The Previous Sentencing Regime
58 As at the date of the offences, the Crimes Act (1900-1989) s 18(1)(b)/s 24 provided for a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for manslaughter. This penalty was reduced to 25 years imprisonment by the Crimes (Life Sentences) Amendment Act 1989 commencing 12 January 1990. Having regard to s 19(2) of that Act, both offenders are to be sentenced on the basis that the maximum term of imprisonment for their offence is 25 years.
59 As at the date of the offences, s 97 of the Crimes Act (1900-1994) provided a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment in respect of the offences of robbery in company and assault with intent to rob. Section 117/154A of the Crimes Act 1900 provided in respect of the offence of take and drive a conveyance a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment.
60 Although the offenders were, by virtue of their absconding, responsible for the delay in charging them with their respective offences, it seems clear that they are to be sentenced having regard both to the range of sentence imposed at the time of the commission of the offence and the sentencing practice at that time: Shore v R (1992) 66 A Crim R 37. In R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368 (following R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736, which was inconsistent with although it did not mention Shore) a five member bench of the Court of Criminal Appeal reconsidered the question. By majority (Mason P dissenting) the Court confirmed that, when sentencing for an offence a court should take into account (subject to practical limitations) the sentencing practice, including the applicable range of sentences for the offence in question, that were applicable at the date of the commission of the offence where sentencing practice had moved adversely to the offender.
61 As a practical matter, the most significant changes in sentencing law were the repeal of the Probation and Parole Act 1983 and cognate Acts, the enactment and then repeal of the Sentencing Act 1989 and the enactment of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. In 1987, the first category of legislation, namely the Probation and Parole Act 1983 and cognate legislation governed sentencing in New South Wales. The most significant element of the sentencing regime at the time was the system of remissions, which were calculated after a sentence was imposed and, most commonly, permitted the release of the offender on parole after two thirds of the sentence had been served. Although this was said to require the offender to have remained of good behaviour whilst incarcerated, it was virtually automatic. In point of principle, a sentencing Judge was not permitted to take into account the availability of remissions since this was a matter for the executive government: R v Macleay (1990) 19 NSWLR 112. The restatement of this principle was important since, at the time, it was often said (and was, in my experience, likely to be true) that courts often increased the sentences which otherwise would have been imposed because of the effect of the remission system on the actual term served. It will be remembered that the remissions system came to be regarded as undermining public confidence in the administration of justice since the sentences actually imposed by the courts were not by a substantial margin the terms actually served in gaol. The Sentencing Act 1989, proclaimed on 25 September 1989, was expressly passed to "restore truth in the sentencing system in New South Wales" and "restore the integrity of public institutions of the State, particularly in the area of the administration of the justice" (Sentencing Bill, Second Reading, Hansard, 10 May 1989, p7905, quoted in Janet B L Chan, The New South Wales Sentencing Act 1989: Where Does Truth Lie (1990) 14 Crim LJ 249), from which some of the following material is taken.
62 Thus a major actual change since the offences were committed is the abolition of remissions. Although it was not controversial that the sentences I now impose should make allowance for this change, I doubt that I can (and do not) do so: AJB v R [2007] NSWCCA 51; 169 A Crim R 32; Bradbery v R [2008] NSWCCA 93.
63 Another major change concerns the relationship between what was then called the head sentence and the non-parole period. My recollection is that it was overwhelmingly the most common practice in respect of all offences to set the latter at around one half of the former and not infrequently at even less. In some judgments it has been suggested that the most common ratio was between one-third and one-half. Ms Chan's helpful article sets out the statistics for 1988, confirming (at least for that year) that the average percentage for the fifteen offences there noted, the overwhelming majority reflected a ratio of about 50%. Since that calculation has the advantage of actual research and is for the year immediately following that with which I am concerned, it seems to me, that the present sentences should reflect this ratio. The difference between the ratio then habitually applied and the present statutory calculus required by s 44 of the Sentencing Act 1999 also constitutes special circumstances allowing such a variation.
64 The third major change in sentencing practice is the institution of a formalised structure for acknowledging the utility of pleas of guilty in the administration of justice. Although this feature of a plea of guilty was long acknowledged (see Winchester v The Queen (1992) 58 A Crim R 345) as the Chief Justice observed in R v Thomson and Houlten (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 at 389ff, there was substantial (and, in my experience, justifiable) scepticism about the extent to which, in reality, any substantial allowance was made, especially for an early plea. In my view, the appropriate discount (here in the order of 25%) should be applied to the sentences otherwise to be imposed.
65 So far as the reduction in the maximum sentence for the offence of manslaughter is concerned, it is very much my impression that it did not have any significant effect on sentencing patterns for this offence, at least for manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. Although it was common to refer to the maximum, the sentences for this class were never calculated by reference to it, except in the sense that the maximum reflected the undoubted seriousness of taking life. It should be borne in mind that manslaughter by provocation, or where there was diminished responsibility or excessive self-defence involved an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm and, by and large, would be much more objectively serious than manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.
66 More generally, it seems to me that the trend of sentences for provocation manslaughter and manslaughter by diminished responsibility (as it used to be known) have increased over the intervening years, despite the reduction in the maximum, as have sentences involving violence to a child. However, whether this understanding is right or wrong does not matter since the category of manslaughter with which I am dealing in this case is very different and stands as a distinct category. The circumstances found in this kind of case vary very widely and my own experience of past sentencing decisions in respect of it, going no further than an impression, is not sufficiently informative for me to take it into account. I am certainly far from satisfied that a sentence passed today for the charge of manslaughter in the present circumstances would be likely to be greater than one passed in a similar case twenty three years ago, leaving out of account the issues of remissions, ratio between head sentence and non-parole period and utilitarian discount.
67 I have been referred to a number of specific cases reflecting to a greater or lesser degree (and mostly the latter) the facts in the present case which, in a general sense have been helpful, but in the result largely emphasise the protean character of this offence. In R v Marsh [2002] NSWCCA 151 appeals by the Crown and the offender against the sentence were dismissed. The offender had pleaded guilty to a count of manslaughter, a count of robbery in company (of the deceased) and a count of taking and driving the vehicle used in the offences. The sentence at first instance was a term of imprisonment of ten years and four months on the first of these offences, on the second a fixed term of six years and on the third a fixed term of 14 months, all three sentences to be served concurrently. The facts were, briefly, that the offender and his accomplice were driving in a stolen car when the offender suggested that they should snatch a handbag and they proceeded to look for a victim. The vehicle stopped about 50 metres from the victim, who was standing on the footpath. The co-offender alighted, approached the victim, grabbed her handbag and then got back into the vehicle. The victim pursued them, running alongside. The offender, who was driving, stopped the vehicle briefly and the victim partially entered it. He then accelerated and swerved the vehicle down the street in an attempt to dislodge her. The victim grabbed hold of the co-offender's head, apparently to prevent herself from falling onto the road. The offender, still driving, punched her in the head a number of times and she fell from the vehicle about 40 metres or so further on, rolled onto the roadway, the rear tyre of the car striking her head. She was found unconscious and died shortly after from her head injuries. The starting point for the sentence was nominated as 13 years, and a deduction of 20% was made in light of the plea of guilty. The appellant had a substantial criminal record, including some serious offences. The Crown's real complaint was that the direction as to concurrency failed to reflect the total criminality of the offender. In dealing with the offender's appeal, Hidden J (Bell J agreeing, Meagher JA dissenting) described the sentence as "high in the range", (as, indeed, had the sentencing Judge) but concluded that "it was rightly so, given the distressing facts of this offence". Hidden J said, in respect of the robbery in company offence, that the sentence of six years was also "high in the range" but his Honour was not persuaded that the proper range was exceeded. The sentencing Judge was not satisfied that the offender had originally shown any remorse although in his subsequent consultation with a psychologist he had shown some insight into the extent of his criminality. No special circumstances were found and Hidden J rejected the offender's complaint in this regard. In respect of the Crown appeal, Hidden J was of the view that it was open in the circumstances to the sentencing Judge to direct that all three sentences should be served concurrently and that the overall effective sentence was adequate to reflect the totality of the offender's criminality.
68 In R v Perry; R v Roberts (unreported, NSWCCA, 7 March 1986) the appellants were convicted of murder and robbery with wounding on the same occasion and in respect of the same victim and sentenced to penal servitude for life for the murder and 14 years for the robbery; a non-parole period of seven years was imposed in respect of each offence. The crimes were committed in the home of the victim where the appellants had gone to obtain drugs. It was claimed that a sexual advance was made to one of the appellants, following which both of them attacked the victim with what Street CJ described as "a horrifying degree of savagery". On leaving the victim's home, the appellants took several items, which formed the subject of the robbery charge and also took the victim's car to flee the scene. The Crown case was one of felony murder (although, as the Chief Justice observed this seemed to be a needless complication). Amongst other defences advanced at trial, Perry advanced a defence of diminished responsibility whilst Roberts advanced a defence of provocation. In the result, the summing up on the charge of murder was held to be deficient and the Court substituted a verdict of manslaughter against both together with acquittals on the robbery charge. Both appellants were aged 22 with "unsatisfactory" criminal records. The appellants were both sentenced to terms of fifteen years imprisonment with a non-parole period of ten years. (an exception to the general practice mentioned above as to the relationship between head sentence and non-parole period but significantly more generous than the 75% "default" under subsequent regimes).
69 In R v Jennar (unreported, NSWCCA, 4 March 1991) the appellant appealed against sentences following trial in respect of charges of manslaughter and robbery with wounding. The appellant, a drug addict who was "hanging out" had attempted to purchase heroin. He alleged a "rip off" and entered the supplier's premises with a shotgun which he claimed was accidentally discharged, though, he claimed, that its safety catch was engaged. The appellant was charged with felony murder. He was convicted of armed robbery with wounding but the jury convicted him of manslaughter rather than murder. In respect of the first of these offences he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and, in respect of the second, 20 years, with both sentences to be served concurrently, and the non-parole period being 15 years. The appeal was allowed but, since the trial occurred prior to the commencement of the Sentencing Act 1989, it was necessary to translate the redetermined sentences. Those sentences were, in the result, (rounding down by a few days) a minimum term of seven years and seven months and an additional term of two years six months in respect of both charges, to be served concurrently. These sentences reflected a head sentence of 16 years with a non-parole period of 12 years.
70 R v Stevens (unreported, NSWCCA, 15 August 1993) concerned an appeal against sentence which had been imposed in accordance with the Sentencing Act 1989 regime. The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced (taking into account an offence of larceny of a motor vehicle) to a minimum term of seven years imprisonment and an additional term of two years four months imprisonment. Briefly, the facts were that the appellant had been on a drinking spree and decided to go home early in the morning but, having no car, decided to steal one from a nearby car park. He hotwired the vehicle and was driving it from the car park when the owner ran over, opened the driver's door and endeavoured to stop it. The appellant continued to drive the car, attempting both to keep control and to remove the owner. He drove erratically along the street, eventually crossing onto the incorrect side and colliding first with a parked vehicle and then successively with the walls of two buildings. The victim was caught between the frame of the vehicle and the driver's door, which took the bulk of each impact, eventually falling to the footpath. The vehicle then collided with a tree and finally with the side wall of another building. The appellant fled. The owner died from his injuries. There were some subjective features favouring some mitigation: the appellant was 18 at the time of the offence and, though from a stable home with the support of his family, had been born with a congenital serious physical disability and also was close to illiterate having had extreme difficulties in learning. He was otherwise a good worker. He had only a minor and irrelevant criminal record and the sentencing Judge accepted there were good prospects of rehabilitation. It appeared to the Court on the appeal that the starting point for the sentence, absent the mitigating features, would have been in the vicinity of at least thirteen years. The Court commented that such a sentence "would be a very high sentence for an offence of manslaughter for criminal negligence or for an unlawful and dangerous act, where the prisoner necessarily has to be sentenced on the basis that he had no intention of killing the victim and no intention of causing the victim serious injury. The Court considered that the sentencing Judge's view that the offence was a serious one was correct but that, in substance, the sentence did not give sufficient recognition to the fact that the appellant was taken by surprise and his capacity to think rationally was diminished by his drunkenness and he had no intention of causing any injury to the owner. The sentence was reduced to one of eight years comprising a minimum term of five and a half years and an additional term of two and a half years.
71 R v Dixon; R v Dunn unreported, NSWSC, 18 November 1994, concerned sentences imposed at first instance in this Court for offences of manslaughter and armed robbery with wounding. The victim had been approached by three males whilst walking home from a railway station. Dunn was armed with a bottle and Dixon with a wooden tree stake. The victim was stabbed in the shoulder with the bottle and hit a number of times with the stake. He fell to the ground and his wallet was stolen. The victim was later treated at hospital for a wound to his shoulder and, some five hours later, was allowed to leave without suffering permanent injury. After the robbery the two offenders went to a parkland area where they continued to drink with others and decided that they would rob another victim. They followed a 69 year old man who was tackled to the ground and then punched and kicked a number of times, his pockets searched, his wallet and money removed. Witnesses came across the victim who was taken to hospital where he died some hours later. He had suffered a cerebral haemorrhage, five broken ribs, several lacerations and extensive bruising. The sentencing Judge treated the crimes as part of the one enterprise although they were separate events. Each of the offenders was just over 16 years of age, one of them having a relatively serious record but the other no relevant matters. The sentencing Judge accepted that the offenders were significantly affected by alcohol at the time of the offences and had exhibited remorse. His Honour considered that the factors referred to in R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 were applicable, in light of their Aboriginality. In the result, Dunn was sentenced to an overall sentence of ten years six months imprisonment comprising a minimum term of six years and an additional term of four and a half years, special circumstances having been found. In respect of the robbery, a fixed term of five years was imposed, both sentences to be served concurrently. Dixon was sentenced to a term of nine and a half years comprising a minimum term of five years with an additional term of four and a half years, again in the light of a finding of special circumstances. On the second charge a fixed term of five years imprisonment was imposed, to be served concurrently with the first sentence.
72 In R v Clarke [2001] NSWSC 703 the judgment was that of McClellan J (as he then was). His Honour said, in dealing with sentence -
[15] …… There is a great need for the sentence which is imposed to be sufficient to deter and discourage others from carrying out crimes which may involve a risk to human life. The snatching of bags from pedestrians always creates a risk to their safety but that risk is significantly increased when a motor vehicle is part of the overall plan. The community is entitled to expect that people can use the pedestrian pathways without fear of their property being taken and their life threatened.