R v Tongia Halisi Heaki

The offender's evidence

1. The offender tendered a bundle of documents which became Ex 1.1 - 1.17. It comprised the medical records of St George Hospital (Ex 1.1), a letter from optometrist Melinda Nordin dated 12 February 2021 (Ex 1.2), a letter of apology from the offender dated 28 May 2021 (Ex 1.3), eight testimonials attesting to the character of the offender (Ex 1.4 - 1.11), the offender's curriculum vitae (Ex 1.12), a letter from a prospective employer dated 30 April 2021 (Ex 1.13) and various certificates of completion of programs and NSW TAFE statements of attainment (Ex 1.14 - 1.17).

The offender's oral evidence

1. The offender, who was born on 15 September 1982 and is now 38 years of age, is the second eldest of five children. He was born in Auckland, New Zealand and left school at age 17 years following which he worked in hospitality and then in unskilled labouring work. He obtained a number of certificates which enabled him to work in fibre optic installation, installing a broadband rollout in New Zealand.
2. He set up his own business in fibre optics which he ran for two years before it failed.
3. The offender was first married at 17 years and had seven children, one of whom has predeceased him. He has been married to his present wife, the co-offender, for 11 years and they have three children.
4. The offender gave evidence that when in his twenties he had conflicts with the law in New Zealand, usually because of issues he had with alcohol. He had first used cannabis at age nine years and used it regularly until his late twenties.
5. The offender gave evidence that he arrived in Australia in February 2017 as he obtained employment on the Sydney Light Rail Project. His wife's parents and sister already lived in Sydney and his wife's grandmother followed soon after. His work on the Light Rail included random drug testing and was completed in September 2019. He then became a stay-at-home father for several months until January 2020 when he started work on the Westmead Light Rail project. He was also subject to random drug testing in that employment.
6. The offender and his wife rented a house in Hurstville however with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in mid-March, he was laid off work and as a New Zealand citizen was not eligible for government support. He was not earning any income and his wife was coming to the end of a contract she had at a call centre. He described their financial situation as "bad" and that they were unable to support themselves.
7. The offender gave evidence that on 25 April 2020 he and his wife visited a friend known as Astrid at her home. She was his cousin's partner and a good friend. They arranged for his sister Eryka to babysit their three children.
8. In his police interview he admitted consuming cannabis and ice. When asked why, he gave evidence that he was depressed and at a dead end, and didn't know what to do or how to handle it.
9. The offender gave evidence that he remembered coming home on the morning of 26 April 2020. He felt weird and hadn't slept. He had heard the video, Ex C, being played in court and was asked why he went out to his car. He gave evidence that he thought his friends were dead and were in the car. He gave further evidence that he found a bum-bag in the car which he took inside. The bum-bag contained some pipes and a bag of crystalline substance; however the bag and its contents did not belong to him. He smashed the items by throwing them against the wall.
10. When asked what he would say to the victim if she was present, the offender gave evidence that he was sincerely sorry for what he did. He described it as a "real coward act". He was disappointed and ashamed of himself and deeply sorry. The offender gave evidence that he had completed some programs relating to cannabis and hoped that the victim would be able to accept his apology. He only vaguely remembered bits and pieces of the event.
11. The offender gave evidence this was his first time in custody. His wife was also in custody for a time which meant their three children were living with his in-laws. He expressed being really disappointed and upset with himself.
12. The offender gave evidence that he now had employment as a sweeper and he spoke to his three children every weekend. He had no contact with his six children in New Zealand although he had a good relationship with them.
13. The offender gave evidence that he understood that the offending was very serious. He also understood that his consumption of methamphetamine could not be taken into account in mitigating the sentence. When asked what his present attitude was to illicit drugs he said "don't do it, I don't like it anymore, then it is not in my future".
14. The offender gave evidence that if in the future he became depressed he would talk to professionals. He had been offered drugs in custody but had said no many times. He had first consumed alcohol at six years of age through his family. The offender gave evidence finally that he was sorry for what he had done and asked for a second chance.
15. In cross-examination the offender gave evidence that he was aware of the effects of consuming cannabis but was unaware that it could lead to paranoia. He was also unaware that smoking methamphetamine could lead to paranoia and said that he believed it just caused "staying up".
16. The offender gave evidence that prior to 25 April 2020 he had not consumed methamphetamine. He also acknowledged that his family belief system did not align with the use of prohibited drugs.
17. The offender admitted that he consumed a quantity of illicit drugs at Astrid's home but he could not remember denying the use of illicit drugs when he arrived at hospital. When asked on how many occasions he had been subjected to random drug tests in his employment he said "once".
18. The offender denied having anyone upon whom he could rely for financial support at the time of the offending. He vaguely remembered the event and gave evidence that he had been involved in a drug rehabilitation program but had not completed any program.
19. It was put to the offender that he was more concerned about the emotional trauma caused to his own children than to the victim, to which he replied "both".

The Crown submissions

1. The Crown relied on a detailed written outline of submissions noting that the offender was born on 15 September 1982 and was 37 years of age when the offences were committed. He is now 38 years of age. He was arrested on 26 April 2020 and has remained in custody since that date.
2. The Crown set out general principles of sentencing emphasising the importance of deterrence in cases involving violence on the streets and in particular unprovoked attacks on people going about their ordinary business. The degree of violence used or ferocity of attack is a material consideration on sentence even if the consequences of the attack on the victim are minimal. The Crown submitted the fact that an offence is unprovoked and unjustified is a matter to be taken into account when assessing the objective seriousness. It was further submitted that there was no principle that requires the nature of the injuries sustained to be a determining factor in the assessment of objective seriousness for an offence pursuant to s 35. In some cases it will be the most significant factor, although there are other matters which may impact on that assessment (referring to Waterfall v R [2019] NSWCCA 281).
3. The Crown submitted that whilst the offence was not planned and did involve a degree of impulsivity, the violence perpetrated on the victim was not unintended in a prolonged and ferocious attack. The offending occurred around 10am on a Sunday, on a footpath in a public suburban street and was perpetrated on the victim merely because she had the misfortune to be walking past the offender's home at a point in time when the offender and co-offender were looking out their front window. The Crown submitted that the offender engaged in a deliberate unsolicited assault upon the victim which continued for around 10 minutes, during which period the victim blacked out on two occasions. A significant degree of force was applied on multiple occasions whilst the victim was screaming out for help and also that she did not know either offender. The offender had the greater role in the physical assault upon the victim although he was encouraged by the co-offender who presented him with both a knife and hammer during the attack, and incited him to kill the victim. The assault only ceased when the police arrived, at which point the victim was between the offender's legs.
4. The Crown submitted the victim suffered the following injuries:

• Visible injuries to her face, hands and knees,
• A cut to her index finger, consistent with the knife blade pressing against it,
• Bleeding lips,
• Grazes,
• Two left rib fractures,
• Trauma to her teeth as outlined above and,
• Further mental and physical sequelae as outlined in the Victim Impact Statement referred to below.

1. The Crown submitted that the offence was properly characterised as a very serious example of reckless GBH and an offence of very considerable objective seriousness, falling above the middle of the range for this type of offence.
2. The Crown submitted an aggravating feature of the offending pursuant to s 21A(2)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ("CSPA") was that the offence involved the actual or threatened use of a weapon.
3. It was submitted that the court was entitled to have regard to the significant harm caused to the victim as outlined in her Victim Impact Statement.
4. The Crown conceded that the offender was entitled to a 25% discount for his early plea of guilty. Although the plea may be some evidence of contrition, it may also have been the inevitable response to a strong Crown case.
5. The Crown submitted that the offender was disentitled to leniency in sentencing on the basis of his New Zealand criminal history.
6. The Crown submitted that self-induced intoxication, whether by drugs or alcohol, was not a matter of mitigation. Rather, the use of drugs involved a personal choice for which an offender should take responsibility, referring to R v Rhodes [2017] NSWSC 694.
7. The Crown conceded that as this was the first time the offender will receive a sentence of full-time custody, and would benefit from counselling for his drug abuse issues prior to his return to the community. In the event of a finding of special circumstances the court should not alter the statutory ratio of the non-parole period by a large amount. With respect to the issue of parity it was submitted that the facts here make out a common criminal enterprise. It was submitted that parity does not require that co-offenders receive the same sentence because they were involved in the same conduct. Rather, disparity may be explained by differences in findings of fact and different finding of respective culpabilities, relying on R v Chandler; Chandler v R [2012] NSWCCA 135. In this joint criminal enterprise, the Crown submitted that the level of criminality was similar for both offenders who should receive similar sentences. Although they had different roles, their culpability was not that different from each other.
8. In conclusion, the Crown submitted that the subjective features of the offending should not outweigh the objective circumstances of the case. Along with general deterrence, specific deterrence was important to send a strong message to the community that this type of criminal conduct will not be tolerated. The s 5 threshold had been crossed and there was no alternative other than a full-time custodial sentence.
9. In her oral submissions, the Crown rehearsed her submission that the drug-induced psychosis apparently suffered by the offender merely explained the offending and did not diminish his moral culpability for the offending to any significant extent. The offender here was in a transient psychosis brought about by his voluntary ingestion of illicit drugs. He suffered no underlying mental illness or mental health condition.

The offender's submissions on sentence

1. Counsel for the offender also relied on a detailed written outline of submissions. Counsel set out the facts as outlined above. He had told police that the night before the offence at Astrid's he smoked "probably" three or four bongs of marijuana and five or six puffs of ice. He told police it was the first time he had tried ice and when asked if he wanted to try it he thought "why not". Counsel submitted: "The objective seriousness of the offence is acknowledged. The assault on the victim was unprovoked, with a significant degree of violence on her over an extended period of time. It is aggravated by the use of a weapon (s 21A(2)(b)). The victim was undoubtedly terrified during the offence."
2. Counsel submitted that the objective seriousness of the offending fell at the lowest end of "grievous bodily harm" in terms of s 35(1) offences. In Swan v R [2016] NSWCCA 79, Garling J summarised the construction of the phrase "grievous bodily harm" as follows at [66]: "To summarise, it seems to me that, based upon the authorities in the preceding discussion, the following principles can be stated with respect to the phrase 'grievous bodily harm': 1 It is to be interpreted according to its natural and ordinary meaning; 2 On its natural and ordinary meaning, the phrase means not just serious bodily injury, but really serious bodily injury; 3 There is no bright-line by which an injury can be classed as really serious bodily injury; it is always a question of fact and degree; 4 Not every injury is capable of amounting to grievous bodily harm; 5 Only the injury itself and its direct physical effects, not its personal, social and economic consequences, can be taken into account in deciding whether an injury amounts to really serious bodily injury."
3. Counsel referred to Haoui v R (2008) 188 A Crim R 331, where Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) gave examples of the range of injuries which fall within the expression "grievous bodily harm". Counsel characterised the only injuries that could amount to grievous bodily harm here were the injuries suffered by the victim to her teeth. The other injuries, whilst amounting to actual bodily harm, arguably did not amount to really serious bodily injury with the possible exception of the fractures to the victim's ribs.
4. Counsel acknowledged that the extent of the injuries does not of itself determine the objective seriousness of the offence, and all of the injuries and the offender's conduct towards the victim may be taken into account. Here, the offender was clearly in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the offence as a consequence of smoking ice the night before, and, believing his friend Astrid had been killed and the victim was responsible, the offender had grabbed her and told his wife to call the police. It was submitted that it was clear that his intoxication explained his false belief. It was also clear that the offender's self-induced intoxication could not be taken into account as a mitigating factor, pursuant to s 21A(5AA) of the CSPA.
5. It was submitted that the objective seriousness of the offence fell below the mid-range for an offence pursuant to s 35(1). Notwithstanding that the attack was unprovoked, and the number of times the victim was struck over an extended period of minutes and included being threatened with a knife, the extent of the victim's injuries fell at the lowest end of grievous bodily harm. There was no evidence the injuries have any permanent effect. None of them were life-threatening and the offence was not planned and occurred spontaneously. Whilst the offence was committed in company, that aggravating element which had the effect of increasing the maximum penalty from 10 to 14 years, does not add significantly to the criminality here. It was submitted that the co-offender played virtually no role in the assault of the victim, although she did hand him the knife and the hammer.
6. It was submitted that the offender's criminal antecedents did not amount to an aggravating factor in sentence although it may deny him leniency.
7. It was submitted that the offender had significant subjective features which should be taken into account. He was a family man who had a good work history and had come to Australia in 2018 where he commenced employment on the Sydney Light Rail project. When that finished, he obtained employment on the Westmead Project but was laid off due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. He was ineligible for government benefits, being a New Zealand citizen, and as at the time of the offence his family was in a dire financial situation.
8. It was submitted the offender had been exposed to drugs and alcohol abuse at an early age although he had been abstinent from cannabis use for some 10 years prior to the current offence. He had advanced his rehabilitation by doing a number of vocational courses whilst in custody. His testimonials attested to his commitment to his family as well as contrition for his offending behaviour of which he was extremely ashamed.
9. It was thus submitted that a mitigating feature was not only his plea of guilty but his remorse pursuant to s 21A(3)(i) of the CSPA as outlined in his letter to the court and his evidence. It was submitted the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation and the court would accept his evidence that prohibited drugs have no part in his future.
10. It was submitted that the offence was a serious example of random violence on a member of the public where general and specific deterrence are relevant considerations. Although the offending was explained by a drug-induced psychosis, this could not be taken into account as a mitigating factor. The offender however was very remorseful and had demonstrated good insight into his offending. He had undertaken some vocational study in custody and whilst it was conceded the s 5 threshold had been crossed, the period of time spent in custody since 26 April 2020 could be taken into account and if an ICO was found to be appropriate in accordance with Mandranis v R [2021] NSWCCA 97, it would be acceptable for that term to be adjusted by the deduction of the period equivalent to the term of pre-sentence custody, so that an ICO could commence on the day of sentence. It was submitted that whilst community safety was a paramount consideration in the making of an ICO, Simpson AJA did not accept in Mandranis that an ICO could only be made provided there was a positive conclusion that an ICO was more likely to address an offender's risk of reoffending as opposed to serving a sentence of full-time imprisonment. It was submitted that given the significant period already served, further detention was unlikely to better address the offender's risk of reoffending. A significant consideration was that the offender has a position of part-time employment available to him upon his release.
11. In the event that the court did not consider an ICO appropriate, a finding of special circumstances should be made to vary the statutory ratio between the head sentence and non-parole period.
12. In his oral submissions, counsel for the offender submitted that the offender's consumption of ice was largely aberrant conduct on this isolated occasion and that the offender did not have an ongoing drug issue. This would affect the assessment of his prospects for rehabilitation.
13. Counsel submitted further that whilst the event was horrific for the victim, the offence pursuant to s 35(1) involves gradations of assault and he rehearsed his submissions that whilst unprovoked and of some duration, including numerous strikes and the use of a weapon, and the aggravated factor of being in company, the only ongoing injury was the victim's issue with her teeth. Given the range of injuries countenanced by s 35, the fact that the section deals with far more significant injuries for example brain damage, necessarily meant that a finding of objective seriousness would be made below mid-range.
14. Counsel rehearsed his submissions about the subjective features to be taken into account. The offender was genuinely remorseful and accepted full responsibility for his criminal conduct. His last offence in New Zealand had occurred in 2013 which must also affect his prospects of rehabilitation. He was a committed family man who had applied himself to supporting his own family. He had prosocial support and no ongoing drug issues, this meant that he had reasonable prospects for rehabilitation.
15. Counsel rehearsed his submissions for consideration of an ICO by reference to Mandranis and also rehearsed his submissions for a finding of special circumstances in the alternative, given this was his first time in custody.
16. In respect of the related matter on the s 166 certificate, an offence pursuant to s 195(1) of the Crimes Act, this was of low objective seriousness involving damage to the victim's Apple Watch.

Determination

1. Section 3A of the CSPA sets out the purposes of sentencing as follows: "3A The purposes for which a Court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows: (a) To ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, (b) To prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) To protect the community from the offender, (d) To promote the rehabilitation of the offender, (e) To make the offender accountable for his or her actions, (f) To denounce the conduct of the offender, (g) To recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community."
2. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offence pursuant to s 35 of the Crimes Act, the nature of the attack and surrounding circumstances are highly relevant as is the severity of the consequences. Here, the offender left his house to attack an innocent victim because she had the misfortune to be walking past his home at a time when the offender and co-offender were in a drug-induced psychosis. The attack took place around 10am on a Sunday, on a footpath in a public suburban street. It involved the offender viciously grabbing the back of the victim's hair causing her to fall backwards and hit her head on the concrete footpath. The offender accused the victim of killing his friend and ignored her pleas for help. The attack continued for approximately 10 minutes during which the offender punched the victim with a closed fist several times to the left-side of her face and pulled her hair out, causing her to lose consciousness on two occasions. Notwithstanding that the victim was screaming for help, the offender then pushed her head into a brick wall a number of times and then repeatedly smashed her face into the window of a parked car whilst holding her head by the hair.
3. The offender told the victim that she was going to pay for killing his friend and told her that he was going to "shove this ring up your ass" following which the victim blacked out. The co-offender then handed the offender a kitchen knife and hammer and whilst holding the kitchen knife in his right hand and the victim by the back of her head with his left hand, he moved the knife up and down the victim's right leg so that she could feel the blade through her leggings. The offender told the victim, "I'm going to assassinate you now" and in trying to push the offender away from her body the victim suffered a cut to her middle finger. The offender then lifted the victim to her knees and placed her head between his legs, facing downwards to the concrete footpath, with the co-offender screaming, "Kill her! Do it!"
4. The offender was also seen by a witness to hold a silver object, inferentially the kitchen knife, in front of the victim's face and was observed to pull her head back by one hand holding her hair and punch her with the fist of his hand holding the knife. He then pointed the knife into the face of the victim. It was at that point that the police arrived and arrested the offender.
5. This was an attack carried out in a frenzied, manic state by the offender, unprovoked on a defenceless young woman in broad daylight on a public street. It was a terrifying ordeal for her, during which she thought she was going to die. She suffered numerous cuts and abrasions, fractures to two ribs and severe injuries to her teeth including a fracture to the enamel and dentine of the upper-left permanent central incisor, an injury requiring root-canal therapy to Tooth 11 and requiring her to wear a splint to prevent further trauma to her front teeth. The long-term prognosis for those injuries is guarded due to the possibility of root resorption, extraction and further implant placement. The victim was hospitalised for six days and required significant ongoing assistance from her family.
6. Having regard to all of the surrounding circumstances and the considerable injuries suffered by the victim, the objective seriousness of the offending conduct was high, falling within the mid-range for an offence pursuant to s 35 of the Crimes Act. The offender himself characterised it as a "coward act".
7. The following aggravating factors must be taken into account pursuant to s 21A(2) of the CSPA: (c) The offence involved the actual or threatened use of a weapon, being the knife held by the offender. (g) The injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial, although care must be taken given the nature of the offending conduct to ensure that I do not double count this as an aggravating factor. Nor is it an aggravating factor that the offence was committed in company as that is an element of the offence pursuant to s 35(1).
8. Pursuant to s 21A(5AA) the self-induced intoxication of the offender at the time of the offence must not be taken into account as a mitigating factor.
9. I do have regard to the following mitigating factors pursuant to s 21A(3): (b) The offence was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity. (h) The offender has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. (i) The offender has demonstrated remorse for his offending conduct, has insight into it and acknowledges responsibility for it. (k) The offender has entered an early plea of guilty and is entitled to a 25% utilitarian discount on sentence.
10. General deterrence is important in the sentencing process for offences pursuant to s 35(1) of the Crimes Act. A clear message must be sent to like-minded members of the community that Parliament has prescribed lengthy maximum sentences of imprisonment for such offending, and the courts will impose condign punishment particularly for crimes which show a contemptible and callous disregard for the welfare and wellbeing of innocent victims.
11. Specific deterrence also has an important role to play. The offender had a criminal history in New Zealand which included two prior assault charges and he must understand that to reoffend in this way would bring increasingly lengthy custodial sentences upon him.
12. Having regard to the offender's criminal history, as he last offended in 2013 I do not take it into account as an aggravating factor however it does disentitle him to any leniency in the sentencing process.
13. I have had regard to the Victim Impact Statement setting out the significant psychological impact of this attack and the injuries caused to her on the victim. It is a poignant reminder that victims of crime, particularly victims of crimes of violence, carry the impact throughout their lives, and are left with understandable anxiety and fear when going about their daily activities. It is common ground that the injuries suffered to her teeth as outlined above constitute really serious injury and whilst there is no medical support for the ongoing psychological and emotional sequelae suffered by her, it is readily understandable that she would suffer in this way. Whilst having regard to the Victim Impact Statement, in the absence of medical evidence supporting it I have not taken it into account so as to increase any further the offender's moral culpability for the offending. The Victim Impact Statement does however form the basis of my finding, together with the agreed facts, that the harm suffered by the victim was substantial, as outlined above - see Culbert v R [2021] NSWCCA 38 per Adamson J (with whom R A Hulme J agreed) at [110] - [120].
14. The offender does have significant subjective features to be taken into account. He had not offended for some seven years and had a good employment history. The testimonials tendered on his behalf speak highly of him as a dedicated family man, who until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic was supportive of his family. I was impressed with the evidence that he gave that he has been abstinent from illicit drugs and intends to remain so in the future. With appropriate support, so as to avoid relapse into abuse of prohibited drugs, I find that he has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, and I further accept the assessment made by Community Corrections that he has a medium-low risk of recidivism. I also accept his expressions of remorse and that he has acknowledged responsibility for his offending conduct.
15. I have had regard to the maximum penalty prescribed of 14 years imprisonment and the standard non-parole period of 5 years imprisonment for the offence pursuant to s 35(1) of the Crimes Act. The maximum penalty and standard non-parole period are guideposts in the sentencing process.
16. Having regard to the objective seriousness of the offending as outlined above and notwithstanding the subjective features relied on by the offender, which cannot outweigh the objective seriousness, I am satisfied pursuant to s 5 of the CSPA, having considered all possible alternatives, that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate in all of the circumstances. I find that an appropriate sentence would be six years imprisonment which having regard to the 25% utilitarian discount, I reduce to four and a half years. Given the length of the sentence, it is not appropriate for me to consider that the sentence be served in the community by way of the imposition of an Intensive Correction Order in accordance with the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision in Mandranis. Even if that was a sentencing option available, having regard to community safety as a paramount consideration would mandate against such an order.
17. I find that there are special circumstances arising from the fact that this is the offender's first time in custody and that he will require relapse prevention counselling to ensure his return to the community is productive. I therefore intend to vary the statutory ratio between head sentence and non-parole period.
18. I therefore intend to sentence the offender to a non-parole period of two years and six months to commence on 26 April 2020 and to terminate on 25 October 2022. The balance of term will be a period of two years from 26 October 2022 to 25 October 2024. For the related offence on the s 166 certificate, an offence pursuant to s 195(1) of the Crimes Act of destroy or damage property being the victim's Apple Watch, as the offence occurred as part of the conduct comprising the offence pursuant to s 35(1) of the Crimes Act, I intend to convict the offender and sentence him to a fixed term of imprisonment of three months to be served concurrently with the above sentence.

Orders

1. I hereby make the following orders: 1. You are convicted of the offence pursuant to s 35(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 that on 26 April 2020 in Hurstville in the State of New South Wales, you did recklessly cause grievous bodily harm to the victim, in company of Naquita Heaki. 2. I sentence you to a non-parole period of two years and six months to commence on 26 April 2020 and to terminate on 25 October 2022. 3. The balance of term will be for a period of two years from 26 October 2022 to 25 October 2024. 4. You are convicted of the offence pursuant to s 195(1) of destroy or damage property, namely Apple Smart Watch, the property of the victim. 5. I sentence you to a fixed term of imprisonment of three months to commence on 26 April 2020 and terminate on 25 July 2020. 6. You should understand that release to parole is not automatic. The State Parole Authority will hold a hearing sometime before that date and decide whether they are going to release you to parole on that date or some other date. You should understand that your parole will be subject to stringent conditions, one of which is not to commit offences whilst on parole. Other conditions will include things such as who you associate with, where you live and doing what your parole officers direct. If, during the time you are on parole, you breach any conditions of parole, the State Parole Authority will revoke your parole and you will have to go back to gaol to serve the balance of your sentence.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 05 July 2021