must do so on the material before it. Westpac must prove that the composition was void because the statutory requirements of the Bankruptcy Act have not been complied with; the necessary statutory majority having not been achieved because it was improperly denied a vote. In short, proof that Westpac was a creditor is an essential element to establish both its standing to bring the application and its entitlement to the relief sought."
I am of the opinion that, in view of these principles, the primary Judge was required to consider, in addition to the material before the chairman, the further material placed before him, namely that Mr Dennis had not been validly appointed as receiver of Avokah Irrigation. The uncontested effect of this invalidity was that Mr Dennis had no authority to represent Avokah Irrigation at the meeting, had no authority to vote on its behalf, had he been permitted to do so. Nor did he have any authority specifically conferred upon him to lodge with the chairman of the meeting, the "proof of debt" which was rejected on the ground that it infringed the principle against double proof.
It is clear that his Honour was seized of these considerations. However, he dealt with the question of the invalidity of Mr Dennis' appointment in the following way:-
"In the view I take of the matter, independently of the question of whether Mr Dennis was validly appointed as receiver, Avokah Irrigation was a creditor of Mr Loeskow and was entitled to vote at the meeting and its vote was crucial. Contrary to the Chairman's ruling, the entitlement of Avokah Irrigation to vote was not affected by any consequences of the rule against double proof."
It was the contention of the appellant that his Honour erred in the approach taken in this passage. It was submitted that he should have taken into account that the invalidity of Mr Dennis' appointment, irrespective of any error in the application of the rule against double proof, was sufficient to deprive Avokah Irrigation of any entitlement to vote at the meeting.
The appellant, in written submissions, developed the argument, with reference to the relevant statutory provisions, in the following terms:-
"The process of determining the entitlement of a person to vote at a meeting under Part X involves:
(a) firstly, determining that the person is a creditor within the meaning of s198;
(b) secondly, determining that the creditor has exercised his right to vote by appointing a person in the manner prescribed under Part X:
ss199, 200 and the Bankruptcy Rules, or by attending personally.
If a person is not either a creditor or has not properly exercised the right to vote then a chairperson should reject the vote."
Having regard to these considerations, the argument proceeded, it devolved upon the present respondents to prove at the trial:-
"(a)that the First Respondent was a creditor in fact (s198); and
(b) that Mr Dennis (who attended the meeting) had a right to vote at the meeting for the First Respondent (s200); and
(c) that the vote would have affected the fate of the meeting."
Only if these matters were established would the Court's discretion be enlivened to overturn the decision of the chairman and make a sequestration order.
Specifically, it was submitted that his Honour erred in failing to accept the existence of an issue, namely; was Mr Dennis the attorney or proxy of the first respondent (s 200(1))? As this issue could only be decided in the negative then, it followed that the present respondents had failed to prove that the first respondent was entitled to vote at the meeting.
I should add that there was no dispute that if Mr Dennis had been permitted to vote at the meeting he would have voted against the resolution and that the vote would have defeated the resolution.
The respondents did not dispute that the invalidity of Mr Dennis' appointment prevented him acting as a duly appointed attorney or proxy of Avokah Irrigation within the meaning of s 200(1) of the Act. However, they argued that his Honour was correct in treating this matter as irrelevant. Because Avokah Irrigation had been wrongly rejected as a creditor entitled to vote through the erroneous application of the rule against double proof, the question of Mr Dennis' authority to vote on its behalf simply did not arise at the meeting and, perhaps, was not allowed to determine the result of the applications.
The respondents relied upon the wording of s 198(4) in contrast with the wording of s 200. It may be noted that s 198 has the heading "Entitlement to Vote at Meeting" whereas s 200 bears the heading "Manner of Voting". It was the respondents' contention that in determining "entitlement to vote" it was irrelevant to consider whether an entitlement established under s 198 might not, in fact, be capable of exercise through failure to comply with s 200.
I think there is considerable force in this argument. Indeed, I am persuaded by it. As already indicated, Avokah Irrigation was a "creditor" of Loeskow and was therefore entitled to vote at the meeting pursuant to s 198(1) unless disentitled by the provisions of any sub-sections of that section. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that it was so disentitled by sub-s (4) in that it had not made known to the chairman particulars of its debt. This failure was said to have occurred by reason of the fact that the particulars had been supplied by Mr Dennis in the absence of authority to do so. I am of the opinion that the very general wording of s 198 when contrasted with the wording of s 200 precludes any necessity that, in the case of a company, the particulars of debt be supplied in any formal manner. In particular it is not a critical requirement that they be furnished by some person holding a relevant power of attorney or proxy. Here the information was given to the chairman in the presence of Loeskow and his son both of whom were directors of Avokah Irrigation. The information was not disputed and was accepted by the chairman. In my view, common sense requires that it be accepted that in those circumstances sufficient compliance with the sub-section had occurred. That being so, "entitlement to vote" was established.
The difficult question in the case, as I see it, is whether the acknowledged inability of Mr Dennis to vote on behalf of Avokah Irrigation at the meeting prevented the establishment of the ground of the application.
This is not a case such as Tregonning, Zantiotis, or Dingle where the Court entertained additional evidence bearing upon an issue raised at the creditor's meeting. Here, the question of Mr Dennis' right to represent the company and vote on its behalf against the resolution was simply not raised, nor was it intended to be raised, it being assumed on all sides that the right existed. Although the Court was required to re-hear and not merely review, it could not, in the nature of things, assume the role of chairman and engage in essentially hypothetical considerations as to what might or might not have occurred had the issue raised before it for the first time been presented to the chairman at the meeting. In my view, this provides a critical point of distinction between this case and the earlier cases.
In my opinion, the present case would be properly analogous to cases such as Tregonning and Dingle if objection had been taken at the creditor's meeting to Avokah Irrigation being represented by Mr Dennis, followed by a dismissal of the objection by the chairman made without the benefit of material demonstrating invalidity which was later placed before the primary Judge. The Judge would then have been in a position to consider the objection afresh with the benefit of the additional evidence which had been denied to the chairman. Undoubtedly, in such circumstances, he would have been entitled to reverse the chairman's earlier ruling.
However, this was not such a case. The point was never taken before the chairman and, consequently, was not ruled upon at the meeting; whereas, the "double proof" point was taken and resulted in the exclusion of Avokah Irrigation from any participation in the voting procedure. The correctness of this decision on the part of the chairman was properly the subject of application to and reconsideration by his Honour pursuant to s 222 of the Act. His Honour found that the rule had been wrongly applied. I have respectfully differed from his Honour in finding that, had it been appropriate to apply the rule, its application by the chairman would have been correct, but that, in the circumstances, it was inappropriate to apply the rule at all.
In my opinion, his Honour was correct in refusing to consider, in the absence of its having been an issue before the chairman, the question of the validity of Mr Dennis' appointment. It is quite clear that, had the chairman not fallen into error in relation to the double proof rule, Avokah Irrigation would have been accepted as entitled to vote within the meaning of s 198. No question as to its right to exercise that entitlement pursuant to the provisions of s 200 would have arisen as there was then no question of the validity of Mr Dennis' appointment or his proxy. Nor is there any question that his vote would have been against the resolution. In my view, the respondents were properly successful before his Honour in establishing that the chairman's error resulted in the resolution being carried in circumstances where it should have failed for want of the necessary majority in value. The respondents have similarly succeeded in establishing this before this Court.
In my view, to allow the invalidity of Mr Dennis' appointment to be raised as a further basis for the upholding of the chairman's decision would be to enter into an impermissible area of speculation. For example, if one were to assume that Avokah Irrigation had not in fact been excluded from voting entitlement but that it had been met with an objection that it could not participate in the vote because Mr Dennis could not represent it, then, obviously, a variety of events might have occurred, including an application to the chairman to adjourn the meeting so that the situation could be cured. The Bank might have made application to amend the amount of its debt to claim the whole of the debt. This application would not then have been made in the context of any discussion as to the application of the double proof rule, which discussion, as appears from the transcript, had the result of deterring the Bank from persisting in that very application. In the absence of any such deterrence, it is very likely that such an amendment would have taken place or, at least, an application made for the meeting to be adjourned so that the position could be considered. These and other possible speculative considerations are sufficient, in my view, to indicate that his Honour was amply justified in refusing to regard the invalidity of Mr Dennis' appointment as determinative of the question before him. He was correct in regarding them as irrelevant to that determination.
His Honour, having found that the resolution for the entering into of the Deed of Assignment was invalidly passed, then exercised his discretion under the section to make a sequestration order in respect of Loeskow's estate. His Honour indicated the grounds for the exercise of this discretion in his Honour's reasons for judgment. It has not been argued that, in the circumstances of the resolution having been found to be invalid, his Honour committed any reviewable error in the exercise of that discretion. Indeed, in my opinion, he was plainly correct.
Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal with costs and confirm the sequestration order made by his Honour.
I certify that this and the preceding twenty seven (27) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of the Honourable Justice M. L. Foster.
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