R v Spadina

Judgment 1His Honour: By a notice of motion filed 22 November 2012, Radoslav Spadina, (the accused) seeks the following orders: "1. An order that the Hearing of the trial set to commence on 3 March 2013 [sic] be vacated; 2. That the proceedings be stayed until such time that the Prosecution provides to the Defence the data missing Dutch electronic material [sic] (being the intercepted telephone calls, SMS messages and facsimile transmissions). 3. That the proceedings be stayed until such time that the Prosecution provide to the Defence all of the audio recordings of intercepted telephone calls of Radoslav Spadina; 4. Such further or other orders as the Court sees fit." 2The accused is charged with conspiring with Adam Keith Watt ("Watt") and others between 1 December 2005 and 3 September 2007 to import a commercial quantity of pseudoephedrine into Australia. The charge of conspiracy is founded on s 307.11(1) and s 11.5(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) 1995. He is also charged with aiding and abetting the supply of pseudoephedrine, being not less than the large commercial quantity applicable to that prohibited drug, contrary to s 25(2) and s 27 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW). His trial is listed to commence on 4 March 2013. Mr Watt was found unfit to be tried on 12 December 2012: R v Watt [2012] NSWSC 1574. 3Broadly stated, the Crown alleges that between December 2005 and September 2007, the accused and Mr Watt were part of an international conspiracy to import 210 Kilograms of pseudoephedrine into Australia from the Democratic Republic of Congo ("the Congo"). It is the Crown case that the accused and Mr Watt were party to the agreement in conjunction with members of a Dutch-based drug syndicate, and were the known joint co-principals of the Australian end of the importation operation. 4The name given by the Australian Federal Police ("AFP") to the investigation leading to the charges against the accused was Operation Lacerta. The AFP had been notified of possible Australian involvement in the importation of pseudoephedrine by the National Police Agency of the Netherlands ("NPA") who were investigating 35 suspected Dutch-based syndicate members. The NPA investigation was known as Operation Mayer and was not confined to suspected Australian customers, but concerned the supply of pseudoephedrine by the syndicate to customers around the world. 5Members of the Dutch-based syndicate include: Louis (Loek) Weerden ("Weerden"); Michael (Mike) Glen Von Hohenberg ("Von Hohenberg"); Jan Plas ("Plas"); Rene Asbeek- Brusse ("Asbeek-Brusse") and Thomas Van Den Berg ("Van Den Berg"). 6The Crown alleges that the Dutch Syndicate members referred to each other and to Mr Watt and the accused in coded language. It is alleged that they referred to Mr Watt as "Jerry", "the tall one" or "the long one" and the accused as "Jerry's boss" or "Ray". The Crown alleges that the importation bound for Australia was referred to as the "Jerry" shipment or the "210" shipment. A summary of this shipment is contained in paragraph 96 (second item) in the draft Crown case statement. There is no record of this shipment leaving the Congo. 7The principal basis of the accused's application to vacate the trial date and/or for a temporary stay is the contention that the accused would not receive a fair trial if the trial was to proceed on 4 March 2013. The accused's contention is founded upon the following circumstances: (a) the additional brief and disclosure material served by the Crown in late September 2012 and October 2012 that is referred to in paragraphs 106 to 108 and paragraphs 116 to 120 in the affidavit of Charles Parisi, the accused's solicitor, sworn 3 December 2012; (b) the delay in the Crown disclosing the 32 DVD's that contained 67,809 intercepted calls, 23,612 SMS messages and 5,188 facsimiles in the Dutch language; (c) the delay in providing the missing 21 CD's that contained 18,706 intercepted calls, 12,581 SMS messages and 41 facsimiles; (d) a failure by the Crown to disclose the existence of intercepted telephone call transcripts made by Von Hohenberg that are held by Dutch police; and (e) the failure by the Crown to complete their obligation of disclosure by providing the content of intercepted calls, SMS messages and facsimiles of the Dutch syndicate members held by Dutch investigators. 8The Crown opposes the application. Put shortly, the Crown argues that the "interests of justice" militate against the vacation of the trial date or the grant of a temporary stay as: (i) neither the Crown, nor its agencies possess the "missing data" from the Netherlands; (ii) to the extent that material may be missing from the Netherlands the evidence is that it is no longer available (and that while summaries or transcripts, in Dutch, do exist, these are not readily available); (iii) it has not been established that there is any real likelihood that material exists, and has not been provided, which would materially assist the accused; and (iv) the accused has failed to identify any relevant prejudice. 9The Crown submitted that delay in the commencement of the trial may result in the following which are relevant to the considerations of justice: (a) witnesses' recollection of events will fade (there are over 200 witnesses); (b) witnesses may die, become lost or ill. The witness list comprises over 50 witnesses that are presently located overseas; (c) further addition to the cost of proceedings; (d) concerns as to possible contact between the accused and any witnesses; (e) inconvenience to witnesses; and (f) loss of public confidence in the administration of justice. 10The focus of the hearing was upon the missing Dutch electronic material. Little attention was given by the accused to the AFP intercept material, the subject of proposed order three of the motion. 11Mr Avni Djemal of counsel appeared for the accused and Mr Hament Dhanji SC with Ms Sophia Beckett appeared for the Crown. 12Before proceeding further, it is convenient to set out a summarised history of the proceedings, which is drawn from the Crown's written submissions and Mr Parisi's affidavit. The accused accepts that the Crown's history is broadly accurate. History of the proceedings 13The accused and Watt were arrested on 25 September 2008 and appeared in the Central Local Court on that day. Orders were made by the Magistrate for service of the brief of evidence. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions ("CDPP") has had conduct of this matter since that time. 14The Brief of Evidence served on the defence by the CDPP in mid 2009 consisted of approximately 50 volumes of material such as statements and annexures in addition to 79 discs containing electronic material to be relied on by the prosecution. Of these discs, 41 contained telephone intercept ("Tl") product from Australia and 10 contained Tl product from the Netherlands. Operation Lacerta recorded approximately 250,000 "connections" between telecommunications services intercepted under warrants granted pursuant to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. However, only about 1,500 of these connections were contained in the brief of evidence. 15During the period of time that the matter was before the Local Court, a number of CDs and DVDs containing electronically recorded material were served upon the defence, both as part of the brief and by way of either disclosure or pursuant to a defence request for material. 16Committal proceedings commenced on 20 April 2010 and continued on 22, 27 to 29 April 2010 on which date the proceedings were adjourned to 13 September 2010 for four days. 17On 1 June 2010, disclosure material comprising all Dutch Tl material in the possession of the AFP and the CDPP and provided by the Netherlands in response to a Mutual Assistance Request by the Australian Government in Operation Lacerta was served on the defence, comprising 64 CDs. The material contained on these discs is mostly in Dutch. Ten discs of transcribed Tl material based on this Dutch material had previously been served on the defence as part of the brief of evidence. The AFP also served a CD containing a schedule (called a 'BRIO report') of 130,000 intercepted calls involving the accused and/ or Mr Watt. The BRIO database includes brief summaries of the content of these connections, and has a search facility for names, phone numbers, text and dates. Calls recorded, but made by members of the public, calls made after 8 January 2008 and calls between associates of Mr Watt and the accused that did not involve either of them, were not included. 18The accused was invited on 1 June 2010 to access the calls after the calls that were required for review or for supply had been specified. On 28 May 2012, 242 calls were requested by Mr Parisi, and supplied on 26 July 2012. 19Conditional bail was granted to Mr Watt on 11 August 2010 and the accused on 24 December 2010. 20On 14 September 2010, the committal hearing continued. The matter was adjourned to 15 December 2010 so that the evidence of Asbeek-Brusse could be taken in person. 21On 9 November 2010, a subpoena was issued by the accused on the NSW Crime Commission ("NSWCC"). The subpoena sought the production of "all documents, notes, intelligence reports, memorandums, statements, emails and communications related to Mark Standen ("Standen") and James Kinch ("Kinch") having possible connections in 2006 to criminal activity, including but not limited to the importation of drugs". 22The NSWCC subpoena was returnable on 3 December 2011 and adjourned to 10 December 2011. The terms of the subpoena were broadened by consent via a letter from the accused's then solicitor dated 8 December 2010. On 10 December 2011, some documents were produced by the NSWCC and the subpoena was adjourned to 15 December 2010. The subpoena was mentioned on several further occasions. 23On 15 December 2010, the defence applied for an adjournment of the committal proceedings on the basis that, inter alia, the committal could not proceed until the trial of Mark Standen was completed and the brief of evidence in his case had been disclosed to the accused. 24On 16 and 17 December 2010, the committal proceedings continued. The matter was adjourned to 4 July 2011 for five days so that the evidence of Asbeek-Brusse could be taken in person and the NSWCC could comply with the subpoena that had been issued on behalf of the accused. 25On 4 to 6 July 2011, the committal proceedings continued. On 6 July 2011, the defence sought an adjournment of the proceedings until after the NSWCC subpoena was complied with, on the basis that those documents were required in order to cross-examine Federal Agent Chad Aston ("Aston"). The matter was adjourned to 19-22 December 2011 for the hearing of the final evidence of Aston and the completion of the committal proceedings. The subpoena was adjourned to 19 September 2011. 26In August 2011, the CDPP provided the defence, at their request, with a copy of the Standen Brief of Evidence. The charges against Standen and Bakhos Jalalaty ("Jalalaty") arose from Operation Octans, the AFP investigation into the importation of about 300 kilos of pseudoephedrine involving Standen, Jalalaty and Kinch covering a period between mid January 2007 until June 2008. The "Standen" brief was served in electronic form consisting of 3 discs containing the entirety of the AFP GEMS brief as relied upon in the trial of Standen as well as in hard copy. 27On 28 October 2011, subpoenas were issued by the accused on the Australian Crime Commission (the "ACCC"), the NSWCC, and the AFP and were returnable on 8 November 2011. 28On 8 November 2011, the accused filed a Notice of Motion in respect of an application for a stay or adjournment of the committal proceedings. 29On 5 December 2011, 26 discs were produced to the Local Court in answer to the subpoena. These discs comprised an incomplete set of the 32 CD - TI material in Dutch, obtained from the Netherlands in response to a request for assistance in relation to Operation Octans and was disclosed to the defence in the prosecution of Standen. 30On 6 December 2011 the accused's application for a stay was stood over until 19 December 2011. The magistrate was advised that the CDPP would assist the defence by providing the accused with a fresh and complete copy of the "Standen disclosure material" which comprised 32 discs. 31In early December 2011, 32 DVDs were served on the accused, comprising the intercept material recorded by the Dutch in respect of the Dutch Operation Mayer investigations ("the Dutch electronic material"). 32The accused retained Damir Cuca, a computer data analyst, to analyse the Dutch electronic material. In his second report dated 14 December 2011, Mr Cuca concluded that: (i) there are 34,417 telephone calls within the Dutch electronic material; (ii) there are 11,400 telephone calls identified within the Dutch electronic material for which there was no physical audio file; (iii) there are 8,679 records identified as SMS messages; (iv) there are 4,348 identified SMS records where no data of the SMS records has been provided; (v) there are 1,021 identified intercepted facsimiles; and (vi) there are 544 identified facsimile records where no data of the facsimile has been provided. 33By letter dated 5 April 2012, the CDPP replied to correspondence from Mr Parisi advising that further material sought from overseas authorities would need to be obtained via s 10 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth), and that the CDPP was not able to request that the Attorney-General make such a request to the Dutch Government due to the "lack of specificity as to precisely what is sought, and for what purpose. " 34On 1 May 2012, Mr Parisi wrote to the CDPP advising that the issue of the missing Dutch electronic material was not resolved and requested that the CDPP provide information to the defence in regard to the DVD's and CD's that were provided to the AFP as part of their Mutual Assistance Request ("MAR") to the Dutch Authorities. 35On 29 May 2012, Mr Parisi together with Mr Cuca attended the AFP to confirm that the accused had been provided with such discs as were held by the AFP. As a result of this meeting it became apparent that the set of discs provided to the AFP (and, consequently, those provided to the accused) by the Dutch was incomplete. 36On 25 September 2012, the Crown served three ring bound folders on the accused which included a witness statement of Federal Agent Adam Jones annexing the transcripts and audio of 102 additional telephone call and transcripts of 244 additional SMS messages, witness statements of Aston annexing transcripts and audio of 167 additional intercepted telephone calls and the briefs in the prosecutions of Scott Andrew Miller and Jamie Maher. 37On 30 October 2012, further statements of Aston with audio recordings of 21 intercepted telephone calls, the NSW Police Brief of Evidence in the prosecution of Steven Spaliveiro, a copy of a statement and undertaking to give evidence against the accused from Source 463706 and other material was served on the accused. The Spaliveiro brief consists of 136 Police witness statements and 62 lay witness statements of approximately 2,400 pages. The "missing" Dutch electronic material 38In accordance with the Crown's duty of disclosure, the accused has been provided with all of the Dutch electronic material that has been supplied by the National Police Agency of the Netherlands (NPA) to the AFP. However, it is clear from Mr Cuca's analysis and Sergeant Hendricus De Hoogen's ("De Hoogen") evidence that there is a large body of data missing from the material provided by the Dutch to the AFP. 39De Hoogen, a member of the NPA, who played a central role in Operation Mayer, gave evidence that all calls that were captured by the NPA Interception Unit were copied onto 53 CD's and 32 DVD's and that this material had been provided to the AFP. He had subsequently established that 21 discs were missing from the set of 53 CD's and 32 DVD's given to the AFP. He explained that telephone data might be missing due to compatibility issues between telecom service providers in the Netherlands and the NPA's Comlog system resulting in recorded calls but no audio product attached. He said that calls had also been edited as confidential communications. He opined that SMS data could be missing as the practice had been to use SMS messages as part of "stealth" surveillance. Furthermore, De Hoogen testified that capturing facsimile records was problematic under the Comlog system and recorded "No image available". 40De Hoogen said that Dutch police could not go back to the Comlog system and recreate the missing discs. However, either summaries or transcripts were prepared contemporaneously as the intercepts were recorded and listened to. For each intercepted call there would either be a summary or transcription, which De Hoogen said are stored in a national police system (BVO) that is used for all police investigations in the Netherlands. He described the difficulties that would be involved in obtaining copies of all the Operation Mayer files from the BVO system. He thought that there may be 100,000 or more phone calls transcribed or summarised and the task of downloading this material would be huge. A significant allocation of police resources would be required and it could not be done on a police request. As such, a Mutual Assistance Request would be required. 41In cross examination, De Hoogen agreed that the extraction of summaries of transcripts from the BVO system would be assisted by the provision of the warrant ID, record ID, MSN ID and telephone number, but said that one item that was missing which would make the task easier was the record number of the database that the call was in. On this topic, De Hoogen's evidence included the following (T61 15-27): "Q. If you were given the task, assuming it could be identified and we could get 400 calls, would it take more than an week? [sic] A. WITNESS: Four hundred calls? Q. I will give you 400 identifiable numbers and telephone calls, how long would that take someone to go it, to print a transcript? [sic] A. WITNESS: I don't know. It could be a week or could be more or less. It is difficult. I don't know. When we make a print of something it's that is interesting for our investigation, we do it right away. It is one by one. It doesn't take extra time. So when you have to search through all of these conversations and ... print it out ... that's a lot of work. But in the end everything is possible. It takes a lot of time." 42And (T62 3-6): "Q. It could be done in a week or two? A. WITNESS: Four hundred? Q. Yes? A. WITNESS: Yes, maybe." 43In further cross-examination, De Hoogen agreed that a large number of calls made by Irwin Beekelaar ("Beekelaar") had been intercepted. He agreed that the NPA investigation had started with Beekelaar. De Hoogen said that Beekelaar was the person who brought people together including Weerden. He could not explain why the Dutch electronic material supplied to the AFP did not include "lots of" Beekelaar's calls (T64 45-50). 44Von Hohenberg's telephone, De Hoogen said, had been intercepted by the Germans and the Austrians and the transcripts of these intercepted calls were in the NPA files in Holland and would require a Mutual Assistance Request for their production. 45In a statement dated 10 December 2012, Aston, who was responsible for the selection of Dutch electronic material to be included in the Operation Lacerta brief of evidence, details at paragraph 28 the review process that he adopted, which included travelling to the Netherlands in July 2009. Aston had Dutch police officers perform key word searches of the Comlog system (such as "210 kg", "Jerry", "Ray", "Jan", "Congo", "Australia"), to ensure that relevant Dutch TI product had not been missed. Any identified TI product was copy onto a new CD and has been served on the accused. 46I do not propose to discuss in detail the evidence of Mr Parisi. Mr Parisi summarised at paragraph 79 of his affidavit the Dutch electronic material as follows: "(i) Total Telephone Calls 120,932 (ii) Telephone calls where data is missing 28,281 (iii) Total SMS Messages 44,872 (iv) SMS Messages where data is missing 12,676 (vi) [sic] Total Facsimile Transmissions 6,250 (vii) Facsimile messages where data is missing 3,083" 47Mr Parisi deposes at paragraph 88 of his affidavit that the Dutch electronic material appears to provide the intercepted telephone calls of the telephone used by Weerden and does not include calls made by Von Hohenberg, Plas, Asbeek-Brusse, Beekelaar or Van Den Berg other than calls made by them to Weerden or made to them by Weerden. 48Mr Parisi identifies at paragraph 90 that Kinch uses the word "Jerry" in an email dated 22 August 2007 and at paragraph 93, SMS transmissions from Dutch telephone service number 316 404 81370 to Beekelar from which an inference can be drawn that Beekelar was referred to as "tall one". At paragraph 105, Mr Parisi states that it appears from his review of the Dutch electronic material that most of the missing data are concentrated for the period between March 2006 to July 2006. He refers at paragraphs 98 to 104 to matters that relate to Ronald Cornelis Vink ("Vink") a member of the Dutch-based syndicate. The competing arguments 49Mr Djemal submitted that the missing Dutch electronic material would assist the defence on issues such as the intended recipients of the proposed importation to Australia and to demonstrate the legitimate contacts between Mr Watt and Dutch syndicate members such as Plas and Weerden. Mr Djemal contended that the evidence adduced in support of the application demonstrated that there was a real possibility that the missing material would point to persons other than the accused and Mr Watt as being the recipients of the intended 245kg (gross weight) importation of pseudoephedrine. Particular emphasis was placed on the missing material assisting in the identification of the recipients of a 15kg importation into Australia, an importation that was said to be believed by investigators not to be directed to Mr Watt or the accused. Mr Djemal argued that this was relevant to the 245kg (gross weight) intended importation as both were addressed to HWI Breville. 50It was further submitted that the missing material relates to communications between significant members of the Dutch-based syndicate of which one member Vink (a.k.a Blondie) was present in Australia at the time Plas was in this country. Mr Djemal contended that neither Aston nor De Hoogen were aware that Vink was in Australia at the same time as Plas and any inquiry relating to Vink, as a possible recipient of the 245kg (gross weight) import into Australia was not undertaken. This was said to be shown by "the very limited Comlog system search" undertaken by Aston in the Netherlands. The missing material was also required to put into context the limited selection of Dutch calls being relied upon by the Crown. Mr Djemal specifically referred to Aspeek-Brusse's evidence in the committal hearing that "Jerry" was the package, not the person. 51Mr Djemal pointed out that the accused had not been aware of the existence of the transcripts and summaries on the Dutch BVO system prior to De Hoogen's testimony. He referred to De Hoogen's evidence that it would take about two weeks for the transcripts of 400 calls to be provided and said that the accused could narrow that time by specifying the calls required. The calls had been reviewed and identified with precision. Provision of copies of BVO reports and the Von Hohenberg transcripts, Mr Djemal contended, could satisfy the Crown's disclosure obligations. He asked that the trial date be vacated and listed to commence towards the end of June 2013. 52Mr Dhanji accepted that De Hoogen's explanations as to the missing Dutch electronic material were unlikely to account for the number of missing calls suggested in the reports of Mr Cuca. The central issue in the proceedings appeared to be whether the accused was a customer of the Dutch syndicate and the onus of proof was on the Crown. Mr Dhanji argued that proving that there was another customer in a case where it is accepted that there are multiple customers did not go to whether the accused was a customer other than to the extent that care would need to be taken in terms of the Crown's onus with respect to particular communications. 53The Dutch electronic material, Mr Dhanji reminded the court, concerned the entire investigation of the Dutch-based syndicate members with the movement of drugs to other customers around the world, only part of which related to the Australian operations focussed on by Operation Lacerta and Octans. Mr Dhanji referred to the evidence of De Hoogen and Aston that efforts had been made to identify and capture anything relevant to the Australian arm of the enterprise. He submitted that the material recorded and contained in the original CD's served as part of the brief of evidence represented the totality of the intercept material available and relevant to the investigation. 54Mr Dhanji in written submissions at paragraphs 54 to 62, made specific reference to Mr Parisi's affidavit and agreed that there may be more than one reference to "the tall one" or a "boss" or even another "Jerry", but argued that did not detract from a powerful circumstantial case that the "Jerry" referred to in Operation Lacerta is used in reference to Mr Watt and the reference to "Jerry's boss" on 23 April 2006, is used in reference to the accused. Furthermore, Mr Dhanji contended that even if a meeting had taken place between Vink and Plas when Plas was in Australia, there was nothing inconsistent with a meeting having also taken place between Plas and Mr Watt. 55The Crown's position was that the CDPP has complied with, and indeed had exceeded its duty of disclosure. Further, and independent to any duty of disclosure, there was no risk of an unfair trial. Consideration 56The legal principles governing the grant of a temporary stay are well established. The test to be applied is what the interests of justice require in the case. It is not necessary for the accused to show that he would not receive a fair trial, but rather that there was a risk that the trial would not be fair: Re K [2002] NSWCCA 374. The touchstone is fairness: Petroulias v R [2007] NSWCCA 154; (2007) 176 A Crim R 302. 57The Crown does not dispute that there is a large amount of the Dutch electronic material that is missing and was understood by the CDPP and AFP to be available when the Operation Mayer DVD's were served in early December 2011. It was Mr Cuca's careful analysis that discovered the discrepancy between identified material and data provided. 58I accept that the Crown has complied with its obligation of disclosure by providing all of the Dutch electronic material in the possession of the CDPP and AFP to the accused. However, transcripts and summaries of the missing material are available on the Netherlands National Police Agency BVO system. 59The draft Crown case summary reveals that the communications between the Dutch-based syndicate members are an important part of the Crown case. Of particular significance is the assertion by the Crown that the syndicate members referred to each other and to Mr Watt and the accused in coded language. 60Aston's attention to capturing from the Operation Mayer material anything relevant to the accused does not, in my opinion, ensure a fair trial. What might be or might not be considered relevant by the Crown may be far removed from the accused's understanding of relevance in maintaining his defence. The fragility of placing reliance upon Aston's efforts is demonstrated by the AFP's and NPA's incognizance of Vink's presence in Australia. 61In my opinion, there is the potential for the accused to uncover evidence from access to the transcripts and summaries of the missing material that may materially assist his defence. Whilst the accused has already ascertained from data presently available that code names relied upon by the Crown have been use in other contexts, the discovery of further usage inconsistent with the Crown's code has the capacity to weaken the Crown case. 62Furthermore, the detection of material relating to Vink's visit to Australia and the asserted 15kg importation might undermine proof by the Crown that the accused and Mr Watt were to be the recipients of the 245kg (gross weight) importation, notwithstanding Aston's testimony that he believed there was no such 15kg importation of pseudoephedrine into Australia during Operation Lacerta. 63The touchstone of fairness, however, does not require transcripts or summaries of all of the missing Dutch electronic material to be provided to the accused. Mr Djemal's sensible approach in the cross-examination of De Hoogen that a Mutual Assistance Request might be restricted to 400 items of missing data recognised the considerable burden that would be imposed on the Netherlands as the Requested State and the likelihood that such a number, so confined, could be identified by the accused with precision. 64Von Hohenberg's role in the intended 245kg (gross weight) importation is disclosed in the draft Crown case summary. He is regarded by the Crown as having been a notable member of the Dutch-based syndicate. Particular use of the word "Jerry" appears to have been made in the communications between Weerden and Von Hohenberg. It seems that the accused was unaware of the existence of the transcripts of the intercepts of Von Hohenberg's phone that were made by the German and Austrian authorities until De Hoogen disclosed that this material was in the NPA files. I consider that it is "on the cards" that access to these transcripts will assist the accused. 65I conclude that there is a risk that the accused's trial will not be fair unless he is provided with some of the transcripts of the missing Dutch electronic material and the transcripts of the Von Hohenberg phone calls. 66It is in the interests of justice that the trial date be vacated and a temporary stay granted. To avoid undue delay in the commencement of the trial, the request for an application under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Kingdom of the Netherlands) Regulations is to be made by the CDPP in accordance with the court's directions. The AFP intercept material concerning the accused 67It is unsurprising that little emphasis was placed by the accused upon the provision of further AFP intercept material. The accused has had the BRIO report since 1 June 2010. On 28 May 2012, 242 calls were requested by Mr Parisi, which were supplied by the AFP on 26 July 2012. No further calls have been requested. 68The evidence before me concerning the AFP intercept material does not support the vacation of the trial date or an order for a temporary stay. 69Accordingly, I make the following orders: Orders