Provisions very similar to those now found in Pt. III of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956, although by no means entirely the same, were contained in Pt. III of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949. Section 25 of that Act, which was a provision of Pt. III, corresponded sufficiently with s. 37 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1956, but the power there given was to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Clearly enough it was not part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. It formed part of the general industrial powers of that court although it was exercisable by way of review or revision of the decisions of the Australian Stevedoring Industry Board. The differences between s. 25 of the Act of 1949 and s. 37 of the Act of 1956 are of no significance with reference to the character of the power as judicial or industrial. It seems reasonably plain that the real intention was that the Commonwealth Industrial Court should exercise the same power as theretofore had been reposed in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in entertaining appeals against the suspension or cancellation of the registration of a waterside worker. There can be little doubt that it was intended as an industrial power, or if you like an administrative power, the exercise of which should be governed by a consideration not only of the specific matters set out in s. 24, which roughly correspond with those enumerated in the present s. 36, but also of all matters which might seem relevant to a sound and wise administrative control over the stevedoring industry. This Court took the view in Reg. v. The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: Ex parte Ellis [1] that s. 25 of the Act of 1949 conferred upon the waterside worker, by the remedy which s. 25 called an appeal, a right to a review of the action of an administrative body by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration exercising a special authority. That court as a revisory tribunal was placed in the same position as the Stevedoring Industry Board; it must be satisfied of the existence of the necessary conditions prescribed by the provision, but once so satisfied the same discretion arose in the court for exercise on the same considerations. It is difficult to believe that as s. 37 of the Act of 1956 the provision, unaltered in substance, is based on any other principles or expresses any other intention. The same legislative intention is apparent in s. 5 of the recently enacted Stevedoring Industry Act 1957. Section 5 is expressed to repeal the present s. 37 and replace it with a provision in almost identical terms conferring the power which it describes upon the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. Section 5, however, is not to go into operation until such date as is fixed by proclamation and it therefore has no present effect. We were informed that only in the event of the present s. 37 being held invalid was it intended to proclaim the new one. Nevertheless, it represents the expression of a legislative intention and does nothing to dispel the notion that the words used in s. 37 were not intended to be read in any limited fashion so as to accommodate them to the judicial power and restrain their operation within the limits of that power; on the contrary it tends, if anything, to confirm the contrary view. It seems clear enough that the power in the hands of the Commonwealth Industrial Court was intended to be of the same scope and have the same purpose as that given to the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration by s. 25 of the Act of 1949 and when in the Act of 1957 the same words are used so that they may be applied to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, no change of meaning is intended. The argument in support of the validity of s. 37 was simply that once the power was conferred on a court established for the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth the provision should be restrained by construction to the limits required for the exercise of jurisdiction falling within the judicial power of the Commonwealth. For this argument much might be said were it not for the history of the provisions and were there not so much evidence of the fact that the true intent of the legislation is that the exercise of power arising under s. 37, wherever it might reside, should be governed by what might broadly be called administrative and industrial considerations and should not be restricted to purely legal criteria. If what may be described as a realistic approach is made to s. 37, there can be no escape from the conclusion that it can have no validity as a provision purporting to confer jurisdiction on the Commonwealth Industrial Court.