27 Finally, counsel for the applicant invokes the decision of this Court in Newman as authority for the proposition that disproportion between the seriousness of a breaching offence and the sentence of imprisonment proposed to be activated is an important consideration in determining whether to restore the suspended sentence. He argues that while the Corporations Act offences carried possible terms of imprisonment, the fact that the applicant was fined only $5,000 was indicative of the relatively insignificant nature of the offences. As counsel puts it, the fines imposed indicate that the offending was at the lower end of the scale of seriousness, and he submits that the disproportion between offending of that kind and the restoration of the suspended term of imprisonment is so great as to constitute an exceptional circumstance, at least when taken in conjunction with the other factors which he mentioned.
28 I regret I do not agree. Like the judge, I consider that the magistrate was particularly lenient. The breaching offences were calculated and devious and reflected dishonesty of much the same kind[16] as led to the offences for which the suspended sentence was imposed. As appears from the prosecutor's statement of facts at the sentencing hearing, despite that the applicant was prohibited by law from acting as a director or being involved in the management of a company, and although he knew that to be the case, he acted as a director of Stegtel Trade and Equities Pty Ltd between September 2000 and February 2001; he acted in a management role at Broadband and Wireless Pty Ltd between July 2001 and 31 January 2003; and, during 2001, he lodged with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission three notification of change of office holder forms, in relation to three separate companies, appointing himself as a director of each company, using aliases and false details of birth to conceal the fact that it was he. When Callaway, J.A. spoke in Newman of disparity between the offending for which the suspended sentence had been imposed and the breaching office, his Honour was dealing with a case in which the offender had been given a total effective sentence of 15 months' imprisonment, of which 10 months was suspended for two years, for offences of aggravated burglary and intentionally damaging property. The breaching offence was limited to the offender throwing a rock through the windscreen of his girlfriend's car during a domestic dispute, and that offence was provoked by the offender's girlfriend smashing the windscreen and puncturing the bonnet of the offender's car. With respect, I can well understand why his Honour regarded disparity as an important consideration in such a case, and thus how his Honour came to the conclusion that it was in the interests of justice to be lenient. But, as it seems to me, all of that is a world away from a case like this one. Here the
applicant was sentenced to 25 months' imprisonment for serious offences of dishonesty, and here, having been given the "last chance" for which s.27 provides, the applicant was so little appreciative of the opportunity thereby afforded to him that he almost immediately began again, and for the next two years he continued, to engage in acts of continuing criminal dishonesty. So far from the nature of the breaching offences in this case being an exceptional circumstance warranting an amelioration of the restoration of the suspended sentence, it strengthens me in the view that full restoration of the suspended sentence is just what is required.