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[1999] WASC 165
Supreme Court of WA
1999-09-13
Santow J, Zeeman J, Parker J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : RADONICH -v- RADONICH & ANOR [1999] WASC 165
Equity - Estoppel - Real property - Representations by registered proprietor - Acted on to detriment - Whether registered proprietor estopped from asserting title
Limitation of Actions - Land - Title by possession - Whether tenant at will or licensee - Possession by licensee not adverse - Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 9
Limitation of Actions - Land - Title by possession - Joint tenancy - Whether adverse possession necessary - Licensee - Possession not adverse - Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 14
Paradise Beach Transportation Co Ltd v Price Robinson [1968] AC 1072 not followed
Limitation of Actions - Land - Title by sole receipt of profits - Joint tenancy - Profits received by consent of other joint tenant - No legal right to sole receipt of profits - No right to sole title created - Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 14
Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 5, s 9, s 14
Defendant's claim to have acquired sole legal and beneficial ownership of plaintiff's interests in three pieces of land dismissed.
Allen & Anor v Roughley & Ors [1955] HCA 62; (1955) 94 CLR 98
Beaton v McDivitt & Anor (1987) 13 NSWLR 162
Beaumont v Hochkins [1889] VicLawRp 90; (1889) 15 VLR 442
Booker v Palmer (1942) 2 All ER 674
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] 1 Ch 623
Chaka Holdings Pty Ltd v Sunsum Pty Ltd (1987) NSW Conv R 55
Clement & Ors v Jones & Ors [1909] HCA 11; (1909) 8 CLR 133
Cooke & Ors v Dunn, unreported; SCt of NSW (Santow J); 7 August 1998
Green & Ors v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343
Guimelli v Guimelli, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 960249; 8 May 1996
Horrocks & Anor v Forray [1975] EWCA Civ 9; [1976] 1 All ER 737
Hounslow LBC v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 233
Ian Rumney Office Equipment Pty Ltd v State of Tasmania, unreported; SCt of Tas (Zeeman J); 18 June 1997
ICI Alkali (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation [1977] VicRp 48; [1977] 1 VR 393
Inwards v Baker [1965] EWCA Civ 4; (1965) 1 All ER 446
Kitchen v Royal Airforce Association [1958] 1 WLR 563
March v Neumann [1945] SASR 167
Murnane v Findlay [1926] VicLawRp 11; [1926] VLR 80
National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] UKHL 1; [1965] AC 1175
Petkov & Ors v Lucerne Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 7 WAR 163
Plimmer & Anor v The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Wellington (1884) 9 App Cas 699
R v Toohey & Anor ex parte Meneling Statin Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 69; (1983) 158 CLR 327
Richardson & Anor v Greentree & Ors, unreported; SCt of NSW (Einstein J); 1 December 1997
Riley v Penttila [1974] VicRp 67; [1974] VR 547
Stanley Malter & Felicity Malter v Boris Procopets, unreported; SCt of VIC (Smith J); 79; 28 September 1998
Sterne v McCarther [1988] HCA 51; (1988) 165 CLR 489
Wallis' Clayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd [1975] 1 QB 94
Wheeler v Mercer [1956] UKHL 5; [1957] AC 416
Wik Peoples Ltd (in liq) v Love, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 970237; 14 May 1997
1 PARKER J: The ownership of three pieces of land is disputed by two brothers and a family company of which one of the brothers has substantial control.
2 Two of the pieces of land may be sufficiently described as Lot 17 Rockingham Road, Munster ("Lot 17 Rockingham") and Lot 126 East Churchill Avenue, Munster ("Lot 126 Churchill"). The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of an estate in fee simple of each of these. The plaintiff and the first defendant are the registered proprietors of the third piece of land as joint tenants of an estate in fee simple. This property is Lot 192 Rowley Road, Jandakot ("Rowley").
3 There are other lots adjoining Lot 17 Rockingham which are owned at present by other members of the family viz Lot 15 owned by another brother Boris Radonich and Lot 16 owned by the first defendant. There are also lots adjoining Lot 126 Churchill which are owned by other members of the family at the present time viz Lot 123 owned by the first defendant and Lots 124 and 125 owned by Boris.
4 What may be loosely described as the family market gardening business had been conducted principally on the combined Rockingham Road properties which I have identified and also to a lesser degree on Rowley. Those properties are still utilised by the family business but now other properties are also used. At present, and since 1989, this business has been conducted by the second defendant of which the first defendant is the managing director. Before 1989 the business was conducted by a succession of family partnerships of which, since 1970, the first defendant had effective control.
5 The plaintiff inter alia seeks orders requiring the defendants to deliver up possession of Lot 17 Rockingham and Lot 126 Churchill. He also seeks orders for the sale of Rowley and an equal division of the proceeds.
6 By their defence and counterclaim, the defendants inter alia claim that the plaintiff has abandoned his interest in each of the three properties in dispute in favour of the first defendant and is estopped from asserting that he is entitled to any right of ownership or possession in respect of any of them.
7 With respect to Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley the defendants also rely on the Limitation Act 1935 contending that the first defendant has acquired title by possession from the plaintiff, in the case of Rowley sole title.
8 It is the defendants, more pertinently the first defendant, that bear the effective onus of proof in this action. They seek to displace the title of the registered proprietor in respect of each of the three pieces of land in dispute.
9 This action involves many members of the Radonich family. To avoid confusion the relevant parties will be referred to by their first names; and in this respect the anglicised name by which they are usually known will be used.
10 The parents of the plaintiff and the first defendant, Joseph and Yoka Radonich, were immigrants to Australia from the then Yugoslavia. They had three sons each of whom was born in Western Australia. The plaintiff, Ivan Vladomir Radonich, usually known as John, was born in 1936. The first defendant, Jure Dragomir Radonich, usually known as George, was born in 1940. Boris Anthony Radonich was the third son. He was born in 1954.
11 The evidence reveals that during his life Joseph, the father, as head of the family, generally made the commercial decisions for the family and was the controlling force of what was then the family market gardening business. In 1935 the father had purchased Lots 15 - 17 Rockingham Road ("the Rockingham Road properties") together with adjoining properties which also have since been disposed of, and Lots 122 - 126 Churchill Avenue, Munster ("the Churchill Avenue properties") together with adjoining properties which also have since been disposed of.
12 The parents established their family home on the Rockingham Road properties working some 10 acres of this holding as a market garden; the remaining approximately six acres was used mainly as a limestone quarry at least until the father died in 1970. The Churchill Avenue properties appear to have been used primarily as a limestone quarry until the late 1970's.
13 John grew up on the Rockingham Road properties, helping in the family market gardening business during his school days and working full-time in it after he left school until he moved interstate in 1957.
14 George also grew up on the Rockingham Road properties and helped in the business until he left school in 1953. Since then he has been employed full-time in that business and, following the death of his father in 1970, he has effectively been the controlling force of the family business. When he married his wife Gloria in 1964, George and Gloria moved into the old family home with George's parents. The old home had been constructed on Lot 16 Rockingham. A year or two later the parents moved to a new home they had built on Lot 15 Rockingham. The mother, Yoka, continued to live in the new home, after the death of the father in 1970, until her death in 1982.
15 The third son Boris also grew up on the Rockingham Road properties, living with his parents and then his mother until her death and, it seems, has occupied the new home the parents built since the death of his mother in 1982. He too helped in the family business while he was at school and has worked full-time in it since he left school.
16 On 17 August 1955 the father purchased Rowley but effected the registration of ownership in the names of John and George as joint tenants. Rowley comprised some 142 acres. Evidence was led for John that Rowley was purchased as a longer term investment for the two sons although to be put to use in the meantime. On the other hand it was George's evidence that when the father purchase Rowley he said words to the effect:
"That's a beautiful property for a market garden and you two boys can one day be able to establish a big beautiful market garden and be your own bosses, I want the two of you to work this as a market garden, that's why I'm buying it for you."
I would observe that, if they were his words at the time, his appreciation of the quality of the property and its potential as a market garden does not appear to have been immediately realised, as will appear. Indeed I am satisfied that it is only with more modern fertilisers, irrigation and agricultural techniques that have been employed since the late 1970s that Rowley has been really worthwhile for market gardening.
17 Without more, I was not able to be confident that one of these differing recollections was to be preferred to the other. As will appear, however, I have been persuaded that John's recollection is the more reliable in this and other respects.
18 While it was the evidence-in-chief of George that nothing at all was done with Rowley until 1958, after John had moved interstate, when George personally and at his own expense developed Rowley for market gardening, I am satisfied that from the time of the acquisition of Rowley in 1955 work was undertaken by their father and John, no doubt with George helping at times, to improve the fencing, effect some clearing and plant olive trees. By the end of 1957, however, it was apparent that the olives were not going to be successful and, in 1958, the father with George's help commenced to develop and use Rowley for market gardening. This seems to have been pursued by them until the father's death in 1970. It involved a limited amount of clearing of Rowley to enable some cropping in those parts of the property which offered the most obvious potential for market gardening. A pump and irrigation facilities were installed. The evidence does not indicate that any extensive area of Rowley was used for crops. The evidence suggests that there was not continuous cropping throughout those years.
19 As indicated, it is the effect of the evidence of George that until 1970 he paid for the outgoings in respect of Rowley such as rates and taxes, and for the clearing, the irrigation equipment and the expenses of preparing the ground and producing and harvesting the crops. I am satisfied there were expenses of this type. I am also satisfied there were returns from the crops. It is clear that John contributed nothing to these expenses and received no part of the proceeds.
20 I am not persuaded, however, that the expenditure was met by George personally. There is no independent evidence. George's account seems quite inconsistent with the general effect of his and other evidence as to the financial stringency experienced by George during this period and the poor financial provision made available to him (and others) by the father even after George married in 1964. It is also the general effect of the evidence that the father's role as head of the family led to him having effective control of the family business, especially the finances, while he was alive and also a substantial influence over the respective affairs of the members of the family. It appears from George's own evidence that he received only small amounts of what may be best described as pocket money for his work, both before and after his marriage in 1964, although the family market gardening business met all the ordinary expenses of his living and personal costs. This is borne out by the evidence of Boris which indicates that he was similarly treated until after the father's death when Boris was put on a regular wage for the first time. It is also the effect of Gloria's evidence that, from the time she had contact with the books of the family market gardening business when she married George in 1964, expenses in respect of Rowley were met by the business. It is also consistent with the father's observations to Gloria in 1964 to the effect that "we also have a block at Jandakot" (Rowley) and "George and I have some turnips growing there". Having regard to all of this, it appears to me to be more probable than not that after John left in 1957 and during his father's lifetime George found it convenient, if indeed he thought about the matter at all, to deal with Rowley on the basis that the development and cropping undertaken on Rowley was undertaken as an aspect of the family market gardening business and that the costs in respect of Rowley were met by the father from the resources of the family business. So, too, it is more likely than not that any returns from Rowley were received by the family business.
21 In short it is more probable than not that from 1955, during the father's lifetime, Rowley was treated for practical purposes as one of the family properties, its use being by, and at the expense of, the family market gardening business. Just what internal accounting, if any, there might have been within the family and its business, and what distinction, if any, might have been made about Rowley for income tax and partnership purposes, remain mysteries as to which I am unable to make findings on the evidence which I am able to accept. It has not been established that George directly met any of the expenses associated with Rowley until the father's death in 1970, or that he directly received any of the returns from its use. As a partner in the family business during much of this time he did so indirectly.
22 There was a suggestion that, in the accounts, relating it seems to the partnership which conducted the family business, there may have been a separate treatment of George and perhaps also of John at least at some stage, so that expenses incurred with respect to or on behalf of each of them would be brought to account against any notional earnings or distributions from the family business. However there were no accounts, records or other evidence to substantiate this. While that has a ring of commercial normality about it, the evidence I am prepared to accept falls far short of enabling any finding on this issue.
23 Neither is there a sufficient basis in the evidence to persuade me that there was a separate partnership between John and George established when Rowley was acquired in 1955 or at some time between then and 1957 when John moved interstate. While George's evidence was express in this respect it was quite unsatisfactory in its detail and effect, and is denied by John. There is no documentary or independent evidence. As I have indicated, from what is revealed of the general circumstances of the family and its affairs, the greater likelihood appears to me to be that during the father's lifetime Rowley was treated as another of the family properties by the father, even though registered in the names of the sons, and that the father, rather than John or George, made the effective decisions as to its use in that time and met the expenses incurred in respect of it, as expenses of the family business. I find accordingly.
24 It is clear that by the mid-1950's John had an ambition to branch out from the family market gardening business and to try his hand at cartage contracting. In particular he had an ambition to try his hand at operating on the east-west truck route. Late in 1957 a prime mover and trailer unit (a semi-trailer) was purchased and John left WA with the intention of pursuing his ambition. On the evidence I readily find that the parents wanted John to stay and help with the family market gardening business, but they did not stand in his way. On some basis or other, which is not made clear in the evidence, the father facilitated the venture by buying, or enabling the acquisition of, the truck and trailer.
25 Again there is dispute between the evidence of John and George as to the financial circumstances of the purchase of this truck and trailer and as to the financial basis on which John operated. George contended it was an asset of a partnership between John and himself. John contended that it had been purchased, by their father, their mother, George and him utilising finance from Esanda, which finance was secured when he, George and their father went to Esanda for this purpose. It is apparent that neither John nor George had the means to purchase the truck and that the father enabled the funding of the purchase. At that time John was a partner in the family business. George was still a juvenile and not a partner although he was admitted into the partnership with his father and mother, in place of John, some time after John left home in 1957. Whether the truck was in truth an asset of the family business or of John is not an issue I can resolve, but I am persuaded as a matter of probability that it was not an asset of a partnership between John and George. I note that John was later able to dispose of the truck and trailer, apparently without reference to the father or George, which suggests it was registered in his name.
26 It was also suggested there may have been a plan to diversify the family business by establishing a trucking business to operate in conjunction with it, although on what basis did not emerge. Once again the evidence in these respects was not clear or satisfactory and none of it is independently supported. It is clear that John went off with the truck and trailer to operate as a cartage contractor and I accept that, because John was financially strained, some of the hire purchase payments on the truck and trailer, and even until the late 1960s some other accounts in respect of the expenses of John's trucking venture, found their way back to Perth where, on balance, I am persuaded they were paid by the father utilising the funds of the family business, not by George as he suggested.
27 In the few years following 1957 John upgraded both the prime mover and trailer unit, at different times, and it seems more than once. It was John's evidence that some of the costs of doing this were met by the family business, but he met the balance. George's evidence was that he paid for some of these costs. The evidence, however, does not reveal how he would have had such money personally. Again I am persuaded that, on balance, the costs which were not met by John were paid by the father utilising funds of the family market gardening business. How these costs were treated for accounting purposes is not disclosed by the evidence.
28 In making these findings I have taken into account that in 1993 George asserted to John that he had met costs associated with the truck and trailer, and that John then accepted his assertion as true, although he had not known of this until then. Nevertheless, on the evidence George has not established that he personally met expenses associated with John's trucking venture, except that after he became a partner in the family market gardening business at some time after John moved interstate in late 1957 George indirectly bore a share of the expenses paid by that business.
29 The general effect of the evidence, scant as it is for this purpose, persuades me on balance that the parents hoped that John would return to Perth, which was his expressed intention, and that one way this could occur was for him to establish a trucking business so that it could be run in conjunction with the market gardening business. It is more likely than not that the father supported him in the trucking venture, in part at least, with this possibility in mind. John did not repay the moneys paid by the father, nor, on the evidence, was he asked to do so.
30 It was John's evidence that he wanted to prove he could make a success of his own life, in particular by succeeding in the trucking business, and that when that had been achieved this he planned to return to Perth. Competition for the east-west truck run proved to be fierce and John struggled financially. Although he occasionally made a journey to Perth, when he stayed at the family home, the evidence satisfies me that he quickly concentrated on other trucking routes on the east coast, in order to try and survive financially. As events turned out, John did not return home to live and work, although he has visited his family from time to time over the years. After a little more than a decade John came to move from the trucking industry, which had been a financial and personal failure for John, to the construction industry. I will return to that in due course.
31 It was George's evidence that when John set off with the truck in 1957 he said words to the effect that George could have Rowley to do with it as George pleased and that he wished to have no more to do with it, ie effectively he then abandoned his interest in and rights to any entitlement in the property in favour of George. This, on the evidence of George, was consistent with John's position at that time and over the years that followed, which position was that John had turned his back on the family and the family market gardening business and wanted nothing to do with them.
32 John's evidence was firmly to the contrary. It was to the effect that there was no specific discussion with George or his father about Rowley when he set off on the trucking venture in 1957. Importantly, he was very definite that he did not then, or later, hold the view that he rejected any interest in the family business or in Rowley, or that he abandoned his interest in Rowley in favour of George. On the contrary, he then saw the trucking venture as a means of proving himself after which he continued to hold an expectation of returning home. In his mind when John left home (and it remained so) Rowley was an asset he shared with George which could be realised at a beneficial time but which, in the meantime, was viewed by his father as of use to the family market gardening business. In assessing the position I am persuaded it is of some significance that there had already been established a pattern whereby the father, with the implied concurrence of John and George, had substantially assumed the management of Rowley for the purposes of developing it as a part of the family business and at its expense. John was leaving home, but his father remained behind and was still a significant controlling force of the family business, the family and the family finances. George was still a juvenile and had no independent means and in practical terms almost no income, even though he was later admitted to the partnership. There is no evidence other than that of John and George on this issue. While the probabilities as to this disputed and critical step in the history of events material to this case tend in my view to favour John's recollection over George's, as this dispute is at the heart of the issues in this case it is preferable to view the total effect of the evidence before making final findings. This will be done later in these reasons.
33 I accept that, at least in the initial decade from 1957 and until the end of the 1960s, John struggled financially and was forced to live fairly roughly. He had no permanent place of residence and often stayed with friends or slept in the truck. Because of his itinerant lifestyle George had to make extensive enquiries of acquaintances in 1959 and 1969 to find where John was staying, in order that George could visit John. It is also evident that John did not maintain regular contact with his family. I am persuaded that this was due in some part at least to his personal pride. He was very embarrassed that the trucking venture was not successful. For this reason I am persuaded that if John did telephone home he would try to speak to George rather than his parents because he felt his embarrassment most in relation to his parents. Another factor may have been his desire to avoid pressure from his parents about returning home to live.
34 John did, however, return home on occasions over these years. Mostly those occasions were associated with events such as 21st birthday parties, weddings and such celebrations of family members or close friends. It is not disputed that John was made welcome on those occasions. After John left the East-West truck route I am satisfied he returned home three times between 1959 and 1965. It seems to have been a feature of John's return visits to Perth that the family would often celebrate his presence with a party for family, friends and neighbours. It is also clear that whilst John's parents were generally minded to try to persuade him to stay in Perth, they were not insistent about this and accepted his preference to return interstate. Neither his parents nor the family ever turned their back on him. He remained accepted and welcomed as a member of the family. Even though bills in respect of his trucking venture would sometimes find their way home, even until the late 1960s, they were always paid.
35 The evidence also persuades me that in the mid-1960s, John lost his driver's licence as a consequence of traffic offences. A driving licence was critical to his trucking venture. He found a way of manipulating the distinct licensing arrangements of each State by using the false name of John Farrell to obtain another driver's licence in another State. By this means he continued to drive as a licensed truck driver even though his original licence had been cancelled. It was not long after this that he came to obtain the first of a number of specialised machinery licences eg. as a crane operator. For this purpose he used, of necessity, the driver's licence he held in the name of John Farrell. I am satisfied that, as a consequence, whenever he came to obtain a further specialist machinery licence, this too was in the name of John Farrell. These specialist machinery licences were acquired by John in the course of a gradual process by which eventually he ceased his unsuccessful trucking venture and moved to the construction industry. He became established in the construction industry by this process. As a consequence of the driving and machinery licences he held, John came to be generally known in the construction industry as John Farrell although, I am satisfied, simultaneously he was known as John Radonich by friends from the trucking industry and by family and other friends. I accept that for the purposes of what became by the late 1960s, his regular employment in the construction industry, and as a consequence for purposes such as banking and income tax returns, John used and became generally known by the name John Farrell, although I am persuaded he never abandoned the use of John Radonich with those who had known him by that name.
36 The evidence about the composition of the partnerships until the death of the father in 1970 is vague and not independently substantiated. From the pre-World War II days until the 1950s the family market gardening business appears to have been conducted by and in the name of the father. He too owned all the real estate. In the early 1950s a partnership was formed between the father and the mother. It was said this was for tax purposes. So far as appears it made no difference to the management of the business which remained firmly the province of the father. At some stage before 1957 John was admitted to the partnership. After John left home in 1957, precisely when is not revealed, John ceased to be a partner and George took his place. That remained the position until after the death of the father in 1970. There are no partnership records of any type produced in evidence for this period. These are only some accounting records from the mid 1980s and some registration records. There are no details whatever as to the nature or form of the partnership at any time and no means of determining what arrangements were in place as to capital or income.
37 There is a marked divergence in the evidence as to changes in the composition of the partnership following the death of the father in 1970. The evidence of George, Gloria and Boris would suggest that when the father died the mother ceased to be a partner as well, and Gloria and George conducted the family market gardening business in partnership until 1974 when Boris was admitted as a partner. That position, on their evidence, continued until the second respondent was incorporated in 1989. However, evidence in the form of registered particulars of the business name Radonich & Co, under which the partnership conducted the business, suggests a different history. By these records it appears that from 4 August 1970, following the death of the father, until 5 July 1974 the partners were George, Gloria, Yoka (their mother), and Boris. Following the execution of a deed of family arrangement to which reference will be made later, from 5 July 1974 until 1 July 1982 the partners were George and Gloria. Following the death of their mother, from 1 July 1982 until 26 June 1989 the partners were George, Gloria and Boris.
38 I find the registration records to provide a more reliable source and find in accordance with them.
39 Since the incorporation of the second respondent in 1989 it has conducted the family market gardening business. Originally George, Gloria and Boris were shareholders and directors, with George the Managing Director. The only change since then appears to have been the admission of George's eldest son Peter as a shareholder. He may also be a director.
40 Joseph, the father of the family, died intestate on 23 July 1970. John returned home just before he died having been called by George.
41 There was evidence from both John and George that following their father's death there was a discussion between the brothers about the future. On John's evidence, but contrary to George's evidence, their mother participated. Boris did not. It was the effect of John's evidence that he knew it was his role as the eldest son to take on the responsibilities previously carried by his father, especially of managing the family business and looking after his mother. While he knew that to be his responsibility he was not eager to accept it, especially as he considered he had not yet proved himself. His trucking venture had been a failure and he was just starting to get established in construction. Hence, he was greatly relieved when George made it clear that George was willing to take on that role. He readily accepted George's offer to take on the responsibilities, in effect, of head of the family. As a consequence John felt free to return to the East and he did so to continue in the construction industry. At the time it was expected that the three sons would share in their father's estate by each taking one of the three Rockingham Road properties, and John's evidence was that he told George and his mother that George could continue to have the use of his anticipated inheritance of one of the Rockingham Road properties to continue to conduct the family business as it had been previously conducted by their father. Although not expressly mentioned it was implicit in this that he might also continue to have the use of Rowley for the same purpose. Although not expressly spelt out it was his understanding of the previous use of the Rockingham properties and of Rowley that the family business should have the profits, but meet the expenses, of doing so. Nevertheless, John's evidence was clearly to the effect, once again, that he did not turn his back on the family business or suggest to George that he had no interest in it, or in any of the properties, and he did not say or imply that he renounced any interest he had or might be entitled to in any of the properties in favour of George.
42 By way of complete contrast, it was George's evidence that at the time John returned to Perth for his father's funeral, John remained completely disinterested in the family properties and the family market gardening business, so much so that he continued in his attitude expressed in 1957, and repeated since then, that George should have and use Rowley as his own as John wanted nothing more to do with it, and that equally John wanted to have nothing to do with any interest in the Rockingham or Churchill properties as a consequence of his father's death. George did agree that he proposed to John that he should take on the conduct of the family business and assume the responsibility of caring for their mother, although his evidence in this regard was put more on the basis that he was really forced to do this because John was not prepared to accept these responsibilities that were John's, as eldest son. On George's evidence, John's refusal to accept this responsibility and his complete disinterest in the family business and properties went entirely hand in hand. In effect, as George saw it, John turned his back on his family and the business, and wanted to disassociate himself from everything to do with them, including the properties that their father had owned and Rowley (just as he had done in and ever since 1957). It was on this basis, on George's evidence, that by default he was obliged to step into the shoes of his father. He did so, he said, on the basis of the assurance of John in effect that George should have all of the property interests of John, or to which John might become entitled, that were associated with the family business. I will return later to that fundamental divergence between John and George.
43 It was common ground that following the father's death, the family business continued under the primary management of George. The Rockingham and Churchill properties and Rowley continued to be used by the family business. The family business in my finding received the profits from all of these properties and met the expenses of their ownership, development and use. Financial provision was also made through the family business for their mother until her death in 1982, she and Boris continuing to live in the new house on Lot 15 Rockingham. John continued to live interstate, during much of the 1970's in New South Wales and then in Victoria, and to be employed in the construction industry. He visited the family in Perth at least in 1974 and 1980 and was always welcomed. Boris worked with George and other members of the family in the family business.
44 I should record my acceptance of the evidence, which includes that of George, his wife Gloria and Boris, that the family market gardening business was not always a flourishing concern. There were often difficult times financially and it was only by virtue of persistent hard work by the parents during their lives, and by George and his family, with Boris, thereafter, that the business has survived, developed and prospered, as will appear.
45 There remained in 1970, however, the distribution of the estate of their father. I accept that, at the insistence of their mother, solicitors were retained to assist her as the administrator, although much of the instructions were given by George. John had no part in instructing the solicitors. While the evidence provides little detail of the progress of this matter, the outcome is clear. In consultation with the solicitors, on 8 May 1974 a deed of family arrangement was executed in relation to the father's estate by which there was to be transferred:
These four family members were parties to the deed of family arrangement.
46 It was John's evidence that this distribution of the estate was agreed to by him when it was put to him by George. It reflected what had been anticipated when John, George and their mother discussed the future after the funeral of their father. By this distribution each brother took an equal share in the Rockingham Road properties and their mother took all the Churchill Avenue properties. This, he said, recognised and was in accord with his expectation as to his inheritance and his continued interest in the family and his continuing intention one day to return to Western Australia to take up his interests. In the meantime the arrangement reached with George and their mother after their father's death in 1970 continued. Although it had not been expressly discussed it was John's expectation that all expenses in respect of his properties would be met, and the profits would be retained, by the family business.
47 George's evidence was again in marked contrast. He insisted that despite the terms of the 1974 deed of family arrangement John continued to eschew any interest in the family business and the properties and he wanted no part of them. He was adamant that the deed of arrangement did not disturb in any respect John's position that all of his interests in any of the family properties were George's, and that John had in effect abandoned them in favour of George.
48 George explained the terms of the deed of arrangement, which were prepared on his instructions, as being something he understood from the solicitor to be a necessary legal formality which the family had to go through to wind up the estate of the father, and not something which in any way revealed or evidenced that John had in truth any desire to own or have any interest in Lot 17 Rockingham. On George's account the deed of arrangement did not contradict his evidence that John had abandoned his prospective interest in Lot 17 Rockingham to George after their father's death in 1970, just as in 1957 he had abandoned his interest in Rowley in favour of George. In these critical matters the position of John, after the deed in 1974 was, according to George's evidence, as it had been at the time of the death of their father in 1970. I will return to this later.
49 In keeping with the picture painted by George's evidence of John's complete disinterest in the family, the business and the properties, it was George's evidence that after talking to the solicitors he had rung John and discussed the terms of the deed as proposed by the solicitors. John showed no interest but agreed to sign whatever was needed to finalise the estate, so that when the deed was ready George posted it to John who returned it by mail after John had executed it. John's evidence, again in marked contrast, was that George and he had indeed discussed the terms of what was proposed by telephone and that John agreed to each of the three sons receiving one of the Rockingham Road lots with their mother having all of the Churchill properties. When the deed was eventually prepared, however, it was John's evidence that he made a special trip to Perth to execute the deed and finalise the arrangements. He said that all four parties to the deed, ie their mother and the three sons went together to the solicitors office to execute it. The deed is now in evidence. The signatures of all four parties are witnessed by Mr A Torre, who was then a partner in the firm of solicitors which acted in the administration of the estate. In my finding this bears out the evidence of John concerning the deed which I therefore accept. It also indicates, in my view, that John was not then showing complete disinterest in the affairs of the family or in the distribution of the property comprised in their father's estate as George's evidence would suggest. John's conduct on this occasion in making the journey to Perth (and leaving aside the terms of the deed to which I'll return later) in my assessment provides in itself some contemporary indication that John had a real concern for the affairs of the family and a real interest in receiving what he described in evidence as his inheritance.
50 It is convenient to mention at this point the matter of the probate and estate duties payable in respect of the death of the father. George and Gloria gave evidence that they had met these duties personally. George put the duties about $16,000 and he stressed that it took four years of hard work and financial stringency for them to meet this expense. Significance was attached to it as these duties were an expense in respect of the whole of the estate, including Lot 17 Rockingham, and that John made no financial contribution. Thus it was contended for George that the payment of the duties could be seen as some confirmation that it was George's and John's expectation that George was in truth to have the benefit of Lot 17 Rockingham. George said he paid the duty because he thought the properties would be his. Further, it was another factor which might weigh in favour of the fairness and equity of George now enjoying the full proprietary interest in Lot 17 Rockingham. It is accepted that John made no contribution to the payment of the duties or to any of the expenses of the administration of the estate. I accept from the evidence that the duties totalled in the order of $10,000, not $16,000. There were undoubtedly legal fees as well, but the evidence does not establish their amount. I note, however, that there was over $8,000 in cash in one of the bank accounts of the father at the time of his death and it is clear that during the period of the administration of the estate income was being earned by the estate. While these issues were not fully explored during the trial I am not able to find that it was necessary for the whole of the amount of the duties payable to be found from outside the estate. In substantial part they could have been met by the estate itself. Indeed it is the effect of one of the terms of the deed of family arrangement that the funds in the estate were expended on duties and the expenses of administration. Further, the duties were in respect not only of Lot 17 Rockingham, but of all of the Rockingham properties including Boris' lot, and all of the Churchill properties which passed to their mother, as well as the other assets of the estate. These matters detract significantly from the force of the arguments that were sought to be advanced in support of George's case from the payment of the duties.
51 There is a further significance in my finding, however, to this issue of the death duties. I have no doubt that George and Gloria did experience financial stringency by virtue of the need of the estate to meet death duties and the legal and other expenses of the administration of the estate. It may well be that in truth they did need to contribute some of their own money, although whether that was so and, if so, what amount, I cannot reach findings about on the evidence. The stringency they experienced, however, demonstrates the practical reality of the way in which in truth the financial affairs of the family business and the financial affairs of the partners were in practice treated as one, and how they were under the substantial practical control of the person who performed the role of head of the family.
52 It was John's evidence that by 1975 he had managed to get on his feet. By then he had met and formed a permanent relationship with Yvonne, a lady who became and remains his de facto wife. She changed her name by deed poll to Farrell. They have lived as Mr and Mrs Farrell since then.
53 It was John's evidence that in 1975 George requested that John led him $10,000 to buy a truck. George was trying to establish a trucking business of his own. John said he felt an obligation to help, so that although he hadn't $10,000 to spare, he did send to George by post office orders $7,500 in 1975 and a further $1,400 at the beginning of 1977. He produced bank passbooks showing withdrawals of the two amounts as some confirmation of this. George denies these events occurred. George's evidence, under cross-examination, had some consistency with John's evidence, however, in that George confirmed that he was short of money at that time and that he was trying to build up a trucking business. It was also John's evidence, denied by George, that in 1978 he accepted a proposal by George that, instead of repaying the $8,900 in cash, George would build a shed on John's land at Lot 17 Rockingham, which could be used in the family business in the meantime. A shed was built by George in 1978, on Lot 17 Rockingham. While George asserted this had cost some $7,500, in fact under cross-examination it appeared that only $4,500 was outlaid. The remaining $3,000 was explained as an estimate of the value of George's own labour on the flooring. George contended that his construction of the shed on Lot 17 Rockingham, at the expense of the family business, demonstrated that at that time he believed, and acted to his disadvantage on the basis, that Lot 17 was in truth his and that John had no interest in it. As a matter of an assessment of the relative credibilities of John and George as they gave their evidence on this issue, however, I am persuaded that the evidence of John regarding the $8,900 and the shed is to be preferred. It also has some external and contemporary support, in my finding, from the bank passbooks and the construction of the shed.
54 After the death of the father, in the 1970's George diversified the family business to use Rowley for cattle. For this purpose some fencing and yarding was built and a dam formed and stock was run. Eventually this venture was abandoned as changing market conditions caused it to become unprofitable. Some significance was sought to be attached to the fencing as part of John's case, as it included a fence which approximately subdivided Rowley into two equal blocks. It was contended this involved a recognition by George that John had a continuing half interest in Rowley, contrary to George's evidence, and indicated that it was anticipated by George that the time would come when, on partition, each brother should take half of Rowley as his own. For my part, however, it appeared to me that the fencing and yarding was explicable as an ordinary and sensible stock management layout and I was not persuaded that there should be seen to have been the deeper significance which the submissions for John would attach to the fencing.
55 Since the cattle venture, the more suitable parts of Rowley have been used for crops as part of the family market gardening business. Only parts are suitable for vegetable crops. For this purpose, in the 1980s quite extensive irrigation improvements were made together with earthworks. A work shed and a staff shed have been constructed. Rowley is in regular, though not necessarily constant, and apparently profitable use by the family market gardening business. Indeed it is part of George's case that Rowley is essential for the continued wellbeing of that business, although for reasons which will appear I am persuaded there is a different reason why George is so keen to acquire the sole title to it.
56 In 1978 George built a new home for himself and his family. He built this on Lot 16 Rockingham which is the Lot which became his under the terms of 1974 deed of family arrangement. The original family home built by the parents is also on Lot 16, but toward the boundary with Lot 15 (Boris' land). There was difficulty accommodating the house design, which George and his wife Gloria desired, on the Rockingham Road frontage of Lot 16, in the space left between the original family home and the boundary with Lot 17. The plans presented to the local authority for approval for the new home showed the minimum required setback of the north side of the house from the boundary with Lot 17. In fact, however, as constructed, the home is nearer the boundary than the plans indicated. It is, however, constructed entirely on Lot 16 even though to achieve this the house has had to be cramped close to the old family home and built closer to the boundary than the plans indicated and the by-laws would permit. At some time or other George then built a fence on the northern side of his house, there not having been such a fence before then. A survey reveals that this fence was erected in fact on Lot 17. The position of this fence creates the impression that the house is setback from the northern boundary of Lot 16 by the required amount, ie in accordance with the approved plans whereas, in truth, the fence but not the house has encroached on to Lot 17. Even so, the new house is built so that it is as close to the old home as the building by-laws allowed and the new home may be seen to have been squeezed into the available frontage space on Lot 16. While George sought to assert that his encroachment with the fence demonstrated his then belief that Lot 17 was his and not John's, George was not able to offer any satisfactory explanation for the lengths gone to accommodate the new home within Lot 16 by the means I've described if, as was his firm belief on his evidence, he had available to him the whole of the immediately adjoining and equally desirable Lot 17 by virtue of John's abandonment of his interest in Lot 17 in favour of George. In my view of the evidence, had that been his honest belief at the time, at the least George would have raised the matter with John to explore the possibility of securing the transfer to him of Lot 17, or he would simply have built the house on Lot 17 rather than cramp the house and mislead the local authority. It is to be noted that this was the same year that George built the shed on Lot 17 Rockingham. On his evidence he built the shed in the belief and on the basis that Lot 17 was his. Yet his approach in the matter of the house was quite the opposite. The misleading plans persuade met that George did not honestly encroach with the fence onto Lot 17 as he asserts. I would record that George's apparent discomfiture as he was tested about this matter in cross-examination, which was in contrast to John's demeanour as he dealt with this matter, has played a significant part in my assessment of the truth about this matter, as is also the case with the several other matters in respect of which I mention in these reasons that I have come to prefer one version of the evidence over another as a matter of personal credibility.
57 Mrs Yoka Radonich, the mother of the family, died on 10 July 1982. She too died intestate. John returned to Perth for his mother's funeral. It was the evidence of George that at this time John informed George that he was not interested in any of his mother's property and in effect that George should have whatever might be John's entitlement from his mother's property to use as George liked. George stated that this only served to further entrench his belief that John had relinquished in favour of George any interest or entitlement John had to any of the family properties including Rowley. John staunchly denied all of this.
58 John's evidence was that during this visit to Perth for his mother's funeral he and George once again visited Rowley. John recalled previous conversations in the 1970s, and in particular one in 1980, when George and he had discussed the possibility of selling Rowley. In the 1980 discussion it was John's evidence that George was proposing subdivision and sale of Rowley as prices had risen and sale could result in a good return. He had made some rough calculations of the possible return. George wished to generate some capital. John said he agreed to George's proposal when his consent was requested. George's evidence, however, was that the 1980 conversation was merely as a matter of courtesy. He did not seek John's permission and none was given. He considered he was dealing with his own land and John made no demand or suggestion that John should in any way share in the proceeds. Again, as a matter of personal credibility, I considered that the evidence of John on this matter was to be preferred.
59 On the occasion in 1982, following the funeral of their mother, John enquired how the plans for subdivision of Rowley were progressing and was informed by George that he had deferred the idea as the land was to be reclassified for residential use and the value would be higher. John's evidence was that because of this he agreed with George to wait before selling the Rowley property. These events were denied by George. Again, as a matter of personal credibility, on this issue I preferred the evidence of John.
60 Significantly, in 1984 there was another deed of family arrangement in relation to the mother's estate which was executed by John, George and Boris. This deed was prepared on the instructions of George by a different firm of solicitors. By the terms of this deed the mother's estate was to be distributed by transferring:
As with the 1974 deed I am satisfied John made a trip to Perth to see to its execution and the comments which I made and the implications I drew from his trip to Perth to execute the 1974 deed are repeated in respect of the 1984 visit to Perth.
61 The evidence of both George and John with respect to this deed was in broad effect similar to their evidence with respect to the 1974 deed of family arrangement. George explained it as having been prepared on his instructions but they had merely reflected the legal advice he had received that it was, as he understood it, a legal requirement that the three sons should share in the mother's estate. He dismissed it as merely a necessary legal formality to wind up the mother's estate and not evidencing any wish of John to receive any entitlement from the estate or to have any interests in any of the real estate that had been owned by their mother. The deed did not, on George's evidence, countermand or contradict John's stated position that, as George effectively described it, any property interests of John's were George's to use as he liked.
62 As with the 1974 deed, on John's account the deed reflected both his continuing interest in the lands and the affairs of the family and the acceptance at that time of George and Boris that he had a continuing right to an interest in the disposition of the family properties. It was John's evidence that, as he had done at the time of the 1974 deed and when his father died and when his mother died, at the time of the 1984 deed he was prepared to allow George to have continued use of Lot 126 Churchill, as had been the case before their mother died, for the purposes of the family business. I will return to this deeply disputed issue later in these reasons.
63 The Churchill properties had been in profitable use for the family business since the mid 1950s when John assisted his father to negotiate an arrangement for limestone to be quarried from the properties. This was still the case when the father died in 1970 and for some years after that, by which time they had become the property of the mother. Nevertheless they continued to be used for the financial benefit of the family market gardening business even though the mother was no longer a partner in that business. George seems to have managed their use. In the late 1970s he commenced a process of filling the quarry site under an arrangement by which waste material was dumped at no cost . Quarrying had ceased. On a couple of occasions he acquired and spread soil as part of this process. By 1984 the filling was nearly complete. This filling greatly improved the value of all four lots. This was completed in 1989.
64 Since the deed of 1984, although utilising changing legal structures, it may be said that in practical terms George has continued to conduct the family market gardening business using the Rockingham properties and to a limited extent Rowley.
65 John has continued to return to visit the family occasionally in the years following the death of his mother, much as he had in the years before his mother's death. These visits may generally be described as irregular and occasional and most usually were associated with an event of family significance. He visited at least in 1982, 1984, 1988, 1989 or 1990, twice in 1993 and 1995. In more recent years he was usually accompanied by Yvonne. Usually he stayed with George or another family member. While there was dispute in this respect in the evidence I am satisfied it was his practice, both before and after his mother's death, to visit each of Rowley, Lot 126 Churchill and Lot 17 Rockingham during these visits, sometimes in company with George or another family member, and sometimes on his own. He would usually go onto Rowley and Lot 17 Rockingham, but not always Lot 126 Churchill. Sometimes he visited Rowley more than once a visit. He did not usually help out with the market gardening work on these visits although I am satisfied he did so on more than one occasion, despite evidence to the contrary.
66 During the visits to Perth he would discuss with George developments relating to each of the three properties, as he did in between visits by telephone.
68 In 1988 John was retrenched from his work in the building industry in which, until then, he had been quite successful. By then, he and Yvonne were living in Victoria where they owned a house and were developing other financial interests. I am persuaded that the retrenchment caused John to take stock of his future, which led him to consider seriously the possibility of returning to Perth. He visited Perth and I am satisfied that he discussed with George the sale of Rowley to raise capital for himself and also the possibility of building a house for himself on one of his lots. While their evidence differed in many respects, I am persuaded that during this visit George proposed that John should get less than half of the proceeds of any sale of Rowley to provide some compensation to himself because of his efforts over the years in developing and maintaining John's properties, and that John disagreed with that proposition because of the income that George or the family business had received from the land. I am also satisfied that it was George's clearly expressed preference that John remain in Victoria.
69 At the time of the 1988 visit George also raised with John his concern that John's land, ie all three properties, would go to Yvonne if John should die without a will, which could "make things complicated". On John's account George requested he go with him to George's solicitors to sort this out. George and he did so and he made a will providing for these properties to be shared equally by his brothers - Boris and George.
70 George however presents that matter of this will in a quite different light. He says it occurred in 1984 at the time of the deed of family arrangement. On George's evidence he expressed a concern for John to "tidy up the paperwork" concerning their mother's property. This would necessarily relate to Lot 126 Churchill which pursuant to the deed was to become John's land. The implication of George's evidence is that the Will was the means of overcoming and correcting the effect of the unwanted legal necessity of the title to Lot 126 Churchill being transferred to John, when John had abandoned his interest in that property in favour of George. George's evidence described how on the way to the solicitor, in discussion, John asked George what he wanted done and John agreed with George's request that everything in the Radonich name should be left to him, and that having gone to the solicitor John assured him he had done so. Even on George's evidence the questions arise why a will was seen by John, George, and by the solicitor, to be the most effective way of achieving the desired ultimate result whether it be of Lot 126 Churchill, or of everything in the Radonich name, being transferred to George, when John wanted nothing to do with any of the properties.
71 These are, however, other difficulties in the way of accepting George's account of these matters. The will is in evidence. It was made in 1988 at the time of John's visit to Perth in that year. It was not made in 1984. In support of John's evidence that George's concern was in respect of all three properties, not just Lot 126 Churchill as George's evidence initially suggested, there is evidence which I accept and which persuades me that the night before John went to the solicitor with George to give instructions for the will, George's wife Gloria turned out their records and made a note for John of the descriptions of the three properties. I am satisfied on balance that the episode concerning the will occurred in 1988 and that, as John said, it arose because of George's concern in respect of the consequences for the family business should all three properties pass to Yvonne.
72 The will was in respect of all of John's estate and provided primarily for it to be shared equally by Boris and George. This is quite inconsistent with George's case that John had abandoned his interests in the three properties in favour of George. I notice that John made a further will in 1994 by which in effect any land or interest in land in Western Australia which he owned, together with any estate or interest he had in the estates of his mother and father, were to be shared equally by Boris and George, but all else was to go to Yvonne. The inconsistency with George's case persisted. Further, the terms of the 1994 Will reveal that, in John's mind, he had not rejected any inheritance that had come to him from the estates of his parents. Thus, the terms of the 1988 and the 1994 Wills in my finding, tell against George's case by providing some contemporary indication that when they were made John did not hold the views on which George's case so heavily depends.
73 John came to Perth in 1989 or 1990 for the wedding of George's daughter and in each of the years 1990-1992 there were visits to Melbourne by George and various members of his family. They visited John and Yvonne on each occasion, some of George's family staying with John and Yvonne. George places significance on a conversation with John during one of these visits. He described a social discussion, which included friends, in which John described in very favourable terms how well he'd become established in his affairs and in which George described the financial difficulties he was experiencing with the family market garden business and set out his plans for the future development of the business including its use of the three properties. On George's account John made no comment, showed no interest and raised no objection to any of George's views about the use of the properties. This helped to reinforce in George's mind, on his account of what occurred, that John continued in his position that he had no interest in any of the properties and that George could do with them as he wished. John recalled that occasion but on his evidence had understood the import of what was being said by George quite differently from George's evidence and did not see in what was said by George any occasion or reason to understand that George was regarding any of the properties as his own or to raise any such issue. Milenko Mihaljevich was among those present. He recalled some discussion of John's affair and George briefly putting a more gloomy picture of the position of the business in Perth. He did recall that at one stage John had said to the effect that he wouldn't be coming back to WA but otherwise his evidence on this matter did not assist to resolve the differences between the evidence of John and George about this meeting. At this time John was in good work in the construction industry, which may provide some explanation for some comment concerning his intention, at that time at least, to say in Victoria. I am not able to accept from the evidence concerning this incident that it presented an occasion on which it was reasonable to expect that if John maintained a claim to any interest in any of the three properties it was to be expected that he would publicly assert it, nor that there was in effect a clear assertion of or claim by George to the effective ownership of the three properties (sole ownership in the case of Rowley), such that by his silence it might be thought by George that John was acquiescing in such an assertion or claim. The evidence does not demonstrate that this was an occasion which could reasonably have been understood by George as giving rise to any such inference.
74 In particular in July 1993, during the second visit by John and Yvonne to Perth in that year, I find that John renewed discussions with George about the sale of some of his land, canvassing particularly Rowley and Lot 126 Churchill, and the possibility of his returning and building a house on one of his lots. George remained opposed to the sale of any properties arguing that they were needed to maintain the viability of the family business and he repeated his preference that John remain in Victoria. Tension was developing between them.
75 While John pursued with George the prospect of him building a home on one of his lots at least on each of the 1988 and July 1993 visits, it is my finding from the evidence that there was no firm plan on the part of John to return to Perth. It was a possibility, one which may have been stronger on his retrenchment in 1988 than in later years, but at the same time the evidence indicates that Yvonne may have preferred to retire to the coast of southern New South Wales which would be nearer her family interests. As much as the evidence reveals there was no resolution of this issue between John and Yvonne. Even so, it is clear in my view of the evidence, that he was seeking to achieve some indication of the attitude of George and the family to his return. I would describe John's posture and intentions as exploratory. He was seeking to see whether there was some satisfactory basis upon which he and Yvonne might re-establish themselves with the family in Perth. If a satisfactory basis did emerge then, clearly, Yvonne and he would have needed to resolve whether to do so. But if not, in deference to Yvonne's preference, on balance I would think it more likely that he would have sought to arrange with the family some satisfactory financial realisation of his property interests in Perth and retire to the New South Wales coast. It is clear that George's preference for John not to return to live in Perth, first expressed in 1988 became a significant deterrent against John reaching a decision to return to Perth. John's readiness to contemplate returning to Perth also varied with availability of work in the construction industry. This was variable and it is my impression that John's active interest in returning to Perth was higher when construction work was not available.
76 George's general position over the years 1988 - 1993, as I perceive it from the evidence, may be summarised as one of opposition to any sale of land. He pursued this principally by raising objections to John's proposals, urging a deferment of action to get better values, and by promising to come up with some firm proposal in the future. From all the evidence, I am persuaded that even by 1988 it was George's wish to preserve intact the Rockingham and Churchill properties and Rowley. While it was his evidence that the Rockingham properties and Rowley were essential for the future needs of the family business, and that in any event it was his adamantly expressed philosophy never to sell any land, as will appear I am satisfied that another objective had emerged.
77 I am persuaded that during the July 1993 visit, George ventured to John that he would come up with a satisfactory sale proposal in respect of John's properties in a couple of years when values were likely to be better. In 1993 John had roughly estimated his properties were worth $1,000,000, which in my view of the evidence was an underestimate. George suggested they were worth about half that figure and there was also maintained by George the issue of compensation to him for his efforts in developing and maintaining them. There was also, in my finding, discussion of a concern raised by their mother in 1970 that Boris should have some share in the proceeds of the sale of Rowley, to which George was opposed.
78 The issue of sale was taken up again in a more significant way in July 1995. There was a meeting between George and John in Kuala Lumpur, where John was working in the construction industry, and where George's son was on a practical placement as part of his tertiary studies. In the course of these discussions there was a proposal aired by George that he would make John a lump sum payment of $200,000 on the basis that John should transfer his interest in each of Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley to George, but John retain Lot 126 Churchill. The time for payment, however, was to be deferred until such time as George deemed it appropriate to sell one or more of his other properties. He contended that market conditions were particularly adverse at that time. This offer was made by George on the professed basis that, according to legal advice he had received, John no longer had a legal interest in any of the properties the subject of dispute, and that therefore his proposal that he should pay John $200,000 and that John retain Lot 126 Churchill was really by way of a family gesture to help John. This proposal was not acceptable to John.
79 Following the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, John wrote an extensive letter to George which I find quite compelling as an indication of the true state of John's thinking at that stage and as to the previous negotiations between him and George, as John had perceived them. Nothing came of this approach and within a few months solicitors had been retained and events were put in train which led to these proceedings.
Changes in the Family Market Gardening Business
80 There have been some significant changes affecting the family business and George's activities in more recent years. George had been successful since 1975 in establishing a trucking company. This is now quite substantial and profitable. Further, the family market gardening business has been expanded dramatically, first by the acquisition and use of a property at Gingin in 1989, and more recently in December 1998 by the acquisition for some $1,000,000 of a very substantial property of some 100 hectares at Lancelin. This was chosen after extensive research and investigation as a site suitable for a major modern market gardening operation, being capable of being efficiently managed according to current crop rotational needs. George's sons, each of whom have tertiary qualifications in horticulture, are engaged in the family business. George and Gloria have moved from Lot 16 Rockingham to a much more modern and elaborate home. The family business is now a very significant financial and physical undertaking. The Churchill Road properties are not used for growing crops. A part of Rowley Road is used regularly though not continuously. The Rockingham Road properties are still used regularly but they are no longer the centre piece of the gardening operation as production from Gingin and Lancelin entirely overshadows them. The trucking business operates separately in that its main contract work seems to be associated with local government contracts, although it does also have a role in the cartage of produce from the Lancelin and Gingin properties. The family business is, however, very heavily committed to its bankers especially by virtue of the acquisition and development of the Lancelin property.
81 It was George's position, adamantly maintained during his evidence and despite everything, that his concern in this action was to preserve Rowley and the Rockingham properties for use as essential parts of the family market gardening business. That position was reinforced in respect of all three disputed properties by an underlying philosophical view that no property should be sold, it should be retained for the family in the future. Cultural as well as personal values were advanced in support of this attitude.
82 It was surprising to learn in the course of the trial, therefore, that there had been activities involving the defendants, in which George played a central role which were relevant to these issues, materially so in some respects, which had not been the subject of discovery by the defendants and which were not dealt with at all in the statements of the defendants witnesses. By direction, statements had been exchanged between the parties before trial and these formed the substance of the evidence-in-chief of each witness at trial. The failure to make proper discovery had to be dealt with, as far as possible, under pressure during the trial at great inconvenience to the plaintiff's representatives.
83 These activities included the purchases of properties for use by the family business as market gardens at Gingin and in particular the major purchase at Lancelin, efforts over some years to secure the rezoning of both the Rockingham Road properties and Rowley, and the development of a detailed residential subdivisional proposal for the Rockingham Road properties which, with minor modification, could have been undertaken in association with the subdivision of neighbouring properties or as a discreet subdivision, and a commitment by the defendants to their bankers to the sale of Rowley if certain financial targets were not met by August 1999. In the course of some of these matters it is clear that George had purported to act as the authorised agent of John, when that was not the case and George could not honestly have thought it was. He had forged John's signature. George had told John nothing of these matters except for the purchase of the Gingin property.
84 In respect of the purchase of the Gingin and Lancelin properties it was maintained for the defendants at trial that these were reasonably viewed as not relevant to these proceedings. While I disagree, such a view if held by the defendants' legal advisers may well explain that aspect of the failure to make proper discovery and the omission of the new properties from the statements of evidence.
85 With regard to the rezoning and subdivision issues, however, the position cannot be explained away. It is clear from the evidence that these activities had not been disclosed by the defendants to their solicitor until the preparation for this trial was well underway. Even then their solicitor came upon an aspect of what was occurring in relation to Rowley almost by chance. There followed a confrontation between George and the solicitor, as the solicitor well appreciated that this conduct appeared to materially contradict his instructions. The solicitor was, in the end, called to give evidence at the trial. I am satisfied that George then persuaded the solicitor that these matters had long ceased and had only been undertaken as strategies to dissuade the planning and zoning authorities from rezoning the Rockingham Road properties as part of a proposed school site, and from rezoning Rowley for a water or marine park and/or a regional highway. I am persuaded that each of these possibilities had been real and that in respect of each of the pieces of land there had been developed by George, along with his planning advisers and in the case of Rockingham with his neighbours similarly threatened, a strategy of trying to improve the zonings of the two holdings so that the public authorities would be persuaded to turn their attention to less valuable land for these public purposes. But I am also satisfied on the evidence that this was only part of the story. The rezoning and subdivisional proposal for the Rockingham properties was actively pursued, and significantly further developed at considerable expense to George, well after the threat of a school rezoning had been removed. Indeed, I am satisfied George was still pursuing this when the defendants' solicitor confronted him over this very issue and that he deceived the solicitor and persuaded him it had been a mere strategy and was a thing of the past. The evidence persuades me that, despite George's denial, he was active in developing the subdivisional proposal until September 1998, and that he only stopped the planning advisers then because he was concerned that if that activity became known it would harm his prospects in this action. With respect to Rowley the evidence reveals the position to be much the same, although less dramatic, and that George deceived the solicitor into the belief that this too was a thing of the past and had been merely a strategy. As will appear I am persuaded that George was activated by personal interest in these matters.
86 Returning to the issue of discovery, however, I regret to have to say that having satisfied himself from George's deceitful explanations that there was an innocent explanation for these matters, the solicitor mistakenly decided that they could have no relevance in this action. He returned the papers to George and they were not discovered. It is disappointing indeed that such an experienced practitioner should have fallen into this fundamental error. In effect he tried the issue and made a finding in favour of his own client. That is not his role in the matter of discovery. The potential relevance of these matters and of the documents to this action had been glaringly obvious to the solicitor; hence his confrontation with George. They should have been discovered. Fortunately, the preparation of the plaintiff's case was so thorough that documents concerning the rezoning and subdivisional efforts were uncovered through other sources and the matter came to be fully aired before me.
87 George's credibility should not suffer because of his solicitor's mistake. But the deceit of the solicitor by George stands out clearly as a matter adverse to George's credit, especially so because of the relevance in this action of the point of the deceit. It is also my finding that George deliberately kept these matters from John even though they were well underway in respect of both Rowley and the Rockingham properties before the Kuala Lumpur meeting in 1955.
88 It was the evidence of John which I accept that as early as 1970, and in 1975 and 1980 there were discussions with George about the possible sale of Rowley. In 1980 a subdivision and sale was contemplated. It seemed to be accepted by George that he had been considering the idea of the subdivision and sale of Rowley although he limited this to around the time of their mother's death in 1982. He saw this as a means of easing financial stringency which was being experienced at that time (whether personal or in the family business or both is not clear). Nothing came of this immediately. George made calculations of subdivisional costs and likely returns and had decided, particularly in view of the then zoning of Rowley, that it would be more beneficial to hold on to the property. There is dispute in the evidence, however, whether George told John about this. Somewhat strangely George denies that he did but John recalled this occurring in 1982 after their mother's funeral. I accept this. I am satisfied that as early as 1986 George was aware of the possibility of a water reserve affecting Rowley and that he made some mention of this to John during one of their telephone conversations. When John visited Perth again in 1988 among other things the subdivision and sale of Rowley was again discussed. I am satisfied that this was the first time at which George raised the issue of compensation of his efforts in developing Rowley and the management of the other properties by proposing that John should receive less than a half share of the proceeds of any sale. John did not agree with George's proposal and the issue was left unresolved only to be raised again, but left unresolved, to and including the July 1993 visit of John to Perth.
89 Then followed George's efforts, undisclosed to John at the time, to secure a rezoning of Rowley from rural. This became complicated and delayed because the use of the land was affected by the issue of groundwater reserves for the metropolitan area of Perth. While the outcome seems to have been settled and generally known much earlier, the future was formally resolved by the gazettal of a formal governmental planning policy on 12 June 1998. Under this policy I am satisfied that there is at least a reasonable expectation that, on application, Rowley will be rezoned Special Rural. This will allow subdivision into two hectare farming lots on which a dwelling may be erected. This policy led valuers advising George to revise their valuation of Rowley from $575,000 to a current valuation of over $1,200,000.
90 During 1998 George conducted dealings with bankers principally in connection with financing the purchase and the development of the Lancelin property. Having been refused adequate finance by their existing bank, arrangements were made with another bank. In the course of these negotiations I am satisfied George estimated his half interest in Rowley to be worth some $2,000,000, ie the total value to be in the order of $4,000,000, which is in marked contrast to the views of the valuers. He also provided exaggerated valuations in respect of the Rockingham properties (excluding Lot 17). He also persuaded the bank that he planned to sell Rowley but that he preferred to delay doing so to get a better return. He also predicted very favourable returns for the business as Lancelin came into production. It became an express stipulation, however, at the insistence of the bank, that if the borrowings of the defendants had not been reduced by $2,000,000 by 15 August 1999 then Rowley would be sold and George's share of the proceeds applied to ensure the reduction of the borrowing by $2,000,000. George appears to have satisfied the bank that John's cooperation in the sale was not in question. The evidence satisfies me that George was neither frank nor honest in his dealings with the bank on behalf of himself and the second defendant. I would note that his stated intentions to the bank concerning Rowley were in contradiction of his evidence in this trial.
91 The description in these reasons of the evidence and the factual differences which it throws up has tended to concentrate on the evidence of John and George. Their centrality to the factual differences has tended to encourage this. There were other witnesses though, whose evidence generally touched on one or a few issues. No other witness was able to give an expansive account of the history of affairs over the years. The nearest was the evidence of Boris and Gloria. Each gave evidence of relevance to several issues, but generally speaking the evidence of each of them was noteworthy for what it did not deal with. In particular, their evidence confirms that generally the really material issues were not dealt with by John and George in their presence. John and George appear to have dealt privately over matters of property and the family business although, of course, during the respective lives of their parents, the father, and only after his death the mother, were central to any such discussions.
92 I have mentioned one aspect of the evidence of Milenko Mihaljevich. I should also note briefly my acceptance of his evidence that in 1970 after the father's funeral he did set out with John to take him for a job interview with Bell Bros but John told him to turn around as he wasn't interested and was to return interstate. In that regard I also accept John's evidence that this was a job as a steam-roller driver which was an inferior job with inferior pay and prospects from that which John then enjoyed in the construction industry.
93 I also accept from Mr Mihaljevich and Tom Garbin that in the 1950s John was disinterested in market gardening and was keen to seek out better prospects. I hesitate, however, to accept that they can now recall with any accuracy or reliability comments made by John during social conversation in those days or that their evidence revealed or offered any significant support for George's case that John rejected everything to do with market gardening and turned his back on it and on the family.
94 I also accept from the evidence of John Garbin that during the late 1970s on a number of occasions, his then neighbour George, referred on a number of occasions to John's land in reference at least to Lot 17 Rockingham and that John could return to work his land, whether or not in partnership with George.
95 While I have not specifically referred to the evidence of these and the other witnesses at every relevant point, I have had regard to it where relevant in coming to the views I have formed in this case.
96 Given the very extensive evidence of matters concerning the history of the Radonich family and its business and property affairs and the quite fundamental differences in evidence, particularly as between John and George, the task of discerning where the true facts lie in this case is not an easy one. The task is made the harder because of the considerable span of years which are relevant and for the most part the absence of evidence of contemporaneous documents, the sparsity of evidence of material events from persons other than John and George, and what is often the vagueness and generality of the evidence of John and George.
97 In the course of these reasons I have recorded some findings about particular factual issues which findings have been made on the basis of the particular evidence and the credibility of John and George as it impressed me in respect of those issues. It remains essential, however, to deal with the fundamental difference between John and George which is at the heart of this case. Some circumstances stand out, in my appreciation of the facts, as particularly material and informative on the issue of their credibility on the fundamental difference between them. Most significantly, there are the two deeds of family arrangement, one in 1974 and the other in 1984. Their terms are quite inconsistent with the general effect of the position for which George contends that, at all times since 1957 and in particular following the death of their father in 1970 and their mother in 1982 and at the time of the deeds in 1974 and 1984, John remained entirely disinterested in the family business and the family properties and wanted nothing to do with them and consistently held to the position that all his property interests and entitlements were George's for George to do with them as he wished. The attempts by George to explain the two deeds of family arrangement as merely something that he understood from the two different solicitors to be a necessary legal formality to wind up the estates, as each of the sons had to share in the disposition of the parental estate, is not supportable as a legal proposition. It is not credible that two different legal practitioners, one for the 1974 deed and one for the 1984 deed, should have given such advice had John's position been put to them by George, who instructed both solicitors. The only explanation is that George did not instruct either solicitor about what he insists was John's clearly expressed attitude. The most probable explanation for this, in my finding, is that George did not then understand that to be John's attitude. Further as a matter of personal credibility, George left me entirely unconvinced that in 1974, or 1984, he genuinely held that view, or that he now does so. I found his evidence in these respects unsatisfactory, both as to its content and the manner in which he gave it.
98 I remain firmly unpersuaded that, if John's position in 1970-1974 and 1982-1984 had been as George indicates, effect would not have been given to that at the time of the respective deeds of family arrangement. The terms of the arrangement effected by each of the deeds appears to be a normal, appropriate and rational scheme for the distribution of the two estates in the circumstances then prevailing among those family members who had an entitlement to share in the distribution and who sought to participate in that distribution to secure an appropriate recognition of their entitlement. In this respect cultural and family influences appear to have had a natural effect in that in respect of the 1974 deed an appropriate provision is made for the mother before the three sons shared equally, and after the mother's death special provision was made in favour of the youngest son Boris who had not had the benefit of an interest in Rowley and, at that time, had not established himself in a position in any way equivalent to that of either of his older brothers. These two deeds strike me as providing very persuasive contemporary evidence of the true states of mind of both George and John as at 1974 and 1984. I find them to be entirely consistent with and confirmatory of John's evidence and quite fundamentally inconsistent with the evidence of George.
99 The siting of the new house built by George in 1978 seemed to me also to offer a clear indication of George's true understanding of John's position at that time. As I have indicated, George went to some lengths to squeeze on to Lot 16 Rockingham his new house even though, in truth, it could not lawfully be accommodated on the available land. Had he genuinely held the view at that time that John had no wish to have any part of the immediately adjoining Lot 17 Rockingham and that John took the view that this was George's to use as George wished, it appears to me far more likely than not that, at that time, George would have, at the least, contacted John with a view to arranging for John formally to transfer Lot 17 Rockingham to George so that George and his wife Gloria might be free to build the home they planned without the restriction imposed by the limited frontage available to them on Lot 16 Rockingham. There was no attempt to contact John or thought of doing so. George's attempts to explain this were entirely unpersuasive. His position about the house was in marked contrast to his position about the shed he built on Lot 17 in the same year, even on his own account of these two matters. In my view this event provides further indication that at that time George did not believe that Lot 17 Rockingham was his to do with it as he wished. Instead he went to some lengths, and from his point of view he took unsatisfactory indeed illegal measures, to build the house that he and his wife wanted on what was the only block which George owned, ie Lot 16 Rockingham.
100 The evidence concerning George's efforts, particularly between 1995 and the time of trial, with respect to the zoning and subdivision of the Rockingham Road properties, the zoning of Rowley, and the dealings with his bankers, also tell against the credibility of George in significant respects. In my view George was evasive and at times deceptive, both pre-trial and in his evidence, about the zoning and subdivision affecting the Rockingham Road properties and about the zoning of Rowley. Despite his evidence, which was adamantly to the contrary, I am persuaded that he was pursuing each of these, at least in part, against the possibility that he would either come to some satisfactory arrangement with John by which he would secure title to these properties, or that he would succeed in this action. I am further persuaded that, contrary to his evidence, George does not regard Rowley and to a lesser extent the Rockingham properties, as still necessary to retain in the long term interests of the family business and that he would be prepared to sell these, if they were his, when an appropriate opportunity presented itself. I am further persuaded that he deliberately mislead his solicitor about the zoning and subdivisional plans for Rockingham and the zoning of Rowley when the solicitor first learnt of these and confronted George about them. Not only do these matters effect adversely the credibility of George, it should be noted that those issues of credibility are in respect of matters that provide an insight into George's motivation in respect of this action. He strenuously insisted in the course of his evidence that he would never dispose of any of these properties, were they his, and that his fundamental objective is to maintain the properties (or at least Rowley and Lot 17 Rockingham) so that the family market gardening business can succeed and also so that all three properties can be retained for the benefit of the family in the future. The view I take of the truth of George's activities in these matters is that his motivation is, more probably than not, to seek to secure these properties so that he personally can secure the very substantial financial gain which would be his on the sale of each of them, especially if rezoning and subdivisional prospects are realised.
101 Aspects of George's dealings with the bank, which have already been discussed, serve to confirm my conclusion that John's credibility is to be preferred.
102 Each of the deeds of family arrangement, the zoning and subdivisional issues and also the deceit of the solicitor as to them, and aspects of the dealings with the bank, if taken alone would persuade me that as a matter of general credit the evidence of George should not be preferred to that of John. In combination, these matters together with the siting of George's house, leaves me firmly persuaded that I should not accept the evidence of George where it conflicts with the evidence of John in respect of the fundamental difference between them. In this regard I should record that I found the evidence of John generally to be given in a satisfactory, consistent and convincing manner. That is not to suggest that John's evidence was in every respect entirely satisfactory. The difficulties with his evidence which I perceived were, however, generally explicable as genuine lapses of memory or as a view of long past events through favourably tinted glasses. I did not perceive any deliberate deception. In these respects my impression of the credibility of John was in marked contrast to my impression of George's credibility.
103 In brief summary in respect of matters left unresolved so far in these reasons, I am persuaded and find that
a) when John left home in 1957 there was no express discussion with George or anyone concerning the use or future of Rowley, and that in the understanding of both John and George at the time, it was left by John in the expectation that it would continue to be used for the time being as it had been since it was purchased, ie by the family business for its profit and at its expense under the primary guidance of their father;
b) this remained John's expectation until their father died and during those years his expectation was realised;
c) following their father's death, without express discussion, Rowley continued to be used by the family business for its profit and at its expense but under the primary guidance of George; and that this was the understanding and expectation of both John and George;
d) this has remained the understanding and expectation of both John and George, being confirmed and not disturbed by events of 1974 (the deed), save that since their mother's death George has developed a different plan and in recent years the brothers have fallen into dispute over the future of Rowley, and the other two properties;
e) when Rowley was purchased and ever since, until the emergence of the dispute, it was also the understanding and expectation of both John and George that at an appropriate time Rowley should be realised and the proceeds shared equally between them;
f) in 1970 John expressly indicated to George to the effect that his prospective inheritance which became Lot 17 Rockingham could continue to be used for the time being by the family business as it had been used before their father's death, although in future under the primary guidance of George, and this was accepted by George;
g) at that time it was John's intention and expectation that this use should be for the profit and at the expense of the family business, and this expectation although never agreed expressly between John and George was in fact realised;
h) subject to (d), George too has proceeded in this expectation;
i) following their mother's death in 1982, by implication from the circumstances and not by express discussion or agreement, the family business continued to have the use for the time being of John's prospective inheritance from his mother's estate which became Lot 126 Churchill, as had been the position during their father's lifetime and which had continued thereafter, although since the death of their father in 1970 under the primary guidance of George;
j) this use continued on the expectation of both John and George, implied from the circumstances, that it should be at the profit (if any) of the family business and at its expense;
k) subject to (d), this continues to be the position and was confirmed and not disturbed by the events of 1984 (the deed);
l) neither in 1957, nor in 1970, 1974, 1982, 1984 nor at any other time, has John ever said or by conduct given George to understand or to believe to the effect of any of -
(i) that he had abandoned all his interests in all or any of Rowley, Lot 17 Rockingham and Lot 126 Churchill,
(ii) that George may do with all or any of them as he wished for his own benefit, or
(iii) that George should regard all or any of them as his own;
and that at no time has George ever honestly held or acted on the basis of a belief of any of those things or to similar effect.
104 George seeks to establish a right of title in fee simple to both Lot 17 Rockingham and Lot 126 Churchill, and a right of title in fee simple in Rowley to the exclusion entirely of any interest of John. He seeks to achieve these outcomes by a declaration that John's interest in Rowley is held on trust for the sole use and benefit of George and by consequential orders for the execution of the documents necessary to have him registered as the sole proprietor of an estate in fee simple of all three pieces of land.
105 It is George's case that John's conduct and representations over the years, as expressly pleaded in his defence and counterclaim, induced him to believe that
a) John had abandoned all his right title and interest in the three pieces of land,
b) George was at liberty to treat the three properties as his own,
c) George was free to possess, occupy and use the three properties for his own benefit.
106 Further it is George's case that relying on those inducements and acting upon those beliefs, he has
(i) since 8 May 1974 been in possession and occupation of the land, to the exclusion of John, from which he has conducted the business of a market garden,
(ii) expended personal effort and substantial moneys on improvements and has since 1989 caused the second defendant to expend moneys on improvements,
(i) been in sole possession and occupation and use of, and since 1958 has developed, the land for and conducted the business of a market garden,
(ii) expended personal effort and substantial moneys on improvements and has since 1989 caused the second defendant to expend moneys on improvements,
(iii) prior to their father's death, contributed to the payment of rates, taxes and other outgoings, paid for them since then until 1989 since when he has caused the second defendant to do so;
c) in relation to both Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley expended moneys on machinery, equipment and expenses of a recurring nature associated with market garden business conducted on them, and since 1989 has caused the second defendant to do so; and
d) in relation to Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley expected he would be at liberty to give the properties to his male children and accordingly has counselled and encouraged them to study horticulture.
107 It is George's case that by virtue of these matters, of which John had knowledge or implied knowledge,
a) it would be unconscionable and inequitable for John now to assert that he is entitled to ownership or possession of any of the three properties, and
b) John is estopped from asserting that he is entitled to ownership or possession of, or that he enjoys any right, title or interest in, any of them.
108 Reliance was placed principally on the decision in the Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 in support of George's claims in this respect. That case was not, of course, concerned with any issue of proprietary rights in real property. Nevertheless, it is submitted that passages in the reasoning would support the proposition that the conduct here relied on, if that be established by the evidence, would give rise to an estoppel which, if necessary, might be described as being in the nature of a proprietary estoppel. Observations in the reasons of Mason CJ at 410-412 and Deane J at 431-2 and also of Brennan J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7; (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 428-9 are relied on as supporting the proposition, however, that there is no longer need to turn to traditional categorisations of estoppel. It is put that George's belief in and reliance on the assumed state of affairs, induced by John, gave rise to an entitlement to relief based on that assumed state of affairs viz a declaration of ownership with consequential relief. Such relief, it was submitted, in the circumstances would not exceed "what could be justified by the requirements of good conscience" or be unjust to the party estopped; cf Deane J in Commonwealth v Verwayen at 445, 446. This is a case, it is contended, where the detriment to George is such that John should be held to the assumption he created, ie in effect that he had abandoned his interests in each of the three properties in favour of George. To do so would be a remedy proportional to the detriment, cf Mason J in Commonwealth v Verwayen at 412 and 413.
109 Earlier cases such as Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343, Greasley v Cooke (1980) 1 WLR 1306 at 1311, Jones v Jones (1977) 1 WLR 438 at 443, and Pascoe v Turner [1978] EWCA Civ 2; (1979) 2 All ER 945 were also relied on as illustrating that where the nature of the detriment is sufficient, what in essence may be described as "expectation relief" (ie an order that a promise, express or implied, be fulfilled) has been granted. It is submitted that the decisions bear out the proposition that in appropriate circumstances fulfilment of the promise may be the only means of achieving equity. The circumstances of the present case, it is submitted for George, reveal what amounts to a promise that George should have and enjoy the sole possession, use and benefit of each of the three properties as if he were the (sole) owner.
110 While recognising that there will be cases where the detriment cannot sustain the fulfilment of the initial promise, it is submitted that this is not such a case. In support of the proposition that the detriment to George revealed by the evidence was sufficient to justify and require in equity the relief sought, it was submitted in particular that
a) George's continuing engagement in market gardening on all the family properties since 1957 would not have been undertaken but for his reliance in the belief induced by John and his conduct that George had the right to possess use and occupy the three properties, and
b) in practical terms, the relief sought by John, if granted, would effectively result in the cessation of market gardening activities by George.
111 Insofar as the relief claimed by George relied on a constructive trust, it is submitted that a constructive trust would be an appropriate relief to satisfy the equity created by the estoppel; Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; (1985) 160 CLR 583 cf 613-615 and Cape : Constructive Trusts (Law Book Company) pp 654-655. See also Guimelli v Guimelli [1999] HCA 10. It is submitted that relief by way of a declaration of constructive trust in property may properly be granted in circumstances where it would be unconscionable for the holder of the property to deny the other's interest in it; Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1987] HCA 59; (1987) 164 CLR 137 at 147. Thus it is submitted that unconscionability underpins both relief by way of estoppel and a declaration of a constructive trust; Grant v Edwards [1986] EWCA Civ 4; (1986) 3 WLR 114; Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (supra) at 416. The touchstone of a constructive trust is equity and good conscience. Thus the circumstances of standing by on the one hand and of reliance on the other, and also general considerations such as unfairness and laches are relevant; Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179, Attorney-General (HK) v Humphrey's Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114.
112 For John, apart from a denial that the evidence establishes the factual basis on which George's case is entirely dependent, it is submitted that it is necessary for George to establish that any conduct in reliance on a representation was reasonable; Commonwealth v Verwayen at 445; Waltons Stores at 396, 397, 462. Of necessity, it is submitted, a representation must have been clear and unequivocal and unambiguous, Legione v Hateley [1983] HCA 11; (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 435-440, and plainly intended to be acted upon before reliance on it can be reasonable. See also Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1988) 81 FCR 475 at 516-518.
113 It is further submitted that before a party will be estopped he or she must have played such a part in the adoption of or persistence in the assumption that the party would be guilty of unjust and oppressive conduct if he were now to depart from it. A critical question, where the estoppel is based on a representation, will commonly be whether the party to be estopped knew or intended or ought to have known that the other party would be induced by the conduct to adopt and act on the basis of the assumption; Commonwealth v Verwayen at 444-445.
114 It is further submitted, in reliance on the analysis in, and cases cited by, Meagher Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies 3rd ed at para 1721, and especially Dillwyn v Llewelyn [1862] EngR 908; (1862) 31 LJ Ch 658, 45 ER 1285 and Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129 at 140-141, 171 and Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96 at 105-106, that to establish an acquisition of property by estoppel, by virtue of encouragement or acquiescence, it would be necessary for George to show inter alia that -
(1) He had a belief or expectation that he had an interest or would obtain an interest in each of the three properties, in this case an interest of full ownership in each property is relied on;
(3) George acted in reliance on his belief or expectation;
(4) John by conduct or action encouraged George to act as he did, or, at least, had knowledge of those activities yet failed to assert his title when the activities were adverse to it, so that he may be seen to have "dishonestly remained wilfully passive", such that it would be fraudulent for him to rely on his legal rights to defeat the belief or expectation encouraged by him, and
(5) John must have known of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by George.
See also Olssen v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 378-9; Commonwealth v Verwayen at 444-5 and Waltons Stores at 403-4. I note it has been suggested that it may not have been absolutely necessary for all of these to be established in every case, Riches v Hogben (1986) 1 Qd 315, 319, although if that be so the circumstances would, in my respectful view, need to be quite unusual. Brennan J in Waltons Stores approached the issue a little differently, identifying six elements necessary to establish an equitable estoppel. There is no need to set them out here. There is substantial overlap with the five points identified above.
115 With respect to remedy, it is submitted in reliance on Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 at 198 that any relief should be the "minimum equity to do justice". In this regard I note also the views sympathetic to this proposition expressed by five of the Justices in Commonwealth v Verwayen. In particular, reliance is paced on Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 for the proposition that where the benefits gained by the occupation of the land equal or outweigh any detrimental reliance, relief may be refused entirely. Raffaele v Raffaele (1962) WAR 29 is also relied on to illustrate that even though in that case a family arrangement had such elements that it was found to have given rise to contractual relations, the estate of the son was awarded the value of the house he had built on the father's land, but the value of the land on which it was built was excluded. John would also rely on the views of the learned authors in Meagher Gummow and Lehane (supra) at para 1723 that the amount of the expenditure, or the present value of the improvements effected, on the property of another would be the "profit" wrongfully made by the owner, and it would smack of penal remedies to require the owner to afford any greater relief such as to transfer the title.
116 Many of these submissions from each party as to the law to be applied are not controversial although a number of them have little relevance to the facts as I have found them to be. Nevertheless, at the heart of the case advanced by George lies the unsettled and still emerging state of the law with respect to estoppel, see for example the various views expressed in the decision in Commonwealth v Verwayen, especially in its application to a case such as this. Some of the submissions raised issues of considerable interest the answers to which are not clear or settled at the present time. Fortunately, the views I have formed as to the facts of this case, make it unnecessary to attempt to resolve these interesting questions. It appears to me that by dealing with a number of factual matters clearly relevant to estoppel and unconscionability, I will have sufficiently identified my reasons for reaching the clear views to which I have come that George's claim founded in estoppel has not been made out on any of the possible views as to the present state of the law which have been canvassed. Nor is there shown to be any justification for any relief by way of constructive trust.
117 It is obvious that the cornerstone of George's case for an estoppel is his evidence that at various times, especially when John left home in 1957, when their father died in 1970, at the time of the deed of arrangement in 1974, when he informed John he wished to subdivide and sell Rowley in 1980, when their mother died in 1982, at about the time of the deed of arrangement in 1984 and when George reviewed his future plans for the three lots in John's presence in Melbourne in 1991, John expressly
(a) indicated to the effect that he had no interest in the family market gardening business or in any of three lots (of course Lot 17 Rockingham and Lot 126 Churchill did not come under specific attention until 1970-74 and 1982-84 respectively),
(b) abandoned his interests, at some points in time these were merely his prospective interests, in each of the lots and did so in George's favour,
(c) indicated to the effect that George might deal with each of the three lots as his own property,
and, or alternatively, that by his conduct at these and other times and by his general indifference to all that George did with the properties
and with knowledge of George's belief whether by virtue of (a), (b), (c) or (d) or any combination of them
(e) he stood by and allowed George to expend much money and effort maintaining and improving, each of the three lots and in the case of Rowley and Lot 17 Rockingham he also stood by allowing George to expend much money and effort developing and producing from each lot (and in each case after 1989 he stood by allowing the second Defendant to advance much money for these purposes at George's instigation).
118 The factual foundation for these matters has been canvassed extensively elsewhere in these reasons. For reasons which have been given I have in general terms been unable to accept George's evidence in these respects. In fact, as explained elsewhere, in material respects I am satisfied that the true circumstances were in some of these matters quite the contrary of the factual case George sought to establish.
119 I am satisfied that John at no time expressly or by conduct indicated to George to the effect that he had no interest in the three lots in question or any of them, or that he abandoned his interest in them or any of them, or did so in favour of George, or that he indicated or implied that George might deal with them as his own property.
120 I am further satisfied that George never ever held any one of those beliefs which he sought to establish. In my finding of the relevant facts, especially regarding the conversation of George and John with their mother in 1970, George's acts in instructing the respective solicitors and in executing the deeds of arrangement in 1974 and 1984, his construction of the shed on John's Lot 17 Rockingham in 1978, the placement of his house on Lot 16 Rockingham in 1978, his conduct in seeking John's permission to subdivide and sell Rowley in 1980, their discussions particularly in 1972, 1975, 1982, 1988 and 1993 concerning the possible sale of Rowley and especially in 1993 concerning the possible sale of others of John's lots, and George's efforts in 1988 and 1993 to justify receiving some provision for his management of the property over the years, and his proposals, albeit tentative and vague, to purchase on various terms from John in 1993 and 1995, all tend to confirm that George never did hold any such beliefs.
121 It is the case that over the years John did not intervene to stop George from, and allowed George to expend money of the family business, and personal effort, in respect of each of the three properties, but this was on the basis, in my finding, that George or more accurately the family business should receive the profits from the use of each lot. I am satisfied George was as aware of this as John, and that this arrangement well suited George and the family business financially.
122 The position with regard to Lot 126 Churchill was in some respects different in that it had ceased to be income producing as a quarry for the family business before the 1980s and it was unsuitable for agricultural development. Nevertheless, while all four of the Churchill properties were still owned by their mother, and while they were still income producing, George fell into the way of managing them, using family business money to meet the outgoings of ownership and later some costs and in some part his own labour to gradually fill in the quarry which extended over all the four lots. After the death of their mother this pattern was continued by George even though two of the four lots became Boris', one George's and Lot 126 John's. There is a sufficient indication in the evidence that the combined properties were seen by George as having a better value than as individual lots (he put this to John in 1993) so that, in my finding, there was reason for George to perceive some advantage in completing their improvement and maintaining the four as one holding for the time being. Nevertheless, it was Lot 126 Churchill which in 1995 George proposed that John should retain while George purchased from him Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley.
123 In reaching these findings I have considered the possibility that, even without any of the express statements which George sought to establish, the mere circumstances that George was left since 1957, 1974 and 1984 respectively with substantially undisturbed sole use and management of each of the three lots for the family business, together with the continued meeting of the outgoings and receipt of the profits, and his holding of the duplicate Certificates of Title, might have induced George to fall into one or more of the beliefs identified earlier. These reasons have sufficiently spelt out, however, my findings that George never did hold any of these beliefs. That disposes of any such possibility. In addition, it is to be observed that the formation of any such belief would be quite inconsistent with the basis, which on balance I am satisfied was mutually understood by both George and John, on which John allowed the use of the three properties for the purposes of the family business. Further, any such belief, if it had been held genuinely, would not in my view be reasonable in the circumstances; John's conduct (on the assumed scenario being considered) would not be sufficiently clear, unequivocal or unambiguous to justify such a belief, nor would it be plainly intended by John to be acted on by George.
124 In these reasons when dealing with the facts, and later when I deal with questions concerning the Limitation Act 1935, I have made findings relating to the evidence and the principal propositions relied on in support of George's case for an estoppel. For reasons given elsewhere I have not been able to accept that these have been established.
125 I will not delay to go through each of the factual matters raised in George's pleaded case in support of an estoppel. The general consideration given to the evidence elsewhere in these reasons sufficiently indicates the findings I have made concerning most, if not all, of those matters.
126 For these reasons I am unable to conclude that George has made out the essential factual foundation on which any estoppel of the type advanced might be founded.
127 With respect to unconscionability I would add, having regard to the findings made elsewhere as to the true nature and purpose of the family arrangement between John and George by which George had the use and profits of the three properties for the family business, or at least had the substantial use and profits of them over the respective periods, that rather than George's case having been made out, it would appear most unconscionable that any estoppel against any assertion of ownership by John in respect of any of the three properties should be thought to arise. The arrangement, perhaps accurately the three similar arrangements, whether viewed separately or together, were to assist their mutual family interests and enabled George and the family business to have what have become the considerable financial benefits that have accrued overall from their use of the three properties, even though in turn the business has met the costs associated with their maintenance, development and use.
128 There was a deal of evidence from George and Gloria as to moneys claimed to have been expended on improvements to each of the three properties over the years. This was advanced as expenditure by George himself and so directly supporting his claim to equitable relief by way of estoppel. As I have indicated elsewhere in these reasons, I am persuaded that the payments were actually made by the family business in its various manifestations over the years and therefore only indirectly and partially by George until 1989. There was also accounting evidence of expenditure for these purposes by the second defendant since it was formed in 1989. George also sought to rely on this as supporting an equity in his favour.
129 I note that while it was possible for George and Gloria to identify expenditure of this nature, going back to the 1950s in the case of Rowley, it is also their evidence that there are no accounting records available, especially no records of the partnership in its various forms over the years before the mid 1980s, to enable any exploration of the question whether there was any accounting within the partnership by which this expenditure or any of it came to be debited against George's interest in the partnership from time to time. I found this somewhat surprising. George carried the onus in this respect so that the uncertainty tended against acceptance of his evidence about these matters. Further, the absence of partnership accounting records or other satisfactory evidence in respect of most of the period in question, and the nature of the records tendered for the period since the mid 1980s, precludes any satisfactory evaluation of the returns to the family business or to George from the use made of each of the three lots over the years.
130 The evidence I have received has proved to be confusing or incomplete. There is nothing as to the quantum of rates and taxes and the like paid in respect of each of the three lots over the years. These expenses are said not to be improvements. Yet expenditure on firebreaks each year is included. In some matters the evidence was unsatisfactory and tended to exaggerate actual expenditure, particularly by incorporating without identification an estimate of the value of George's labour, cf of the consistent annual 'expenditure' on firebreaks and the cost attributed to the shed in 1978. Except for a few items of expenditure by the second defendant none of the evidence was supported by original accounting needs, or primary documents or cheque books. Even the evidence as to company expenditure was unsatisfactory as there is uncertainty whether material expenditure related to land other than the three properties in question.
131 Nevertheless, in case it should prove relevant in some later proceedings by way of appeal, I shall record my findings, general and approximate as they are, on the evidence as to expenditure by the family business on each of the three lots.
132 In respect of Lot 17 Rockingham I have excluded from these findings expenditure by the second defendant recorded in June 1989 of $9,000 for bituminising outside a shed which appears in the company ledger in respect of the Gingin property.
as this appears to relate to a shed constructed on George's Lot 16 Rockingham.
134 In 1991 there was a shed "extension" which straddled the boundary of Lots 16 and 17 and which connected the existing sheds on Lots 16 and 17. As this structure straddles the boundary it is not in any sense an asset that can remain in its present form and pass with the title. There was however money expended on it by the family business which in part related to Lot 17 Rockingham. The expenditure on this extension, including electrical work, was some $14,000 which has not been included in the above findings; only part of this related to Lot 17 Rockingham and the evidence does not allow any estimate to be made by way of apportionment to Lot 17.
135 In support of his claim for equitable relief George also placed some reliance on an expectation that he might leave the three properties to his two sons as part of the family market gardening business, it being also asserted that it was with this in mind that George encouraged his sons to acquire tertiary qualifications in horticulture. This they have done and both now work full time in the family business. What is not established in my view of the evidence, is that any encouragement by George to his sons to study horticulture had any direct connection with George's expectations with regard to any one or all of the three properties in dispute. That case might have had some greater prospect of being made out had the family business been oriented to, and dependant on the three properties. That has not been the case in any respect at any relevant time with respect to Lot 126 Churchill. With regard to the other two properties it is clear, in my finding, that the acquisition of the Gingin property in 1989 had the effect that Rowley was no longer essential to the family business. Now that Lancelin has been acquired, in my finding neither Rowley nor Lot 17 Rockingham are essential. In my finding, as indicated elsewhere, George has contemplated the future sale of both properties at some financially convenient time in the future. This is because the acquisition of Lancelin has satisfied what I find to have been a long term ambition of George, to find a suitable very large property which can be developed to be the market garden of the business, so making the other properties redundant. This also negates acceptance of the pleaded assertion that the granting of the relief sought by John would in practical terms result in the cessation of market gardening by George.
136 I have been unable to accept that in the years relevant to the tertiary education of his two sons, George saw the future of the market gardening business as being dependant on any one of Rowley, Lot 126 Churchill or Lot 17 Rockingham. Further, for reasons given elsewhere I am not able to accept that George ever honestly held any of the beliefs on which this aspect of the case is predicated.
137 This is not a case in which further factual findings could be made which might materially assist with the issue of the proportionately of relief to the detriment suffered, should my findings concerning estoppel come to be reversed on appeal. I will not, therefore, deal further with that issue.
138 In view of my findings no issues concerning a constructive trust need be separately considered.
139 For these reasons the claim of George insofar as it is founded on estoppel and relief consequential thereon, fails.
140 George places no reliance on the Limitation Act 1935 ("the Act") with respect to Lot 126 Churchill.
141 With respect to Lot 17 Rockingham George seeks to establish that he has acquired title by possession as the tenant at will of John at least since 8 May 1974 when the deed of family arrangement was executed pursuant to which John acquired his legal interest in Lot 17 Rockingham. Were George in possession within the meaning of s 9 of the Act, John's right to bring an action to recover Lot 17 Rockingham from George is "deemed to have first accrued ... at the expiration of one year next after the commencement of" that tenancy ie 8 May 1975. By s 4 John had to bring an action to recover Lot 17 Rockingham from George "within 12 years next after the time at which the right to make such entry ... shall have first accrued" ie by 1 May 1987. That not having occurred, by s 30 of the Act, John's "right and title ... to the land ... shall be extinguished". Hence George would now have title by possession to Lot 17 Rockingham.
142 With respect to Rowley, George also claims to have acquired title by possession to John's undivided half share as joint tenant. It is George's case that from the time John set off in 1957, or at least from 1958 a distinction which need not be considered in detail, to engage in the trucking business George has been in sole occupation and possession of Rowley. At its highest George's case would be that John expressly abandoned his interest in Rowley in favour of George in 1957 or alternatively that George's occupation and use of the whole of Rowley following John's departure in 1957 left George in possession of the whole and John dispossessed. It is George's case that that has remained the position, although in very recent years in effect John has tried to revive his interest. It is George's case that these attempts at revival are without legal significance as John's interest in Rowley had long been extinguished by the operation of s 30 of the Act.
143 George's case in respect of Rowley is not founded in s 9 which applies only to a tenancy at will. George's case relies on s 14 which deals with questions relating to possession as between inter alia joint tenants. It is George's case that he has been in possession and in receipt of the profits of Rowley, in the senses of possession and profits relevant to s 14, for more than 12 years since the first accrual to John of a right of action to recover his interest in Rowley from George (s 4 of the Act) so that by s 30 John's right of title as joint tenant to Rowley has been extinguished leaving George as the sole legal and beneficial owner of the whole.
144 John's primary answer to these contentions of George is that George's occupation of Lot 17 Rockingham and of Rowley was with John's consent, ie as licensee. It is John's submission, therefore, that George has never been a tenant at will of Lot 17 Rockingham, so that s 9 of the Act has no operation. Further, it is John's submission with respect to Rowley that it is essential for George to establish that his occupation of Rowley has been adverse to John's interest as joint owner which could not be so as George's occupation was with John's permission, ie George was a licensee of John for any privilege he may have enjoyed in respect of Rowley beyond that to which he was legally entitled as joint tenant.
145 It is accepted by the parties that s 9, on which George's case with respect to Lot 17 Rockingham depends in this respect, has no application to licences. It is not possible for a person to be an adverse possession of property over which he or she has a licence as long as the licence exists: Moses v Lovegrove [1952] 2 QB 533 at 544; Cobb v Lane [1952] 1 All ER 1199; Hughes v Griffin [1969] 1 WLR 23; Ghilarducci v Ghilarducci (1993) 134 ANZ Conv R 331 at 332 at 5 per Malcolm CJ; Caltex Properties Limited (in liq) v Love and Ors, unreported; SCt of WA (Parker J); Library No 970237; 11 May 1997 at 16-17.
146 As was said by Denning LJ in Errington v Errington and Woods [1951] EWCA Civ 2; [1952] 1 KB 290 at 296:
"The classic definition of a licence was propounded by Vaughan CJ in the 17th century in Thomas v Sorrell [(1673) Vaugh 330 (124 ER 1098 at 1109)];
'A dispensation or licence properly passeth no interest nor alters or transfers property in any thing, but only makes an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful.'
The difference between a tenancy and a licence is, therefore, that, in a tenancy, an interest passes in the land, whereas, in a licence, it does not."
Hence, the fundamental distinction is that a tenant enjoys an estate in the land while a licensee does not. A tenancy is the holding or possession of lands by any right or title and a lease is a contract whereby that right or title is created in favour of the tenant. As was considered in greater detail in Caltex Properties Limited (in liq) v Love & Ors (supra) at 17 there is some divergence between English authority and Australian as to the appropriate test for distinguishing leases and licences. The High Court, however, has held that the right to exclusive possession is the sole test; Radaich v Smith [1959] HCA 45; (1959) 101 CLR 209. It must be mentioned that it would be wrong to conclude that unqualified support was given in that decision for the exclusive possession test; see McTiernan J at 214, Taylor at 218 - 220 and Windeyer J at 221 - 222. Nevertheless it is widely accepted that Radaich v Smith is decisive in its acceptance of the exclusive possession test as the sole test for distinguishing leases from licences; see eg Goldsworthy Mining Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1973] HCA 7; (1973) 128 CLR 199, Lackham v Orange City Council (No 2) [1968] 2 NSWR 667, General Discounts Pty Ltd v Crosby [1968] Qd R 418. This remains so even though there have been some attempts to reconcile the difference in approach between United Kingdom and the Australian decisions; see G Street v Mountford [1985] UKHL 4; [1985] AC 809, Lewis v Bell (1985) 1 NSWLR 731.
147 The exclusive possession test is not one which is easy to apply in many situations. It is necessary that there be a legal right to exclusive possession which must be distinguished from the fact of exclusive possession cf Radaich v Smith at 223. It does not necessarily follow that because a person in fact has exclusive possession that person has a legal right to exclusive possession; cf Hill v O'Brien [1938] HCA 48; (1938) 61 CLR 96 at 111.
148 Of course the fact of exclusive possession can be indicative of a right to exclusive possession. Subject to one qualification in this case George, for the purposes of the family business, may be seen to have in fact occupied Lot 17 Rockingham since 8 May 1974. Since that time John has not met any of the expenses of ownership and has not received any of the profits from the use of the land. George has held the duplicate certificate of title for Lot 17 Rockingham since it issued in 1976. Were there nothing more these circumstances might well provide a significant indication of a legal right to occupy Rowley to the exclusion of John. The facts of the present case, however, reveal that there is in truth much more to be considered.
149 The facts have already been substantially canvassed. In light of them, I am persuaded that George has never been a tenant at will of John in respect of Lot 17 Rockingham. He has never enjoyed a legal right to the exclusive possession of Lot 17 Rockingham. His occupation and use of that land has been with the permission of John, ie as licensee. Further, I am satisfied that the license George enjoyed could have been revoked by John at any time, there was no contractual provision colouring or affecting the license. I find accordingly.
150 In particular I note the following in support of the view I have reached. Primarily, there are three dates which require attention for the purposes of assessing the true nature of George's occupation and use of Lot 17 Rockingham. They are immediately following their father's funeral in 1970, at about the time of the execution of the deed of family arrangement on 8 May 1974, and at about the time of the registration of the Transfer of the title to Lot 17 Rockingham to John pursuant to the 1974 deed, which appears to have been in June 1976.
151 In essence, the arrangements which came to govern the affairs of John and George with respect to Lot 17 Rockingham were put in place when they, together with their mother, discussed the future following their father's funeral in 1970. While, at that time, it may not have been clear that John would take Lot 17 as part of the distribution of the estate it was, in my finding, the common expectation of the three people involved in the discussion that the three sons would share equally in the Rockingham properties and that their mother should take the Churchill properties. Hence, their conversation proceeded on the basis that John, George and Boris would each take one of the three lots which comprised the Rockingham properties.
152 Given what transpired in that conversation, which I have considered in greater detail elsewhere, the following matters stand out. John and George were not strangers and were not dealing at arms lengths. The central issues discussed were the distribution of the father's estate and the future conduct of the family marketing business and John's role in that, but with an underlying concern to ensure the future maintenance and wellbeing of their mother. John felt a clear obligation to abandon his career in the East and return to accept the responsibility expected of him as eldest son, particularly to ensure his mother's wellbeing and the future management of the family market gardening business. I accept he was reluctant to do this but, nevertheless, I am persuaded on balance he would have done so had this been necessary. George, on the other hand, was keen to assume control of the family market gardening business in place of the father. He had been engaged in this business all his life and was prepared to accept the responsibilities which went with that, including the maintenance and wellbeing of their mother. While the additional labour of John in the family market gardening business would have made life easier, it would have resulted in a significant diminishment of financial return to George. Hence it suited George to offer to step into his father's shoes and to assume the primary management of the family market gardening business and the care of their mother. John was relieved to accept George's offer as it left him free to continue his preferred career. John offered George the use of John's prospective share of the Rockingham properties to facilitate the continuance of the family market business for the time being, which George in turn readily accepted. I am satisfied that no term for the use of John's prospective inheritance was considered or agreed, neither was the payment of any rental considered or agreed and of course none has ever been paid. There was never any written agreement nor was one ever contemplated. As the mother was the administrator of the estate her concurrence in this arrangement during her administration was implicit in what occurred. For relevant purposes the conversation did not go beyond these matters. In particular there was no specific discussion of Rowley, it being apparently assumed, in my finding, that it would continue to be used and managed as it had been since 1957, except that now George would be in sole day to day control free of the influence of their father.
153 I am further satisfied that there was no further specific discussion of the basis on which George should have the use of Lot 17 Rockingham for the purpose of the family market gardening business, whether at that time in 1970, or in association with the execution of the deed of family arrangement in 1974, or the time of the registration and issue of the title in favour of John for Lot 17 in 1976 or, with one exception, at any other time. The one exception was a specific issue as to the payment of the rates in respect of "John's blocks", which I understand to be both Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley. This arose, more probably than not in 1976 or 1977 when the solicitors had sent the rate notices to John. The evidence differs but I am persuaded that John approached George to enquire whether George wanted John to pay the rates. Significantly, in my view, this was approached as an issue which had not previously been discussed or agreed between John and George. George, I find, volunteered to continue to accept responsibility for payment of the rates. In fact the family market gardening business continued thereafter to pay them as it had done until then even during the mother's administration of the estate, in the case of Rowley since before 1957.
154 In fact George managed Lot 17 Rockingham from the time of their father's death and he did so in his role as a partner in effective control of the family market gardening business (from 1989 as managing director of the corporate entity), that business meeting all costs relating to, and receiving all profits from, the use of Lot 17 Rockingham. George had assumed possession of the duplicate certificates of title with respect to Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley on their father's death and the duplicate certificate of title in respect of Lot 17 was returned to him with the other duplicates after it was issued by the Land Titles Office in 1976. George thereafter retained possession of that duplicate certificate of title and John never sought it from him.
155 I am also persuaded, despite evidence to the contrary particularly from George and some aspects of the evidence of Boris, Gloria and Peter, that whenever John visited Perth until 1995 he inspected the use being made of Lot 17 Rockingham and also of Rowley, usually going on to each property to do so. Sometimes this was in George's company, sometimes not. During these visits he also discussed the affairs of the family market gardening business and its use of Lot 17 and Rowley with George. I am also persuaded that he also discussed these matters by telephone with George on average once or twice a year at least since 1980 and less frequently before then. Limited and infrequent as these events were, and while they are capable of more than one construction, I am satisfied on balance that this visitation to the properties and their discussion of their use and management was not merely in the capacity of a guest of George, as is advanced by George, but revealed an interest as proprietor in each of Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley and an exercise of John's rights as proprietor, particularly his right of entry. The authorities consistently point out that even the slightest evidence of the exercise of proprietal rights may be sufficient to negate any inference of abandonment or discontinuance of possession. These events are also relevant to the question whether there existed in George an exclusive right of possession.
156 Those episodes aside, it remains clear that George, on behalf of the family market gardening business, enjoyed effectively the sole occupancy of Lot 17 Rockingham and of Rowley for the purposes of the family market gardening business, which business included the diversification into cattle at Rowley for a time. He also made an additional use of limited parts of the Rockingham properties for his own trucking business which he developed since 1975, but the evidence suggests that at most, with respect to Lot 17 Rockingham, this involved only a very limited use.
157 Having regard in particular to these circumstances I am unable to accept that John and George in their dealings re Lot 17 ever contemplated the establishment of any formal legally binding relationship. They dealt as brothers with a strong sense of family responsibility and with a concern for the wellbeing of the whole family, especially their mother. John felt a great sense of responsibility and of guilt that he did not step into his father's shoes as was expected of the eldest son. He was relieved that George was in effect willing to assume that responsibility and was therefore willing to facilitate George in doing so by enabling the family market gardening business to continue for the time being as it had under their father's leadership. To this end he was prepared to have the family market gardening business have the use of his expected inheritance, which became Lot 17 Rockingham, as well as Rowley, and the family market gardening business thereafter under George's leadership continued to use it as the business had until the father's death. These circumstances are quite compelling in my view as revealing that John and George found a convenient family arrangement which suited their separate concerns at the time and in the interests of the family were content to conduct their affairs with regard to Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley accordingly. The whole point was to enable the family market gardening business to have the returns from Lot 17 for the benefit of the family in Perth, including their mother, and to keep intact the family market gardening business as it had been. At that time John was prepared to forego any personal return from his properties for the time being to facilitate these family purposes. The motivations and actions of John and George, in these circumstances, are not to be measured and judged reliably merely according to the conduct of strangers or of persons engaged in commercial dealings with respect to land. A number of decided cases, including Hill v O'Brien (supra), Errington v Errington & Woods (supra), Hardwick v Johnson [1978] 1 WLR 683 at 688; Wood v Brown [1984] 1Qd R 593 cf 607 - 609 provide an illustration of the relevance of the circumstance that parties were dealing with each other by way of family arrangement or even merely as personal friends. Decisions such as these illustrate how family arrangements may well need to be judged in a different light and how the nature and purpose of the family arrangement may well be persuasive against a conclusion that legally binding obligations were contemplated or created. This is not a case where there is any direct parallel in any of the decided cases to which I have been referred, nevertheless, the facts of this case are in my view quite compelling as to the fundamental significance of the desire of both John and George to further family interests by their arrangements with regard to the use of Lot 17 Rockingham and Rowley.
158 The absence of any written agreement, and the lack of the identification by John and George of, or agreement as to, even the most basic terms which would be expected if parties were effecting a legally binding agreement, in the absence of any sufficient factual foundation from which those basic terms might properly be implied, also precludes in my view a finding that a binding legal agreement was effected. In particular, I am unable to conclude that there was any commitment or understanding as to the duration of the use which George was to enjoy for the purposes of the family market gardening business. That was an issue which did not arise. I am satisfied that the only proper conclusion is that it was an arrangement which was to continue indefinitely until it suited one or other of the parties to bring it to an end, ie, it was at pleasure. While, at a later time in the circumstances that I have discussed, they did specifically consider the question of the payment of rates and taxes, I am persuaded that even following that, and certainly until then, there had been no more than an expectation based on what had been the usual practice within the family. I am not able to conclude that at any time it ever became a matter of binding and enforceable obligation on George or the family market gardening business that it should pay rates and taxes. That was the expectation. In my view if ever it were not realised that might have provided in fact a reason for John not to continue with the arrangement, but he would have not had a legal right to recover the amount of rates and taxes from George or the family market gardening business.
159 In my view there is entirely absent from what transpired any sign that John and George had in contemplation that the proprietary or possessory rights of either or each of them should be affected, or that any formal right of property or possession was to be created between them, especially any which detracted from their own individual proprietal rights. In my finding they came to an informal family arrangement, one which emerged from their discussions and their conduct. The very nature, informality and incompleteness of what they did draws attention to the fact that they were two brothers cooperating informally for the benefit of their family.
160 I should also note that it would be my finding that no formal legal interest in Lot 17 Rockingham was created in favour of George and that at no time did he ever have any legal right to the exclusive possession of Lot 17 Rockingham, even if it had been accepted that, in fact, George had enjoyed the sole occupancy of Lot 17 Rockingham since 1974 and that John's visits and inspections and discussions with George over the years had not involved the exercise of proprietal right.
161 As a matter of legal analysis, these circumstances reveal in my view that the use of Lot 17 Rockingham by George (and the second respondent successively) since 1974 was at all times by license of John, a license which is not attended by any contractual term of any type, and which has been terminable at any time by John. I have not been able to discern the existence of any form of tenancy at will or other leasehold in respect of Lot 17 Rockingham or any form of legal right of property or possession in favour of George in respect of Lot 17 Rockingham. It follows that George's claim in respect of Lot 17 Rockingham, which in this respect is founded in s 9 of the Limitation Act, must fail.
162 It is the basis of George's claim in respect of Rowley that by virtue of s 14 of the Limitation Act it is sufficient that he occupied Rowley whether as licensee or otherwise for the period stipulated by s 4, ie that adverse possession is not required for the purposes of s 14.
163 In this State it has long been held that for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1935 possession means what is commonly called "adverse" possession. This has been the approach followed in decided cases concerning both s 9 and s 14. In McWhirter v Emerson-Elliott (1960) WAR 208, Wolff CJ said at 213:
"The nature of possession required to establish adverse possession under s 5 of the Limitation Act 1935 is, I consider, well laid down. In deciding whether there is adverse possession it is relevant to consider the nature of the property and the use which the owner might reasonably be expected to make of it. The possession must be adverse in the sense that the person claiming it is using it to the exclusion of the owner (Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19; Clement v Jones [1909] HCA 11; (1909) 8 CLR 133; Kynoch Ltd v Rowlands [1912] 1 Ch 527). The possession must be continuous (Trustees, Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Short (1988) 13 AC 793). To sum up in the words of Gavan Duffy J, in Maguire v Browne [1913] HCA 57; (1913) 17 CLR 365 at p 369: 'The dispossession and discontinuance contemplated by this section have been held to connote the existence of a person to be protected by the statute who has dispossessed such owner and kept him dispossessed for a period of 12 years, or the abandonment of possession for such a period by the owner and the possession by some other person during the same period'."
In Middleton v Young, unreported; SCt of WA (Wilson C); Library No 0634; 17 March 1969 it was there said by Wilson C (as he then was at 7):
"'It is convenient at this point to examine briefly the concept of actual, or as it is more commonly described, adverse, possession. Prior to 1833, when the Real Property Limitation Act became law in the United Kingdom the concept was hedged around by a number of artificial rules: see Preston & Newson's Limitations of Actions, 3rd ed, p 86. The 1833 Act abolished the old rules and emphasised the accrual of a cause of action as a basic factor: Nepean v Doe d Knight, 2M & W 894 per Denman, CJ at 911. Adverse possession means the possession of those against whom the true owner has or is deemed to have an accrued right of action. It must be an actual possession that is inconsistent with the rights of the true owner. It must be "such as to reasonably raise a presumption that the person claiming to be possessed is there exercising dominion over the land, and in such a way that everybody who comes into the neighbourhood can see what he is claiming": per Martin, CJ in Harnett v Green (No 2) (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 292, at 300. In considering whether there is evidence of an actual possession of the land, the particular circumstances will determine the character and weight of the acts of occupation and user on which the claim is based. Its size, its location, and the use which an owner might reasonably be expected to make of it are vital considerations: McWhirter v Emerson-Elliott (1960) WAR 208, at 213; Murnane v Findlay [1926] VicLawRp 11; (1926) VLR 80."
It will be seen that an essential feature identified in both cases is that the possession must be inconsistent with the rights of the true owner.
164 Hence, in the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Ghilarducci v Ghilarducci (supra), Malcolm CJ at 331 - 332 pithily summarised the position, in the context of s 9, in these words -
"The acquisition of a possessory title by adverse possession in Western Australia requires the adverse possessor to be in continual possession of the relevant land without the license of the true owner and to the exclusion of the true owner for a period of not less than 12 years." (Emphasis added).
As appears at 334 - 335 of that report, Franklyn J directed himself to the same effect. The decision in Caltex Properties Limited (in liq) v Love & Ors, (supra) (as is apparent at 10) was based on the application in the context of s 9 of the views expressed by the majority in Ghilarducci v Ghilarducci (supra).
165 For George, as I understand the submissions of counsel, it is accepted that this is the position with respect to s 9. Section 9 deals only with a tenant at will. A tenant at will has, during the continuation of the tenancy, a legal right to possession whereas a person in possession under the mere license of the owner has no such legal right.
166 With respect to s 14, however, it is George's submission as I understand it, that possession has a meaning which involves no more than actual occupation, it being irrelevant whether it be by way of license, tenancy or otherwise. In short it is submitted that possession need not be adverse. In support of this reliance is placed upon Paradise Beach Transportation Co Ltd v Price Robinson [1968] AC 1072, 1082 - 1084. George also seeks to bring himself within the operation of s 14 on the basis that since 1957 he has been in "receipt of the entirety --- of the profits" of Rowley.
167 Subject to one critical qualification, the Limitation Act in its terms so far as it is relevant to this action may be said generally to follow the provisions of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 (UK). That significant qualification is to be found in the last paragraph of s 5 which paragraph has no equivalent in the 1833 UK Act. It is this last paragraph of s 5 which is at that heart of the contention in this case concerning adverse possession and the meaning of possession in s 14.
168 For relevant purposes the provisions of the Limitation Act are concerned to limit the time for actions to recover land or rent (s 4). The scheme of the Act in this respect is to establish a limit of 12 years from the time at which the right to bring such an action first accrues.
169 To further facilitate the operation of s 4, provisions such as s 5 and s 9 make express provision (often by way of deeming) for the determination of the time when the rights of action with which s 4 was concerned should first accrue. These provisions deal with a variety of situations in which that time would not otherwise be clear, or to vary the existing law as to the time of first accrual of rights of action to recover land or rent. Section 5(a) provides that a right of action first accrues in a case where a person in possession is dispossessed or where possession is discontinued. Section 5 also deals with the first accrual of a right of action where the interest in dispute is that of a deceased person, cases of alienation, future estates, and forfeitures and breaches of condition. Section 9, as we have seen, deals with tenancies at will to the effect that the cause of action is deemed to accrue 12 months from the commencement of the tenancy. When the equivalent of s 9 was first enacted in the 1833 UK Act this represented a significant change to the previous law.
170 Section 14, however, is not dealing with the first accrual of a cause of action. It is dealing with the possession of land as between coparceners, joint tenants and tenants in common. In cases of joint tenancy and tenancies in common, the common law presumed that possession of land by one of the joint owners was possession on behalf of all of them, Culley v Doe d Taylerson [1840] EngR 149; (1840) 11 AD & EL 1008, 113 ER 697, so that all the joint owners continued in possession and time could not run. Being a presumption it is to be expected that it was open to a party to rebut it by proper evidence that one joint owner had in fact taken possession to the exclusion of the other, ie possession which was adverse to the right to possession of the other owner and therefore giving rise to a right of action to recover that right of possession from which there had been exclusion. Perhaps the most usual circumstance in which one joint owner might so occupy the property to the exclusion of the other involved ouster, a common law notion which most usually amounted to the forceful turning-off from the land of the other joint owner, although ouster could be achieved under less physically dramatic circumstances.
171 This is the area of operation of s 14, as it was of s 12 of the 1833 UK Act. In my respectful view it is displacing the operation of the common law presumption; hence the words "such possession ... shall not be deemed to have been the possession or receipt of" the non-occupying joint owner. The provision does not, however, provide for more than the displacement of the presumption. Its words do not go so far as to preclude possession by one joint owner from being possession on behalf of another joint owner, it merely displaces the presumption that the possession by one joint owner is possession by all. In the language of the section it precludes that being "deemed" where, in fact, that is not the case.
172 Hence, in my respectful view, the apparent effect of s 14 is to leave the question whether possession by one joint owner is on behalf of another joint owner, or to the exclusion of the other joint owner, to be determined as an issue of fact in each case, ie according to the truth of each situation. By displacing the presumption, in my respectful view, s 14 opened up the way for one joint owner of land at least more readily to establish that he or she had secured sole title to the land by possession from the other joint owner. It was no longer necessary to overcome a presumption to the contrary.
173 If my view be correct, it would remain necessary for a joint owner to establish as a matter of fact that his or her possession was not that of other joint owners, ie that it was to the exclusion of the others, in other words that it was adverse to their rights as joint owner. As it was put by Bramwell LJ in Leigh v Jack (1879) 5 Ex D 264 at 271 "... In order to defeat a title by dispossessing the former owner, acts must be done which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he intended he used it".
174 On this view, it must follow that if George's possession of Rowley was by the license of John that use would not be to the exclusion of John; George would have had no legal right to exclude John, it was a use entirely consistent with John's enjoyment of the land. It would have been indeed John's intended use of the land. As the cases have so often held the possession of a licensee can never be adverse; Heslop v Burns [1974] 1 WLR 1241, Hughes v Griffin [1969] 1 WLR 23.
175 This view of s 14 appears to accord with the views of the majority of the Full Court in Ghilarducci v Ghilarducci (supra). One issue for determination in that case concerned events preceding 1964 when there had been a tenancy in common between the parties to the action. Both Malcolm CJ at 332 and Franklyn J at 334 disposed of the reliance on s 14, which was attempted in that case in respect of the period of the tenancy in common, on the basis that, there being no evidence of ouster, the possession by one brother was with the consent of the others so that it could not be adverse. While the dissenting reasons of Rowland J (which are not reported but to which the reference is Ghilarducci v Ghilarducci, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 920365; 15 July 1992 per Rowland J at 10-11) do not expressly deal with this precise issue, observations of his Honour are at least consistent with the case now argued before me on behalf of George. His Honour's reasoning relied, like George's case, on the Paradise Beach decision. The decision of the majority, however, was clearly to the contrary of George's case with respect to s 14. Thus, in my view, Ghilarducci is a decision of the Full Court in which the majority have rejected the operation of s 14 now contended for by George and did so notwithstanding the decision in the Paradise Beach case.
176 There are, however, reasons beyond the decision of the Full Court in Ghilarducci, and the proper construction of the terms of s 14 itself, for rejecting the case of George on this issue.
177 This case arises in the context of an action by John to recover his land which is occupied by George. George claims to have dispossessed John of his interest as joint tenant in Rowley. This is a case within s 5(a) of the Act. The effect of s 5(a) is that the time at which John's right to bring an action to recover Rowley first accrued is when George dispossessed him - which can be sufficiently stated on George's case as being at the end of 1957 (or in 1958) following John's departure for the Eastern States.
"5. In the construction of this Act, the right to make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued, at such time as hereinafter is mentioned, that is to say:-
(a) When the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom he claims, has, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, been in possession or in receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent, and while entitled thereto has been dispossessed, or had discontinued such possession or receipt, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of such dispossession or discontinuance of possession, or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were or was so received."
As John's action is within s 5(a), by the opening words of the section the provisions of s 5(a) apply "In the construction of this Act ...". In determining when it was that John was dispossessed by George within the meaning of s 5(a), ie when John's right to bring the action first accrued, the last paragraph of s 5 is critical. Relevantly it provides:
"For the purposes of this section, the right to ... bring an action to recover any land, has not and shall not be deemed to have first accrued ... until such land is in the actual possession of some person not entitled to such possession, ...." (Emphasis added).
In my view, the words "not entitled to such possession" can only mean in this context that the possession must be adverse to the true owner. This is how they have been viewed in all the decided cases in this State. Hence, in construing s 5(a) the possession on which George relies in his defence to John's claim must be a possession to which George was "not entitled"; it must be possession which was adverse to John's legal interest in the land and to John's enjoyment of that interest.
179 This critical last paragraph in s 5 is the provision which had no counterpart at all in the 1833 UK Act. It also had no counterpart in the legislation of the Bahamas, which was based on the 1833 UK Act, and which was the subject of the Paradise Beach decision. The presence of the last paragraph in s 5 precludes a view being taken of the Western Australian Limitation Act 1935 that its terms and operation do not involve any distinction between possession in the sense of mere occupation, and adverse possession. That was the view of the Bahamas legislation, and of the 1833 UK Act, which appears to underlie much of the reasoning in the Paradise Beach decision. For present purposes the WA Act of 1935 expressly, in my view, retains that distinction. Thus, in my view, by virtue of the opening words of s 5, the notion of possession by a person "not entitled to such possession", ie adverse possession, remains critical to the success of George's case.
180 In my view, therefore, as a matter of precedent, on the ordinary construction of the terms of s 14, and by the necessary operation of s 5(a), the case of George in respect of Rowley must fail if George's occupation and receipt of profits from Rowley was with the consent or permission of John, ie as a licensee of John.
181 I note the submission for George that the introductory words of the last paragraph of s 5 are "for the purposes of this section ..." so, it is advanced, it should not be applied to any other section of the Act including s 14. That submission, in my view, fails to recognise that it is section 5(a), not the last paragraph of s 5, which operates in this case. Section 5(a) applies "In the construction of this Act ...". The last paragraph of s 5, however, informs the meaning and operation of s 5(a).
182 I am also conscious of the evidence of George that Rowley was still vacant land to which nothing had been done by John when John left home in 1957 and that it was George who first went into physical occupation of the land in 1958 and commenced to work it. To the extent that this may have been directed to showing that John had never been in possession of Rowley, so that s 5(a) could not apply in this case, there are a number of difficulties in the way of any such approach which preclude its acceptance. In particular I accept from the evidence that between the acquisition of Rowley in 1955 and John's departure in 1957, John with George and their father did quite a bit of work on Rowley which included some fencing, some clearing and the planting of olives, at the expense of the then family business. That experiment proved unsuccessful so that in 1958 in my finding George and his father tried other crops, again at the immediate expense of the family business. There can be no doubt that John was in physical and legal possession of his undivided interest in Rowley as joint tenant when he left WA in 1957. The case George seeks to make, therefore, necessarily involves the dispossession of John or the discontinuance by John of his possession and is therefore within s 5(a).
183 I turn now to consider the nature of George's occupation and use of Rowley. It is relevant to consider the position from the time it was first acquired by the father in 1955 and registered by him in the names of John and George as joint tenants. Although it is not in accordance with the evidence of George, as earlier indicated, I am satisfied that John and George both then accepted the father's view which I would summarise as being that Rowley was a good long term realisable investment which could be usefully used in the meantime for the family business. I am satisfied that both John and George accepted the father's ideas for the future of Rowley so that with the father they did some clearing, fencing, put in fire breaks and commence olive planting. This work continued until 1957. On balance, as indicated earlier, I am persuaded the funds for this were provided by the father from the family market gardening business of which George was not then a partner and I am persuaded that the likelihood is that the development of Rowley was treated as part of the undertaking of the family market gardening business under the primary influence of the father. An aspect of this state of affairs in my view is that, from the beginning, outgoings such as rates and taxes were paid by the father as an outgoing of the family market gardening business. As indicated elsewhere, I've been unable to be satisfied that there was a distinct partnership between John and George or that the development of Rowley was undertaken by any such partnership or by George separately from the family market gardening business.
184 It was against that established pattern that the events of 1957, when John left home, come to be viewed. For reasons given I am unable to accept the evidence of George of John's express rejection of any interest in Rowley and the family market gardening business when he left or of his relinquishment of his rights to Rowley in favour of George. Instead, I am persuaded that there was no express conversation or arrangement between John and George regarding Rowley when John left. Their attention at the time was focussed on the new trucking venture which John was embarking on. As best I can determine, John departed under an assumption that Rowley would continue to be developed and managed as it had been since it was purchased, although without him helping with the work, but with the family market gardening business continuing to meet the expenditure and having the benefit of the returns. His understanding or expectation in this regard can be understood having regard to the pattern that had already been established and the continuing influence of the father. In my assessment of the evidence his expectation proved well founded. While George in his evidence suggested that all that occurred after John left home with respect to Rowley was at George's instigation and at his expense, that does not, in my finding, reflect what occurred. I have no doubt that George had views and that these may well have been a factor in determining what occurred. Nevertheless, the evidence sufficiently indicates, in my finding, the continuing role of the father in decisions concerning, and in the work actually done on, Rowley until his death, and all the circumstances lead me to the conclusion that the funding came from the family market gardening business at the father's instigation.
185 To what extent, if at all, the accounts of the family market gardening business might have maintained some differentiation of Rowley or of George's interests is simply not established by the evidence which I am prepared to accept, so that it cannot be concluded that in truth George eventually met the costs of Rowley or received the profits except insofar as he had any notional return from the activities of the family market gardening business in which he became a partner sometime after John's departure in 1957.
186 Thus, in respect of Rowley, it is significant that John has received no returns from Rowley since he left in 1957, and John has not met any of the expenditure of owning, maintaining, developing or producing from Rowley since 1957. George has effectively enjoyed the sole occupation of Rowley since 1957, subject to John's visits, inspections and discussions with George over the years, the general nature of significance of which have been sufficiently identified when dealing with Lot 17 Rockingham. Since the death of the father in 1970 George has, in fact, had possession of the duplicate certificate of title of Rowley and has had the effective day to day management of Rowley on behalf of the family market gardening business.
187 It is also material that John and George were not strangers; since 1955 they had a joint right of possession of the whole of Rowley by virtue of their joint tenancy. With that George always had a joint right to use all of the land and have its profits and also an obligation, jointly with John, to meet rates, taxes and other outgoings of ownership. There is no direct evidence which I accept of ouster of John from his right of joint possession and, with the rejection of George's evidence directed to establishing a voluntary discontinuance by John of his joint possession, there is no direct evidence of such discontinuance. Self evidently, John and George were not at arms length and were not dealing as strangers in respect of Rowley. They were both joint owners and brothers, the latter being of particular significance because of the strong sense of family responsibility and the significant influence of the particular culture of the family in ordering their lives and affairs. There was no specific discussion of any terms relating to George's occupation and use of Rowley, either when John left or at any time since then; at most there was an assumption that Rowley would continue to be used and managed much as it had been before John left. No rental was ever considered or agreed and none has ever been paid and there has never been any term considered or agreed for the continuation of George's use and occupation. No other terms have ever been expressly considered or agreed, nor has there ever been any written agreement contemplated or effected between them concerning any of these matters.
188 After the father's death, in my finding, there was no specific discussion of Rowley except for some brief canvassing between John and George in the presence of their mother of the possibility of it being sold, which possibility was not pursued. Otherwise, the conversation that did occur has been canvassed when dealing with Lot 17 Rockingham. The practical outcome was that George was to step into their father's shoes and run the family market gardening business instead of John and I am satisfied that it was implied or assumed by both that George could continue to have the use of Rowley for the time being for the purposes of the family market gardening business on the same basis that had prevailed since before 1957, this being a position that suited the interests of each of them at that time. As indicated previously no terms were then or later discussed or agreed, the past pattern merely was continued, and in particular no duration was considered or agreed nor could one reasonably be implied.
189 As with Lot 17 Rockingham, the evidence reveals the strong relevance in what occurred, both in 1957 and over the years that followed, of family considerations. In my view of the facts there was no sense of the creation of any legal rights or obligations in respect of Rowley. The pattern of family management of its affairs was simply adjusted to accommodate, in a practical way which suited everyone, the circumstance that in 1957 the eldest son left home. Throughout the life of the father, and indeed of the mother, there remained an expectation of John returning at some time and John never foreclosed that prospect. After the death of the father there was a further adjustment with the way in which the family managed its affairs to accommodate the loss of their father and to provide for the future conduct of the family business in a way which best suited the principle players namely John, George and their mother.
190 While George enjoyed, at least substantially, sole occupation of Rowley I am unable to conclude he ever had a legal right to sole exclusive possession Rowley. In my view he remained a joint tenant with the legal rights and obligations which flowed from that, but in my finding, any privilege he enjoyed beyond that was by way of license from John, a license which could have been revoked at any time and which was not accompanied or coloured by any contractual obligation. When the full circumstances are considered they do not establish, in my finding, that George's occupation and use of Rowley was pursuant to any right to possession to the exclusion of John or any other form of legal right beyond that which was his as the joint owner. In my finding his use and occupation were with the permission of John, indeed it was in a real sense for John's purpose in that it was to assist the welfare of John's family. In my view George was a licensee of John in respect of any use or occupation he enjoyed of Rowley beyond that which was his entitlement as joint owner.
191 It follows in my view of the operation and effect of s 14 of the Limitation Act that George's occupation and use of Rowley were always with the permission of John and therefore were not adverse to John's lawful title and right of possession. For the reasons given George's claim insofar as it relies on s 14 of the Limitation Act must fail.
192 Implicit in what I have said is my rejection of any view of the proper operation of s 14 which would enable the fact of the receipt of the profits of Rowley by George, with the consent and permission of John, to give rise to any statutory entitlement in George and to the extinguishment of John's title as joint tenant by virtue of the operation of s 30 of the Act. It would make a nonsense of the legislative scheme for possession by consent of the owner not to give rise to the extinguishment of title but for receipt of rents by consent or permission of the owner to do so. In my view any receipt of profits must be adverse to the legal right of the owner to receive those profits, for them to come within the operation of s 14 in this context.
193 As I understand the case for the defendants it is not pursued on the basis of any right in the second defendant which arises independently of the claims of the first defendant, George. As George's claims have failed, so must the claims of the second defendant.
194 The statement of claim sought mesne profits and damages although these issues were not actively pursued in evidence or submissions. I will proceed on the basis that they are not a live issue at this stage of the proceedings.
195 By the defence and counterclaim the defendants inter alia sought an accounting for benefits that the plaintiff would receive, by virtue of the work and expenditure of the defendants over the years, in the event that the defendants failed in their primary claims to title. An accounting was also sought with respect to rates and taxes, charges, insurance, outgoings and expenses of a recurring nature which the defendants met in respect of the properties over the years. No attempt was made to prove the quantum of these claims in full on the basis that they would be the subject of a subsequent accounting should the claim for an accounting be granted. There was some evidence directed, it seems, to establishing the expenditure of the defendants which was claimed to have improved each of the three properties, and hence their value to the plaintiff. This was led generally in support of the claims of the defendants in equity. I have recorded my findings in respect of this evidence elsewhere in these reasons.
196 While the defendants have unquestionably expended in total quite an amount of money and a considerable amount of effort in respect of the properties over the years, including much of the sums identified in the evidence of George and Gloria although in my finding not all of them, it is apparent that much of that expenditure was necessarily incurred in respect of achieving the production which the family market gardening business has had from the use of Rowley and Lot 17 Rockingham over the years, the profits from which have been retained in their entirety by the family market gardening business and so have benefited directly the second defendant and indirectly the first defendant. While the evidence does not permit any precise quantification it is my finding from the evidence that the defendants have benefited substantially from the use they have had of Lot 17 Rockingham and have, at least overall, benefited from the use they have had of Rowley. The evidence certainly does not establish the contrary. While Lot 126 Churchill had provided a useful regular financial return to the family business while it was let out and used for the quarrying of limestone that use had ceased before the 1984 deed of arrangement pursuant to which John became the registered proprietor. Since then Lot 126 Churchill has not been generating income and in fact some expense has been incurred in respect of it by the family business, and hence indirectly by the first defendant, before the formation of the second defendant, and by the second defendant since then. This involved the completion of the filling-in of the quarry which had spread over all the Churchill properties. That work had been at least substantially complete before the 1984 deed, while the land was still owned by the mother. Even then the work appears to have been undertaken under the auspices of George and at the expense of the family market gardening business. While Churchill has not in fact returned any income for the defendants since the 1984 deed, and there has been some expenditure in respect of it, it has nevertheless suited George to retain the four lots. In my view this found expression in George's comment to John in 1993 to the effect that there was the prospect of a better return on realisation if all the lots were retained than if individual lots were sold. I am satisfied, however, that if one considers overall the three lots in question in these proceedings, both the second defendant and indirectly the first defendant have benefited significantly financially from John's preparedness to allow them to be available to be used by George for the purposes of the family market gardening business as George considered appropriate.
197 In these circumstances, and having regard to the conduct of the parties considered elsewhere in these reasons, I am not persuaded there is any entitlement to, or that it would appropriate for there to be, an enquiry into any benefits and an accounting of the type sought by the defendants.
198 In my view the plaintiff has made out his claim to be entitled to delivery up of the duplicate certificates of title and to delivery up of possession in respect of Lot 17 Rockingham and Lot 126 Churchill. I am also persuaded that the plaintiff and the first defendant remain joint tenants in respect of Rowley. The plaintiff sought severance of the joint tenancy and an order for sale of Rowley. I will hear counsel further in respect of this relief.
Radonich
Radonich & Anor [1999] WASC 165
(1955) 94 CLR 98
(1987) 13 NSWLR 162
(1909) 8 CLR 133
(1989) 17 NSWLR 343
(1988) 164 CLR 539
(1992) 7 WAR 163
(1983) 158 CLR 327
(1988) 165 CLR 489
(1990) 170 CLR 394
(1988) 164 CLR 387
(1985) 160 CLR 583
(1987) 164 CLR 137
(1983) 152 CLR 406
(1988) 81 FCR 475
(1969) 120 CLR 365
(1959) 101 CLR 209
(1973) 128 CLR 199
(1985) 1 NSWLR 731
(1938) 61 CLR 96
(1913) 17 CLR 365