R v WP - [2024] NSWDC 544 - NSWDC 2024 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWDC

R v WP

[2024] NSWDC 544

District Court of NSW|2024-11-15|Before: Mr P

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

District Court of NSW

Decision date

2024-11-15

Before

Mr P

Catchwords

[1981] HCA 31 R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125 R v Gavel (2014) 239 A Crim R 469
R v MSK (2006) 167 A Crim R 159

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[1981] HCA 31 R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125 R v Gavel (2014) 239 A Crim R 469R v MSK (2006) 167 A Crim R 159

Judgment (27 paragraphs)

[1]

Judgment

The offender is to be sentenced with respect three child sex offences following a trial and guilty verdicts. The offences were committed against two of his daughters when they were variously aged between 4 and 12. The offender was found not guilty on a separate offence.
In the meantime, the offender has pleaded guilty to an additional two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm against two of his daughters with several offences to be taken into account on a Form 1 arising from the guilty pleas.
The trial indictment verdicts of guilty were for the following offences: - 1. Count 1 - Sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 years, in circumstances of aggravation, namely, the child was under the authority of the offender contrary to s 66A(2) of the Crimes Act 1900. This offence has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 15 years. 2. Count 3 - Sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 years contrary to s 66A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. This offence has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 15 years. 3. Count 4 - Sexual intercourse with a child above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years, in circumstances of aggravation, namely, the child was under the authority of the offender contrary to s 66C(2) of the Crimes Act 1900. This offence has a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 9 years.
The offender has since pleaded guilty (plea indictment) to the following further offences: - 1. Count 1 - Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (DV) contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. This offence has a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and no standard non-parole period. 2. Count 2 - Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (DV) contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. This offence has a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and no standard non-parole period.

[3]

Count 1

At the time of the first offence committed against NP the offender generally worked six days a week whilst TV worked five days per week and at times a shift on Sunday. On the day the offence was committed the offender was home alone with the victim NP whilst TV was at work. The victim was aged somewhere between 4 years and 4 years 8 months.
The offender, who was upstairs in the unit, called NP who was downstairs watching television. He guided the victim into his bedroom where he used a grey T-shirt to create a blindfold which was placed over NP's eyes. The offender threatened NP not to tell her mother about what occurred. The offender told NP to bend down and open her mouth, with which she complied. The offender then inserted his penis into her mouth all the way to the back of her throat following which she started crying. The offender thereafter moved his penis back and forth repeatedly inside NP's mouth, causing her to suck his penis. Whilst the offender was moving fast, NP was crying and telling the offender to stop. He did not do so and said nothing. The offender was moaning whilst having oral intercourse with NP, with the intercourse lasting about five to six minutes. The offender thereafter ejaculated into NPs mouth. He told NP to spit the ejaculate out and to wash her mouth. She subsequently had a shower.
NP did not disclose this event until 2021 (to her sister and subsequently to her mother).
In about 2015 the offender and his family moved to a home in Bankstown, having lived for a short period prior at the home of the offender's sister. They remained at the address in Bankstown until March 2015. During this period the care arrangements for the children were as follows: - 1. NP would stay with her grandparents on weekdays whilst attending the local public school. 2. BP and MP initially stayed with their parents and subsequently with their aunty (their mother's sister). 3. On weekends, the three children stayed with their parents.
The victim's mother continued to work through the week whilst the offender also continued to work six days per week. In late 2015, TP was born and initially stayed at home (several months) before staying with her mother's sister during the week with her two older siblings.

[17]

Report of Sam Borenstein clinical psychologist

The offender was assessed by Mr Borenstein by way of audio-visual link in April 2024. The offender had been imprisoned at that stage for approximately two years four months. He denied criminal antecedents despite the criminal history referred to above. The offender continued to deny the allegations and professed his innocence, claiming that his children were forced to make the allegations.
Whilst acknowledging that at times he would smack his daughters, he did not acknowledge the inappropriateness of this conduct, but rather justified it by way of education and discipline.
The offender was one of 10 children raised in the Cook Islands. He completed high school education until the age of 17 and thereafter arrived in Australia where he has remained. There were no issues at school, and indeed he was elected prefect or vice-captain. He engaged in various sporting activities. The offender had been in employment since arriving in Australia although indicated that he left his employment following the discovery of his wife's alleged unfaithfulness. He claimed thereafter that he did not have "the energy to work" and also indicated that he was depressed upon discovering this fact.
The offender freely acknowledged that he was raised in a strict home in which corporal punishment was used as a form of discipline. However, he did not consider this was adverse but was well intentioned as part of discipline.
Mr Borenstein noted on examination that the offender appeared to lack insight. His intelligence was estimated to be no better than low average. There was a distinct absence of any psychiatric disorder, and he presented as cognitively intact. Testing for depression was unable to be completed due to the difficulties in the offender understanding what was required of him. On a Static 99R the offender returned a score of zero indicating the risk of reoffending was in the low average range.
The offender reported symptoms of depression from approximately a year prior to his arrest and in response to learning of his wife's alleged infidelity. He was anxious and worried about his future, family, and daughters. The psychologist noted that the offender lacked insight into the extent and nature of the offences and the impact on his daughters in the context of continuing to profess his innocence. He presented with symptoms of depressed mood and anxiety in response to his current circumstances.

[20]

Crown submissions

The Crown referred to relevant principles applicable to sentencing for sexual offences against children including the need for general deterrence, denunciation and protection of the community. Further that the maximum penalty for sexual offences against children reflects the community's abhorrence and concern about such abuse. In these circumstances general deterrence was of significant importance.
The Crown also referred to issues relating to the harm to the victims arising from the sexual abuse, by reference the relevant authorities and s 25A(3) of the CSPA. The Crown also referred to the relevant authorities relating to and assessing the objective seriousness of the various offences. The Crown contended that given the relevant features identified in submissions, count 1 on the indictment fell towards the high end of objective seriousness for an offence of this kind.
With respect to count 3, given the features identified, it was contended that this offence fell below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this kind. Whilst the Crown identified relevant features assessing objective seriousness count 4, no specific submission was made as to where this offence fell within a hypothetical range.
It was contended that each of the offences were aggravated by reason of the record of previous convictions as well as the offences having been committed in the home of the victim. With respect count 4 the additional aggravating factor was the offence was committed whilst the offender was on conditional liberty by reason of the community corrections order.
Submissions were also made on the relevant offences to which the offender has now pleaded guilty. By reference to s 3A of the CSPA the Crown contended that given the nature of the offences particular emphasis would be given to punishment, general and specific deterrence, protection of the community, making the offender accountable and recognise the harm done to the victims. However, it was acknowledged that there was still a need to promote the offender's rehabilitation.
The Crown contended that the Form 1 matters provide important context for the offending against the victim and the fact that the offending was not isolated, elevating the need for specific and general deterrence.
The Crown opposed a finding of special circumstances.
Ultimately, it was contended that a significant sentence of imprisonment was called for.

[21]

Offender's submissions

Counsel for the offender referred to the relevant principles applicable given the terms of s 25A of the CSPA. Reference was also made to the relevant factors in assessing objective seriousness.
It was contended that the offending in count 1 would fall near the midrange of objective seriousness whereas count 3 fell towards the lower end of objective seriousness. It was contended for the reasons referred to in submissions that count 4 would fall below the midrange for offending in matters of this nature.
It was conceded that an aggravating factor for each of the offences was that they occurred in the victim's home. Given the offender does not have a previous record for matters of sexual misconduct it was contended that it would not be an aggravating factor, although it was acknowledged it disentitled the offender to any leniency. Further, the offender's record was not relevant to the sentencing exercise and would not be pertinent in deciding within the boundaries of objective seriousness what sentence should be given. It was contended that the offender does have some prospects of rehabilitation given his long work history and that he was assessed at being a low risk of reoffending.
Reference was made to the various matters to which the offender has pleaded guilty and agreed with the Crown's submission that the offender was entitled to 10% discount given the terms of s 25D of the CSPA. The plea of guilty was a further factor in mitigation in that it obviated the need for the victims to give evidence.
As to count 1 on the plea indictment it was disputed that this offending involved gratuitous violence. Rather it was contended that the matter was more spontaneous and a reckless reaction which lacked any planning or premeditation. There was no evidence of any long-standing injury or ongoing treatment. This offence fell towards the lower end of objective seriousness. It was conceded that the matter on the Form 1 on count 1, demonstrated that it was not an isolated incident and it would increase the penalty although not substantially.
With respect to count 2 on the plea indictment the offence could be placed below the midrange of offending for such matters given it fell short of being described as an attack or an example of gratuitous violence. There was no evidence of long-standing injury or treatment. With respect to the Form 1 matter on count 2 the offender conceded "an increment" on the penalty for count 2, although the offender has no prior convictions for assaulting this victim.
With respect to the counts on the plea indictment it was conceded from the totality perspective that it would need to reflect two different victims. However, they all occurred in one residence which would point towards some concurrency.
The offender's submissions referred to principles of totality. It was accepted that as to the trial matters the convictions involved offending against two victims over a lengthy timeframe calling for some accumulation. However, the delay in reporting to police, the objective seriousness, and the need to avoid a crushing sentence pointed towards concurrency of the various penalties. Reference was also made to principles of totality relating to the counts on the plea with concurrency and accumulation pointing in different directions.
A finding of special circumstances would be made given the delay, the offender's first time in custody, the low risk of reoffending and prospects of rehabilitation. Further the court would take into account the offender presenting with symptoms of depressed mood and anxiety in which case he was likely to experience jail more onerously.

[22]

Objective seriousness

As has been recognised in several recent decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal, including, for example DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200; R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125; KM v R [2023] NSWCCA 10; R v Sharrouf [2023] NSWCCA 13; and Pender v R [2023] NSWCCA 291, whilst there is, of course, always a need for a sentencing judge to make an assessment of objective seriousness, there is no requirement that a sentencing judge do so by placing the objective seriousness of the offence on some putative scale or spectrum by reference to its relationship with a notional midpoint. Rather, what is important is that a judge discuss and identify those factors that are relevant to an assessment of objective seriousness. This is what I have endeavoured to do in this matter.
It was noted in the matter of KM that for the benefit of the offender and other interested parties that an assessment of objective seriousness could instead be founded on easily understood English adjectives such as "inconsequential", "trivial", "significant", "serious", "grave", "in the worst class of case" and so forth.
With respect count 1, the victim was aged somewhere between four years and four years eight months, placing her below the middle of the age range contemplated by the offence. The offending was accompanied by a threat not to tell the victim's mother. It involved placing a blindfold over the child victim's eyes at the time of the offending. The relevant sexual intercourse was penile oral intercourse which occurred over a not insignificant period (five to six minutes) and involved the offender moving his penis in and out of the victim's mouth rapidly. The offender continued the offending despite the victim's pleas for him to stop and her obviously distressed condition. The offender ejaculated into the victim's mouth. Given these matters I am satisfied the circumstances of the offending reflect a serious example of the type of conduct contemplated by the offence. I accept that the offending was motivated by sexual gratification.
With respect to count 3 the victim was aged six, placing her just above the middle of the age range contemplated by this offence. The offending involved some trickery by the offender in telling the victim he was going to give her a surprise before blindfolding her. It involved the offender inserting his penis into the victim's mouth for a relatively short period and making her suck it. There was no evidence of ejaculation and was not accompanied by any threat. This was not an offence committed in isolation. I am satisfied that whilst this is a significant example of the type of conduct contemplated by the offence, it would not be considered as a serious example.
With respect to count 4, the victim was aged 12 years 10 months, placing her above the middle of the age range for this offence. It involved the offender directing the victim to bend down and suck his penis before inserting his penis into her mouth. There is no evidence that the offender ejaculated and was not accompanied by any threat. There is no evidence to suggest it occurred over any significant time period. I am satisfied that this again, whilst a significant example of an offence contemplated by the section, would not be considered as serious.
Each of the trial indictment offences occurred in the victim's home (s 21A(2)(db) of the CSPA), being a place where the victims were entitled to a reasonable expectation of safety and security: R v Lulham [2016] NSWCCA 287 per Bathurst CJ at [5].
The Crown contends that each of the offences constituted a breach of trust on the part of the offender. This submission is to be distinguished from a specific factor of aggravation under s 21A(2)(k) of the CSPA involving abuse of position of trust or authority in relation to the victim: Rainbow v R [2018] NSWCCA 42 at [30] to [31]; Burr v R [2020] NSWCCA 282 at [123]; HA v R [2023] NSWCCA 274. Ultimately, the offender conceded that it was open to the court to find there was a breach of trust without offending the De Simoni principle: The Queen v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; [1981] HCA 31.
Each of the offences on the trial indictment occurred whilst the offender had the care of his daughters whilst the childrens' mother was absent from the family home. I am satisfied that each of the offences did involve a fundamental breach of trust in those circumstances.
With respect to count 4, a further aggravating factor was that the offender was on conditional liberty by virtue of an earlier imposed community correction order relating to the victims' mother.
I do not accept the Crown's submission that a further aggravating factor was the offender has a record of previous convictions, although his criminal history disentitles him to leniency.
With respect to the offences on the plea indictment, count 1 involved the offender throwing a shoe at the victim, striking her eye and causing it to swell and become red. The victim was a child at the time (12 years of age). I do not accept the Crown's submission that it involved gratuitous violence, although it did clearly involve violence directed at a child. Whilst the offence caused some injury, there is no evidence that it caused any long-term physical disability or harm. I am satisfied that this does reflect a serious, although not the most serious sample of an offence contemplated by the section.
The second count on the plead indictment involved the offender striking the victim repeatedly on her back with a broomstick. At the time the victim was crying, and the offender thereafter punched the victim on the nose, causing it to bleed. This offence was also directed towards a young child, the victim being only six years old. I am satisfied that this offence does involve some gratuitous violence which did cause fear in the victim and resulted in some injury including nose bleeding and bruising. I am satisfied in all the circumstances this offence reflects a serious example of offences contemplated by the section.
Both offences were aggravated given they similarly occurred in the home of the victims. Whilst it must be acknowledged that the offender has previous convictions, including for violence, I am not satisfied that it is a distinctly aggravating factor as contemplated by s 21A(2)(d) although it disentitles the offender to leniency. Both offences are aggravated by the fact that the offender was on conditional liberty by virtue of a community corrections order for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and contravene prohibition, with the victims' mother being the subject of those offences.

[23]

Other relevant considerations

The courts have consistently recognised the harm inflicted on children that are victims of sexual abuse. In R v Gavel (2014) 239 A Crim R 469; [2014] NSWCCA 56 the Court observed at [110]: "… that child sex offences have profound and deleterious effects upon victims for many years, if not the whole of their lives: R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5 at [92]. Sexual abuse of children will inevitably give rise to psychological damage: SW v R [2013] NSWCCA 255 at [52]. In R v G [2008] UKHL 37; [2009] 1 AC 92, Baroness Hale of Richmond (at [49]) referred to the "long term and serious harm, both physical and psychological, which premature sexual activity can do". The absolute prohibition on sexual activity with a child is intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity: Clarkson v R [2011] VSCA 157; 32 VR 361 at 364 [3], 368-372 [26]-[39]."
General deterrence and denunciation have a significant role to play with respect to sexual abuse perpetrated on children. As Hoeben CJ at CL observed in EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21 at [42] (with whom Harrison J and RA Hulme J agreed): "General deterrence, denunciation and the protection of the community are principles of sentencing which are relevant to cases involving child sexual abuse. The concern of the courts is to send a message to those who would sexually abuse children intentionally and repeatedly that their actions will not be tolerated and that they will receive significant punishment.".
The trauma of abuse on children is now statutorily recognised and a mandatory consideration in accordance with s 25A(3) of the CSPA. As was observed in Grange v R [2023] NSWCCA 6, even in the absence of a victim impact statement or other evidence of psychological harm, the court is entitled to consider that there is a substantial risk of emotional harm to the victims arising from the offender's conduct. However, in this case both victims have provided short yet powerful statements in the context of the offender being their father.
Both general and specific deterrence have a significant role to play in the sentencing of the offender with respect to the trial indictment offences.
There is a distinct lack of remorse by the offender with respect to all the offences for which the offender is to be sentenced. This includes the fact that the offender continues to maintain his innocence with respect to the trial indictment offences.
However, even with the plea indictment offences there is a distinct lack of remorse despite the offender's guilty pleas. The offender maintained in the history provided to the psychologist that he had a close bond to his daughters (including his victims). The offender maintained justification for these offences in the context of discipline and punishment of his children. However, it must be acknowledged that at the time of the report the offender had not yet entered the plea of guilty.
The nature of the violent acts perpetrated upon his own children, including repeatedly striking a child with a broomstick, punching them in the head and forcing a child's hand into boiling rice, causing scald and blistering, is entirely unacceptable in a civilised society. Any attempt to justify such violence on a child by a parent in the name of discipline or correction is abhorrent and must be denounced in the strongest terms.
Whilst the offender initially submitted that the principles in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 were applicable, ultimately this was not pressed. I accept however that the offender's upbringing, including the infliction of corporal punishment, provides context to the offender's approach to the discipline of his own children. However, it does not reduce the offender's moral culpability nor the role of specific or general deterrence in determining the appropriate sentence. As much was conceded by the counsel for the offender.
The offender at no time, in the history to Mr Borenstein, suggested that he was adversely impacted by the discipline to which he was subjected as a child. Mr Borenstein did not proffer such an opinion.
Whilst I accept that the offender's previous strong history of employment will assist in his rehabilitation upon release, his prospects otherwise must be considered guarded given his lack of acknowledgement of the offences he has committed, as well as the lack of remorse and acknowledgement of the harm done to his children. However, in light of the offender's active and positive engagement whilst on remand there is some prospect that the offender's time whilst in prison will lead to the offender reflecting on his behaviour and the harm inflicted on his children. The offender has enthusiastically embraced religious and pastoral services and has been commended of his work ethic. I accept the unchallenged opinion of Mr Borenstein, based upon the Static 99R, that the offender is in the low average range for risk of reoffending. This was based upon testing which was unchallenged by the Crown.
Having regard to the remaining purposes of sentencing provided in s 3A of the CSPA it is important that the sentence reflects the offender being adequately punished, and that the offender is made accountable for his actions. As previously observed, general and specific deterrence remain very relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence, as does protecting the community from the offender.
Findings have already been made as to the role of personal deterrence in the sentencing process.

[24]

The Form 1 offences

In Re Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (No 2 of 2002), Spigelman J at [42] observed the following: - "The position, in my opinion, is that, although a Court is sentencing for a particular offence, it takes into account the matters for which guilt has been admitted, with a view to increasing the penalty that would otherwise be appropriate for the particular offence. The Court does so by giving greater weight to two elements which are always material in the sentencing process. The first is the need for personal deterrence, which the commission of other offences will frequently indicate, or to be given greater weight by reason of the course of conduct which the accused has engaged. The second is the community's entitlement to extract retribution for serious offences."
In R v JRD [2007] NSWCCA 55 Howie J considered the significance of taking into account other charged offences as follows: - "[29] … Clearly it may be a fact or circumstance relevant to the commission of a particular offence that, at or about the time when that offence was committed, the offender committed other offences. It would be relevant, for example, to a finding whether the particular offence was an isolated 'fall from grace' or whether it was merely an instance of a course of criminal conduct in which the offender was involved at the relevant time. [30] So in sentencing the respondent for any one offence it was highly relevant that all of the offences and the matters on the Form 1 were committed in a period of about four months and that each offence represented a different aspect of the respondent's overall criminality in that period."
I accept the Crown's submission that the Form 1 matters provide important context to the offending against the relevant victim including the fact that the offending was not isolated. I accept that it does elevate the need for specific and general deterrence. Particularly the additional offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm against NP, when sentencing with respect to count 2, reflects a serious example of the offence contemplated by the relevant section given it involved the offender placing the victim's hand inside the boiling rice causing scalding and blistering. As quite properly conceded by the offender in submissions, it must reflect an increase in the penalty that would otherwise be imposed with respect to both offences for which the offender is to be sentenced.

[25]

Sentences to be imposed

I am satisfied that the s 5 threshold has been crossed and that no sentence other than imprisonment is appropriate. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate matter for the court to invoke s 53A of the CSPA and impose an aggregate sentence. It will be necessary for me to indicate what sentences would have been made.
With respect to the plea indictment offences, the offender is entitled to a discount of 10% on the sentences that would otherwise be imposed. The plea must also reflect the offender facilitating the course of justice noting that it avoided the need for the victims and other witnesses to give evidence: Giles-Adams v R; Preca v R [2023] NSWCCA 122.
The offender contends that a finding of special circumstances given some of the delay in prosecution, this will be the first time the offender has served a custodial sentence, there is a low risk of reoffending and prospects of rehabilitation, and that the offender presents with symptoms of depressed mood and anxiety.
I accept the Crown's submission that delay is not a relevant factor in circumstances where the offender has contributed to the delay as a result of the threat to NP accompanying the conduct constituting count 1: Young (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWCCA 111 at [50]. I further accept the Crown's submission that the mere fact that the offender is in custody for the first time of itself does not justify a finding of special circumstances: Collier v R [2012] NSWCCA 213 at [36]. However, as counsel for the offender submitted, it is a relevant factor, in combination with other applicable circumstances, that may justify a finding of special circumstances: R v Little [2013] NSWCCA 288 at [30].
I accept the unchallenged evidence of Dr Borenstein that the offender was not merely demonstrating signs of depression and anxiety at the time of the assessment. The offender had told Dr Borenstein that he also had been experiencing depression over the year or so prior to his arrest and being charged. Further, I am satisfied that a combination of the offender's first time in custody, the mental health issues identified in the report of Dr Borenstein, together with the need for the offender to be closely supervised and undergo significant rehabilitation points towards a finding of special circumstances. This must also be considered in the context of my previous observations relating to the offender's prospects of rehabilitation and his activity whilst on remand.
With respect to count 1 on the trial indictment, the appropriate sentence is 12 years with a non-parole period of 7 years 10 months.
With respect to count 3 on the trial indictment, the appropriate sentence is 8 years with a non-parole period of 5 years 3 months.
With respect to count 4 on the trial indictment, the appropriate sentence is 6 years with a non-parole period of 3 years 11 months.
With respect to count 1 on the plea indictment and taking into account the two offences on the Form 1, the appropriate sentence is 2 years from which is to be deducted 10% for the plea of guilty, resulting in a sentence of 1 year 9 months.
With respect to count 2 on the plea indictment and taking into account the one offence on the Form 1, the appropriate sentence is 2 years 6 months from which is to be deducted 10% for the plea of guilty, resulting in a sentence of 2 years 3 months.
In determining the aggregate sentence, it is necessary to ensure that the overall sentence is just and appropriate in that it reflects the totality of the offending behaviour: Hall v R [2021] NSWCCA 220 at [53] - [63] (per RA Hulme J with whom Leeming JA and Campbell J agreed). The Court must be mindful of the "crushing" effect of a long total sentence which has the potential of inducing a feeling of hopelessness and destroying any expectation of a useful life after release: R v MAK; R v MSK (2006) 167 A Crim R 159; [2006] NSWCCA 381 at [15] - [17] (per Spigelman CJ, Whealy J and Howie JJ).
The offending on the trial indictment occurred over a period of approximately nine years involving two victims. The most serious of the offences (counts 1 and 3) were committed against different victims. In the circumstances, the aggregate sentence must reflect a reasonable degree of accumulation. With respect to the offences on the plea indictment there must be some accumulation, although less so, reflecting the fact that the offences involved two victims although over a relatively short period. I find an appropriate aggregate sentence is 16 years imprisonment with a non parole period of 10 years 5 months.
The offender has spent a total of 1109 days in custody solely referable to the offences for which he is to be sentenced (since 3 November 2021) Accordingly, the sentence will be backdated to allow for the time spent in custody.

R v WP

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (27 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (26)