R v Rahn [1998] QCA 338

He suffered no injury beyond minor seat belt injuries. The impact on the family from the death of the mother of young children has been very extensive.

After being arrested on this charge, he was apparently released on bail. The next charge is that of threatening violence. In the night, he visited his de facto spouse who was asleep in bed. He told her that they were going away for a few days and held a gun to her head, saying, "This is it; I'm sick of your shit." He then pulled the trigger, but the gun was not loaded. He then made a further threat and told her to get dressed and began to load the gun. The complainant was naturally very frightened. She was dragged into the kitchen and a motor cycle helmet was placed on her and she was then taken to an area in Carole Park, before the applicant ultimately calmed down.

It is unnecessary to detail the various property offences, other than to note that they include a number of serious matters, including burglary. The uttering charge does not contain much detail, but apparently the applicant obtained the possession of three $100 notes and passed these to service stations and to a computer accessory firm.

There is a disturbing psychiatric report. It is said that the property offences were something of a spree - a sort of self

destructive bender and that he was in a state of depression after the motor vehicle accident. That hardly detracts from his responsibility for his own actions. In my view, the fact that he reacted in this anti-social manner after what should have been a sobering shock and lesson, counts against him. Matters suggested in mitigation included the psychiatric report, which suggests that he has a personality disorder, with anti-social and dependent traits and that such disorder is not responsive to psychiatric treatment. That factor is obviously two-edged and is somewhat disturbing.

His co-operation in bringing these matters to a head and in giving a relatively early indication of pleas of guilty certainly stand in his favour. The threatening violence charge was not the subject of an early indication for a plea, but he ended up pleading guilty to that charge also. So overall, he is entitled to consideration on that aspect.

It was also submitted that the driving for which he fell to be sentenced, occurred over a very short distance. There seems to be some fallacy, in my view, in that particular submission, in that his assumption of control over a motor vehicle and trailer when he was impaired by a very considerable consumption of methylamphetamines suggests irresponsible and dangerous behaviour. One naturally takes account of the fact that there is no suggestion that the aberrant driving occurred over a great distance. However, the consequences were very serious.

Counsel for the applicant referred correctly to the fact that the maximum penalty for driving which produces such a consequence, when the offender is impaired by alcohol consumption, is 14 years, whereas the present relevant maximum for such driving when impaired by other drugs, is a maximum of 10 years.

It was submitted that the sentence imposed for the first offence was at the top of the range for such an offence, although it was not submitted that it falls outside the range. The burden of the submission was that the combination of the sentences, taking account of the cumulative sentences, makes the result overall excessive. In short, one needs to bear in mind what is sometimes called the totality principle. It may be noted that there was a recommendation for eligibility for parole after serving three years. The written submission was that this did not give sufficient recognition to the co-operation of the applicant. In summary, on his behalf, it was urged that the cumulative effect was overall disproportionate and that the recommendation for parole gave insufficient recognition to his co-operation.

In justification of the sentence, the Crown pointed out that the applicant was at least vulnerable to a "violent crime" declaration under section 161(B)(3) of the Penalties and Sentences Act, which if made, would require him to serve 80 per cent of the head sentence. Obviously, His Honour did not choose to proceed along those lines and indeed, made a recommendation for parole something short of the halfway mark.

Reference to cases is unable to produce any authority which guides one on the overall totality of a combination of offences of this kind; however in relation to the principal offence of the fatal driving, I find some assistance in the cases of Byrne, CA 3 of 1995, 22 March 1995 and Vessey,

CA 453 of 1995, 16 February 1996. The approach since Byrne in this Court is plainly more severe than is indicated in that case and is inter alia affected by the new section 9 in the Penalties and Sentences Act, which became effective from

1 July 1997. Among other matters there is a considerable emphasis upon public safety and of course that factor is a strong one in the present case. Those cases suggest to me that the major sentence in this combined sentencing exercise was not manifestly excessive.

In the end I consider that the total response of the learned sentencing Judge was quite an appropriate one. Indeed, the sentencing remarks of His Honour show that he understood completely the competing contentions and so that he paid due regard to the submissions that were made below and that have to some extent been repeated and expanded upon here on behalf of the applicant.