Telephone calls to the National Australia Bank
39On the night of 17 April 2010, the offender borrowed a mobile phone from another neighbour as his own phone was out of credit. The neighbour gave evidence that her phone was returned by the offender, but was then borrowed again by Ms Grant. Concerned about getting the phone back, she knocked on the door of the offender's apartment demanding its return (T331.10- 331.50).
40The neighbour stated that Ms Grant answered the door and told her that she would give the phone back in a minute. The neighbour repeated her demand and Ms Grant appeared at the door again, holding a tissue over her mouth, stating that her teeth were bleeding. She told the neighbour that she was going through a crisis with the offender.
41The neighbour also gave the following evidence (T332.20):
Q. You said you saw her with a cloth on her mouth, a tissue on her mouth, did she say if anything had happened to her?
A. She said that he was trying to kill her.
42The neighbour had never mentioned that fact in previous statements or interviews with police. During the trial, the accused submitted that the neighbour's demeanour manifested some cognitive difficulties on her part. Mr Turnbull, who appeared for the offender, noted that the police had determined to have a psychologist present as a support person for the neighbour when her original statement was taken. I have considered her evidence with due caution in light of those contentions. In my assessment, the neighbour was a credible and careful historian. The only indication of any vulnerability in her as a witness was when, in the face of a skilful cross-examination by Mr Turnbull, she appeared to recant from the evidence set out above. I am satisfied that her evidence-in-chief was the truth.
43Ms Grant and the offender used the neighbour's phone to make several calls to the National Australia Bank. The purpose of the calls was to order a new bank card for Ms Grant, as she had lost her purse.
44The recordings of those telephone calls are chilling. They reveal that Ms Grant was at times incoherent, angry, frustrated and distressed. The offender, by contrast, was calm, politely providing the information required by the bank before a new card could be issued.
45Significantly, Ms Grant told the bank officer that she needed the new card because she was going away. At several points, when she was asked innocuous details such as where she lived, she became inexplicably distressed and turned to the offender to say how she should answer the question.
46The prosecution relied on the telephone conversations as evidence of the offender's premeditation to kill the deceased, contending that he instigated the calls so as to have a means of access to her bank account after her death. The offender refutes those contentions, stating that the decision to order the new card at that time was the deceased's (T857.10) and that she was upset and crying because she was drunk, sad and depressed (T858.10), as opposed to being scared of him.
47After listening to the recordings of the telephone calls, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Grant contacted the bank that night under threat from the accused and that she was in grave fear of harm at his hands at that time. I am further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, by the time those calls were made, the offender had formed the intention to kill Ms Grant and was forcing her to make the calls so that he would have access to her bank account after her death.
48My conclusion on that issue is reinforced by other aspects of the evidence. I have already referred to my finding that the events of the week leading up to the scheduled hearing of the assault charge must have rattled the offender's confidence that Ms Grant would not give evidence against him. He is astute enough to have gleaned that, if she did give evidence in accordance with her statement to police, the Crown's case against him was strong. Further, it is my assessment that the offender was lying as to why he did not call an ambulance for Ms Grant after she allegedly fell. His failure to do so belies his denial that he intended to kill her.
49I have also had regard to what the offender did to Ms Grant's body that night. For the reasons already explained, it is not possible to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to whether any part of what he did was done before she died. I can only proceed on the assumption that he took those steps after her death.
50The offender dismembered Ms Grant's body with a circular saw. Where he did so was a matter of contest in the trial. The Crown submitted that it could not have occurred in the offender's apartment, since nobody heard it and the forensic evidence collected by crime scene officers found no evidence of the kind one might expect if that had occurred. I am unable to resolve the anomalies in the evidence in that respect and, on balance, I think I should proceed on the basis that the offender dismembered the deceased's body in his apartment, as he states. However, I do not accept his evidence as to why he did so.
51The offender stated that, after Ms Grant died, he panicked because he thought he would be implicated in her death. He admitted that he cut up her body but said that the reason he did so was to enable him to get it out of the apartment without arousing suspicion.
52I accept that there was ample reason for the offender to fear that he would be implicated in Ms Grant's death. She had last been seen in his company. He had already been charged with an offence of assaulting her and an offence of breaching the AVO granted to protect her. Only a day earlier, a large number of police had attended his apartment in response to another allegation of assault. However, it does not follow from those events that the offender had no other reason to deal with the body as he did. The object of disposing of the body may have been part of the reason for dismembering it, but other aspects of the autopsy evidence reveal a higher level of criminality.
53Some parts of the body had been cut into pieces smaller than can sensibly be explained by the need to fit them into garbage bags. One of the deceased's feet had been cut into two pieces. Both hands had been cut off at the wrist. A little finger had been removed from one of the hands. Both nipples had been cut off, probably using a pair of scissors that were found in one of the bags (T531.45). The front of the skull bore marks indicating that the face had been cut diagonally from right to left and left to right and across the midline of the skull (T535.25).
54Those acts weren't beyond what was required to conceal the transport of a body. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender's treatment of the body was in part motivated by a desire to remove evidence of injuries inflicted by him. I am further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that to some extent at least, the offender's treatment of the body was an expression of anger and hatred towards the deceased. I do not accept that this is merely emotive speculation, as submitted on behalf of the offender. The state of the body admits of no other conclusion, in my view.
55As noted by Johnson J in R v Wilkinson (No 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 at [61], whilst care must be taken in examining events after the offence for the purpose of assessing its objective seriousness, circumstances which as a matter of common sense are directly related to the offence are properly regarded as informing that assessment. The offender's treatment of the deceased's body contributes to the overwhelming inference that he intended to kill her.
56It was acknowledged on behalf of the offender that his treatment of the body may be taken into account in assessing the seriousness of the offence: R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315 at [36]; R v Knight (2006) 164 A Crim R 126 at [28] and [29]; [2006] NSWCCA 292. The offender's meticulous and disturbing dissection of his former companion into smaller parts to be dumped unceremoniously in the bush requires that the sentence be increased to some degree.
57A further aggravating feature of the offence is that the offender was on conditional liberty at the time it was committed, having been granted bail on 30 November 2009 for the alleged assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was also subject to the AVO.
58I turn to consider the offender's circumstances and any factors that mitigate the seriousness of the offence. The offender's sustained denial of his guilt removes any basis for a finding of remorse in respect of the murder. The Court was invited to accept that he is remorseful as to the way in which he treated the body (T779.40). I accept on balance that he does at some level regret those acts. That is a slight consideration in mitigation of the appropriate sentence.
59I have also taken into account a report prepared by Anna Robilliard, forensic psychologist, tendered on behalf of the offender. Ms Robilliard assessed the offender to have a high score on measures of schizoid, depressive and dependent personality attributes. One of the hallmarks of a schizoid personality is a lack of emotional involvement and responsiveness. I accept that may have impaired the offender's ability to experience or articulate guilt or remorse in the ordinary way.
60The offender has a prior matter for common assault against the deceased in October 1997. The offence was proved but no conviction was entered. That is probably of limited significance in the present context. He has some other minor convictions but none of any significance in the present context. He had a relatively privileged and unremarkable upbringing and appears to have had a good work history until after his mother died, when he succumbed to the seductive destruction of heroin.
61The offender is not in the best physical or mental health. Ms Robilliard assessed him as suffering to some extent from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. As already noted, he is a diabetic and there is some evidence from Justice Health (albeit limited) to suggest that he is at risk of heart disease. I have accordingly given some weight to the likelihood that his experience of custody may be more arduous than for a healthy prisoner.
62I am not persuaded that the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation. I accept that his offending must be viewed in the context of his difficult and co-dependent relationship with the deceased. However, his elaborate persistence in denying his guilt prohibits any confidence as to his future conduct.
63In all the circumstances, I consider that the appropriate sentence for the offence is a term of imprisonment of 28 years with a non-parole period of 21 years and a balance of term of 7 years. The offender has been in custody since his arrest on 4 May 2010. I will fix the sentence to commence on that date. The first date on which he will be eligible for release to parole is 3 May 2031.
64Neal Richardson, please stand. You are convicted of the murder of Kirrilee Nicole Grant. For that offence, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 21 years commencing on 4 May 2010 and concluding on 3 May 2031 and a balance of term of 7 years concluding on 3 May 2038.