131 To sentence a person of his age for the offence of murder, is a formidable challenge, for which there is very little, if any precedent in this country or elsewhere. In this regard the various decisions concerning the fixing of a tariff arising out of the conviction of the two boys who murdered Jamie Bulger, when they were aged 10 ½ years, particularly that reported in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex Parte Venables in the Court of Appeal [1998] AC 407, House of Lords [1998] AC 467, and the later decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Thompson [2001] 1 All ER 737, provide some, although limited, assistance by reason of the very different sentencing regime there involved.
132 In view of the concerns which I will later mention, in relation to sentencing in a case such as the present, it is convenient to make brief reference to the Bulger case, which fell to be dealt with pursuant to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. Under the sentencing regime so established, the offenders were sentenced to be detained pursuant to her Majesty's pleasure.
133 Pursuant to s 53(1) of the Act "tariff recommendations", concerning the minimum period which would need to expire before the offenders were released, were made in 1993 by the trial judge and by the Lord Chief Justice respectively of 8 and 10 years. In the exercise of the power reserved to the Secretary of State, in 1994, the tariff was set at 15 years, which would have permitted a first review after 12 years (that is, 3 years before the tariff date), so as to determine whether the offenders could be released on licence at the expiry of the tariff. Upon appeal the Secretary of State was found to have taken inappropriate considerations into account and the 15 year tariff was quashed.
134 Following that decision and other proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights, a change of legislative policy was announced so as to allow for the tariff in cases involving children aged under 18 years to be set in open Court. In the meantime, the case was referred back to the Lord Chief Justice for a recommendation which the Secretary of State indicated he would accept.
135 After a consideration of the striking progress and genuine remorse which each of the offenders had displayed over the intervening 7 years, and taking into account the undesirability of undoing the good work which had been achieved, by sending them into young offender or adult institutions, Woolf LCJ refixed the tariff at 8 years (at 742). His Lordship did however indicate that had he been determining the matter in 1993, he would probably have selected 10 years as being the appropriate tariff. Moreover, he made it clear (at 741) that the sentencing regime in existence meant that the offenders would be on licence, and liable to be recalled to custody for the rest of their lives, if they did not comply with the terms of their licence.
136 Nothing approaching this procedure is available to me. If a life sentence were to be specified, I could not fix a non parole period. Moreover, there is no procedure in existence for sentencing a young offender to Her Majesty's pleasure, or for fixing a minimum term and accompanying date for a review as to whether the offender should be released on licence or parole at the end of that period. The only option I have is to fix a head sentence, and if it is one other than imprisonment for life, to specify a non parole period.