"Danckwerts, J., delivering the judgment of the Divisional Court of the Chancery Division in the present case, cited ((1956) 2 A11 E.R. at p.99) and applied to the analogous circumstances of the present case, the passage which I have quoted from the judgment of Romer, L.J.; and he treated the word 'was' in the second sentence of that passage from the judgment of Romer, L.J., as meaning 'was at the date of (Fenton's) receiving order'. I think that the learned judge was entitled so to do, for the date of that order was, on the hypothesis on which Romer, L.J., was proceeding, the relevant date just as, in the present case, Mr. Waite's receiving order is conceded to be the relevant date. I am, therefore, on the whole, of the opinion that the language and reasoning of the three judgments in this court in Re Fenton, Ex p. Fenton Textile Assocn. Ltd., are more consonant with the argument of counsel for the respondent trustee than with that of counsel for the appellant. None the less, the precise point with which we are concerned was not raised in Re Fenton, Ex p. Fenton Textile Assocn.,Ltd. and not determined in that case by this court. If that is so, then I am thrown back on the terms of s.31 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, for the right of set-off claimed is a special right, defined and ordained by the statute. I have already expressed my view that, as I read the language of the section, and on the footing, which counsel for the appellant has conceded, that the relevant date for the application of the section is Oct. 1, 1954, the date of Mr. Waite's receiving order, there was then nothing 'due' from the appellant to the bankrupt; and that the sum paid nearly ten months later by the respondent trustee to discharge the sum then due to the appellant's bankers (which may well have been quite different from the sum due on Oct. 1, 1954) cannot be treated as a mere quantification of an obligation in the nature of a debt already existing on the last-mentioned date."