In the course of cross-examination of Loren Gattellari ("the witness") senior counsel for the accused asked a question in the following terms:
"Q. Sir, have you ever been involved in trying to forge Mr Medich's signature?"
The Crown objected to that general line of questioning on the grounds of relevance. Senior counsel for the accused submitted that it was relevant to the credibility of the witness. In the event that the questions are allowed, it can be reasonably anticipated that the witness will object to answering them, triggering the operation of s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ("the Act"). In order to resolve the objection, some short background is necessary.
The witness is the son of Fortunato Gattellari ("Gattellari") who is the Crown's principal witness and who has already given evidence. One of the allegations put to Gattellari in cross-examination was that he demanded a sum of $1 million from the accused following his (i.e. Gattellari's) arrest, and threatened that if the money was not paid (and on the evidence, it was not) he would implicate the accused in the murder of the deceased. Gattellari agreed that he sought $1 million from the accused. However, he denied that he sought to blackmail the accused in the manner alleged.
The witness is said to have been involved in conveying a message to the accused's son seeking the money. Whilst he has generally admitted to conveying a message to that effect, he strenuously denied engaging in any attempt to blackmail the accused at the behest of Gattellari.
One of the many areas of cross-examination which went to Gattellari's credit centred upon an allegation that he repeatedly stole large amounts of money from the accused. In that regard, he was asked questions about a conversation he had with Senad Kaminic (another witness who, on the Crown case, was a participant in the joint criminal enterprise to kill the deceased) on 17 March 2010. In the course of that conversation, the following exchange took place:
"KAMINIC: Listen, I'm here in the office. Here is chequebook and I'll take one and also I find something with a - his signature.
GATTELLARI: Yes, eh? Take it. Take it with you and have a look at it and see if you can copy it, all right?
KAMINIC: We need Lauren, mate.
GATTELLARI: Who, Lauren? Heh, Lauren's in bloody Queensland. (laughs) Anyway, look, I may...we may not; we may not need it, so just take it, take the, take the cheque and take the thing with you, all right and eh, I'll talk to you tomorrow morning."
Kaminic was questioned about that conversation commencing at T1364.8:
"Q. Had Loren forged Mr Medich's signature in the past?
A. INTERPRETER: I don't know, but he was skilled with copies.
Q. What you mean by that, you knew that he had copied documents in the past, correct?
A. INTERPRETER: Yes, it was said that he is able to copy it and that he's skilled in it. He would also copy Lucky's signature."
The evidence in [5] and [6] is relied upon as the basis for the line of questioning which is sought to be put.
The issue which is raised engages s 103 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ("the Act") which is in the following terms:
103 Exception: cross-examination as to credibility
(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness.
(2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to:
(a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth, and
(b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred.
Senior counsel for the accused submitted that the credit of the witness was obviously important in light of what was said to be his role in the attempted blackmail of the accused. He emphasised that the line of questioning raised allegations of dishonesty and submitted that in those circumstances, the test in s 103 of the Act was met. In terms of the mandatory considerations in s 103 (2), senior counsel submitted, in particular, that the fact that the relevant events took place a long time ago was not a factor which detracted from their substance or importance.
The Crown submitted that the test in s 103 had not been met and that the evidence did not substantially affect the credibility of the witness. The Crown emphasised, in particular, that the relevant events occurred a long time ago and submitted that the evidentiary basis on which the questions were sought to be put was tenuous. The Crown referred me, in particular, to a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the R v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 in support of the proposition that cross-examination of this nature should not be permitted.
There are a number of matters to be noted in respect of the operation of s 103. Firstly, the word "substantially" as it appears in the section must be given its full force and effect. The circumstances must be such that the jury's assessment of the credit of the witness cannot be properly or adequately determined without the evidence being given: R v Ronen [2004] NSWSC 1290 at [48].
Secondly, the word "could" as it appears in s 103(1) is directed to the capacity of the evidence to substantially affect the witness' credibility, and not to the question whether such credibility is, in fact, substantially affected.
Thirdly, the issue must be resolved on the assumption that the witness will respond affirmatively to the question(s) asked: R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155.
The considerations in s 103(2), although not exhaustive, are nevertheless mandatory. The first (s 103(2)(a)) addresses whether or not the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when he was under an obligation to tell the truth. Again, noting that the ultimate issue must be resolved on the assumption that the witness will respond affirmatively to the question, and bearing in mind the nature of the allegation which is to be put, s 103(2)(a) favours the position of the accused. Obviously, the forging of a signature may, if admitted, prove that the witness made a false representation.
The second (s 103(2)(b)) addresses the period which has elapsed since relevant events occurred. Doing the best I can, the relevant events happened somewhere between eight and ten years ago. That is obviously a long time. Prima facie that is a factor which may tend against the evidence being permitted, although that necessarily has to be weighed against the nature of the allegation itself.
The credit of the witness is necessarily a significant issue. It is also of some importance that the allegation which is sought to be put to the witness is one of dishonesty. That is a factor which weighs heavily in favour of the questions being allowed.
I have had regard to the decision in ATM to which I was referred by the Crown. That was a case involving allegations of sexual assault in which the complainant had given evidence in cross-examination admitting having forged the signature of her mother and her father on notes which sought to have her excused from attending school. Howie J considered that evidence in the context of a ground of appeal which asserted that the verdicts of the jury were unreasonable and could not be supported. He concluded (at [58]) that in the context of that case the evidence had little probative value, and that had the Crown objected to it at trial, it should have been rejected. Importantly, his Honour went on to say (again at [58]) that the evidence had no bearing at all on a consideration of whether or not it was open to the jury to convict the appellant.
In these circumstances, the decision in ATM is of little assistance. It is not, as the submissions of the Crown tended to suggest, authority for the proposition that in each and every case where questions of this nature are sought to be put, they should not be permitted. To the extent that Howie J commented upon the evidence at all, such comments were clearly obiter, his Honour expressly stating that the matter had no bearing whatsoever on his determination of whether or not the verdicts were unsafe or unsatisfactory.
In my view, the test in s 108 has been met. For all of these reasons I propose to allow the questions to be put.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 30 April 2018