7 It appears that the applicant had no prior offences recorded against him.
8 There are two grounds of appeal: First it is said that the sentences on both counts are "manifestly excessive." I am unable to agree that this ground has been made out. The sentencing judge carefully considered the relevant factors, some of which were subjectively favourable to the applicant, including the fact of addiction to "ecstasy", that the supply offences arose out of the applicant's need to finance his own drug use, that the sale of drugs was to friends for a relatively modest profit and that the applicant had been frank and open in his account of his dealings.
9 So we have undoubtedly serious offences committed by a person without any prior criminal conviction, but with a drug addiction. It is true, as the applicant contends that, on the evidence, the motivation for supplying the drugs was to finance the applicant's own drug use, as distinct from being an entrepreneurial or cynical drug supplier who did not himself or herself use drugs but was simply out to make a profit.
10 It is contended that in these circumstances, the crimes constitute a level of criminality "low on the range …", I would take account, as I believe the sentencing judge did, of the lack of prior criminal record, the plea of guilty, the contrition which can be inferred from that plea of guilty and the prospects of rehabilitation. I accept that the head sentence of two years for the first count is at the high end of the range. I note that it is conceded by the applicant that the facts and circumstances of the second count were more serious and that, in particular, whilst the applicant was on bail for the first count, he was found in possession of 5.42 grams of methylamphetamine and 4.2 grams of ecstasy, located in a motor vehicle. It was obviously relevant that the applicant was on bail at the time of the second offence and that this was a significant aggravating feature. There were some favourable subjective circumstances, and in my view a real prospect of rehabilitation. Nonetheless, I have difficulty in finding that the head sentence of three years in relation to the second count was excessive or beyond the established range of penalties.
11 It is vitally important, in my opinion, that this Court respect the discretionary nature of sentencing by trial judges. Of course, if error can be demonstrated or if a sentence is outside of the range (whether excessively lenient or excessively harsh) then correction can occur and a variation can be made of the sentence imposed. But, a prime factor that this Court should give weight to, is the necessarily discretionary nature of the sentencing process. These are matters upon which minds can legitimately differ. But it is insufficient for this Court to form the view merely that it may have come to some different view as to the appropriate sentence that the decision at first instance should be varied. Rather, it seems to me that some error of principle or some manifestly inadequate or excessive sentence has to be demonstrated in the appellate argument.