74 In respect of Counts 1 and 3, as the case has unfolded, there is no reasonable basis on the evidence for concluding that she had the relevant prohibited drugs for purposes other than for supply, that is, either for keeping or having in possession for supply or delivering for supply (which may include selling or giving to others). It was not argued at the trial that is was open to conclude that the accused was in the same position as the appellant in R v Carey (1990) 20 NSWLR 292, that is in possession of the relevant prohibited drug with intention of returning it to the real "owner". This, as a factual consideration, requires the accused to establish the defence on the balance of probabilities pursuant to s.29 of the Act (see Carey at 294C - G). Although not argued, I have considered this issue, but I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities in respect of Counts 1 and 3 that this is made out. Firstly, this aspect is not asserted by the accused in any form. Secondly, the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence of possession for the purpose of supply, in the extended definitional sense, are more dominant than a conclusion of "looking after" the relevant prohibited drugs for Damian, to be returned to him to do as he pleased.