The question is whether the public interest in the enforcement of the law as to safety in the driving of vehicles on the roads and in obtaining evidence in aid of that enforcement is so outweighed by unfairness to the applicant in the manner in which the evidence came into existence or into the hands of the Crown that, notwithstanding its admissibility and cogency, it should be rejected.
However, his Honour agreed with the judgment of Stephen and Aickin JJ who attributed to the principle expressed in Ireland a wider purpose than the avoiding of unfairness to an accused. Their Honours said [45] :
What Ireland involves is no simple question of ensuring fairness to an accused but instead the weighing against each other of two competing requirements of public policy, thereby seeking to resolve the apparent conflict between the desirable goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law. This being the aim of the discretionary process called for by Ireland it follows that it by no means takes as its central point the question of unfairness to the accused. It is, on the contrary, concerned with broader questions of high public policy, unfairness to the accused being only one factor which, if present, will play its part in the whole process of consideration.
Their Honours exemplified the principle in Ireland by citation from earlier Irish and Scottish authorities [46] :
Several passages from earlier cases exemplify the principle which finds expression in Ireland's Case. In People v O'Brien [47] Kingsmill Moore J said: "I am disposed to lay emphasis not so much on alleged fairness to the accused as on the public interest that the law should be observed even in the investigation of crime." In Lawrie v Muir [48] (in a passage later cited by Lord Hodson, speaking for their Lordships in the Judicial Committee, in King v The Queen [49] ) the Lord Justice-General, Lord Cooper said: "From the standpoint of principle it seems to me that the law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests which are liable to come into conflict - (a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from courts of law on any merely formal or technical ground. Neither of these objects can be insisted upon to the uttermost. The protection of the citizen is primarily protection for the innocent citizen against unwarranted, wrongful and perhaps high-handed interference, and the common sanction is an action of damages. The protection is not intended as a protection for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the public prosecutor to vindicate the law. On the other hand the interest of the State cannot be magnified to the point of causing all the safeguards for the protection of the citizen to vanish, and of offering a positive inducement to the authorities to proceed by irregular methods."
Thus the chief object of the public policy discretion is the constraining of law enforcement authorities so as to prevent their engaging in illegal or improper conduct, although the securing of fairness to an accused is a relevant factor in the exercise of the discretion. But if a confession of an offence is voluntarily made in circumstances that throw no doubt on its reliability, it is difficult to identify the unfairness that may be thought to affect the admission of his confession in evidence at his trial for that offence. The unfairness, if any, must consist in the admission of a confession which would not have been made or would not have been made in the form in which it was made if a person or persons in authority had treated the confessionalist in a lawful and proper manner. Unfairness of this kind, if it is to be regarded as unfairness, is different from the unfairness of admitting a confession of dubious reliability into evidence with the attendant risk of wrongful conviction. Unfairness of the former kind is simply the disadvantage suffered as the result of the conduct of the person or persons in authority. To characterise that disadvantage as "unfair", the conduct which produced the confession must be of such a nature and degree that no suspect in the confessionalist's place ought to be subjected to it. That judgment must be made by reference to either a controlling statute or public policy.
1. (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 64.
2. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 74-75.
3. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 75-76.
4. [1965] ILR 142 at 160.
5. [1950] SLT 37 at 39-40.
6. [1969] 1 AC 304 at 315.