The expressions to which we refer in McGibbony's Case [1] might perhaps be taken to mean that upon an issue which the Crown must establish beyond reasonable doubt a verdict against the accused must be sustained unless upon the evidence the finding is unreasonable, there being no misdirection, erroneous reception or rejection of evidence and no other lawful objection having arisen to the course of the trial. If this were so the Court of Criminal Appeal would occupy much the same position as a Court of Crown Cases Reserved. For it has long been considered a question of law - that is a question for the court - whether there is reasonable evidence upon which a jury may reasonably find an issue in favour of the party upon whom the burden of proof rests. It is unlikely that it was intended by what was said in McGibbony's Case [1] to restrict the functions of the Court of Criminal Appeal to such cases. The express words of the statute say that upon a certificate of the judge of the Supreme Court or chairman of general sessions before whom a prisoner was tried or with the leave of the Full Court he may appeal against his conviction on a ground which involves a question of fact alone: s. 563. Moreover, the Full Court may examine witnesses or have them examined before a judge or an officer, send matters of certain descriptions for inquiry and report to a special commissioner and exercise any power which might be needed in an appeal in a civil proceeding: s. 570. It will be perhaps enough to cite by way of example from one early volume of the Criminal Appeal Reports three instances of the use of these powers: R. v. Witton [1] ; R. v. Winkworth [2] ; R. v. Heartsch [3] . It is perhaps useful to add references to R. v. Rice [4] ; R. v. Schrager [5] : R. v. Chadwick [6] and R. v. Hayduk [7] . These cases, chiefly cases turning on identification, provide further illustrations of the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of criminal appeal. However, no special powers were invoked in the present case and the question simply was whether the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence or whether on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice. It was not a question of a verdict being found in opposition to the evidence. In Aladesuru v. The Queen [8] , an appeal from West Africa, the Privy Council decided that it is not a sufficient ground of appeal to allege that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. What was the tribunal of fact in that case does not appear but presumably it was not a jury. The distinction between an attack upon a verdict on the ground that it is against evidence and an attack upon it on the ground that the weight of evidence is opposed to it is, or at all events was, well understood. It is well illustrated by Mount Bischoff Tin Mining Co. Registered v. Mount Bischoff Extended Tin Mining Co. N.L. [9] , where a Tasmanian statute provided that a new trial should not be granted on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence.