49 One important matter, the subject of considerable discussion, was the discount to be given for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty. I was given some details from the bar table which I am prepared to accept and as I understand the matter, whilst this matter could have been dealt with through the conferencing system, the application by the prisoner pursuant to s 91 Criminal Procedure Act for witnesses or a witness to be called to give evidence, meant that there was no case conferencing. As I understood the submissions made, and I have no transcript of the submissions, the provisions in ss 16 and 17 Trial Case Conferencing Act did not apply. However, I am informed that the prisoner did plead guilty and was committed for sentence at the Local Court before any requirement was made by the Local Court for witnesses to actually attend. The chronology is not entirely clear, but my understanding was that on the day the s 91 application was to be heard, indication of a plea of guilty was given, or a plea of guilty was given. It was argued on behalf of the prisoner that the situation thus was not much different from what might have happened had the matter gone through case conferencing. The prisoner pleaded guilty during case conferencing and thus was entitled to the relevant discount of twenty-five percent under the relevant legislation. This is very much a case where the 'common law' principles in Thomson and Houlton come into contact, and overlap with, the case conferencing legislation. On the other hand the prisoner was not cooperative in the investigation and it is quite clear in relation to each of the three offences with which I am concerned, he was challenging the allegation of 'driver' up to a point when he pleaded guilty or indicated a wish to plead guilty. The Crown was put to the expense, if that be the correct word, of DNA testing to which I have referred, of obtaining expert reports in relation to matters that might otherwise have been self evident from the circumstances of the collision. I have had close regard to the guideline judgement of Thomson and Houlton, so far as it applies. I have had very much assistance from the submissions, but ultimately I could not afford the prisoner a discount of twenty-five percent given what was outlined even by his counsel. There was of course some delay in the matter coming to the District Court and the Crown pointed to certain time frames which must be accommodated for conferencing purposes. The fact that the matter was listed for s 91 application shows, at least at one point, a determination to at least explore the strength of the Crown case, in circumstances where, as we now know by his plea, the Crown case was overwhelming. I am of the view I should afford the prisoner a discount of twenty-two and a half percent, upon the otherwise appropriate sentence, in accordance with the discretion available to me under Thomson and Houlton. It is a marginal discount from that advanced by his counsel, but the full discount could not in my view properly be given.