R v SMP

Additional Section 21A(2) Considerations

The offending is further aggravated in relation to the two matters to which pleas have been entered by reason of section 21A(2)(eb). These offences were committed in the home of the victim. As Jonson v R [2016] NSWCCA 286 at [40] confirms, it is no longer the law that such a reality cannot be taken into account if the offender and the victim share the same house. Why that is so is explained by Bathurst CJ in R v Lulham [2016] NSWCCA 287 at [5]. The Chief Justice said:- "The reason it can be taken into account as an aggravating factor is that an offence to which the subsection applies involves the violation of the victim's reasonable expectation of safety and security in his or her home".
The Crown argues further that the offending is aggravated by reason of a breach of trust on the part of the defendant. In support of that argument the Court's attention is drawn to the decision in PWB v R [2011] NSWCCA 84 at [19]. The observations of Hulme J are worthy of repetition. His Honour said: "The Applicant abused his position in the family as an older brother. Although he was not in a position of parental authority, the relationship between the siblings nonetheless called for trust, respect and support, not abuse".
I also agree with the submission by the Crown to the effect that the victim was a vulnerable victim for the purposes of section 21A(2)(l). A young child at the ages of 12 and 13 does not have the life skills or knowledge to effectively resist the type of conduct imposed on her by the defendant. Because of the age of the victim consent is not an issue. Silent acceptance of the defendant's behaviour is not informed consent. The conduct is not mitigated in any way by the submission of the victim. Given her age in these matters it is of no relevance. I adopt the submission of the Crown in citing Basten J in R v Nelson [2016] NSWCCA 130 as to his honour's observations of "lack of opposition". Counsel for the defendant was right not to venture down this avenue.
At this point it is appropriate to deal with the issue of objective seriousness. It is the view of the Court the conduct of the accused in respect of those matters to which pleas of guilty have been entered is towards the upper level of objective seriousness. Bearing in mind the aggravating factors found to apply under section 21A(2) the moral culpability of the defendant is high.
I turn to the subjective factors relevant to the defendant.
The defendant is 51 years of age. He has no prior criminal antecedents. In assessing the subjective factors I have been assisted by submissions from counsel, a Pre-Sentence Report and a psychological report. The offender is married and resides with his wife, three children and his mother. Ironically the defendant's wife is a senior practitioner in the field of sexual assault services.
The defendant works in real estate and is regarded by his employer, who is aware of these proceedings, as "exceptional". He is well connected within his community and an active member of his church. From a social perspective he presents as an otherwise responsible, contributing, law abiding member of the community and as one who has a deep connection with family. The latter observation is further enhanced by the contribution of the defendant and his wife in fostering two children in addition to their natural children and the apparent fact that he remains in contact with them after they reached adulthood.
Given the course his life has taken since the commission of the offences emphasis on specific deterrence and general deterrence assume a lesser mantle of importance. The offender is unlikely to reoffend and thus has good prospects of rehabilitation.
Counsel for the defendant urged a number of additional considerations on the court in mitigation of penalty. Primarily it was argued that a sentence of imprisonment would be inappropriate, given the age of the defendant at the time of the offending and the jurisdiction in which it may have been dealt with to finality.
It is suggested that the appropriate outcome and one analogous to the speculative outcomes of a Children's Court in 1984 and 1985 would be to apply the provisions of section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 on the basis the defendant would have been unlikely to have been convicted or penalised had he been dealt with in those years. No information has been put to the Court to support this contention. There is however authority for the position that juveniles during that era were not dealt with leniently for this type of conduct.
The decision in PWB is of particular relevance in these proceedings because in that matter the offender was about 17 years of age; the victim was about 10 years of age. The offending occurred in 1987. Complaint was made in 2007 and the offender was sentenced to a not insignificant period of imprisonment. It is important to note that the Court of Criminal Appeal, whilst reducing the period of imprisonment significantly, confirmed the finding that a custodial sentence was appropriate. Noting that counsel for the defendant submitted that his client should be dealt with pursuant to section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for the offending the decision provides more than sufficient rebuttal without more to that suggestion.
The decision also lends support to the rejection of the submission by defence counsel that this Court should proceed to sentence on the basis that the offences to which the defendant has pleaded guilty would have been dealt with in the Children's jurisdiction. That assumption is clearly at odds with the detailed review of sentences undertaken by Hume J in PWB.
The position with which the Court of Criminal Appeal was faced in PWB is not materially different to that confronting this Court - the problem of sentencing an offender for historical offences. In MC v R [2017] NSWCCA 316 it is settled law that a Court must approach the sentencing of the offender on the basis of the maximum penalties that existed at the time of offending and in accordance with sentencing patterns and procedures (including the structure of such sentences) then prevailing.
These principles bring the court back to other observations made in PWB and historical perspective.
In 1984 and 1985 criminal offences brought against persons under the age of 18 were subject to the provisions of the Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW). Section 4 of that Act defined the categories of juveniles. A child was a person under the age of 16. A young person was a person aged between 16 and 18. The defendant in these proceedings would appropriately be described as a young person, not a child.
Discretionary authority for a Children's Magistrate to deal with an indictable offence was established by section 12(1(b) of the Act. Where such discretion was exercised the sentencing options were set out in section 83 of the Act. Such outcomes ranged from a decision not to proceed to a finding of guilt pursuant to section 83(3) or to commit the young person to an institution for a period not exceeding 3 years pursuant to section 83(2)(d). There was however another power, consistent with the vesting of discretion. Section 86(2) allowed a Children's Magistrate to commit a young person for trial to be dealt with according to law. Curiously, appellate court decisions dealing with the sentencing environment during this era seem not to address this option.
It is also important to note that the statement of legislative policy set out in section 6 of the Children's (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), which encourages a perhaps more understanding, lenient appreciation of offending behaviour with a focus on rehabilitation, was not contained in the Child Welfare Act.
Accordingly against that legislative background it would be a mistake to assume that proceedings such as those before me would have been dealt with in the Children's jurisdiction. Why that is so is demonstrated in the facts and decision of PWB itself and some of the other cases described in that decision. The facts in PWB and the relative ages of the offender and the victim are not greatly dissimilar from the situation in these proceedings. The objective seriousness of the conduct in these proceedings however is at a higher level than those described in PWB.
In addition to the decision in PWB there is the decision of R v Ware (unreported, NSWCCA, 9 July 1997) - set out at [84] of PWB. Although the legislative scheme had by then changed and the maximum penalty with it for one of the offences, the nature of the conduct is very similar to the behaviour in these matters. Once again this was a matter dealt with on appeal from the District Court. The offender was 17 at the time of the offence. This matter related to offending that took place in 1997, a date after the commencement of the Children's (Criminal Proceedings) Act. The section 6 considerations in that matter did not cause the prosecution to be completed in the Children's Court.
Rather than accepting a default position that the Children's Court deals with matters of this nature as a routine and would have done so in 1984 and 1985, each case highlights the preferred inference, that over the years the Children's Court magistrates judge each indictable matter on its merits and choose the considered appropriate jurisdiction accordingly. I can make no finding that this would not have occurred in these matters had they been charged during the years in which the offending occurred or before the offender became an adult.
Nor can I come to a conclusion that the defendant would not have been committed to an institution for a lengthy period of time had he been dealt with as a juvenile. Objectively, the offending would likely have been viewed as serious. It should not be overlooked that in less than 2 years after the second offence was committed the legislature redefined the nature of the conduct the subject of the charges in question and placed them in a category that made an offender liable for a significantly greater penalty than that which applied to the offences of assault with an act of indecency.
On the question of remorse counsel submitted that the transcript of telephone conversations between the victim and the defendant before charges were laid indicate contrition and remorse. Those conversations were recorded at the instigation of police. I accept that there is a degree of remorse on the part of the accused albeit somewhat belated. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the victim has carried the debilitating consequences of the defendant's conduct with her for decades. Her life has been severely affected from the very beginning of his conduct, criminal offending conduct for which the victim, given her age at the time, bears absolutely no responsibility whatsoever. The impact of remorse for the defendant is arguably something that has occurred only in recent times.

The Sentence

I restate the conclusion that there is no basis upon which these proceedings are amenable to disposition pursuant to section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. That was a view taken by the District Court in relation to an historical prosecution and confirmed by the Criminal Court of Appeal in TC v R [2016] NSWCCA 3. It is appropriate to note that in that case the offending was at a lower level than that which occurred in these proceedings. For my own part although the Criminal Court of Appeal confirmed the first instance decision to release the offender on a section 9 bond, that is not a sentence that is appropriate in these matters.
The defendant argues that the need for general deterrence is not a major factor because of the delay in the prosecutions and that there is no need for specific deterrence because the defendant is effectively rehabilitated.
It is the case that general deterrence may be given less weight when the time between offending and sentence is considerable and there has been no further offending. However, as Howie J said in PH v R [2009] NSWCCA 161 at [32]: "This is not to imply that general deterrence is of no significance. Potential offenders should understand the Courts will treat these types of offences harshly notwithstanding that extensive delay occurs before the offender is punished".
I would agree that the need for specific deterrence is affected by the period of time that has elapsed between the offending and sentence. There has been no further offending as an adult. The psychologist report assesses the defendant as having " a low risk of engaging in sexual recidivism" although it does highlight a willingness on the part of the offender to participate in psycho educational counselling to address issues raised by the current charges.
In its detailed and helpful submissions the Crown suggests these matters should be dealt with by way of sentences of imprisonment. Such a view is understandable. A society which is now much better informed and alive to the fact of sexual assault and insightful as to the long term consequences for victims expect courts to do their best to stamp out such unacceptable wickedness. Where it is appropriate for a court to take such a course it should not be deterred from its task merely because the offender was a juvenile.
In these proceedings the Court must undertake a difficult sentencing exercise, balancing the objective seriousness of the conduct, which takes into account the aggravating factors and hence level of moral culpability against those factors, such as prior good character, the utilitarian value of the plea and prospects of rehabilitation that operate to mitigate the penalty that would otherwise be applicable. It must do so by doing the best it can to reflect the sentencing attitudes that prevailed in 1984 and 1985 and with the knowledge that the community today is unlikely to understand the constraints that superior court decisions, such as MC place on a sentencing court.
It is impossible to know with any certainty whether a matter such as this would have remained in the Children's jurisdiction in 1985. It is possible to conclude that the gravity of the conduct would make it less likely to have been dealt with without a conviction. It is possible to come to a view that the seriousness of the conduct is so great that it would have resulted in a committal to an institution and it is possible as indicated earlier, by noting similar cases proceeding on appeal against sentence from the District Court to the Court of Criminal Appeal to conclude that a Children's Magistrate may just as likely have committed a young person to the District Court to be dealt with according to law.
Without any material to suggest the contrary it is the preferred view of this Court that the latter outcome would have been highly likely. That being so it is appropriate to acknowledge again the observations of Hulme J in PWB and the sentences reflected in the Court's review of those imposed at first instance in the District Court.
Taking both the aggravating and mitigating factors into account and giving due recognition to the utilitarian value of the late plea, as well as noting that sentences of imprisonment require a court to be satisfied according to section 5 of the Act that "having considered all possible alternatives that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate", I come to the view that the section 5 threshold in these matters has been crossed. Whilst I have come to the view that imprisonment is required it is important to again acknowledge the observations of superior courts in relation to sentencing in general in 1984-85, namely that sentences imposed at that time were of a lesser duration than those that would be imposed in the present day and must be tailored accordingly.
The sentence imposed on Count 1 in PWB was one of 4 months imprisonment. The offending behaviour in these matters is far more serious in both matters. The 1985 offence is more serious than the 1984 course of conduct and warrants a lengthier sentence. In reaching sentence the matter on the Form 1 has been taken into account. It is significantly less serious such that it plays no real part in extending either sentence.
The defendant is convicted on each charge. He is sentenced on sequence 7 to imprisonment for a period of 6 months. He is further sentenced on sequence 8 to imprisonment for a minimum period of 9 months with an additional period of 3 months.
Having determined the length of each sentence it remains, in accordance with the principles set out in R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17, to determine the manner in which it is to be served. Here again appellate court decisions point in different directions. In PWB the Court was urged to release the offender on a bond under section 12 of the Act. Justice Hulme rejected that submission. He did so on two bases; that the application of section 12(2) precluded such an option, presumably because the appellant had been in custody serving the first sentence at the time the proposal was put to the court, and secondly that because there was no risk of the offender reoffending a good behaviour bond was not a sensible result.
A contrary position was taken in TC (supra) where, in rejecting an appeal seeking the substitution of a bond under section 10 for the one pursuant to section 9 imposed at first instance, the Court reimposed the section 9 bond. A bond under section 12 is higher up in the sentencing hierarchy. Although a more lenient outcome, suspended sentences have nonetheless been recognized by courts as a penalty with potential significance. As the Court of Criminal Appeal observed in Zamagias at [32]: "It is perhaps trite to observe that although the purpose of punishment is the protection of the community that purpose can be achieved in an appropriate case by a sentence designed to assist in the rehabilitation of the offender at the expense of deterrence, retribution and denunciation. In such a case a suspended sentence may be particularly effective and appropriate."
These observations are qualified by the observation in R v Taylor [2000] NSWCCA 442 wherein Wood CJ at CL observed that where a full time custodial order was necessary to reflect adequately the element of general deterrence, a suspended sentence provides very little if anything by way of general deterrence. In the ordinary sense it would not be appropriate to consider suspending a sentence for matters of this nature. Swiftly prosecuted general deterrence is undoubtedly of significant importance. However, where delay is significant, the conduct ceased and the offender has done much to engage in society in a constructive and contributing manner, general deterrence becomes of lesser importance but as was said in PH (supra) not of no significance at all.
On balance a sentence of full time imprisonment at this point will have significant consequences for the offender's family, including his children. Whilst impact on third parties is not of itself a persuasive consequence unless the circumstances are exceptional, it is nonetheless a very real impost to a family with three young children. The consequences for the offender's family do not outweigh in any fashion the consequences of his conduct with which the victim has had to suffer for so many years but a court should not sentence in a vacuum.
On balance I have come to the view that the purposes of sentencing reflected in the need for denunciation and retribution along with the impact of the crime on the victim can be achieved by suspending the sentences of imprisonment, with the proviso that the defendant be required to undergo the psycho educational counselling program proposed by the Forensic Psychologist, Ms Jenny Howell.
The formal orders of the Court are that the sentences of imprisonment imposed be suspended on condition the offender enters a bond in relation to each sentence. The duration of the bond is to be commensurate with the length of each sentence of imprisonment imposed. Each bond is conditioned that the offender be of good behaviour. It is a further condition that he accepts the supervision and direction of the Community Corrections Officer for the periods of each bond and obeys all reasonable direction of that officer including a direction to participate in psycho educational counselling and such other programs as may be required by the supervising officer.
Upon entering each bond the defendant has 48 hours in which to report to the Community Corrections Office at Dee Why.
The defendant is to be registered as a registrable person under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW). Judge Graeme Henson AM Chief Magistrate

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