defendant. Convicted and sentenced to imprisonment: head sentence 6 years with a non-parole period of 3.5 years (non-parole period to commence 9 May 2019 and expire 8 November 2022; balance of sentence 2.5...
Key principles
In sentencing for an offence under s 33(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm), the objective gravity is to be assessed primarily by reference...
The presence and use of a knife increases the danger of the assault and, as a matter of sentencing principle, is likely to attract a more significant sentence reflecting specific...
The mental element of intention to cause grievous bodily harm, where established, is the same mental element required for murder; that fact explains the high statutory maximum...
A discount from a notional head sentence is appropriate for a plea of guilty that yields utilitarian benefits; in this case a 25% reduction from the starting point was applied...
Issues before the court
How to categorise the objective seriousness of wounding with intent (s 33(1)(a)) and select an appropriate head sentence.
What discount should be allowed for a plea of guilty?
Plain English Summary
Weeks pleaded guilty to wounding with intent after an unprovoked knife attack in which she stabbed an unrelated woman multiple times, causing permanent scarring. The judge classified the offending as just below mid-range seriousness because the wounds were not life-threatening but the attack was ferocious, unprovoked and involved a knife. Starting from a head sentence of eight years, the judge applied a 25% plea reduction to reach six years, then found special circumstances (rehabilitation better achieved in the community) and set a non-parole period of three and a half years. Final sentence: six years imprisonment with NPP 3.5 years, sentences to run from 9 May 2019.
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Deep Dive
1,785 words · generated 18/07/2026
What happened
On the night of 4–5 May 2019, outside Peden's Hotel in Vincent Street, Cessnock, Katrina Ann Weeks (then aged 33) produced a small flat-bladed knife and, after returning to the hotel area with her partner, ran at and stabbed an unrelated woman, Katie Cook (aged 25), at least seven times. The knife wounds included two lacerations to the face (each roughly 5–6 cm), a laceration to the right ear/neck region that almost completely severed the right earlobe, and four lacerations to the left upper back and shoulder area. The wounds penetrated to subcutaneous tissue in some places and required suturing, including specialist facial suturing, and have caused permanent scarring and disfigurement [Facts paras 5–6; Seriousness paras 2–3].
Whether special circumstances existed to permit a non-parole period below the statutory standard non-parole period.
Cited legislation
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The attack was unprovoked and unconnected to the victim, following a trivial spur: a spilled drink and an argument about the offender's partner's shoes inside the hotel. Security staff had escorted the parties outside and the offender threatened the victim earlier in the evening and displayed the knife prior to the stabbing [Facts paras 1–4]. CCTV identified the offender; she presented to police and was arrested on 9 May 2019, admitted recent drug use, and had a cut to her hand consistent with the knife wound to the victim [Facts paras 11–12]. Weeks pleaded guilty to the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 and was sentenced in the District Court before Neilson DCJ on 26 June 2020 [HIS HONOUR opening para; Procedural posture].
Why the court decided this way
The judge structured the sentencing reasoning by applying a tripartite assessment of objective gravity for s 33(1)(a) offending: (1) extent and nature of injuries, (2) degree of violence/ferocity of the attack, and (3) intention of the offender [Seriousness para 1]. Against these criteria the salient facts were: multiple stab wounds causing permanent scarring and disfigurement (but not life-threatening injuries or deep structural damage), an unprovoked and ferocious attack on an unrelated person, the visible and deliberate use of a knife, and an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (admitted by the offender and manifest in the manner of attack) [Facts paras 5–6; Seriousness paras 2–6].
On those foundations the judge placed the offending just below mid-range objective seriousness for the statutory offence. The presence of a knife was treated as an aggravating factor likely to increase the sentence (the judge cited R v Watt to that effect) [Seriousness para 4]. The judge also emphasised that the mental element, intention to cause grievous bodily harm, is the same mental element required for murder, explaining why Parliament prescribes a severe maximum penalty and why such intent is treated gravely in sentencing [Seriousness para 5].
Numerically, the judge selected an 8-year starting point (head sentence) to reflect the assessed gravity [Consideration para 2]. He then applied a 25% reduction to reflect the plea of guilty and its utilitarian value, reducing the head sentence to 6 years [Consideration para 2]. The statutory standard non-parole period was noted (7 years for the offence), and the statutory formula would have produced a 4.5-year non-parole period absent special circumstances. However, the judge found that 'special circumstances' existed: notably that the offender's prospects of rehabilitation were conditional but could be better served by community-based psychological and addiction treatment and closer contact with family and diversionary programmes (such as Miruma) than might be provided inside custody. On that basis the judge set the non-parole period at 3.5 years [Consideration para 2; The future paras 1–2].
Finally, the court imposed a six year total head sentence with a non-parole period commencing 9 May 2019 and expiring 8 November 2022, leaving the balance of 2.5 years to run if parole is not granted, with the total term expiring 8 May 2025 [Final orders].
Before and after state of the law
Before this decision the settled sentencing approach for s 33(1)(a) offending required careful evaluation of objective seriousness by reference to injuries, violence and intention; the presence of a weapon has long been treated as an aggravating feature. The judge expressly adopted and applied that approach, citing Matzick v R for the proposition that an attack on a stranger elevates objective seriousness [Seriousness para 3]. The decision does not alter sentencing law; rather it applies existing principles and examples of appropriate numerical ranges to the facts at hand.
What it does illustrate in practice is how a District Court judge exercises discretions available under the statutory regime: choosing a starting point, applying a plea discount (here 25%), and finding 'special circumstances' to reduce the non-parole period below the legislatively-prescribed standard non-parole period. The decision therefore exemplifies the interplay between aggravating features (weapon, unprovoked attack, permanent disfigurement) and mitigating/administrative considerations (timely guilty plea, rehabilitation prospects and the suitability of community-based programs).
Key passages with plain-English translation
Key passage: "The Crown has pointed out that there are three critical factors ... the extent and the nature of the injuries inflicted, the second is the degree of violence and ferocity, and the third is the intention of the offender." [Seriousness para 1].
Plain English: To decide how serious this crime is, the judge looked at (1) how bad the victim's injuries were, (2) how violent and fierce the attack was, and (3) what the offender intended to do.
Key passage: "The presence of a knife increases the danger ... and there is clear authority that that is likely to increase the penalty to be imposed." [Seriousness para 4].
Plain English: Using a knife makes an assault more dangerous and is an aggravating feature that usually leads to a heavier sentence.
Key passage: "The intention involved and admitted in this case is the same mental element for the crime of murder, the intention to cause grievous bodily harm." [Seriousness para 5].
Plain English: The offender's admitted intention to seriously injure the victim is the same kind of mental fault that would be needed for a murder charge if the victim had died. That explains why the law treats this intent very seriously.
Key passage: "I have come to the view that the appropriate starting point ... is a head sentence of eight years imprisonment. I reduce that by 25% to account for the offender's plea of guilty ... That reduces the head sentence to six years imprisonment." [Consideration para 2].
Plain English: The judge started with 8 years, then cut that by a quarter because the offender pleaded guilty, so the final head sentence became 6 years.
Key passage: "With my finding of special circumstances, I intend to impose a sentence of three and a half years by way of non-parole period." [Consideration para 2].
Plain English: The judge decided there were special reasons to let the offender be eligible for parole earlier than the usual statutory period, so parole eligibility was set at 3.5 years.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
This decision is informative where an offender:
Commits an unprovoked, ferocious stabbing on a stranger with a visible intent to cause grievous bodily harm; and
Causes permanent scarring or disfigurement, though not necessarily life-threatening injury; and
Is identified and pleads guilty, but has a history of violent offending and substance misuse; and
Has identifiable rehabilitation needs that are likely to be addressed more effectively by community-based treatment and supervision.
Practitioners can look to this decision when arguing about objective classification (below, at, or above mid-range) for s 33(1)(a) offences, about the quantum of a plea discount where the guilty plea is early and utilitarian, and about whether rehabilitation prospects and available community treatment can constitute special circumstances to reduce a non-parole period.
How later courts have treated it
This decision itself is a single-sitting District Court sentence and is not a binding authority on other courts. It cites existing authorities such as Matzick v R and R v Watt for principles (e.g. stranger attacks are more serious; knives aggravate). Its practical value is persuasive: it demonstrates a set of factual conclusions and numerical outcomes that other sentencing judges may reference when confronting similar fact patterns. Any later appellate consideration would focus on whether the judge erred in principle in (a) assessing objective seriousness, (b) quantifying the starting point and discounts, or (c) finding special circumstances to reduce the non-parole period. This judgment records a balanced exercise of discretion and careful articulation of reasons, factors that appellate courts typically require when invited to intervene.
Still-open questions
Quantification of plea discounts: The judge applied a 25% discount for the guilty plea on these facts. That figure is within the range used in many sentencing exercises, but how large a discount is appropriate depends on timing and utility in each case. The decision does not create a firm numerical rule for other cases; its value is as an example rather than a binding benchmark [Consideration para 2].
Boundaries of 'special circumstances': The judge found that the availability and efficacy of community-based psychological and addiction treatment, together with the offender's conditional prospects of rehabilitation, were special circumstances warranting a reduced non-parole period. Future cases will need to test when rehabilitation prospects and community-program availability do, or do not, amount to 'special circumstances' in the statutory sense and how much reduction that justifies.
Role of earlier violent criminal history: The offender had an extensive history of violence and breaches. The judge regarded that history as disentitling her to leniency but still permitted a reduced non-parole period for rehabilitation. Tension remains between the need for denunciation and protection of the community on the one hand, and rehabilitation and family/community considerations on the other. How appellate courts balance these interests in comparable facts may refine the practical reach of this decision.
Medical/psychological evidence: The judge referenced psychiatric and hospital records summarised in the Sentencing Assessment Report and Dr Smith's report. The decision shows the weight a sentencing judge may place on conditional expert opinion about rehabilitation when considering special circumstances, but open questions remain about the sufficiency and admissibility thresholds for such evidence to justify reductions to standard non-parole periods.
In short, R v Weeks [2020] NSWDC 592 is a clear illustration of standard sentencing methodology applied to an aggravated but non-lethal knife attack: strong emphasis on injury, ferocity and intent; recognition of knife-use as aggravating; numerical exercise showing starting point reduced for guilty plea; and an explicit finding that targeted community rehabilitation can amount to special circumstances reducing the non-parole period. Practitioners should treat the decision as a well-reasoned district-court example rather than a binding precedent, and should canvass carefully the factual parallels required before relying on it to argue for similar reductions in other cases.
Judgment (8 paragraphs)
[1]
Judgment
HIS HONOUR: Katrina Ann Weeks stands for sentence as a consequence of pleading guilty to a charge that on 8 May 2019 at Cessnock in this State she did wound Katie Cook with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to Katie Cook. That is an offence contrary to s 33(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900. Parliament has prescribed a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years. Parliament has also prescribed a standard non-parole period of 7 years.
[2]
Facts
The facts of the offending I find disturbing. The offender was at the time 33 years old. Katie Cook was at the time 25 years old. They were unknown to each other. On the evening of 4 to 5 May 2019 the offender and the victim were at Peden's Hotel in Vincent Street, Cessnock. An altercation took place inside the hotel involving the offender, her boyfriend, Kane Pollock, the victim and others. This altercation commenced because somebody spilt some drink on Kane Pollock's shoes. That is hardly an event calling for physical violence. The hotel security officer, Mr Dane Arnold, escorted Pollock outside the hotel. At Pollock's request, Mr Arnold went back into the hotel to find the offender, as the offender had the keys to Pollock's car. As Mr Arnold was escorting the offender out of the hotel, she told him, "I am going to flog that bitch there in the red," indicating the victim. Mr Arnold said to her words to the effect that she was not to do that and that she needed to leave the hotel.
Outside the hotel, both the offender and Pollock were talking to Mr Arnold for some time. Mr Pollock got the car keys from the offender and went to fetch the car, leaving the offender talking with Mr Arnold. When they were alone, the offender said to Mr Arnold, "That bitch is going to cop it," and pulled a small flat-bladed knife from within her brassiere, showed it to Mr Arnold, then put it back inside her bra. Why the offender was carrying a knife in her bra is completely unexplained but is consistent with the offender's believing that she may become involved in some altercation.
Shortly after that, Pollock returned in the car and pulled up out the front of the hotel. There was some further conversation with Mr Arnold and the offender then entered the passenger seat of the car and at 1.04am Pollock drove the car away. Pollock drove himself and the offender to a nearby 7 Eleven but returned to the hotel a number of minutes later. The agreed facts refer to "approximately 15 minutes" but I agree with learned counsel for the offender that it was probably only about 12 minutes from other agreed facts.
As Pollock drove the car back to the hotel, Mr Arnold heard tyres screeching and he noted that the offender and Pollock had returned. He went to the car to tell them to stay away. According to a witness, probably Mr Arnold, the offender seemed enraged and "off her head". The offender alighted from the vehicle and went onto the footpath outside the hotel and talked with persons known to her. While talking with that group, the offender raised her right hand which had an object in it. The offender kept looking at the doors to the hotel while standing out the front with her group of friends.
At 1.16am the victim walked out of the hotel. The offender immediately turned and ran towards the victim, the knife visible in her right hand. Upon reaching the victim, the offender swung her right arm, connecting with the victim's shoulder area. She stabbed at that area at least five times before the victim was able to push the offender away and started to retaliate by punching the offender. There was then a fight between the two, which Mr Arnold sought to break up. The victim did not let go of the offender until she heard someone call out, "Katie, you're being fucking stabbed. Let go." Mr Arnold managed to seize the offender and tried to keep a grip on the hand which was holding the knife. When the victim and the offender were finally separated, Mr Arnold guided the offender onto the road outside the hotel. The offender then ran across the road and entered the front passenger seat of Pollock's car, which was then driven off. The victim was attended to by onlookers and staff of the hotel until the police and an ambulance arrived.
It is agreed that the victim sustained these injuries: a mixed depth laceration of the right upper side of the face approximately 5 to 6 centimetres long but it did not penetrate any deep musculo-ligamentous or bony structure; a superficial laceration of the lower right side of the face approximately 5 to 6 centimetres long, not penetrating any deep musculo-ligamentous or bony structure; a laceration to the right ear and neck which almost completely severed the victim's right earlobe but again not penetrating any deep musculo-ligamentous or bony structure; four lacerations to the left upper back and left shoulder, each between 1 and 2 centimetres long and between a half to 1.5 centimetres deep, penetrating to the subcutaneous tissue but not penetrating any deep musculo-ligamentous or bony structure. The lacerations to the victim's back and left shoulder all required sutures, whilst the lacerations to her face and right ear needed to be sutured by a facio-maxillary surgeon.
According to the agreed facts, on the following day the offender contacted her mother, Janelle Weeks, and her sister Tameeka Weeks. However, it would appear on my understanding of the facts that that was later in the morning of 7 May 2019. According to a letter addressed to me by the offender's mother, Janelle Weeks, the offender rang her at approximately 2.30am on the Sunday morning crying hysterically saying that she had "fucked up big time". After her mother was able to calm her down, she admitted that she had just stabbed somebody, for which she was very sorry. The offender then, after asking her mother to look after her children, hung up.
According to a statement prepared by the offender's sister Tameeka Weeks, she heard from the offender on the morning after the incident and the offender told Tameeka Weeks what she thought she could remember, although she said at one stage that she did not know if what she remembered actually happened or not, and did not know if she actually hurt the girl badly or not, and she could not remember using a knife. However, clearly earlier in the morning of that Sunday when she phoned her mother, she could remember stabbing the victim with a knife. According to a statement made by the offender's grandmother, Lorraine Meredith, the offender came to see her with her mother shortly after the incident occurred. Ms Meredith refers to "the morning Katrina came here with her mother". Ms Meredith refers to the offender being distressed and remorseful at what she had done.
On the morning after the stabbing, Tameeka Weeks picked up firstly their mother and then the offender from an address in Cessnock. Tameeka Weeks noted that the offender had a cut about 4 to 5 centimetres in length on the inside of her hand and the cut was about 1 to 2 centimetres in depth. According to the agreed facts, the offender told Tameeka Weeks:
"I've really fucked up. I really hurt somebody, hey, Tameeka. I stabbed a girl ten times last night. I fucked up really bad. I don't know how bad I hurt her. I stabbed her in the face ten times."
The agreed facts are much more detailed than what Tameeka Weeks said in her letter to me. It is clear that the offender could still, on the Sunday morning when she was with her sister, remember stabbing the victim in the face. Janelle Weeks, the offender's mother, asked her whose knife it was that she had used, but the offender said words to the effect that the knife had been disposed of.
On Wednesday 8 May 2019 police identified the offender from closed-circuit television recorded at the hotel. Attempts were made to speak to her. As a result of those attempts, the offender presented to Cessnock police station on Thursday 9 May 2019 and was arrested. She appeared to the police to be affected by drugs. The offender admitted to the police that she had been on ecstasy and ice since the previous Friday. The offender provided an electronically recorded interview to the police. She admitted that she had taken a quantity of prescribed medication, as well as cannabis, before going to the police station. When asked how she was feeling, she said that she would like to go to sleep. The offender could not describe what had happened at the hotel or did not wish to do so, but did identify herself as a person likely to be portrayed on photographs taken from the hotel's closed circuit television footage. The offender took part in a number of forensic procedures in which photos were taken of her hands, clearly showing a cut on the outside of the palm of her right hand, probably inflicted by the knife that she had produced in the stabbing of the victim.
The police arranged for the offender to be taken to a local hospital. The hospital records have not been put before the Court. However, there is a summary of them contained in the Sentencing Assessment Report. That summary is this:
"Hospital discharge papers dated 10 May 2019 provide the following diagnosis: Polysubstance use disorder and co-existing cluster B personality traits. The presentation occurred in the context of suicidal ideation following a miscarriage and references Ms Weeks had 'current thoughts to stab ex-partner and family for laughing at miscarriage', 'patient reports hearing voices talking' and 'patient stabbed a stranger as she thought the stranger had killed her baby'. Ms Weeks' sister confirmed that she had experienced a traumatic miscarriage and had carried the foetus with her in a container for a period of time. Further to this, the Hospital recorded chronic anger management issues and that upon discharge 'insight and judgement remain limited'."
Whatever the offender had ingested prior to her being admitted to hospital clearly caused her to hallucinate or fantasise. The circumstances of the stabbing are not consistent with the offender's believing at the time that somehow the victim had been the cause of her foetus' death. I do know from having been told from the Bar table that the offender attended upon a medical practitioner on 1 April 2019, who was unable to detect any heartbeat in the foetus and that on 10 April 2019 the foetus was stillborn and the offender had been taken to Westmead Hospital for necessary treatment following the miscarriage.
[3]
Seriousness of the offence
I shall return to the personal circumstances of the offender a little later. However, it is incumbent upon me to consider the nature of the stabbing of the victim to categorise the level of the offender's culpability for this very serious crime. The Crown has pointed out that there are three critical factors in assessing the objective gravity of an offence contrary to s 33 (1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900. The first is the extent and the nature of the injuries inflicted, the second is the degree of violence and ferocity, and the third is the intention of the offender.
The victim was stabbed seven times. That does not mean that there was only that number of attempts to stab. Clearly there were other attempts to stab, as the offender's own admission to her mother suggests. There were two wounds to the offender's face, a wound to her right ear and neck and four wounds on her left upper back and shoulder region. The wounds were relatively superficial. There was no damage to any musculo-ligamentous or bony structure. The injuries were not life-threatening. There is no suggestion that there was a severance of any nerve, artery or vein. However, the wounds have permanently scarred and disfigured the victim's face, her right ear and her upper back and supraclavicular area. The Crown has submitted that for a young woman such as the victim, the mother of two young children, such scarring and disfigurement is significant. The victim suffered shoulder pain for some time after the event and the victim impact statement, which was read today, clearly attests to ongoing distress resulting from the scarring and the psychic trauma caused by the assault upon her. I hazard the observation that, were the victim to provide reports from treating practitioners, that it is likely that a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder would be made. That is merely from what the victim impact statement says. However, the scarring is both permanent and unsightly. I have viewed it myself and sought to outline it on the Court's transcript.
This attack was unprovoked, un-called for and unjustified. As I have earlier mentioned, the victim and the offender were unknown to each other. These facts elevate the objective seriousness of the offence (see Matzick v R [2007] NSWCCA 92 at [23]). It has been submitted that there was a substantial degree of ferocity in the attack, and I accept that. It is not disputed by the offender through her counsel.
[4]
Criminal history
The offender has a criminal history which is mainly a list of crimes of violence. She is not entitled to any leniency from the Court because of her criminal history. On 15 March 2006 at the age of 20, she contravened an apprehended violence order. For that, a s 9 bond was imposed for a period of 12 months but she was called up for breach of that bond but the same penalty was reimposed. On 2 December 2006 at the age of 21, she committed the crimes of affray, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and common assault. For the affray and the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, she was sentenced to periodic detention for a period of four months. For the common assault, she was placed on a two year good behaviour bond but she breached that bond, and for the common assault she was given a four month suspended sentence. On 21 March 2007 at the age of 21, she committed another common assault for which a two year good behaviour bond was imposed. On 2 November 2009 at the age of 24, she assaulted two police officers. For the assault on one, she was given a three year good behaviour bond; for the assault on the other officer, she was given a six month suspended sentence. On 11 July 2013 at the age of 28, she committed another offence of affray for which an 18 month good behaviour bond was imposed. On 10 August 2015 at the age of 30, she committed two offences, one being armed with intent to commit an indictable offence and the other a common assault. For the first of those offences, she was sentenced to an intensive correction order for a period of 12 months, and for the common assault, she was placed on a two year good behaviour bond. Since her arrest on 9 May 2019, the offender has been in fulltime custody.
It is clear from what I have just recited that the Courts have previously done their best to dissuade the offender from committing crimes of violence by imposing bonds to be of good behaviour, often requiring supervision by what is now called Community Corrections, by imposing suspended sentences and by imposing periodic detention. But following upon this serious crime, the offender has been in fulltime imprisonment and it is conceded on her behalf that she must be sentenced to a fulltime custodial term of imprisonment.
[5]
Personal circumstances
The offender's background is largely set out in a report from a forensic psychologist, Dr Rebecca Smith, who has a doctorate in psychology. Dr Smith examined the offender via audio visual link on 21 March this year for 90 minutes, the interview being by audio visual link probably because of the COVID-19 health emergency. The relevant parts of Dr Smith's history are these:
"Ms Weeks was raised by her parents alongside her three siblings; two brothers and a sister, in Queensland until she was approximately 14 years of age, before moving to the Hunter to live with her grandmother. Ms Weeks was the eldest of her siblings and reported that "being the eldest kid, I saw a lot of shit my siblings didn't...'
She spoke about having a somewhat difficult childhood, stating, 'Dad used to be an alcoholic and used to bash Mum'. She also recalled 'clashing' with her father, and 'he used to flog into us'. As a result of the escalating conflict with her father and a deterioration in her own behaviour, Ms Weeks moved in with her grandmother after she had begun high school. She lived with her grandmother until she was 18 years of age, after which time she moved back in with her parents when they relocated to the Hunter.
Ms Weeks reported a 'heaps close' relationship with her mother and her sister, and an improved relationship with her father in more recent years. She spoke of her father having 'done gaol time', and their relationship becoming closer as a result. She remains emotionally close to her grandmother, and stated that 'my whole family is tightknit'. "
A little later Dr Smith points out that the offender grew up with unclear and inconsistent boundaries set on her behaviour by her parents, which would have made her childhood somewhat chaotic.
The offender enjoyed primary school and performed reasonably well academically. However, when she began high school, she started smoking cannabis which she was stealing from her father. She later began truanting. After relocation to live with her grandmother in the Hunter, she attended a local high school but her drug use escalated and she started truanting from the local high school. Her behaviour and learning at school were both poor and she was expelled at the age of 17. The offender spent the following years "partying and drinking a lot". She fell pregnant at the age of 19 and fell pregnant again at the age of 23. During her pregnancies and in between them she attempted to kerb her drug use for the sake of her children's health. She told Dr Smith that she was largely sober during the mid-years of the last decade. In her mid-twenties, she obtained some work at a bowling club but again took up using drugs.
[6]
The future
One of the matters that I need to consider is the offender's future, that is, the prospects of rehabilitation and the prospects of re-offending. Dr Smith expresses the opinion that the prospects of rehabilitation are good, provided that the offender remains engaged with regular psychological input as well as engaging in formal rehabilitation programmes and demonstrating help-seeking strategies should her mental health or coping in the future deteriorate. That is, it is a conditional positive. The Sentencing Assessment Report says that the offender has been assessed as having a medium to high risk of re-offending. That requires the offender on release to parole to have a medium to high level of supervision by Community Corrections.
The offender, through her counsel, asks me to accept that the prospects of rehabilitation are good, but I can only agree with Dr Smith that they are good on the proviso that she engages in all necessary forms of treatment, that is, treatment not only for her alcohol and drug dependence but treatment for her anger management and treatment for her personality traits which lead her into difficulty. It is up to the offender herself to demonstrate her determination to carry out all forms of treatment. However, I accept that those forms of treatment can be better given in the community rather than whilst the offender is in custody and that entitles me to find special circumstances. To assist the offender to rehabilitate herself, she will need longer in the community under the supervision of Community Corrections and where the level of psychological assistance will be greater than it is in the Correctional system.
[7]
Consideration
If the offender's criminality were in the mid-range of objective seriousness and she had pleaded not guilty, then I would have to consider imposing the standard non-parole period of seven years. Such a standard non-parole period postulates a head sentence of some nine and a half years with no discount for a plea of guilty. As I said, I rate the objective seriousness of this criminality below mid-range but not very far below mid-range. The crime is an extremely serious one. The prospects of rehabilitation are good with a proviso that the offender must remain determined to extricate herself from the position in which she finds herself. Her three children are currently aged 15, 11 and 3. They are in the care of her sister Tameeka and her partner Mr Craig Simpson, living in the Hunter Valley. One must consider, of course, that the absence of the offender from her children increases her distress in custody, but that is the inevitable result of her offending behaviour.
I have come to the view that the appropriate starting point in this sentencing exercise is a head sentence of eight years imprisonment. I reduce that by 25% to account for the offender's plea of guilty and its utilitarian value. That reduces the head sentence to six years imprisonment. Applying the statutory formula, the non-parole period ought be four and a half years. With my finding of special circumstances, I intend to impose a sentence of three and a half years by way of non-parole period.
Does anyone want any further reasons?
KRIPPNER: No, your Honour.
SUTERS: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: I have enquired of the representatives of the parties whether any further reasons for judgment are required. I am told that none is so required.
Katrina Ann Weeks, on the charge that on 5 May 2019 at Cessnock in this State you did wound Katie Cook with intent to cause her grievous bodily harm, you are convicted. I sentence you to imprisonment. I set a non-parole period of three and a half years commencing on 9 May 2019 and expiring on 8 November 2022. I impose a further period of imprisonment of two and a half years to commence upon the expiration of the non-parole period and expiring on 8 May 2025. The total sentence is therefore six years, comprising the non-parole period and the balance of the sentence. I have found special circumstances. You are eligible to be considered for release on parole at the expiration of the non-parole period.
[8]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 07 October 2020
Convicted and sentenced to imprisonment: head sentence 6 years with a non-parole period of 3.5 years (non-parole period to commence 9 May 2019 and expire 8 November 2022; balance of sentence 2.5 years thereafter, total term to expire 8 May 2025) [Consideration para 2; Final orders].
Wounding can be caused without the use of a weapon. Punching can cause wounding and often does when it breaks the skin above the eye. The presence of a knife increases the danger in any emotionally-charged situation and there is clear authority that that is likely to increase the penalty to be imposed. As long ago as 1997 it was pointed out in R v Watt that an assault involving the use of a knife calls for a significant sentence reflecting both specific and general deterrence. Why the offender was carrying a knife and carrying it where it was on her person is completely unexplained and bespeaks of her view that she might need to defend herself or indeed to attack.
The intention involved and admitted in this case is the same mental element for the crime of murder, the intention to cause grievous bodily harm. If the victim had died of the stab wounds that the offender inflicted, she would have been guilty of the crime of murder. It is this mental element which causes Parliament to impose such a serious penalty. The offender, according to the agreed facts, threatened the victim outside the hotel prior to being driven off in Pollock's car. Then she maintained the animus which she had against the victim for the period of time when she was in the car and she and Pollock went to the 7-Eleven. She maintained that animus until the victim emerged from the hotel at 1.16am when she commenced her vicious attack upon the offender.
The Crown submits that the current case approaches the mid-range of objective gravity for an offence contrary to s 33 (1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900. The offender, through her counsel, submits that the crime is somewhere above the midpoint of the low to mid-range of objective seriousness. I accept as being accurate the Crown's submission. In my view, this case falls just below the mid-range of objective seriousness, bearing in mind the permanent scarring and disfigurement resulting from this frenzied attack, the use of the knife and the intention to inflict grievous bodily harm.
In another part of her history, Dr Smith recorded that the offender's first serious relationship led to her bearing her first two children. The relationship was tumultuous. The offender described her partner as being a "drug dealer" who introduced her to smoking methamphetamine or ice. Her partner was unfaithful to her and at one stage the offender was charged with "bashing the lady he was cheating on me with".
The offender's second serious relationship began when she was 26 years old, that is, in 2011 or 2012. However, the offender and her partner were both using drugs. The offender described herself to Dr Smith as having her "brain...fried". They decided to move to Sydney and begin a new life, seeking to avoid using drugs. It was to her second partner that the offender bore her third child. However, their relationship was violent and emotionally abusive and they split up in 2018.
At the end of 2018, the offender returned to the Hunter Valley to Abermain and eventually commenced a relationship with Kane Pollock, the gentleman she was with when she stabbed the victim. It was to Pollock that the offender conceived the child which was stillborn in April 2019.
An issue arises as to when the offender relapsed to drug use. Histories given by relatives and the offender herself suggest that it was only after the miscarriage that she relapsed to drug use, but even her counsel conceded this morning she relapsed to drug use prior to the miscarriage. She relapsed to drug use at least three months before the event now in question. According to the letter from Tameeka Weeks, the offender told her that she had been using crystal methamphetamine since she returned to Abermain. It is unclear exactly when she relapsed to drug use but I can accept that the disappointment of the stillbirth would have increased her drug use.
According to the history obtained by Dr Smith, the offender had smoked crystal methamphetamine on the day before the offence and had been looking to ingest more of that drug on the evening of the offence. She was unable to obtain any and, accordingly, took two ecstasy tablets. She also admitted to smoking a number of cones of cannabis before she went out. She also admitted to consuming ten cocktails before the offence.
There is a similar history obtained by the maker of the Sentencing Assessment Report, Ms Bronwyn Grainger, who noted that the cocktails cost $150 and that the offender had ingested what she referred to as tripstacy, a combination of LSD and 3,4MDMA on the night of the offence.
Counsel for the offender has taken me through the offender's criminal record and the pattern of drug use and, although the offender's first offending was before she started using crystal methamphetamine, it seems fairly clear that much of her violence thereafter may have been in the context of her use of that drug. That is not in any way a mitigating factor. Since the offender only commenced using that drug at the age of 21, she cannot claim that she became addicted to it because of her callow youth or the like. However, it does explain repeated crimes of violence.
The offender is well aware that her drug use may precipitate outbursts of violence. She is determined to try to wean herself from illicit drugs. In her report, Dr Smith recorded this:
"She has undertaken a number of programmes whilst in custody, and reported that 'I will do every single course I can get my hands on'. She expressed a particular interest in the rehabilitation programme at Miruma (based through Cessnock) in order to be closer to her children.
She stated that she is committed to her recovery and is driven by the desire to be an active and committed parent to her children."
There is also reference to her determination to attend the Miruma diversionary programme which I understand to be offered by Corrective Services out of Cessnock.
However, the presentence report makes a point also made by Dr Smith that the offender has need for other forms of treatment for her mental health. According to the Sentencing Assessment Report, the offender rates as her major priority having AOD treatment over having treatment for her mental health or anger management. In her report, Dr Smith said this:
"Certainly, Ms Weeks requires therapeutic treatment towards better understanding her thought patterns, maladaptive stress responses, emotional disregulation and the relationship they have with her offending behaviours. She has demonstrated some insight into her difficulties, but is only at the start of her therapeutic journey. Her sobriety is still fragile, and she acknowledged the importance of remaining connected with her social network in this regard, as well as remaining future focused."
The offender's problems will not go away merely by weaning herself off illicit drugs. She must have psychological treatment for her anger management and to control her personality traits. Cluster B personality traits are characterised by emotional disregulation, impulsivity and frequent interpersonal conflict. Such personality traits are often found in antisocial, borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. There is no suggestion, however, the offender has such a disorder but some of the traits of it. She needs to regulate that behaviour and learn how to regulate that behaviour.
Any other orders sought?
KRIPPNER: No, your Honour.
SUTERS: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: My Associate assures me that my computation of time is correct. Is it, ladies?
KRIPPNER: I believe so, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Good. I don't profess being mathematically accurate.