The decision in Kim
18 In submitting that item 1124B(3) did not go to the validity of the visa application, the appellant relied primarily on the decision of Kim. That case concerned the validity of reg 2.12 of the Regulations and the effect of subcl 832.211(3)(c)(iv) of Sch 2 to the Regulations. Clause 832.211(3)(c) of Sch 2 to the Regulations contained two criteria that the applicant was required to meet in order to satisfy the clause. The specific criterion the subject of consideration in Kim was:
…
(iv) before turning 18, spent the greater part of the period that the Minister regards as the applicant's formative years in Australia; and
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19 The primary Judge found that reg 2.12 was ultra vires because the language of the Act did not support the making of regulations that imposed a qualification on the entitlement of a person to make an application for a particular class of visa. Importantly, the primary Judge considered that a decision of the Minister concerning the validity of an application is intended to be a determination that can be made without giving consideration to the merits of the content of the application. Clause 832.211(3)(c)(iv), however, did require the Minister to consider material and reach a conclusion as to the whether the visa applicant had spent the greater part of the period that the Minister regarded as the applicant's former years in Australia.
20 On appeal, the Full Court held that reg 2.12 was not ultra vires, but that cl 832.211(3)(c)(iv) could not be read as imposing a requirement that affected the validity of the application. This was principally because "the criterion involves a subjective evaluation of a criterion which is in wide and, in a sense, elastic terms" (at [20] per Moore J). As stated by Allsop J (as his Honour then was) (at [43]-[44]):
Section 48(1) contemplates regulations that regulate the non-citizen applying for a visa. It is the permission to apply that is subject to the regulations here. Whether or not a non-citizen has the permission granted by s 48 to apply is something that is to be judged from the time of the purported taking advantage of the permission: that is, the making of the request. Thus, the regulations governing that permission to apply are to be seen as directed to matters which go to whether the act of application is permitted or not, that is, whether the non-citizen may apply or may not apply. So understood, the regulations contemplated by s 48(1) are concerned with indicia which can be assessed by reference to the time of the making of the application. Only in that way will it be able to be known whether the non-citizen has or does not have the permission granted by s 48(1); that is, whether the application when made was valid or invalid.
For these reasons, a regulation that suspends the assessment of the validity of an application by reference to an opinion of the Minister which cannot exist until some time after the making of an application is not authorised by s 46 or s 48. The relevant regulations under the Act, as presently drafted, are limited to regulations setting out criteria ascertainable as existing as at the making of the application and thereafter and which therefore provide criteria or circumstances which enable an assessment to be made as to whether an application is valid or invalid at the time of being made and thereafter.
(Emphasis added.)
21 The appellant submits that the Court should adopt the same approach to item 1124B as was adopted by the Full Court to cl 832.211 in Kim. Although Kim concerned a different provision of the Regulations, the appellant submits that there is no reason why the Court should depart from the reasoning of the Full Court. The effect of such a course would be that the restriction in item 1124B(3)(e)(i) could not affect the validity of a visa application but would only be a qualification on whether the appellant was entitled to the grant of the visa. As a result, the Minister would be obliged to consider the appellant's visa application, which he did not do in this case.
22 The Minister argues that the decision in Kim is distinguishable from the present case. In particular, the Minister submitted that, in contrast to the situation in Kim, item 1124B(3)(e)(i) required the Officer to consider an objectively and readily ascertainable fact, being whether or not the appellant had been refused a Subclass 100 visa since last entering Australia.
23 It is also of relevance that item 1124B appears in Sch 1 to the Regulations, which contains the formal requirements for particular classes of visa. By comparison, the relevant provision in Kim appeared in Sch 2 to the Regulations, which deals generally with the criteria an applicant must meet in order to be granted a particular visa.
24 In this way, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations proposed by the Minister is not contrary to the outcome in Kim. Indeed, it is consistent with the finding of the Full Court that the Regulations are capable of restricting the classes of visas for which a person who has previously had an application refused may apply, pursuant to s 48, and that such provisions can affect the validity of an application by virtue of s 46. Here, the requirement in item 1124B(3)(e)(i) goes to something that was objectively ascertainable at the time the application for the partner visa was made. Item 1124B(3)(e)(i) is therefore a provision of the kind that the Full Court in Kim considered could affect the validity of a visa application. In my view, the Minister is correct in his submission that the decision in Kim does not prevent item 1124B(3)(e)(i) from affecting the validity of the application for a partner visa.