Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) - Crown
Kyriacou Lawyers - Offender
File Number(s): 2012/140479
[2]
Sentence
HIS HONOUR: The prisoner Ross Kenneth Telfer today appears for sentence in relation to 26 offences for which he was found guilty by a jury, after a trial of some weeks, on 7 July 2016. He was found not guilty of 13 counts in the same indictment and I will come back to that aspect of the matter. Although, in the context of my sentencing remarks, it is not a matter of great significance.
The varying offences for which the prisoner is to be sentenced arise under different provisions of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), herein after referred to as "the Code". The prisoner was found guilty of three counts pursuant to s 474.17(1) of the Code. This offence carries a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment and as was pointed out several times in the submissions of learned counsel for the prisoner, is capable of summary disposition I am informed pursuant to s 4J Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The counts in question were counts 1, 29 and 35. The offending took place between September 2009 and March 2012.
The prisoner was found guilty of four counts contrary to s 474.27(1) of the Code. These offences carry a maximum penalty of 12 years imprisonment. The offending took place between November 2009 and March 2011. These offences are described as "grooming offences" in the circumstances in which they occurred in the submissions that have been presented to the Court. The relevant counts were 2, 3, 4 and 9. It is worth pointing out at the present time that the Criminal Code was amended in mid April 2010 to change the structure of the varying offences then able to be prosecuted in respect to offences relating to the use of a carriage service to transmit or communicate offensive, indecent and other material. The amendment affected s 474.27 in the sense that the offences described in counts 4 and 9 did not require the Crown to establish the element that the material transmitted was "indecent".
The prisoner was also convicted of 14 counts contrary to s 474.19(1) of the Code. These offences carry a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment and this offending took place over a period of time between November 2010 and Anzac Day 2012. There were five counts of which the prisoner was convicted for offences contrary to s 474.27A(1) of the Code. These offences carry a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment and are, as with the offences in counts 1, 29 and 35, capable of being prosecuted summarily in appropriate circumstances. This offending occurred between December 2010 and January 2012.
All the matters of which Mr Telfer was acquitted were concerned with offences contrary to s 474.27A(1) of the Code, and it would seem, although it is not decisive in the sentencing proceedings nor a matter that I was particularly called upon to consider, that the issue about which the jury in respect of those counts may have had a reasonable doubt related to his "belief that the person with whom he was communicating and transmitting communications" was a person under the age of 16 years. There can be no doubt one would have thought that the material relevantly particularised by the Crown relevant to the counts for which he was acquitted was indecent.
In relation to the offences it is important at the outset that I particularise what are the elements of the particular charges for which the prisoner is to be sentenced. Each of the offences require the use of a carriage service and the common element in this matter was that the accused used in effect the "internet" as a mechanism for communicating various matters or transmitting various matters falling within the rubric of what is required to be established in each charge.
In respect of s 474.17 offences the use of the carriage service had to be, to use my words not the words of the section, in a way that reasonable persons would regard the relevant material transmitted as offensive. In relation to offences contrary to s 474.27 it required the use of the carriage service to transmit a communication to someone he believed to be under the age of 16 with the intention of making it easier to procure the recipient to engage in sexual activity with himself. That offence is to be distinguished from what I understand to be the offence created by 474.26 of the Code.
With regards to the offences contrary to 474.19 the offence requires by the use of a carriage service the transmission of "child pornography". The offences contrary to s 474.27A, which as I understand it were offences created with the April 2010 amendments to include aspects of what formerly was in 474.27, the Crown had to prove that the prisoner was over 18 years of age, he used a carriage service to transmit a communication to someone he believed to be under the age of 16 years, and the transmission containing material that was indecent. I have already pointed out, going back to 474.27 offences, that proof of the transmission of indecent material related to the two offences committed before April 2010, that is counts 2 and 3.
Before I get to the fact finding in this matter, which very much is tied up with the statutory obligation upon me in this sentencing exercise pursuant to s 16A(2) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), at the threshold I note, as the Crown pointed out from the outset, the prisoner was to be sentenced pursuant to Part 1B of that Act. This includes s 16A, which the Commonwealth Crown persists in calling a "checklist" of matters the Court should take into account. The Crown points out in its submissions that the governing principle is the requirement of the imposition of a sentence that is "of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence" (s 16A(1)). The Court also must consider the various matters that are relevant in s 16A(2) and I received extensive written submissions from both parties in relation to aspects of s 16A of the Act which I need to specifically address.
The Crown properly drew my attention to the varying maximum penalties which presents what the Crown described as a "range of objective seriousness" for the respective categories of offending. The maximum penalty of course is an important yardstick in determining in respect of a particular offence the appropriate sentence to be imposed. The assessing of the objective seriousness of the offence itself must take place in the context of the relevant considerations that arise in relation to that particularly statutory offence and the applicable maximum penalty.
Generally speaking in the context of the matters with which I am concerned the offending is each instance to be described as largely committed in much the same manner, although of course each matter gives rise to a charge involved various aspects of the conduct of the prisoner attracting the different offences and therefore the different elements required to be considered by the jury.
The prisoner in 2009 had access to what were described in the evidence at trial as "chat rooms", that is by use of the internet platforms, where the accused could engage through typed communication in what effectively are "conversations" with another person or persons using another laptop computer or other type of computer engaged in the same platform. The prisoner over the period of time that the offences were committed, that is between 2009 and 2012, adopted a particular persona, or different personae, in order to engage people in chat sessions. That is, as I said, 'live' typed conversations where the other person portrayed themself as a particular identity. The accused had gained access to the people with whom he communicated, as I would understand it, by connecting with people through websites such as "Fetlife", where people with access to the particular website reflected an interest in various types of sexual activity. There were however other websites that permitted the prisoner to gain access to persons who were able to use the relevant platforms upon which the chat sessions occurred. The main platform used by the prisoner was described as 'MSN', but on several occasions the prisoner also used a platform variously described as "Yahoo Chat" or just "Yahoo".
Sometimes in the course of establishing communication with a person the accused would provide in the course of the chat, or particularly by the format of the type of chat that he engaged in, a photograph of himself. There was a common photograph in many of these communications that was clearly a photograph of the prisoner. A photograph that I understood from his evidence had been taken some years before relevant events. During the course of a number of the chats he was, through the technology available, either shown photographs that purported to be the person with whom he was chatting or was given webcam images of the other person. The persons he engaged in the chats all held themselves out to be female and usually females purporting to be under the age of 16 years. Of course it was an element of a number of the charges brought against the accused that he had a belief that the person to whom he transmitted a particular material using a carriage service were under the age of 16 years. On some occasions the person purporting to be a female under the age of 16 years claimed to be in company with other children or another child.
Most of the chats followed the same course. Although it was clear in relation to the particular transcript exhibits that related to particular counts that set out the chat sessions the person had previously communicated to the accused. The chats started with discussions about private matters including inquiries about the circumstances of the other person with whom the prisoner was chatting and some details of his own circumstances. When he provided details of his own circumstances on occasions he provided quite accurate accounts of his personal circumstances.
The nub of the representations typed by him that were relevantly either offensive, indecent or constituted child pornography material, involving sexually explicit comments, descriptions or requests. Usually directed at the other person or directed at someone purporting to be associated with the other person or closely related to that person, or involved such matters concerning people that the prisoner identified as wanting to have sexual contact with either in the present time or at some time in the future. For example, amongst other people he identified as wanting to have sexual contact with, were persons who did not actually exist. Such as possible babies or children that might be born from a relationship developed with the person with whom the prisoner was chatting.
As the Crown in its submissions states, and is accepted largely in the submissions of the prisoner, the depictions of sexual activity that the prisoner wished to engage in were variously graphic, violent and in many instances fairly to be said to be extreme. Certainly, as I pointed out even in respect of the matters for which the prisoner was acquitted, they were relevantly offensive, indecent and/or constituted child pornography by any measure.
It is the fact that several of the chats were with people whose identifies were known to the Court. Particularly I refer to the chats involved in counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9. In those chats the prisoner engaged with people claiming to be female children under 16 who were in fact police men or women specifically trained to engage people such as the prisoner in these chats and identify them for investigation. I accept wholeheartedly, and it was never suggested otherwise, that apart from the emphasis on immaturity and other hallmarks of a policeman engaging in such chats with a person such as the prisoner, there was no encouragement of the prisoner to commit the offences that he did where police were involved. It is to my mind however, without criticism of the police, somewhat extraordinary that a number of years passed between the prisoner's first contact with an investigative agency and his arrest. I understand in drug trafficking matters where there is a need to conduct a complete investigation of a person's role in substantial drug trafficking there may be a need to be permit an offender to keep on offending, so to speak, so the full picture can emerge as to that person's associates, his suppliers, the people to whom he or she supplies and the like. But I have difficulty understanding why there was such delay in intercepting the prisoner. I do not believe it would have been difficult to identify him early in the piece. Certainly by the time of the commission of the offence contained in count 4.
Many of the other participants in 'chats' relevant to the counts have not been identified. Although in a number of the chats the other person purports to provide details of address, phone number, location. These people held themselves out to be either in New South Wales or interstate and in some instances overseas. As far as I understood the evidence of the trial, where a person purporting to be chatting with the prisoner provided some information as to address or purported telephone number no inquiries were made to identify who that person was. At the end of the day it was not decisive in determining whether the accused should be found guilty or not guilty of the particular charge.
The documentary evidence of the hard copies of the chats in which the prisoner engaged giving rise to the charges, were largely recovered from the prisoner's work and or home computers as a consequence of the execution of a search warrant and his arrest on 2 May 2012. Of course those chats in which police officers engaged posing as other people were available to the Court because the police naturally kept the detail of the chats in which they were engaged, given their belief that offences were being committed by the other person with whom they were communicating during the course of the chats. That is the accused.
The evidence that the prisoner gave at the trial was somewhat circumspect, at least in his evidence in-chief, as to whether he was the person who participated in the various chats the subject of charges. In my view the identification of the prisoner was overwhelming. But he, to my mind, was reluctant to concede this. Certainly it was a matter that could have been dealt with by admission. But was a matter that was required to be addressed to the jury by the various circumstances that link the prisoner to the person holding himself as 'Ken Man' or 'Manu', or any other identity that the prisoner used in any relevant chat.
The prisoner somewhat surprisingly in his evidence claimed a lack of memory of the various chats or of particular chats giving rise to the individual charges. This is a claim that is repeated in some of the material that has been provided on sentence. I find it difficult to believe that he after three or four years from the time of his arrest, with ample opportunity to read through the transcripts and in fact having a very good knowledge of the transcripts of the various chats, could not remember particular conversations conducted through the chat room environment. As I will point out later, in the context of matters to be determined under s 16A of the Act, his lack of memory along with other matters reflects no contrition at all on his part. The facts of the matter were, however, that the vast majority of chats were found by the police on computers over which he had control, that is his personal work computer and computers at home. The other matters that linked him to the chats of course were the photograph to which I referred and the fact that there was evidence available that he had obtained access to particular websites by providing personal particulars that coincided with his own.
His evidence was at the trial that in each instance he was participating in what he described variously as 'role play' or 'fantasy role play', taking on a particular persona, usually seeking to assert himself as a dominant male, believing that the people who were communicating with him were themselves adult likewise participating in role play but usually taking a submissive role. He strove to achieve what he described as 'domination' over the other party by very explicit and sexually aggressive language. His evidence was that the deliberate childishness of the language used by others, the coy perhaps coquettish character of the language of other participants, indicated to him that he was not dealing with real children but dealing with people playing a particular role. Obviously it is clear in relation to those counts, where the jury were required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had a belief that the person he was communicating with was under the age of 16, that the jury did not accept the evidence given by the prisoner in this regard.
Of course his belief as to the identity of the other person to my mind had little relevance to the issues that had to be determined by the jury in establishing the guilt of the prisoner in respect of the most serious offences, the offences contrary to 474.19 of the Code and also the offences contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Code, where there is a requirement to establish relevantly that the communications were "child pornography" or "offensive".
He also, when he gave evidence in the trial, reluctantly conceded what is, in the context of the communications, clearly a sexual interest by him in undertaking these chats and making the representations that he did that ultimately constituted the relevant offences. I accept that he had gravitated to explicit sexual discussion from his familiarity with websites offering sexually explicit material in various forms. Some of the histories given by him about how he moved into chat fora are quite believable.
It is clear from the prisoner's evidence of the trial and in the histories given to the psychologist, whose report has been provided, and also to the Community Corrections officer that he was in a relationship with a woman who is the mother of his child during the relevant period. But, essentially for a raft of reasons, he became an isolated person who undertook these chats for sexual pleasure and excitement which was not available to him in his private life.
Although the conduct for which the prisoner is to be sentenced has to be differentiated having regard to the elements and the charges, as I said earlier, what the prisoner actually did was in many respects much the same in a general sense on each occasion. Of course, with various degrees of extremity of language and suggestion by him. It is correct to say that some of the conduct in which he engaged, reading it as it was produced to the jury during the course of the trial, was difficult to digest, so confronting some of the assertions made by the prisoner. I do not propose to go through the detail of the various chats to detail the particular representations of the prisoner in respect of a particular count. The Crown has undertaken that task very helpfully and in my view accurately describes some portions of some of the chats.
I appreciate these matters have to be seen in the wider context of the circumstance of each chat. But it is the fact that many of the statements or representations by the prisoner involved requests or direction or suggestion that the other party engage herself in bestiality, sexual assault, including extreme suggestions of sexual assaults upon babies and small children, detailed descriptions of proposed sexual activity with the other person or with persons known to the person with whom he was communicating.
He also proposed future sexual activity with relevant children, or children that they were in association with, or children that might come into existence in the future. Such as babies he suggested that the recipient of a particular communication may have by having sex with him. As I said, whilst a number of the offences were committed when the offender believed the person was a child under the age of 16 years, in counts 2, 3, 4 and 9 the persons who were engaged in those chats were police officers. These specific offences, contrary to the s 474.27 (1) are sometimes referred to the "grooming" offences. Count 1, of course, involved contact with a police officer as well, but it is a different category of offending.
I will come back to categorising the offending by reference to the particular offences for sentence shortly to comply with the requirements of s 16A(2)(a), that is to assess the "nature and circumstances of the offences". It is to be noted that the prisoner is now 52 years of age as I understand it. As I have just calculated he committed these offences between the age of 45 and 48. He has, at the time of sentencing, no prior criminal convictions. He was arrested on 2 May 2012. He was arrested at his workplace which was an accountancy practice. A respectable accountancy practice, as I understand it where he had the responsible position as a financial planner. I understand from the evidence that he had been a financial planner for some years before his arrest, including performing that responsibility during the period of what is described now as the 'Great Financial Crisis' of 2007/2008, which must have been a very difficult time for financial planners who may have advised people to undertake particular investments that were no longer worth as much as they had been.
Apart from having regard to the evidence at trial relevant to the counts, I am required to have regard to a pre-sentence report tendered by the Crown, the prisoner produced evidence in documentary form. I note of course he gave evidence at the trial and was subject to the test of cross-examination. He provided a reference from a friend who continues to support him, a psychological report and also documentary evidence that he has recently been made bankrupt. I propose to deal with that evidence first before I come back to categorising the offending.
Dealing firstly with the pre-sentence report, much of which accords I hasten to say with aspects of the psychological report, it notes the prisoner is currently divorced. As I understand it he and his wife have been divorced for 18 months and the four year old daughter of their marriage is in the care of the mother, as one would expect, and there is some lack of contact between he and his ex-wife.
The Community Corrections report reflects upon the fact that he was the youngest of six children and the separation of age between he and his other siblings did leave him to be isolated within his family unit as his older siblings went on with their lives and developed their own families. He is quite close to one sister but it would appear the rest of his family have abandoned him including, as I understand it, his father, because of the charges. Although the evidence about that is somewhat equivocal.
The prisoner came to financial planning through an indirect route. He apparently attended a private high school, left at year 10 and ultimately obtained an apprenticeship in electroplating and was qualified in that particular skill. He then obtained a Diploma in Financial Planning, having gone through a number of occupations, including being the Financial Director of a sporting organisation involved with a sport that he was very proficient at. In fact, the prisoner was, as I understand it, a very high standard squash player until he was about 32 years of age. The role with the Squash Association, however, was a voluntary role and he determined in an early stage of his involvement that there were problems with that organisation and he withdrew from that responsibility.
So far as his offending is concerned he explained to the Community Corrections officer, as he did to the psychologist, that what he was involved in chats concerning "bondage, domination, situation role-playing" with women. Although he conceded in his evidence at the trial, I point out although it is not important in this respect, that he understood he could be communicating with men. In fact he was, particularly in respect of the matters where police were involved on some occasions. He attributed his involvement in these matters to first of all an involvement or interest in pornography on the Internet. He goes into greater detail in that respect with the psychologist. He discovered during the course of the financial crisis that he had high levels of stress, difficulty sleeping and being bored and thus watching pornography and progressing to the role play through the chat rooms.
He was the subject of an assessment based on the information he provided to the Community Corrections officer, not with a face-to-face interview, by a psychologist with the Department of Corrective Services who administered what is called the Static 99R actuarial tool, or risk assessment tool, to assess his future risk of offending. The Static 99R "tool" is one that takes into account both static and dynamic factors with regard to the history he gave largely reported in the Community Corrections report. The psychologist notes however that on his own account his interest in these chats and the bondage scenarios and sexually explicit forms of aggression would "suggest use of sex as a primary form of coping". He reported to Corrective Services transitioning to the bondage role-play incorporating themes of child sexual and violent abuse, including incest, sadistic acts of torture, genital mutilation, beating, bruising, ideas of humiliation, racially offensive language, ideas of slavery and dominating the victims and in one fantasy case involving the killing of somebody. The psychologist says:
"This suggests communication and indulging in sexually violent fantasy of this kind was linked with his coping during times of stress. Currently it is difficult to ascertain whether the bondage role-play (that he described) on-line chatting was specifically in relation to deviant sexual arousal to cope with stress or other motivating factors when based on file review. A comprehensive in person dynamic risk assessment would shed further light on the functions of this behaviour as it is not clear from the file review how these on-line chats addressed Mr Telfer's stress."
The assessment of the psychologist incorporated into the Community Corrections report that the offender was assessed as being at "low-moderate" category of risk based on static actuarial assessment. No dynamic factors were taken into account.
Community Corrections noted the prisoner's failure to remember the specifics of the conversations that he had, a matter about which I have commented. It noted, whilst he had a deal with the stress there were no matters of significance so far as mental health history. The Community Corrections Service noted that whilst his criminogenic needs included a need to address sexual offending, emotional and personal issues, his attitude and orientation, he was a "low risk" of reoffending in the general sense.
I accept that after his arrest the offender, as he reports to Community Corrections, to his credit undertook 12 sessions with a private psychologist under what I would understand to be some form of mental health treatment plan although the offender denied being diagnosed with any mental health condition. He had, as the psychologist reports in some detail, suicidal ideation for a period of time. But he has not engaged in counselling for some time. The assessment of the offender reflects upon the matters I have already highlighted and noted his isolation. It is noted the offender would benefit from Community Corrections supervision.
His friend prepared a very detailed reference and it reflected upon favourable aspects of the prisoner's character. He is regarded by his friend as honest and supportive. He formed the view that in all of his experiences of dealing with him noting, of course, that he is well aware of the offences for which the prisoner needs to be sentenced but the prisoner was essentially "a good person". He noted the prisoner had never in his presence expressed either verbally or physically any ill will towards anyone and that he had never been seen by him to be violent.
He noted the hardship that had arisen since his arrest, the damage to his family, the damage to his employment. He obviously lost his employment with the police coming to his place of employment, quite properly so, to execute a search warrant. He noted that notwithstanding the trials and tribulations he had suffered the prisoner was not a bitter person. He claimed that the prisoner had "taken full responsibility for his error (sic) and that he would hope to rebuild his life on sentencing".
The psychologist's report has a great deal of detail about the prisoner's history. Much of it I do not need to place on the record although I have taken it all into account as one would expect. I am very mindful of some submissions made by the Crown about the need to approach psychological reports setting out history or assessment based upon accounts given by a prisoner with some circumspection, in circumstances where the prisoner's claims within the document have not been subject to the test of cross-examination by the Crown or further enquiry.
Of course some of the matters that are contained within the report were the subject of cross-examination. It is fair to point out that some of the matters identified by Mr Telfer as relating to his offending have been subject to the test of cross-examination but clearly have fallen short in at least raising a reasonable doubt as to elements of particular charges requiring proof by the Crown.
One feature of his background that is developed in this report that I note, apart from the fact that he grew up in a household where he was not abused his family were people with "Christian" values and they were law abiding people, was the great impact upon the prisoner of the loss of 21 year old sister in 1969. As I understand it she was actually travelling to visit the prisoner who was then six as I understand it and died on the trip. I have personal experience of a friend whose younger sister was killed when she was being driven by her parents to watch him play a game of football and I know well the impact that that has had upon him for the last 55 years.
Be that as it may, it does not explain his offending beyond noting that it isolated him more within his family. He felt some responsibility even at that young age for what had happened, even though clearly he had no personal responsibility. He had also been isolated because of the difference in ages between himself and his other siblings.
With regard to his educational and medical histories I have already noted the essence of those. He has no significant medical health issues. Some history of unconsciousness when he was a child but nothing that suggest any mental disability or cognitive damage.
There is detail in the report about his romantic relationships. He has had stable relationships on a number of occasions apart from that with his wife and apparently from what his own account is, as a squash player, he managed to have a number of passing relationships with a number of people.
Whilst his relationship with his wife he described as "wonderful" and "picture-perfect", it was so "with the exception of sex". I am mindful, of course, of the need for privacy of intimate details of people. I do not wish to place too much on the record, but it would appear that the relationship with his wife sexually broke down to a considerable degree for reasons that had something to do with, at least, his greater libido and her unwillingness to involve herself in sexual practices that he found desirable.
I found it interesting in the context of particular submissions made by the Crown about this aspect of the matter that the prisoner has revealed to the psychologist that he wished to involve his wife in bondage and discipline sexual practices which she would not engage in or was reluctant to engage in. It highlights in the context of the chat sessions with which I am concerned, the real interest the prisoner had in matters about which he was, on his version, communicating to others in the context of "role play".
With regard to his sexual functioning I have already dealt with that, his superior libido and the like. He acknowledged an interest in what could be described as "non-mainstream sexual activities" including bondage and discipline, dominance and submission, which is given the acronym in the report BDSM. He also noted an interest in "age play". As the Crown observed in its written submissions and again, although I do not have a transcript of last Friday, in its oral submissions, it is of some importance that whilst the prisoner denied any hebephilic or paedophilic sexual interests stating that "age play" was a "side entrance to dominance and submission", the psychologist opines that whilst dominance was likely the primary sources of sexual arousal, it is likely that hebephilic and paedophilic interests were also present.
She also made the important point, again emphasised in the Crown's written submissions, that "justifying age play as a side interest" as it was described by the prisoner is "likely a cognitive distortion" aimed at minimising personal shame related to this behaviour. I would add perhaps also minimising personal responsibility in relation to this behaviour in the context of the matters I have to address.
The prisoner as I said had had an interest in pornography for some time before his arrest. He has no significant history of drug and alcohol difficulties. In fact, he is a very light drinker indeed and he gave his history of involvement in chat sessions emanating from his initial interest in BDSM. He described experimenting with different characters such as "dominant daddy and submissive daughter" or "dominant teacher and submissive student". He reported to the psychologist that the fantasy involved in this supposed role play were "particularly arousing", to use the psychologist's words, as they "offered the older person a significant amount of dominance over the other person".
The psychologist reports, however, that the prisoner reported that his victims were "Federal police officers" posing as children and believed that as such his behaviour caused little harm. I pause for a moment to say that if that is an accurate account of what he said, it may well be a misunderstanding on the part of the psychologist, it certainly is far from the truth of the matter. Only a small number of the offences committed were concerned with police officers and as I remember it, none of them were Federal police officers in any event despite the fact that he was prosecuted under Federal law. It may be a misreporting but if it be what he actually said, it shows downplaying by the prisoner of his conduct to the psychologist.
She noted:
"This form of cognitive distortion is not uncommon for individuals who have not engaged in offence-specific treatment. Whilst he expressed regret for his behaviour this regret is likely related to the consequences upon himself and his family rather than the victims of sexual offending."
She undertook psychological assessment. She noted his history of suicidal ideation and said that what he reported appeared consistent with at the time, that is, after his arrest, persistent depressive disorder known as "Dysthymia". There was a query of childhood diagnosis of ADHD bearing in mind he endorsed symptoms consistent with that condition but that remains undiagnosed and she noted that he had undertaken cognitive behaviour therapy with Dr Jacmon under a mental health care plan to which I earlier referred, which I take to his credit.
The Personality Assessment Inventory was undertaken and whilst certain conclusions were reached the psychologist noted that whilst the profile was valid, there were indicators that Mr Telfer may have been attempting to manage the impressions given of himself in the test potentially under-representing his degree of problems in certain areas. It is consistent with my view of the way in which he gave evidence, and the matters about which he gave evidence, not really addressing the matters which seemed to be self-evident from other sources. He did not endorse any particular unusual thoughts or mannerisms such as moodiness or impulsivity. He did not endorse having marked anxiety or problematic behaviours used to manage anxiety. However, it must be said that his actions in relation to these matters on the history he gave, that is, being unable to sleep because of work worries and perhaps personal worries reflects problematic behaviours being used by him to manage those anxieties.
She made observations about his personality that are not remarkable but are not of great significance. She regarded him as an intelligent man without any evidence of cognitive deficits. She noted his absence of criminal history in the contest of risk assessment. She undertook a 'static risk assessment' using a different actuarial tool than used by Corrective Services and concluded the same as Corrective Services that on the 'static' matters he was a low risk category relative to other male sexual offenders. The 'actuarial tool' she used, and it may be true too for Static 99R I received no information about that, is one that does not have offenders convicted of internet sexual offences present in the original sample, but adaptions to the measure have been allowed for it to be used with those sexual offenders. I realise there are various categories of those as I will point out in a moment when I am assessing the objective seriousness.
With regard to dynamic risk factors at paras 50 through to 55 of her report she goes through in great detail the various dynamic factors. She again concludes, even in consideration of dynamic risk factors, that he is a 'low' risk of reoffending. She however noted that there were factors in the context of other matters that I have already referred to in passing that might elevate his future risk of re-offence. They included that he may use sex to cope with negative emotionality, as she describes it, the history of hypersexuality and his particular interest in BDSM and age play.
She noted that whilst he denied sexual arousal from his offending behaviour it can be inferred that there has been some level of hebephilic and paedophilic sexual interest and, as I said earlier, the prisoner reluctantly agreed in cross-examination at the trial that there was some arousal. Obviously his risk of reoffending by using the internet is a real one, even if it was to be categorised as low, bearing in mind of course his denial at the trial and his denial to the psychologist of any intent to meet face to face with individuals with whom he was concerned.
She regarded in formulation that his behaviour was best understood as a function of inappropriate sexual interest and self-regulation deficits relating to poor self-image within the context of relational stresses and she notes that he would benefit from offence- specific treatment to address his sexually abusive behaviour. He reported some benefit from the CBT that he obtained from Dr Jacmon. He stopped that treatment because he felt that it helped him to manage some of his symptoms better. It was thought that factors relating to offending include difficulties with sexual self-regulation, particularly his hypersexuality, deviant sexual interest and his avoidant coping styles which suggested difficulties with general self-regulation.
In that regard I note there has been somewhat of a decline in his libido over recent years which may be an artefact of his age, or it may well be a reflection of the circumstances in which he now finds himself. It was recommended that he receive offence focused treatment to address his offending behaviour. Particularly it was suggested that in gaol he should receive the CUBIT program although she refers to an Outreach program (CORE) designed for low to moderate intensity treatment needs. He also needs psychological treatment. He might also receive individual treatment from a specialist clinician dealing with child offender categories of people. He would need a treatment too in relation to emotional regulation.
I have taken those conclusions into account. I must say whilst there is some guarded language in the report and allowing for the fact that some of the history is not accepted and that there was circumspection about some of the actuarial tests that were applied, generally the more cautionary observations of the psychologist I accept.
Categorising the offending given the different types of offences with different degrees of seriousness of particular categories of offences is not an easy matter in this case. Counsel for the prisoner correctly pointed out the central factor of seriousness was "the extreme sexual violence and depravity of much of the written content of the material" (relevant to the specific charges). That is a common feature of all the matters for which he is to be sentenced but of course, as I said, there are different elements in the specific offences. The grooming offences required proof that the prisoner believed that the recipient was under the age of 16 years with the intention of making it easier to procure the recipient to engage in sexual activity with himself.
The Crown made the point that some aspects of the written submissions of the prisoner were dealing with a different category of offending. In relation to five of the offences he transmitted material that was indecent to persons he believe were under the age of 16 years and, as I said, 14 of the offences involved deliberately transmitting child pornography material, but with no belief as to age. Extensive submissions made by the Crown as to the bald facts as I said did not raise any particular issues of controversy.
If I could deal with each of the categories of offending. Firstly, dealing with the s 474.17 offences of which there are three, the offences did not require establishing as a fact that the prisoner believed that he was communicating with children which to my mind would be a more serious category of this particular offence. The Crown concedes, however, there is a wide range of offending contemplated by this particular section. The defence also points to the fact that the character of offensive material might extend beyond matters relating to sexual connotation, but to grave threats to another and the like. The Crown categorised these particular offences at para 11(g) of their written submissions as being highly sexualised chats directing themselves at a person holding themself out to be a child. But I accept that these offences are in these circumstances less serious than communications by a carriage service involving grave threats.
The offences pursuant to s 474.27(A) are correctly categorised by the Crown as involving "very explicit language". They reflect on the part of the prisoner deliberate and what could be called persistent conduct involving chat sessions with girls aged between 13 and 15 years for the purpose, in my view, of the prisoner obtaining sexual gratification from the indecent communications. The intensity of the conversations did vary to some extent one to the other, as did the enquiry as to the personal particulars of the other party.
The four offences pursuant to s 474.27(1) of the Code were the offences where police were involved, as I said, as with count 1. These involved highly sexualised conversations as the elements make clear. The Crown in its submissions at para 13(e) noted that in some conversations he indicated he wanted sex with one person purporting to be a "girl" and gave detailed descriptions of sexual acts he wanted to perform with or upon her or she upon him. He asked in each offence for some visual image of the child. One photograph was supplied to him, but of course it was not a real person. In each case the prisoner suggested that the person meet with him and asked for her location and noted his own location.
On the other hand, as was pointed out by counsel for the prisoner, although provided with the opportunity to communicate with the person that the prisoner believed was participating in the chat, bearing in mind these were all chats involving police officers, there is no evidence of any attempt made by the prisoner to in fact communicate with any of the fictional characters involved. The Crown categorises these offences as:
"blatant attempts by the offender to sexually exploit young girls by involving them in discussions of sexual acts with the intention of increasing the prospects of engaging in sexual activity with them."
Whilst the Crown postulates as to what might have happened in the context of the delay between the offences and the arrest of the prisoner it is quite clear in my view the prisoner had no intention of meeting these persons. I appreciate, as the Crown has made the point on two separate occasions, that the Code at 474.28 enables offences to be committed even if it was impossible to commit them because police officers were engaged in relevant communication with an offender. That is not the same thing as concluding that in fact there was in this particular matter an intention to meet with the relevant party.
With regard to these matters I note of course that no actual child was involved and thus no actual child was corrupted, if that is the correct expression, by the representations made by the prisoner. Of course the charge does not involve actual procuring of a person and the relevant representations of the prisoner have clear sexual content. This is not a case of real children being groomed which would be a more serious aspect of this type of offending.
With regard to the s 474.19(1) offences the Crown in detail, but relevant detail, goes through each of the relevant counts to describe the very offensive and deeply disturbing suggestions made by the prisoner constituting child pornography. These are the most serious charges by maximum penalty. They involve clearly very graphic descriptions. I note though that these offences do not involve the transmission of visual imagery as was pointed out by counsel for the prisoner. In my view the transmission of visual imagery would be regarded as more serious than the communication with someone by type representations as in this case.
I accept that the material communicated by the prisoner was not marketable and did not involve what counsel for the prisoner described as quite properly the "vile exploitation and trade in children". It is disturbing as a Judge to have to view child pornography in visual form and see the display of the suffering of the persons in the images, made clear by their circumstances whether they are smiling or not.
I accept that there was no intention that the material be used again in that it could be sold or was intended to be passed to third parties by the prisoner. That is not to say that the material may not have been able to be passed to a third party by the recipient. But that was not the intention of the prisoner. He regarded these chats as what could be called "private conversations" albeit by using a carriage service. That noted, to pick up something that was put in the submissions, the prisoner was "complicit" in the creation of what is described as "vile erotic literature" because he created it himself for transmission to a third person, whatever be their age, primarily for his own sexual gratification.
It is, I note in passing, to be pointed out that the word "literature" arose in a number of contexts in the submissions available to me. I make the observation that the use of the word "ephemeral" is not appropriate to describe what the prisoner created. It clearly was not "ephemeral", simply because it was only transmitted to a third party or perhaps a third party sitting at a computer with another person, because, amongst other things, it was there to be observed and retrieved from the prisoner's computer. I would regard, with the greatest of respect to the very helpful submissions of learned counsel for the prisoner, ephemeral material to be more accurately characterised in dealing with, for example, spoken conversation rather than something that was committed to writing.
The common features of the offending as the Crown pointed out were the exploitation by the prisoner of his anonymity via the use of the internet. The common themes as I have pointed out were sexually explicit comments and encouragement of acts of sexual misconduct or sexual violence by others. While the accused largely initiated sexual discussion, as the Crown submitted, and escalated it, I do not accept that necessarily the chat platforms were to be characterised as the prisoner meeting with innocent minds or that the other participants were not "voluntarily engaged" in sexual discussions. It is quite clear that engagement in the chat involved on the part of the other party a voluntary willingness to be involved in the chat. These people were not randomly chosen by the prisoner. Furthermore, it is clear by reading the transcripts that the other person had any opportunity that person wished to disengage from the relevant chat. In nearly all instances that did not happen.
I cannot be satisfied that the prisoner had any intention at any point to have physical contact with the other party as I have earlier indicated. Although, as I said earlier, some chats involve requests for visual images and on occasions the prisoner was directing others to perform sexual acts thus involving the prisoner in endeavouring to achieve indirect contact with the victim.
Given the use of a carriage serve to commit these crimes, it is to be noted that the use of a carriage service with modern technological methods permits the opportunity in a nanosecond, so to speak, for a person with one press of a button to send to another person, that is transmit or communicate, multiple images via still photographs or videos in the one transaction. This may involve thousands of images in the one transaction giving rise to the one offence for example pursuant to s 474.19. In fact, I have seen such instances where offences are committed either pursuant to that provision or committed contrary to State law by having possession of child pornography, where literally thousands and thousands and thousands of images have been obtained or disseminated at the one time. In this particular matter, this is not such a case. There is no evidence of dissemination by the prisoner to others of the chats that he was engaged in. There is no evidence in this matter of transmission for profit as might be distinguished from other offending within the various categories with which I am concerned. There is no evidence that the prisoner stored the chats that were found on his computers for future use, although that is possible. The chats themselves were likely automatically stored in the way that emails are stored in an email server. As the Crown pointed out, there is no evidence that the prisoner actually did anything to store the chats and in fact he was not really asked anything about that during the trial, if it was relevant to any issue that had to be decided by the jury.
In my view, in respect of each category of offending, the offending in each instance was clearly not the most serious offending as contemplated by the legislation either by measure of its offensiveness, its indecency or its child pornographic material. Amongst other reasons, because of the volume of the material contained in each charge and the character of the engagement of the prisoner with one person, not many people, the absence of profit and the like. But in each instance I could not conclude that it was the least serious type of offending. Particularly having regard to the character of the language and the potential exploitation of the person in communication with the prisoner in circumstances, particularly where the prisoner believed that the person was under the age of 16 years.
Although counsel for the prisoner used the expressions 'mid-range' at various points as a point of reference, that language of course is in a statutory sense only required to be considered when considering sentencing under Pt 4 Div 1B Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, which has no relevance in this sentencing exercise.
One of the problems with the use of the 'mid-range' as a point of reference is determining how wide the mid-range is. In the decision of Way of 2004 Spigelman CJ determined that the middle range of objective seriousness was "not necessarily a narrow band", whatever those words may mean. If the midway was to be seen as a midpoint, again that characterisation of objective seriousness has its difficulties. To use those words for convenience though and trying to be as particular as I need to be for the purposes of any sentencing exercise in the context of the principles laid down by the High Court in Makarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25, I would regard the offences contrary to s 474.19 as below the mid-range but slightly so. The offences said to be grooming offences contrary to s 474.27 would be below that categorization given the fact that no person could objectively be corrupted. I note, however, of course, that there are two categories of offending to be contemplated even though it has the same maximum penalty given the absence of one element subsequent to April 2010.
In relation to the offences pursuant to s 474.27A, I would regard those offences as at about the same level of seriousness as the 474.19 offences. So far as the offences pursuant to s 474.17, I would see them as somewhat marginally less serious than the offences contrary to s 474.27.
Of course the Court is not required to assess these matters with mathematical precision. I simply seek to categorize where the matters may stand in the range of offending as I would understand it contemplated by each provision. I have said earlier that I note the offences carrying a maximum penalty of either three years and seven years could be dealt with summarily. However, as I pointed out to learned counsel for the prisoner, this was not a realistic option given the fact the prisoner was charged with other offences that could not be dealt with summarily in the course of the litigation. Of course, if the prisoner has pleaded guilty to, for example, the 474.17 offences, then there may have been a different course taken in the way in which they may have been treated. But the truth of the matter is I can only deal with the matter in the context of the reality of the situation available to me.
Naturally, in dealing with so many offences, I am required to reflect the totality of the criminality in the context of the observations of the majority in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610, particularly at [45] and more thoroughly discussed in the earlier decision of Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59.
Turning the matters arising under s 16A(2)(c) of the Act, it is correct that the specific offences form part of a course of conduct involving a series of criminal acts of the same or similar nature and this is not disputed. This was "persistent offending", in the context of the prisoner's regular use of the internet and reflects systematic acts of sexual self-gratification. His counsel conceded that it was "an overall course of conduct extending for a significant period". It seems to me that it was at the time to be fairly described as habitual.
The Crown draws my attention to s 16A(2)(d). The Court is required to have regard to the personal circumstances of any victim. It is not submitted the police officers should be regarded as victims, although I appreciate, as it affects me, the effect it might have on a police officer dealing with chat material. It might be different from dealing with images, but I have considerable sympathy for police officers who have to view images, particularly of children suffering as I have been required to do that on a number of occasions. I was once asked to watch a video of a man having penile penetration of a four year old girl in the knowledge that he was to kill the two year old boy that was in the image about half an hour later. It was a very distressing experience indeed from which I do not think I have really fully recovered, although that has nothing to do with this case.
There is to be fairly said in the context of other offences not involving police, particularly those concerned with his belief that the persons engaged in chats were under the age of 16, a potential for people to be damaged. But the extent to which they are damaged is to be seen in the context of what I concluded about the voluntary involvement. I could not conclude that any person was damaged in the way in which a victim shown in a visual image could clearly be held to be damaged by being raped or sexually assaulted when being photographed or filmed.
As I have earlier found pursuant to s 16A(2)(f), the prisoner has shown no contrition. The Crown conceded pursuant to s 16A(2)(h) that there was a degree of co-operation of the prisoner with investigating police. Whilst they executed warrants he assisted them in the identifying of relevant computer equipment. He also participated in a limited interview with police consenting to the searches although his co-operation was not a significant matter.
The Crown also refers to the need to have regard to the deterrent effect that a sentence will have upon the prisoner and the deterrent effect that any sentence may have on other persons pursuant to s 16A(2)(j)(ja).
The Crown has noted in its submissions the findings of the psychologist as to the degree of hebephilic and paedophilic sexual interest probably at play and the way in which the prisoner used the offending for self-sexual gratification and will need to suffer some degree of personal deterrence in that context. The self-evident interest of the prisoner in sexual activity with young girls and preoccupation with that is reflected in the repetitive and extended period of the offending.
So far as personal deterrence is concerned, however, I have taken into account the submissions of his learned counsel about the effect of delay in dealing with the matters. The prisoner has had to agree to certain conditions, potentially at least, preventing him from involving himself in internet inquiry. He has been subject to restrictive bail and not committed any other offences. There have been assessments, given all their limitations I hasten to say noted by Correctional Services and the psychologist, that his prospects of re-offending are low. That would make an assumption I think of ideal circumstances for him on his release to custody. I note his failure to attempt to contact any person on the evidence available to me and I note also the character of the child pornography is to be distinguished from the 'vile' material, as his counsel described it, in images.
So far as the issue of general deterrence is concerned, it goes without saying that in sentencing for offences of this type, general deterrence is a significant matter to be taken into account. Nobody could argue to the contrary. The Crown refers to a number of decisions including R v Booth [2009] NSWCCA 89, Fitzgerald v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 226, where the Court has pronounced upon the emphasis to be given to general deterrence in sentencing offences which involve exploiting children sexually or promoting the need to protect children in circumstances where elements of the offences relating to the transmission or production of offensive, indecent and pornographic material may corrupt people of immaturity. The Crown also noted in the context of issues relating to general deterrence the anonymity of the internet makes it difficult for persons such as the prisoner to be detected and punished for the crimes they commit.
With regard to some of the authorities though, I note in relation, for example, to the decision of Apslund [2010] NSWCCA 316, particularly at [50]-[51], whilst there can be no argument with the general principles enunciated by the then Chief Judge at Common Law, the issue of predation is a matter of degree, as was reflected, for example, in the case of Poynder, a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, again cited by the Crown, where I had sentenced the prisoner in the first instance. My memory is that the facts were there that Mr Poynder had actually been communicating with a police officer in the belief that he was communicating with someone under age and turned up at the address where she was purporting living with a pocket full of condoms. That situation, although a one‑off event in that sense, is a somewhat different situation than the matter with which I am concerned. That having been said, in Poynder (2007) 171 A Crim R 544, (at 550) it was held the issue of the need for general deterrence in procuring offences of particular kinds is a real matter that is to be taken into account.
With regard to using a carriage service to transmit child pornography, I have already made observations about the character of that offending, and compared it to other more serious categories of offending. The Crown cited two West Australian decisions. In the context of Federal sentencing, it does require consideration of sentencing for like offences outside the particular State jurisdiction where a person is required to be sentenced. One of those decisions was a judgment of the District Court in 2009 of Curran. The other decision was a decision of Lee by the West Australian Supreme Court of Appeal, [2013] WASCA 216, particularly at [27] and [33]. Whilst I accept the general principle that general deterrence is a relevant matter - I have already made that point - and ordinarily, prison is the only option in dealing with particularly multiple offences, it is to be fairly said that, coming back to a matter that I raised earlier, categorising what the prisoner did as "literature" not of an ephemeral nature, does not necessarily mean that it is "literature" of a more serious character in the context of child pornography than other literature. That is either literature prepared for the edification of other prisoners whilst in custody, or edification for other people to whom the accused can transmit or communicate the relevant pornographic material.
The prisoner did not make these representations as a, "story", for the digestion of other people for their, "edification". These chats were conversations, as I said, engaged with people in circumstances where even though the prisoner no doubt had an idea of the precise character of what he was engaged in, they were developed in what one would call, a non‑deliberative fashion. Child pornography in literature usually requires preparation and consideration and a great deal of care being taken to ultimately produce the end product. Usually for the benefit or readership of not one person but a range of people. Sometimes a great number of people. The degree of deliberation involved in such written child pornography does not arise in this particular case.
The Crown also cited another decision, De Leeuw [2015] NSWCCA 183. I have no doubt that the summary of the principles arising from that judgment, set out at [72] of the judgment, are entirely correct. But it should be pointed out by reference to the Crown's own summary, at para 38, that a number of the features or principles arising in that judgment particularly are of no application here, excepting that ordinarily a term of imprisonment is warranted, that general deterrence is a primary consideration, that limited weight may be given to prior good character, that offending involving child pornography is becoming increasingly prevalent. The greater prevalence seems to be in child pornography of a different category than the child pornography with which I am concerned. At the moment, I am not aware of a particular case like this that has come before me involving chat room conversations. Although I accept there have been other similar prosecutions. The vast majority of cases and the increasing prevalence is to be found in visual images.
The Crown's submissions refer to child pornography creating a 'market' for the continued corruption of exploitation of child. Well that does not apply here and that is a very significant aggravating factor, one would have thought. The fact is though that child pornography is not a victimless crime. That observation is clearly directed at the way in which visual images come into existence, with the cruel and inhuman treatment of children. I have already made observations about the issue of, where it arose in relation to the grooming offences, the significance of the person with whom the prisoner communicating being a, "fictitious person". Of course, I accept that the legislature has created the capacity to prosecute people for these offences where there is a fictitious person in order to ensure that the prospects for detection are enhanced and to deter offenders. I note what the Crown has said about the increase of the maximum penalty in relation to the 474.19 offences. That is however a matter that does not arise as a practical consideration. I have regard to the maximum penalty that is particularly relevant to a particular offence at a particular time. Clearly, it is the case that the prisoner is required to be adequately punished as required under 16A(2)(k) of the Act. I have taken into account, the character antecedents, age, means, physical and mental condition of the prisoner pursuant to s 16A(2)(m).
So far as the submissions of the defence in this regard, it notes further, the bankruptcy of the prisoner, arising as the sequelae of his arrest and his loss of employment, will affect his capacity on his release to obtain employment. It was conceded that there was no mental condition that while it required consideration of the principles summarised in decisions such as Helmsley and De La Rosa, however, he pointed out that the report of the psychologist did require careful consideration in terms of assessing the appropriate non‑parole period.
So far as his prospects of rehabilitation are concerned, pursuant to s 16A(2)(n), one would need to be very cautious in that regard. The prisoner has not taken full responsibility for his proven misconduct and the prisoner attempts to explain his involvement in these matters involve both the trial and subsequently a degree of prevarication. Of course, there are the qualifications, or cautionary observations, of the psychologist to be taken into account which I have identified and some of those matters have been picked up by the Crown in its written submissions.
I ultimately could not conclude the prisoner has excellent or good prospects of rehabilitation. But it may be that the effect of any sentence I impose ultimately will have effect in that regard, particularly under parole supervision.
I have taken into account the delay that has occurred in this matter. Whose fault that is is not for me to determine. No particular submission has been made about that matter. It is correct to say that to some extent the prisoner has been left in a degree of uncertain suspense.
On the other hand it seems to me he clearly knew what he did. Whether he was actually guilty of particular offences, of course, was appropriate for a jury to decide. But once his identity as a person involved in these chat sessions established, and it was clearly established, the matter that he should have been more upfront about in my view, it seemed to me inevitable that he would be convicted, particularly of the 474.19 offences, the transmission of child pornography and the offences contrary to s 474.17. The live issue, to my mind, in the entire trial really was whether he had a belief that he was in fact communicating with a person of the age that presented in the relevant communications and specifically in respect of those offences where the Crown had to prove a belief on his part that that person was under the age of 16 years.
I note he has been under restricted bail conditions, that is the price one pays for liberty for circumstances where the offences are serious and the likelihood of imprisonment if convicted is very high indeed.
I am required in sentencing the prisoner to fix a non-parole period, pursuant to s 19AB Commonwealth Crimes Act. I am required in that respect to have regard to those authorities, some of long standing, relating to the relevant consideration to be identified in fixing non-parole periods, particular Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623, and of course Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525. In my view, the prisoner needs an extended period of supervision to enable him to receive appropriate assistance in a range of ways to, amongst other things, prevent him reoffending and to assist him in reintegrating back into the community. The facts of the matters are, notwithstanding what I could regard as disgusting, if that is the correct word, the character of his offending in many respects. The prisoner is not a worthless person. Clearly that is so. He lived a life until 45 without offending. He was in a stable relationship, he had responsible employment. Things have dramatically changed since he engaged in the activities with which I am concerned. Apart from the time that will be required to be served imprisoned as punishment, in my view he should be given an opportunity to reap the benefits of parole supervision. Those benefits are not just for him but for the community at large.
The Crown provided me with a range of judgments, not a great many, setting out what was said to be comparative cases. I pressed him on that matter in the context of drawing to his attention the observations of Basten JA and Johnson J in an article in the Judicial Officers' Bulletin from July 2014, concerning misconception on the part of prosecutors of their role in sentencing after the High Court decision in Barbaro. I have had regard to those judgments, I do not need to place them on the record. They provide some small assistance, but of course they deal with different offending and different circumstances relating to the offender.
The only matter of significance in terms of consideration of other matters is what flows from the decision of the High Court in Hilli v The Queen [2010] HCA 45, which deals with the fixing of minimum terms and the need to take into account sentencing across the Commonwealth. I have already dealt with the issue of the need to give effect to totality of sentencing. As I have said, I have concluded a sentencing scheme, complicated though it is, that tries to differentiate to some extent the character of the offending of like offences and tries to give effect to the distinctions that might be drawn for example between counts 2 and 3 and counts 4 and 9, in light of the different elements, although still subject to the same statutory maximum penalty.
Could you stand up please, Mr Telfer - actually remain seated, because this is going to take some time.
In relation to count 1 you are convicted. You are sentenced to six months imprisonment, that will date from 16 September 2016, expire on 15 March 2017.
In relation to counts to 29 and 35 you are convicted. You are sentenced to 12 months imprisonment from 16 September 2016, expiring on 15 September 2017.
In relation to counts 2 and 3 you are convicted. You are sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment. Those sentences will be concurrent one with the other, but will commence on 16 September 2016 and expire on 15 March 2019.
In relation to counts 4 and 9 you are convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Those sentences will commence from 16 September 2016 and expire on 15 September 2018.
In respect of counts 8, 20, 21, 23 and 26 you are convicted. In respect of each count you are sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, to date from 16 March 2017, to expire on 15 September 2018.
In respect of counts 7, 13, 24, 31, 33, 34 and 39 you are convicted. You are sentenced to four years imprisonment in respect of each of those matters, to date from 16 September 2017 and expire on 15 September 2021.
In respect of counts 5, 16, 18, 30, 36, 37 and 38 you are convicted. You are sentenced in each case to three years imprisonment, to date from 16 March 2018, to expire on 15 March 2021.
Pursuant to s 19AB of the Commonwealth Crimes Act I fix an aggregate non-parole period in relation to those terms of imprisonment of two years 9 months. That will date from 16 September 2016 and expire on 15 June 2019. On that date you will be eligible for release to parole. It will be a matter for the New South Wales Parole Authority in consultation with the Commonwealth authorities as to whether you will be released on that date. You may need to complete programs in custody before you are released to parole, and when you are on parole you will be subject to various conditions. If you do not comply with those conditions, which may relate to accommodation, your activities whilst at large and the like, the Parole Authority will have the power to revoke your parole. You will be required to go back to custody and be required to complete such of the terms of imprisonment outstanding, as the parole authority deems you should serve before you may be released to parole on a further occasion, if that was to happen.
Madam Crown, is there anything else?
CATSANOS: There's a forfeiture order, your Honour, which I understand is consented to by defence.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Any matters from you, Mr Williams?
WILLIAMS: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: This is an application for an order under s 23ZD Commonwealth Crimes Act for the forfeiture to the Commonwealth of a black computer tower with LG disc drive and a GW computer tower with disc drive. These are the two computers seized in the search I assume, is that right?
CATSANOS: Your Honour, yes.
HIS HONOUR: And your client doesn't object to those orders, Mr Williams?
WILLIAMS: I don't, your Honour, there's no objection and there has been a satisfactory agreement as to the extraction of some personal material of a family kind.
HIS HONOUR: Right, well I will date those orders today.
You don't have any copies of this order, Madam Crown?
HIS HONOUR: Well how about you give me the copies and I will give you a sealed copy of it, a sealed copy on the file and Mr Williams can have the benefit of a sealed copy. Is that okay?
CATSANOS: It's very kind of your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Now, Mr Telfer, do you understand the sentence I have imposed?
OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: It's a total sentence of five years. The sentences are variously partially accumulative or concurrent, as the commencement dates and the expiry dates dictate.
OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Your non-parole period is two years, nine months and you will be eligible for release to parole in two years, nine months, but that will be a matter for the parole authority on that date.
OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Of course, the orders I have made are subject to review by a higher court. You and the Crown have rights of appeal, I acknowledge that properly so that be. But the point that I am talking to you now about is the effect of the orders I have made. And when you are in custody you may be required to undertake programs in custody. I referred to a particular program identified by the psychologist. She referred to it as a program in custody, although the way she expressed it in its terms it might suggest a program outside of custody. You might have to undertake programs both in custody and outside of custody. But one thing you need to understand is you have clearly got to acknowledge that - and I am not trying to downplay the seriousness of your misconduct, but you clearly have a problem with the use of the internet in a range of ways.
What you do in terms of your own self-edification, without involving others, is one matter. Of course, one can commit offences in that regarding by downloading child pornography or accessing it. I understand that. But engaging with others on the internet is a matter where you, I believe, are prone to failure. That is a matter of self-discipline that you may well need to address when you are released from custody.
Are there any other matters that I have to explain to the prisoner, Madam Crown, relating to the sentence? I know that there's a requirement for me to explain the sentence for the prisoner, but is there any other matter that I can address from your perspective?
CATSANOS: No, thank you.
HIS HONOUR: Any other matter for your perspective?
WILLIAMS: No, your Honour.
[3]
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Decision last updated: 24 May 2017