"2. Access will normally be granted to non-parties in respect of;
(A) pleadings and judgments in proceedings that have been concluded, except in so far as an order has been made that they or portions of them be kept confidential;
(B) documents that record what was said or done in open court;
(C) material that was admitted into evidence; and
(D) information that would have been heard or seen by and person present in open court,
Unless the Judge or registrar dealing with the application considers that the material or portions of it should be kept confidential. Access to other material will not be allowed unless a registrar or Judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist."
18 The final words of that rule suggest a discretion which is framed in terms of the Judge considering, "that the material or portions of it shall be kept confidential."
19 Counsel for the ABC has drawn attention to a case involving Mr John Marsden. At the very outset of that litigation application was made by Mr Marsden for an injunction to restrain Channel 7 from publication. The application was heard in a small court within the Supreme Court where, as it happened, there were five people present. Channel 7 argued that the presence of those five people, when the application was heard, meant that the matter was then in the public domain, the broadcast having been aired before the Court, including those five individuals.
20 Levine J upheld that argument. He declined to restrain the publication. I have not seen a copy of the Judgment. I am simply repeating the gist of what has been given to me by Counsel. However, its application in this case, it is suggested, is this: At the very outset of this trial, when opening the case to me, the Crown showed me, and those present in court, including journalists, the footage which is now the subject of this application. It cannot therefore be said to be confidential. It is in the public domain. The only inhibition upon its dissemination and repetition is the fact that for the moment the Court has the exhibit to which the broadcasting corporation seeks access. That, in Mr Dawson's submission, is not a relevant consideration. It is in the nature of a mechanical inhibition which should not prevent access.
21 There is some force in that argument. Nonetheless, the matter has been approached before me on the basis that I have a discretion, as I believe I do, even though the matter has been aired in public. I, therefore, turn to the discretion which I have.
22 My attention has been drawn, helpfully, to a number of decisions by judges of this court, mainly the Equity Division, and mainly concerning access to affidavits which are taken as read. They form part of the court file but are not repeated in open court and therefore not available to parties, absent an order making them available by access to the file. A number of Judges have said that such material ought usually be made available. Such limitations as there appear to be upon such access, appear to deal with matters which are not read, that is not relied upon by the parties and which do not form part of the evidence in the proceedings.
23 The Practice Note and the decisions rightly place importance upon the presumption, which is included in the opening words of Pt 97 rule 2, that access will normally be granted. I approach the matter upon the basis that in respect of a public hearing and a matter which is marked as a public exhibit, there is a prima facie right of the public to have access to such material. That prima facie right, however, has been expressed to be subject to the qualification that access should not be granted in circumstances which the Court characterises as wholly exceptional. That was the approach taken by Studdert J in the case of R v LMW [1999] NSWSC 1111, picking up the words of Samuels JA in David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors Holden Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294 at 310.
24 My attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Court of Appeal in John Fairfax Publications v District Court of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 324, in which the Chief Justice dealt with the circumstances in which a non publication order or a suppression order may be appropriate. His Honour referred, amongst other things, to John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465, where McHugh JA said, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, that the fundamental rule of common law was that the administration of justice must take place in open court. A court can only depart from that rule where its observance would frustrate the administration of justice or some other public interest for whose protection Parliament has modified the open justice rule.
25 His Honour went on to say that the principle of open justice also required that nothing should be done to discourage the making of a fair and accurate report of what occurs in a courtroom. Chief Justice Spigelman, with whom Handley JA and Campbell J agreed, characterised the principle of open justice as a human right, as well as a mechanism for ensuring the integrity and efficacy of the institutions of the administration of justice.
26 The issue, therefore, arises whether, in the circumstance of this particular trial, and the exhibit sought, it is appropriate to characterise such circumstances as wholly exceptional.
27 On one previous occasion, I have been confronted with a similar application. I was the trial judge in a case of R v RIK [2004] NSWSC 75, in which the accused was a juvenile, being four days short of his 18th birthday at the time of the alleged offence. He was accused of manslaughter. The circumstances giving rise to the charge concerned an incident on Redfern railway station. It was alleged that, having alighted from a train and without provocation, he began to remonstrate with a person who was sitting on a railway seat and to threaten that person physically, being restrained only by two females who accompanied him.
28 The person who was the subject of these remarks got up, walked around the seat, walked to the edge of the platform, jumped onto the tracks and endeavoured to make his way to the opposite platform. As he did so, a train coming in the opposite direction, on the adjacent platform, collided with him before he reached safety. The video footage was again poignant and graphic.
29 In that case, however, it seemed to me appropriate to accede to an application for access to it. It formed part of the Crown case. It was shown in open court. There were issues of public safety. There were, ultimately, if the accused were convicted, as he was, issues of deterrence. Accordingly, upon application, that footage was released.
30 Once released it then had a great deal of currency in the media coverage which followed. It was obviously more powerful than any description of the same events.
31 There being issues of public safety and public interest, it seemed to me wholly appropriate and entirely consistent with the principles of open justice that such material should be made available, even though the accused was, at the time of the offence, although not at the time of the trial, still a child at law.
32 In this case, however, the public interest in having photographs of the deceased and the accused on that afternoon and in the moments before the death of the young child, is less obvious, although I appreciate that that is not the test.
33 One of the concerns in this case is the future well-being of the accused, since, on any view, whatever the outcome of this trial, and whatever the verdict, she is a person who has experienced major depression and a period of lengthy hospitalisation. She is still under treatment.
34 There are also issues of responsibility. The accused is a person who has raised a defence which, if it is successful, will have the effect that she is not guilty of the murder of her child.
35 Questions arise as to whether the publicity which is intended, and that which is likely to follow, may make this case one which is wholly exceptional. As to that issue, a number of doctors have given evidence. Doctor Parmegiani has given the following evidence of this issue in answer to Counsel for Ms Xu: (T51)
"Q. What is being debated here is the transmission of some part of that footage, not as I understand it, including the final moments but other aspects which would depict the accused and her son in the time immediately before the final moments, or at some time before the final moments, and the issue is whether that transmission would be likely to have any detrimental effect upon the accused?
A. Yes, I believe it would because she obviously knows what comes after, even a small segment of that transmission. So she would be reminded herself of what happened and I would expect that if it is released in the media it would be shown several times, not just once in court, it would have a much larger audience than it had when it was aired here. She may again come across comments from friends, acquaintances or even strangers to the effect that they have seen the footage, and again be reminded of it. I believe this would be a cumulative experience. Seeing once, I think, is bad enough but having to see it several times would be re-exposed to it several times in various ways, would certainly be counter productive."
36 In cross examination by Mr Dawson of Counsel, for the ABC, Dr Parmegiani's attention was drawn to the considerable media coverage of the trial to this point. Dr Parmegiani gave the following evidence: (T58)
"A. Yes, I agreed she has received exposure. My argument is why add to that burden to that exposure; why add more exposure than what has already happened?
Q. If there were to be impact upon the defendant as a result of media coverage of the trial, that impact, would you agree, has to some extent at least already taken place?
A. Yes, some of it has taken place and the more exposure she gets, the more impact she will suffer. That is my argument."
37 In re-examination, Dr Parmegiani said this: (T59)
"Q. In your experience is there a difference or is there potential difference from the impact in relation to the impact upon the accused by reason of media coverage describing the events and the circumstances relating to this case, as opposed to live images of her 4-year old son in the moments being depicted live on television, in the moments before he dies?
A. Yes, well, although it may be a cliché, there is a saying a picture is worth a thousand words. I think being directly visually reminded of the events just preceding the death of her son, may have a significant impact on her well-being.
Q. Doctor, in your opinion is there any difference in relation to the potential impact upon her of the accused viewing the footage on one occasion in the controlled environment of this court on the one hand, and being exposed to it potentially on numerous occasions in an environment that is not controlled?
A. Yes, I think within the local context you may see it as a necessary part of the trial process, something that she can brace herself for, expect and deal with. Whereas any subsequent exposure in my view is totally unnecessary. It doesn't contribute anything to her, either the trial process or clinical progress, it is only for the purpose of the media having access to it and I think it would be counter productive for her."
38 My attention has been drawn to the test which was defined by Spigelman CJ in the John Fairfax publication case. Having said that suppression of material is an exceptional jurisdiction, his Honour then said this at paragraph 94:
"This test required a high level of certainty."