36 In the final analysis it seems that the real complaint is that the April 2007 statement carries greater probative weight than the October 2006 statement and that the Crown will secure the forensic benefit of this were they permitted to lead evidence of it. That is not a matter of itself that can weigh in favour of the exclusion of the evidence under either s 135 or
s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995.
37 If, as I have found, there is a reasonable explanation for the late emergence of this evidence, and since I am satisfied there is no procedural unfairness to the defence in now having to deal with it given that Mr Bussing is yet to be asked questions in chief about his interrogation of the hard drive, and that he was last in the witness box a week ago with the adjournment of his evidence and the Easter break intervening, I am unable to conclude that there is unfairness of the kind with which sections 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act are concerned.
38 It is not suggested that the jury will misuse or misapply the proposed evidence, in fact they will not even know of the contaminated disk and the conclusions Mr Bussing reached in the October 2006 statement unless it is introduced in cross-examination. Even then I fail to see how this would or might reflect unfairly on the accused in the relevant sense. To the contrary, should Mr Bussing be cross-examined about his now abandoned findings it may ultimately serve to undermine the reliability of the conclusions he now expresses.
39 I am not satisfied that there is any danger that the evidence may confuse the jury or cause or result in any undue waste of time of a kind that outweighs the probative value of the evidence which I am satisfied is significant. I am fortified in this view by the adjournment that has resulted from objection being taken to Mr Bussing's evidence on 2 April 2007, and the fact that over the adjournment the defence have had the opportunity to take advice and instruction from their expert advisors.
40 While it is regrettable that Mr Bussing's refined or revised opinion emerged late in the proceedings, I am not satisfied that s 137 mandates the exclusion of the evidence and, in so far as the discretionary judgment called for in s 135 is concerned, I am not satisfied, taking into account all that has been put to me, that the balance falls in favour of exclusion.
41 Accordingly, Mr Bussing's further evidence is admitted. I will leave it to the Crown to determine how that evidence is to be led. I do not propose to limit the content of his evidence to the April 2007 statement as some matters of methodology, for example, are common to both reports and may be better expressed in one report as distinct from the other. It is of course entirely a matter for Mr Byrne as to what matters he wishes to raise in cross-examination.