The elements of control, reliance and vulnerability
46 Courts must be cautious in imposing affirmative common law duties of care on statutory authorities (see, in particular, McHugh J - with whom Gleeson CJ agreed - in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 at 34, [79]).
47 In Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, Mason J, (as his Honour then was) at 460, observed that while, generally speaking, a public authority which is under no statutory obligation to exercise a power comes under no common law duty of care to do so, it "may by its conduct place itself in such a position that it attracts a duty of care which calls for exercise of the power". His Honour (at 461) pointed out that "a public authority, not otherwise under a relevant duty, may place itself in such a position that others rely on it to take care for their safety so that the authority comes under a duty of care calling for positive action". These propositions are not controversial and, in substance, are supported by Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1988) 192 CLR 330, Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 and Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540.
48 In Amaca Pty Ltd v The State of New South Wales (2004) 132 LGERA 309, I drew (at 325, [64]) the following propositions from Pyrenees, Crimmins and Graham Barclay Oysters:
"(a) The totality of the relationship between the parties is the proper basis for the determination of a duty of care.
(b) The category of control that may contribute to the existence of a duty of care to exercise statutory powers includes control, generally, of any situation that contains within it a risk of harm to others.
(c) A duty of care does not arise merely because an authority has statutory powers, the exercise of which might prevent harm to others.
(d) The existence of statutory powers and the mere prior exercise of those powers from time to time do not, without more, create a duty to exercise those powers in the future.
(e) Knowledge that harm may result from a failure to exercise statutory powers is not itself sufficient to create a duty of care."
49 For control to be a significant factor, capable of giving rise to a duty on a public authority to take affirmative action, the measure of control must be significant and special. I shall refer to authorities that bear this out.
50 In Crimmins, Gummow J said (at 61, [166]) that in some cases:
"[T]he powers vested by statute in a public authority may give to it such a significant and special measure of control over the safety of the person or property of the plaintiff as to oblige it to exercise its powers to avert danger or to bring the danger to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The powers of the appellant with respect to fire prevention in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day … were in this category." [my emphasis]
51 In Graham Barclay Oysters, Gummow and Hayne JJ said (at 598, [151]):
"[I]n Pyrenees Shire Council v Day … the Shire held a significant and special measure of control over the safety from fire of persons and property at the relevant premises. That degree of control was the touchstone of the Shire's duty to safeguard others from the risk of fire in circumstances where the Shire had entered upon the exercise of its statutory powers of fire prevention and it alone among the relevant parties knew of, and was responsible for, the continued existence of the risk of fire." [my emphasis]
52 Thus, the sole and actual knowledge that the Shire in Pyrenees had of the risk coloured to a material degree the quality of the control it exercised. Moreover, the fact that persons at risk of harm from fire had no knowledge of the risk, while the Shire knew of it, made those persons particularly vulnerable. That vulnerability also contributed to the quality of the control exercisable by the Shire. These matters rendered the control "significant and special".
53 Crimmins was a "control" case of a unique kind. As Callinan J observed in Graham Barclay Oysters (at 663, [317]):
"What distinguished the powers and functions [of the authority in Crimmins ] was that if they were not in fact exercised, then the industry which was a uniquely organised one, would hardly have been able to function at all, or with any degree of efficiency …"
54 In Amaca Pty Ltd v The State of New South Wales, I remarked at (at 322 to 323, [52]):
" Crimmins has always been regarded as a 'very special' case. There can be little doubt that it has to be regarded as a 'control' case of a unique kind. Its uniqueness lies in the degree of control that the Authority had over the actual entering into of contracts of employment, the conditions of work, and the conduct of both workers and employers. The vulnerability of the workers has also to be regarded as 'special'. Their very employment in practical terms was in the hands of the Authority and they were only casual workers with relatively weak bargaining power.
55 The position was summarised by Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 (at 559, [102]):
"[I]t has become more clearly understood that, on occasions, the powers vested by statute in a public authority may give it such a significant and special measure of control over the safety of the person or property of citizens as to impose upon the authority a duty of care. This may oblige the particular authority to exercise those powers to avert a danger to safety or to bring the danger to the knowledge of citizens otherwise at hazard from the danger. In this regard, the factor of control is of fundamental importance …" [my emphasis]
56 The nature of reliance, sufficient to contribute materially to the imposition of a duty of care on the part of a statutory body to exercise its statutory powers, is also a matter of some complexity. In determining the quality of reliance, regard must be had to the seriousness of the risk, the likelihood of its occurrence and the vulnerability of the persons at risk.
57 Knowledge of the risk on the part of the authority, and the absence of knowledge on the part of persons for whose benefit it is said the statutory power should be exercised, would, ordinarily, be critical features in the inquiry. As Gummow and Hayne JJ observed in Graham Barclay Oysters (at 596, [145]):
"[T]he co-existence of knowledge of a risk of harm and power to avert or to minimise that harm does not, without more, give rise to a duty of care at common law. The totality of the relationship between the parties, not merely the foresight and capacity to act on the part of one of them, is the proper basis upon which a duty of care may be recognised. Were it otherwise, any recipient of statutory powers to licence, supervise or compel conduct in a given field, would, upon gaining foresight of some relevant risk, owe a duty of care to those ultimately threatened by that risk to act to prevent or minimise it."
58 In the present case, the difficulties faced by Fatouros in establishing a duty of care on the part of the Council are increased as the duty of care contended for is a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent economic loss. As was said in Woolcock Street Investments v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 at 529, [21]:
"Claims for damages for pure economic loss present peculiar difficulty."