Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions
File Number(s): 2015/00057922; /00091758; /00201980; /00248426; /00287990; /00310843
[2]
sentence
HIS HONOUR: Just sit there, Mr Rahme. Your sentencing is complicated, the orders I make will probably take five or ten minutes to pronounce in due course and I have to make those orders at the end of the sentence. But in your case the total sentence I propose to impose upon you is five and a half year imprisonment to date from the date you came into custody, 24 February 2015. I propose to fix a non-parole period, in relation to that five and a half years imprisonment, of three and a half years imprisonment to date from the same date. Thus, on my calculation your non-parole period will expire on 23 August 2018, that is approximately 18 months and two weeks from today. You will be eligible for release to parole on that date, subject to your right of appeal and the Crown's rights of appeal. Whether you are released or not on that date will be a matter for the Parole Authority. But the sentences I impose will be amongst themselves partially concurrent, partially cumulative with one another to give effect to that total sentence. I will not ask you to stand when I make the orders, but I will ask that what I have just said to you form part of my remarks on sentence.
The prisoner, Charbel Rahme, appears today for sentence in relation to eight offences for which he was committed for sentence to this Court from the Local Court. In respect of three of those offences there are either a matter on a Form 1, or matters on Forms 1, to be taken into account. I will detail which particular committal for sentence matters constitute the "principal" offence in respect of which the matters on the Forms are concerned.
There is in this matter, just in passing, the complication that the various committal for sentence matters are not all matters involving court attendance notices with the same H number and, thus, the sequence numbers for some of the offences are the same although the court attendance notice in question has a different H number to other matters.
The offending with which I am concerned occurred over a period of time between late 2012, although there is evidence in the facts of activities by the prisoner contributing to many of the offences beforehand, and the date of the prisoner's arrest at his home at that time on 24 February 2015. He has been in custody since that date and that time in custody will be taken into account. One of the complications that has arisen since he appeared before me last Friday when I received the evidence in the case and heard submissions is that a matter on the former Form 1, which is referred to as Form 1a, was in fact dealt with, for reasons best known to the Local Court, in the Local Court last Wednesday and the prisoner received a term of imprisonment of 12 months which I have taken into account. The learned Magistrate fixed that term of imprisonment to commence on the date the prisoner went into custody. That sentence will be subsumed by the sentence I impose in respect of the relevant committal for sentence matter that the particular to which Form 1a was attached.
To run through the offences both for sentence and the matters on the Forms 1 in summary. The offender is for sentence in relation to five offences of 'dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception' contrary to s 192E(1)(b) Crimes Act 1900. These matters each carry a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, they have no standard non-parole period.
There are, in addition to those offences for sentence, an offence of 'possessing identification information to commit an indictable offence' contrary to s 192K Crimes Act 1900 which carries a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment. There is an offence of 'possess false document to obtain a financial advantage' contrary to s 255(b)(ii) Crimes Act 1900 which carries a maximum of ten years imprisonment. And there is, finally, an offence of 'deal with property with intent it be an instrument of crime' contrary to s 193D(1) Crimes Act 1900 which carries a maximum of 15 years imprisonment. None of these offences has a standard non-parole period.
In relation to the matters on the Forms (and again to correct something I said earlier there are in fact remaining two matters on the Form 1a to which I referred, both are offences of dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception and, as I will briefly outline in a moment) they involve amounts significantly less than the substantial amounts which are concerned with the principal offences and other offences of like type which are for sentence.
In respect of Form 1b which is to be taken into account in respect of another offence of 'dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception', there are three offences including 'attempting to dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception', 'deal with identification information to commit an indictable offence' and 'possess identification information to commit an indictable offence'.
In respect of Form 1c which relates to the offence of 'deal with property with intent it be an instrument of crime', there is one offence of 'dealing with property suspected to be the proceeds of crime', contrary to s 193C Crimes Act 1900, and another offence of 'forge or falsify certificate' contrary to s 59(2) Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995.
There were matters on a s 166 certificate but they have been transferred, as I understood the situation, to one or other of the Forms 1.
The offences of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception, as they might be shortly committed that are for sentence, were committed between late 2012 and towards the end of 2014. The offences of possessing identification information and related matters arise as a result of police searches of the prisoner's home at Greenacre on 24 February 2015, the date of his arrest.
I am informed that the prisoner's wife was arrested and charged at about the same time. I was given almost no information about the offences for which she was dealt with at the Local Court, except to have it indicated to me and accepted by counsel for the accused that no issue of parity arose in relation to her sentencing. As I understand the matter, she was dealt with in the Local Court and she was charged with substantially fewer offences than those brought against the accused.
The 'dishonest obtaining of financial advantage' offences were concerned in general terms with what could be described in a generic way as conduct by the prisoner amounting to what is known as "identity theft", that is the acquiring by the prisoner of the identity of a real person by use of that person's personal information, or obtaining access to that person's credit card, and using that information to either acquire control of or to acquire access to a particular instrument, such as a credit card, and the use of that card, or the use of the identity information acquired by the prisoner, to acquire goods and/or services. In respect of the matter, the agreed facts that I have been provided run to many many pages and endeavouring to summarise the allegations against the prisoner will require some brevity on my part compared to the abundant detail in the agreed statement of facts. However, there will be some matters that I am required to read from the facts to enable the character of the offending to be properly conveyed. In other instances I propose only to provide the briefest of summaries.
I point out, although it is not a matter that was the subject of discussion by the parties, that the breadth of the offences committed by the prisoner, which is significant when one considers certain matters I will raise in a moment, are not said to be terrorism related and are not part of a wider course of criminal conduct involving some particular organisation or organisations involved in the conduct which is described both in legislation and colloquially as "identity theft".
That having been said, it must be pointed out from the outset that whilst it was characterised by learned counsel for the prisoner as a "backyard operation", in the sense that the criminal conduct centred upon premises or emanated in part from premises occupied by the prisoner and his family from time to time, it was a significant operation conducted by the prisoner albeit by himself.
To give some flavour of the modus operandi of the prisoner, as I said, I will cite particular details of particular offences, the modus operandi in relation to the commission of many of the offences of dishonest obtaining of financial advantage by deception were very similar. The attendance upon the prisoner's home on 24 February 2015 followed what I understand to be a considerable police operation up until that point.
The statement of facts at p 11 among many other details states that in the course of the search of the prisoner's home there were "items" located which included "many different types" in the names of approximately 1,000 different people. The identification information was found in various forms including bank statements, water, gas, electricity and phone bills, membership letters for various organisations, Australian Tax Office paperwork, home loan documents, superannuation statements, insurance policies or renewal policies, payslips, various letters from various government authorities including the Roads and Maritime Services, real estate agents, the State Debt Recovery organisation, Medicare, even advertising material taken from addresses not belonging to the prisoner, letters from New South Wales Fair Trading, as well as a number of "scraps of paper" with names, dates of birth, addresses, numbers, words, phone numbers and the word "pin".
I do not have any photographic evidence or video evidence of the search of the prisoner's home, but it would appear that this material and other material found in the prisoner's home was found in circumstances consistent with the conduct of people who suffer from a psychological condition that compels them to hoard items in their home in a disorganised and voluminous fashion.
Items that I have already identified as relating to other people, amounting to approximately 1,000 such people, were found in shopping bags, paper bags, cardboard boxes, laptop bags, luggage. Boxes and bags were piled up next to the lounge and the TV. The majority of the bags containing mail also contained personal documents and mail belonging to the offender and his partner. The mail located within the home of the prisoner dated as far back as 30 June 2011, referring, I hasten to say, to what I said earlier about evidence available of the prisoner's conduct in at least acquiring personal information going well back before the commission of the first of the offences for sentence. There were also other items found in bedrooms, located in bags of different types, concealed on the top of cupboards and wardrobes, amongst piles of clothing, and also items in the garage. There was opened and unopened mail addressed to the prisoner and his wife. Also items were found connecting the prisoner with the premises, including his own driver's licence, receipts in his name, other bills addressed to him or his partner, insurance policies and the like.
During the search warrant police seized mail that was addressed to 46 different suburbs across Sydney which are listed in the facts, and I am provided with a map showing the location of those various suburbs in relation to two particular addresses that the prisoner was connected with over the period of time between 2012 and 2015, being at South Strathfield firstly and then at Greenacre where the prisoner was arrested.
Credit cards were found throughout the home and in a variety of forms. Some credit cards were located still attached to the mail of their owner, or intended party, some were tied together in bundles and boxes, some were mixed with bags of mail, while others were simply scattered in the house randomly. There were credit cards from 18 different financial institutions which are named in the facts.
In total 179 credit cards were located and an annexure has been provided, which I do not have to read onto the record, which forms part of the Crown bundle including the agreed statement of facts, setting out the list of those cards, the owners' names, the credit card numbers, and the like.
The statement of facts says:
"The offender possessed the personal and financial information for the purposes of building profiles on individuals in order to assume, produce and enable fraudulent activity for personal gain."
I should make the comment at this point that whilst the prisoner is for sentence in relation to five matters involving obtain dishonestly financial advantage by deception, and there are in the Forms 1 with which I am concerned at least four of such offences as substantive offences or attempts to be taken into account as detailed in the Form 1, it is to be observed that, given the period of time that the prisoner must have been in possession of these various credit cards in other people's names or personal information of these other people, it is somewhat surprising that in fact more offences were not committed of the type for which the prisoner is to be sentenced.
Certainly, whilst I cannot sentence the prisoner on the basis of the potential for him to have committed further offences had the police not intervened, the intervention of the police potentially saved many further offences being committed using the modus operandi to which I refer.
Further, as reflected in the committal for sentence documentation, or in matters pertaining to the Form 1, in the course of the search warrant a number of false documents were located by the police, these seem to be home produced, if that is the correct expression, on what is called a "home style ink jet printer" due to their poor image quality and print.
These identification cards had various errors in them, mis-spelling of the word employee, and other information, and related to organisations such as Australia Post, Telstra, Optus, Bunnings, and a number of lesser known companies. There were included amongst these New South Wales Government Induction Cards, and other identification related to various types of employment.
The prisoner placed his photograph, and that of his partner, on the identity cards using the same photographs on different ID types. Police located the original glossy photograph of his partner amongst the false documents that were used on the false identity cards. On a number of the identity cards the prisoner used his driver's licence photograph, which has his real name within the bottom of the photograph.
Annexure B to the statement of facts sets out the false documents possessed by the prisoner, cross-referenced with the credit cards that are shown in annexure 8 of the facts, showing how the offender attempted to build identities of victims.
Also seized from the home of the prisoner was a small silver suitcase containing a variety of documents such as credit cards, mail and identity documents in other persons' names, and other documents in the name of the prisoner and his partner. This suitcase contained stationery and utensils such as label makers, label replacement tape, and other items that are required to create false identities.
One of the principal offences with which I am concerned is an offence of dealing with property with intent for it to be an instrument of crime, that is an offence which carries the greatest maximum penalty of all the offences, and I am required in relation to that matter to take into account the matters on the Form 1 to which I have referred.
In relation to this particular committal for sentence matter the facts state that police located a series of documents in the name of a Mr Nagla of an address in Homebush West. These documents included banking documents, health related documents, and a series of receipts for a motor bike, and a membership of a motor bike riders' club, an EFTPOS terminal receipt indicated that a payment was made to the value of $1,632 using a particular Visa Card, and a receipt addressed to Mr Nagla for that amount.
There is evidence in the facts connecting the receipt with the particular item described as a motor bike. The motor bike itself was found at the home of the prisoner. Annexure C to the statement of facts contains a table of all the receipts and documents from the purchase of the motor cycle, including photographs of the motor cycle and the credit card. The prisoner dealt with all of the personal information to which I have referred, or set out in the facts, as an instrument of crime to possess the motor bike.
In relation to the matter on one of the Forms 1 of dealing with property suspected to be the proceeds of crime, the Form 1 offence being the offence to be taken into account in dealing with the committal for sentence matter of dealing with property with intent to be an instrument of crime, there is a list of property therein described, including iPads, many mobile phones, portable computers, a mountain bike, keyboards, a Smartwatch and a gift card.
In relation to the facts provided to me, the Form 1 offence of falsely creating or forging a certificate under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Act, again on Form 1c, the statement of facts sets out the detail of the mechanism by which the prisoner used a copy of the birth certificate of his son, and the prisoner was able to create identities including identities associated with his family. Annexure D contains a table of documents and photographs of the forged birth certificates found in the prisoner's home.
To come back to other of the principal offences, as they are described, the offences described as 'dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception' concerned with H number 5798095, sequences 1 and 2, give some flavour to the modus operandi to which I referred, and I will just deal with some little detail.
The victim in relation to the sequence 1 matter, that is a matter that does not require the taking into account matters on a Form 1, noticed that her St George Visa debit card had been stolen at Bondi Junction on 21 December 2012. She reported the credit card stolen to Chatswood Police Station.
A number of fraudulent transactions were committed using that person's stolen St George Bank Visa debit card with a particular number between Christmas Eve and 27 December 2012, this was the first in time of the dishonestly obtain financial advantage offences.
The total amount that was, to use the word in the statement of facts, "stolen" using the victim's Visa debit card, was $5,275.30. A search of the prisoner's premises on 24 February 2015 revealed documents that linked the prisoner to the mis-usage of the Visa Card, particularly his possession of personal particulars relating to the victim who was born in 1935.
This victim, if I may described her as that, died in 2014. Of course the prisoner's activities had nothing to do with her death. But it is clear that the prisoner had in fact assumed her identity, or acquired her personal information, to commit the crime, although it is unclear as to the situation in which her credit card was "stolen", as it is asserted in the facts.
This brings me to an important matter that must be pointed out from the outset. I am very careful to bear this in mind, although it may be the case that it is not disputed that the prisoner took the various credit cards, or documents providing points of identity, or those identities to be assumed by the prisoner. The prisoner has not actually been charged with "stealing" the relevant items.
With regard to sequence 2 of that particular H number I referred to, and this is an offence again of 'dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception', and is the particular matter for which Form 1a is relevant, the short facts are that the victims received bank statements from the National Bank indicating that there had been "Internet transfers from one of their joint bank accounts". These were transactions that they had not been concerned with.
The matter was reported to the relevant banking authority and it was advised by the bank that a credit card with a credit limit of $10,000 had been ordered by the female partner on 4 January 2013 and sent to an address at Canada Bay. A mobile number had been provided to the clients of the NAB, or customers of the NAB, of which they had no knowledge. Ultimately it was discovered that the mobile phone number was in fact subscribed to the woman whose identity - if I could use that expression - had been acquired by the prisoner relevant to the first charge for sentence, which I have earlier summarised.
From the various transactions conducted in the course of events relating to these particular victims approximately $60,190 worth of transactions were undertaken and many items that were acquired through the use of credit cards, or accounts related to the names of the victims, were delivered to an address at Strathfield where the prisoner was residing. The prisoner at that relevant time residing approximately 400 metres distance from those particular victims' address.
Various items were found by the police in the search that connected the prisoner to the identities of those persons, ultimately the victims' acquired losses with the bank of $63,403.95, which were reimbursed.
The next principal offence of dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception occurred between 24 April 2014 and 29 April 2014. In this particular matter the relevant victim was the holder of an ANZ account, and an ANZ credit card.
On 13 April the ANZ Bank received an application for a Mastercard in the name of the victim. An application was made for a credit limit of $50,000. A credit card was apparently approved with a credit limit of $15,000, and then various transactions were conducted in a range of ways on that particular credit card.
There was also other activity using that particular identity, ultimately leading to the fact that between 24 April 2014 and 29 April 2014 there were 43 unauthorised transactions on the particular Mastercard in the name of the victim. The total amount of those transactions, notwithstanding the initial credit limit given, was $30,822. Again, as with the other victims, the relevant banking authority reimbursed the victims.
When a search was conducted of the prisoner's premises various items that had been purchased by the use of that particular credit card were found in the property.
So far as the next "dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception" matter for sentence is concerned, as well as matters that are on a Form 1 in relation to this matter, the victim was the holder of an American Express Card, and an application was made for a particular credit line through American Express Australia, and various transactions were conducted, the victim's identity having been acquired.
In total in respect of matters concerning this particular victim, without going into the minutiae as set out in the facts, the victim's purported credit line with the American Express of Australia Limited Corporation led to unauthorised transactions totally $20,296.
The next matter for sentence of 'dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception' followed a similar modus operandi involving the ANZ Bank, with an application being made without the knowledge of the victim for a credit card with a particular credit limit.
There were various transactions conducted in relation to the credit facility provided by the conduct of the prisoner. There were 42 unauthorised transactions. The total amount of those transactions was $45,817, again reimbursed to the victim by the bank.
The facts then set out details in relation to matters on the Form 1, which is known as Form 1a, concerning Mr Chan, and in relation to his situation there was a total, as I understand it, of $147.43 acquired, a relatively minor sum compared to the other matters to which I have referred.
Thus, we come back to the offences that I have earlier referred to, and which the facts provided to the Court provide greater detail of possessing identification information to commit an indictable offence, relating to the items of identification of individuals found at the house and the possession of the false document to obtain financial advantage. An offence which is a committal for sentence matter. The various searches of the house, of course, give rise to a number of the other matters on the Form 1 which are to be taken into account.
In one sense, I have gone into a number of these matters in some considerable detail and other instances dealing with matters for sentence or on the Form 1, I have glossed over the detail that is provided in the statement of facts. But such detail as I have provided, to my mind, is necessary in order to give a proper flavour for both the committal for sentence matters and the Form 1 matters but also to provide an understanding of the context in which a consideration of the criminality of the prisoner is to be undertaken, particularly reflecting upon the totality of the criminality of the prisoner.
With regard to his criminal history, the prisoner was born on 19 July 1978 but his first offending is recorded in 2001, when he was, as I would roughly calculate it, 23 years of age. This is an unusual feature for an offender with this type of offending before me today. It is to be fairly noted, as his counsel pointed out, that he does not have prior convictions for like offending. It is not as if the prisoner has, since an early age, been a, "fraudster", or an identity thief, or substantially involved in crimes of dishonesty. That having been said, however, his criminal history although not an aggravating factor in these proceedings, does not entitle him to any particular leniency. He does have a number of traffic matters of varying types. In fact, most of his criminal history is concerned with either driving whilst licence cancelled, driving with licence expired, driving with a false name or address which suggests some conduct similar to that revealed in the facts of creating false identities. He has a finding of guilt in relation to failing to comply with reporting conditions in respect of the matter for which he was on bail, the detail of which I do not know. He was convicted, however, in the Sydney District Court in June 2005 for obtaining benefit from child prostitution. For that offence, he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and given a non parole period of one year two months and 14 days. That sentence, as I would understand, in commencing from 17 June 2005. He was also convicted at the same time, in respect of an offence of operating premises where a child participates in prostitution and sentence to three years' imprisonment, commencing from 3 August 2004, again, with a non parole period of one year two months and 14 days from that date.
I have not been provided with the facts of those matters. Again I state, as I have stated for the last 14 or 15 years, I do not understand why with matters dealt with in the District Court in the 21st century the judge cannot have the judgments made available to him or her. Any judgment in the matter surely would be available. I have not been provided with the presentence report in this matter. It was not ordered.
HIS HONOUR: Although I made no comment during the course of the sentencing proceedings, as far as I am aware anyone that has previously been on probation, or supervision, or parole supervision, should have a presentence report prepared for the Court.
The defence has produced in relation to the matter, some references of only really marginal value in the scheme of things. I have a character reference which provides a little information. I have a reference from a Minister of Religion which provides again very limited information of a particular value. I note the observations of the author of the character reference, a principal of a stone polishing company and I am prepared to accept the tenor of the report. That the prisoner is regarded by those who know him as a responsible son and a partner to his wife but with respect, the confidence in the prisoner not re offending and being a positive role model to his son, seemed to me to have no real relationship to the objective facts with which I am concerned. A close relative of him speaks favourably of his relationship with his family and the like, and I have taken that into account. This reference again provides however, limited assistance in this sentencing exercise. I do note however, favourably to the prisoner, that there is an offer of employment made by the referee who has provided a reference on letterhead, from the stone polishing company.
The most substantial document provided to the Court was the report of Dr Nielssen. Dr Nielssen prepared a report dated 7 September 2016. However, it must be fairly said that many of the matters of history that are contained within the report, have not been subject to the test of cross examination. Dr Nielssen seems to me not to have a full appreciation of the facts in relation of this matter bearing in mind he reports that the prisoner claimed that the, "offences involved around $100,000" and it seems as though, with respect, that in coming to the conclusions that he reached the doctor was somewhat captive to the reliability of the history given to him by the prisoner. I point out in relation to the matter that in fact, when the matter came before me, the facts prepared by the Crown claimed that the obtain financial advantage dishonestly offences, involved the sum of $266,000, when in fact the sum in total, revealed in the statement of facts, was $168,746.00 and some number of cents as I noted it, which accorded with the mathematics of counsel for the prisoner. Leave that as it may, Dr Nielssen is an experienced forensic psychiatrist and he is a person retained by both defence and Crown. His opinions are to be respected but again the value of those opinions is limited to the extent to which he is captive to the information provided to him by the prisoner.
Part of the history given by the prisoner to the psychiatrist was that he was, "heavily affected on ice committing these offences to support my habit". The prisoner claimed that he smoked as much as "$1,000 worth of methamphetamine every day". This kept him awake continuously for days on end and he would take sleeping tablets to get to sleep. He said that had started using prohibited drugs, particularly methamphetamine, regularly in 2011. The report of the doctor mistakenly states that he "used the drug more or less continuously from that time until his arrest in late 2014". The mistake is the obvious mistake as to the date of the arrest. Again, it brings one to wonder the extent to which the doctor had accurate information about the prisoner's circumstances and particularly his offending.
The prisoner claimed to the psychiatrist that the offences "took place over a period of about two years". He said of his mental state "...I wasn't in the right in the right frame of mind...if I wasn't on drugs, I would never have committed the stupidity". This representation, I have a great deal of difficulty accepting. As I have a great deal of difficulty accepting the general proposition that the offending of the prisoner was committed in circumstances where his judgment was impaired by the ingestion of drugs. I interpose these observations of the findings of the psychiatrist, in the context of the history given by the prisoner, to point out that there were matters arising from the search giving indicia of use of drugs by the prisoner, including drug paraphernalia and the understanding by the police of the fact that people can obtain drugs by providing to drug suppliers, credit cards in exchange for the drugs supplied that apparently conceded by the officer in charge in discussion with counsel for the prisoner and the Crown. These matters are referred to in the submissions that were made last Friday. Although not the subject of direct evidence.
That having been said, when one has close regard to the extent to which the prisoner was able to acquire the identities of others, the numbers of credit cards that were in his possession, the locations of which items of identification and/or credit cards had apparently gone missing, the character and methodology of the offending, even allowing for the fact that the prisoner from time to time, may well have been affected by prohibited drugs, and even allowing for the fact that one of his motivations in committing the offences may have been to acquire money or goods, such as credit cards for the purposes of obtaining drugs; one could not for one moment accept that all of the offending of which I am concerned was entirely driven by a lapse of judgment on the part of the prisoner under the influence of drugs. In fact, much of the prisoner's conduct is entirely inconsistent with someone being adversely affected by drugs.
As to whether the prisoner was relevantly addicted or not, of course, I am unable to reach a final decision, bearing in mind as I say, that what is asserted in this regard is hearsay evidence that the Crown has not had an opportunity to test.
I bear in mind in the matter that the prisoner reports to the psychiatrist that he has had no contact with Mental Health Services until after his release from prison in 2006, where he received some prescription for the treatment of what was said to be "depression". He had some bouts of paranoia described as "frequent" before his arrest but he has no history of admission to psychiatric hospitals or any other form of psychiatric assessment in the years prior to his arrest, in relation to these matters.
He did tell the nurse on reception to prison, he said to Dr Nielssen, that he was withdrawing from drugs, but was apparently, on his version, not referred to further assessment and has reported no further contact with Mental Health Services, despite applying in a number of occasions for an appointment, and he has suffered what naturally would be some reactive depression whilst being in custody, feeling anxious and the like. He claimed to Dr Nielssen that he had "sustained memory loss from his use of methamphetamine" and said, "Half of the stuff I did, I can't remember."
It may be that the taking of drugs can affect his memory but it may also well be that so many instances of identity acquisition have occurred that his lack of memory of "half the stuff" that he did is just a result of the repetition and volume of his activities.
The prisoner's other history, as set out in the report; it is somewhat unremarkable. The prisoner did not report any criminal charges as a juvenile. He gave some account of his conviction for which he was sentenced in the District Court in 2005 which does not accord with the criminal history available to me. The clinical examination by the psychiatrist revealed no obvious signs of neurological disorder, no involuntary movements often observed in long term methamphetamine users. There was some loss of spontaneity in his brief and direct answers. His mood seemed depressed from his demeanour and the quality of his responses. There was no obvious abnormal patterns of speech or odd beliefs suggesting the presence of an enduring psychotic illness, although he described symptoms of psychosis in the past but did not offer a delusional explanation for those symptoms and no apparently delusional beliefs were elicited. He maintained attention during the interview and his concentration was assessed to be unimpaired in the interview situation. His retrieval of information was also assessed to be unimpaired. His knowledge of recent events was surprisingly lacking in detail, which also seemed to be consistent with the loss of interest and impairment in cognitive function associated with chronic methamphetamine use. His intelligence was estimated to be within normal range and the doctor came to the view that such diagnoses as he could make in the context of the material available to him was that the prisoner had a 'substance use disorder' in remission, he had a substance induced psychotic illness also in remission, although I have difficulty understanding how that conclusion could be reached given the history that was available to him, and that the prisoner had a substance related 'mood disorder'. He set out the basis for his conclusions, again emphasising the fact that his conclusions were very much captive to the history available to him from the prisoner, although he described the prisoner's drug use and drug related psychological symptoms in "remission". He noted the past history of claimed depression and depressive symptoms in the presentation of the prisoner to him.
If I may deal with one aspect of the helpful submissions made by counsel for the prisoner. Counsel for the prisoner in the context of the findings of Dr Nielssen invoked the observations of Wood J in the guideline judgment of R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 348 at p. 397-398. There his Honour was dealing with the issue of the relevance of drug addiction in sentencing offenders for armed robbery. It was held by the Court overwhelmingly that addiction to prohibited drugs was not a mitigating factor in sentencing an offender for such offences and those general principles would appear to have applicability to other types of offending beyond armed robbery. His Honour summarised however what he described as "relevant principles" to sentencing an offender with a proven drug addiction. I have taken into account the matters set out at [273] of that judgment, particularly as they relate to the specific submissions of counsel. I accept what counsel said that those matters identified at [273] may have relevance beyond armed robbery and can have relevance in this particular sentencing exercise. As I would understand the particular matter identified by counsel for the prisoner, from the paragraph I have referred to was, is the observation of the learned Judge that the state of mind or capacity of the offender to exercise judgment was a relevant matter in this sentencing exercise. I accept that as a general proposition, but it is worth bearing in mind that what his Honour said about that matter included the further words "if he or she was in the grips of an extreme state of withdrawal of the kind that may have led to a frank disorder of thought processes or to the act being other than a willed act". Of course his Honour also pointed out that drug dependency or addiction may be relevant to assessing what was described as "the impulsivity of the offence and the extent of any planning for it". Of course in this particular matter it is self-evident from the very detailed facts and the matters I have identified from those facts there was a considerable degree of planning involved in the commission of the various offences of obtain financial advantage dishonestly by deception and also in the acquiring of items of personal identification, the forging of relevant documents and the acquisition of credit cards of persons as well as dealing with the proceeds of crime. It is fairly said that the particular acts of the prisoner may at particular times have been impacted by the effect upon him of prohibited drugs. There does not appear to be on the evidence, or even the version given by the prisoner, any suggestion of extreme state of withdrawal, as it was referred to by his Honour. But on the other hand, even if such instances of conduct affected by drug ingestion arose, it is quite clear that in the acquisition of items found in the house and in the execution of the particular crimes there was required of the prisoner a certain degree of cognisance of what was occurring. It was accepted by his counsel in respect of every offence for sentence, the present aggravating factor of the prisoner committing the offence in the context of a series of criminal acts as it is set out in s 21A(2) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. I do not obviously dismiss all of what Dr Nielssen's report states but, as I say, the report has its self evident limitations. I also bear in mind the certificate produced involving work undertaken by the prisoner in study with TAFE in 2015.
I had written submissions from the Crown. They were very detailed and many of the matters set out in the Crown's written submissions available to the defence are uncontroversial. The Crown, mistakenly in my view, suggested that I had to undertake an assessment of the objective seriousness in the same manner as sentencing an offender for an offence where there lies a standard non-parole period. That having been said, the considerations in assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, particularly in respect of the obtain property for financial advantage dishonestly, set out in the Crown's submissions were uncontroversial. I am required to take into account the amount of financial advantage, it is described as "money" in the Crown's submissions, and whether the loss was irretrievable. I have done that in relation to each of the offences. I accept the Crown's submission and I do not believe it is a matter of controversy in this matter that, in the context of the particular amounts which I have identified relating to those classes of offences, whilst the individual customers of the banks ultimately did not suffer any financial loss and were reimbursed by the bank they also suffered, one would have thought, considerable stress and distress at the potential of the loss being ascribed to them and of course the institutions themselves suffered loss which is irretrievable. Accepting that each of the institutions is a financially viable institution the facts of the matter are that there is a loss to the community or to the individual institutions, by the conduct of the prisoner which the prisoner is incapable of compensating.
I have got to take into account the length of time over which the offences were committed and the Crown is correct in identifying the length of time over which the offences were committed as relevant to the degree of planning and show clearly that the offending with which I am concerned could not be described as "impulsive".
The motive for the crime is relevant and clearly each of the offences was for "financial gain". In the context of some submissions made by the defence it is fair to conclude, favourably to the prisoner if that is the correct expression, that financial gain included acquiring prohibited drugs or particularly methamphetamine. In the context of accepting on balance that the prisoner had a dependence upon that drug to some extent, the full extent I could never know based solely upon the prisoner's own account, the truth of the matter is that whether the use of the money was to acquire drugs or whether it was to acquire property, and certainly the prisoner acquired much property from his criminal activity, ultimately the gain is a financial gain to the prisoner and a material gain to the prisoner in acquiring those items or things that were obtained. This is an inherent characteristic of the offending.
I am also required to take into account the degree of planning and "sophistication". Well of course in relation to offences of obtaining financial advantage dishonestly there was a substantial degree of planning. There was an element of "sophistication". The prisoner was clearly able to take advantage of or exploit mechanisms for acquiring credit cards and access to accounts which he could use to his own advantage. It is constantly, however, astonishing to see the relative ease with which banks are prepared to provide valuable instruments such as credit cards in seemingly dubious circumstances. Although one cannot blame the banks for the criminal conduct of the prisoner. There are details in the facts of the way in which the prisoner went about obtaining benefits through the use of credit cards, showing considerable ingenuity and thought on his behalf. Of course, the issue of the degree of sophistication was a matter of particular submission. The level of sophistication may not necessarily have been great but there was an element of sophistication in the commission of the offences.
I have ultimately concluded that the criminality in relation to each of the obtain financial advantage dishonestly offences was substantial although there were variations in the amount of financial benefit for the prisoner. The offending was not of course in the worse category. Just by reference to the amount of financial advantage that was obtained, one can see from time to time without having to hypothesise far greater sums of advantage or extent of advantage being obtained by similar methods. But, ultimately, in the context of considering the mitigating factors that arise, the sentences I have concluded reflect, by reference to the maximum penalty as a yardstick, the significance of the offending. If I was required to assess the offending by reference to the use of the expression "middle-range of objective seriousness", as is required in relation to standard non-parole periods matters, bearing in mind of course that it has been observed that the middle range may not necessarily be a "narrow band", I would regard the offending in the instances of each, of the offences of 'obtain financial benefit by dishonest means and deception' to be just below or at the cusp of the middle range of objective seriousness. That having been said, the offending that is represented in relation to the offence of 'possessing identification information to commit an indictable offence', given the vast quantity of identities is, in the context of the maximum penalty, at a more serious level if only by reference to the number of identities over which the prisoner theoretically had control.
The offences of 'dealing with property with intent to be an instrument of crime' I would assess by reference to the yardstick provided by the maximum penalty as being slightly less serious than the offences of dishonestly obtain financial advantage by deception. But, of course, in sentencing in relation to each of the particular principal offences where Form 1 matters are to be taken into account I am required to have regard to the guideline judgment from 2002, which explains to the sentencing judges of the State that the sentencing of offenders in relation to Form 1 matters requires the Court to give greater weight to personal deterrence and the community is entitled to extract retribution. It was said in that judgment (Attorney General's Application No 1 of 2002 (2002) 56NSWLR 147) that the "entire point of the process" would be to impose a longer sentence or to alter the nature of the sentence that would be imposed if the principal offence stood alone. It was wrong to suggest that the additional penalty would be small; sometimes it would be substantial [18] however the sentencing process is only concerned with the principal offence, not to determine appropriate sentence for the matters listed on a Form 1 or to determine an overall sentence that would be appropriate for all the offences and apply a discount giving appropriate weight to the matters earlier referred to in the judgment. The Court stated that deterrence and retribution are entitled to "greater weight than they may otherwise be given when sentencing for the primary offence" but then again it should be interposed to point out this would be a matter of degree. When one is sentencing an offender for, for example, an armed robbery and required to take three armed robberies into account on a Form 1, the extent to which greater weight would be given to deterrence and retribution may be greater than required in this particular matter. Having regard to the character of the principal offences with which I am concerned and the matters on the Form 1. I generally refer to the observations of the Court at [18]-[44] of that judgment.
Coming back to the Crown's submissions in this matter as a focal point, taking into account of course particular submissions that were put by counsel for the accused, the Crown sought to submit that in respect of the first offence in time involving the 'obtaining of financial advantage dishonestly', a matter involving the offence committed in late 2012, that particular offence had a particular aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(l) of a vulnerable victim. It was correct that the victim was an elderly person and it was correct that by possession of personal information of that person it would be likely to be known to the prisoner that she was an elderly person. But I cannot accept that vulnerability is a particular aggravating factor in relation to that offending. Primarily for the reason that the modus operandi of the prisoner in committing that offence was so similar to the modus operandi of committing other offences under the same statutory provision that it is quite clear that the capacity of the prisoner to commit offences of obtaining financial advantage dishonestly was not restricted to or defined by any element of vulnerability in the victim, but by the fact that the prisoner had access to information that could just as easily, if I could use that expression, have been obtained from another victim of much younger age who would not have fallen within the rubric of claimed vulnerability. That having been said I accept that in relation to the various offences with which I am concerned that the offending constituted "planned" criminal activity, although I cannot conclude it was "organised" criminal activity because there is no organisation involved. Although the Crown did not refer to it, it was accepted as I have earlier pointed out by learned counsel for the prisoner that each of the offences with which I am concerned in various ways and to varying degrees, I hasten to say, involved an offence concerned with "a series of criminal acts". That is a matter not referred to by the Crown.
With regard to the Act, and particularly s 21A(3), there were few mitigating factors that arose from the material. Although I accept as a mitigating factor on balance that this was not "organised criminal activity" as that was understood. Clearly I cannot find that the prisoner is unlikely to re offend or even has "good prospects of rehabilitation" at this point.
I am prepared to accept that the prisoner has expressed remorse for his offending to some extent. But I cannot conclude in the absence of direct evidence from the prisoner or from the account that he gave to Dr Nielssen that the prisoner has relevantly shown "remorse" as since now required under s 21A(3)(i) of the Act.
The plea of guilty by the prisoner is a relevant mitigating factor. In that regard, bearing in mind the prisoner has been committed for sentence and having regard to the complexity of the matter I am prepared to give the prisoner a discount of 25% upon the otherwise appropriate sentence in relation to each of the matters requiring the fixing of the sentence to reflect the utilitarian benefit of the pleas of guilty entered by the prisoner.
It is clear that a criminal trial in relation to this matter would have been a lengthy and expensive affair for the community and there is a high degree of utilitarian benefit on the part of the prisoner's pleas of guilty. I appreciate there were negotiations involved here but it seems to me the negotiations of putting comparatively minor matters on Forms 1 was a sensible way in which to deal with the multiple offending by the prisoner.
With regard to the issue of accumulation and totality I note what the Crown has put. There seem to be no debate in relation of this aspect. Hall J has correctly summarised in the decision of XX (2009) 195 A Crim R 38, at [52], what were the principles to be applied in relation to the assessment of the totality of the criminality, following upon of course seminal judgments such as Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59, particularly at p. 63-64 of that judgment.
Particularly I have regard also to the decision of the majority in The Queen v Pearce [1998] 194 CLR 610 at [45]. The Court is required, even when fixing an aggregate sentence, which I will not do in this matter, to fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider the appropriate issues concurrency and accumulation by reference to the consideration of the totality of the offending.
With regard to credit card fraud as it may be described as it relates particularly to the offences involving the misuse of possession of credit cards, I accept what Johnson J has said, in Araya (2005) 155 A Crim R 555, particularly, at [98], as well as the observations of Fullerton J on the same topic in Yow v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA at 251, at [30]. Her Honour said that the cost to the community of credit card fraud not only undermines consumer confidence but losses generated are invariably passed on to the consumer. Although it is clear that her Honour was dealing with far greater amounts of loss than occurred here. She made the obvious point that the general public are increasingly using credit cards as a convenient substitute for cash on a daily basis and that financial institutions that offer and provide a secure range of credit card facilities to both traders and consumers are entitled to expect that perpetrators of fraudulent schemes or fraudulent use of cards will be deterred from so doing.
I also note the recent observations cited by the Crown of the Chief Justice, that is Bathurst CJ, in Thangavelau v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 141, particularly at [36] for the need for general and specific deterrence as applies here.
I have taken into account what the Crown has said about the relevance of the prisoner's criminal history. In the context of referring to the Crown's written submissions I note the terms of s 3A of the Act. The purposes of sentencing in their various way are required to be taken into account here, adequate punishment, personal and general deterrence, protection of the community from the prisoner, making him accountable, announcing his conduct, recognising harm done by him to any particular victim and the communities, as well as of course promoting his rehabilitation.
With regard to the defence submissions, they were very considered and very detailed. Many of the matters identified by learned counsel for the prisoner in his organised and analytical fashion had been obviously taken into account. For example, I had concluded that there are special circumstances warranting ultimately an adjustment of the effective non-parole period to permit an extended period of supervision. This extended period of supervision is in part to assist the prisoner to adjust to community, to provide if it is available professional assistance to address some of the underlying causes of his criminal conduct which include, I am prepared to accept at least, the use of or dependence upon the prohibited drug methamphetamine.
I believe the prisoner also needs a direction to assist him to avoid offending in the future, particularly in adjusting his attitude to the availability of personal information of individuals to exploit financial advantage for himself.
I have taken into account what has been put by learned counsel for the prisoner about totality and the acceptance of a partial accumulation as submitted by the Crown but I have also considered it relevant as a "special circumstances" in the fixing of the appropriate non-parole period.
With regard to his submissions in relation to the level of sophistication and the character of the offending I have taken those submissions into account. I accept his submission that the character of the offending, for example, of 'obtaining dishonestly financial advantage' is not the most sophisticated one would see in the Courts. I have already dealt with the fact that there was, however, a degree of sophistication as the facts have evidently established. I have taken into account what he has said about financial gain and the relevance of the vulnerability of the elderly victim in relation to the first offence which will require sentencing in this matter.
I have taken into account his submissions in relation to the report of Dr Nielssen. I have also taken into account obviously his submissions in relation to the characterisation of the offending as "greed" as opposed to "need" arising out of the use of the drugs. I do not use the word, greed, in any event. I think that simply put a personal financial advantage is self-evident. Particularly when one has regard to the extent of property reflected in the 'deal with proceeds of crime' offence and other matters emerging from the facts. His categorisation of the offending I essentially accepted in terms of what was put by the Crown in pronouncing upon the degree of seriousness of the offences.
I have obviously had regard to the need for a discount for the utilitarian benefit of the plea of guilty. I have noted what was said about the absence of offences of dishonesty apart from two or three offences of false identities in his management of motor vehicles. I have taken into account what has been said about his contrition and his prospects of rehabilitation. In that regard, he identified three particular matters as relevant to the assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation but in the contents of the facts available to me and the detail of the offending over the period of time one must approach any claims by the prisoner for self-correction with some circumspection. I have taken into account what was put by counsel by the prisoner about issues of totality, the relevance of the Form 1 matters, commencement date of the sentence and the like.
It should be said, of course, the learned Crown put some further submissions to me about the matter, particularly, in the context of replying to the submissions carefully crafted by learned counsel for the prisoner and I have taken those matters account. There were concessions made as I have earlier pointed out by the Crown as to matters informed to the legal representatives of the prisoner by the officer-in-charge. It should be fairly said, putting aside the need for judgment in relation to matters arising under s 21A(2) and (3) of the Act, by and large the principles to be applied in this sentencing exercise were not, for want of a better description, controversial. It is to be fairly said also in the context of finally concluding upon an appropriate sentence, I have taken into account the relationship of the prisoner with his family and I have accepted as sparse as it is, the evidence contained within the character references of the relationship of the prisoner as with his family. I would hope if it be the case that his wife has lived a crime-free existence since her arrest in relation to this matter that family commitments and family connection may provide some incentive for the prisoner to avoid offending in the future.
As the High Court in Veen (No 2) said in 1988 sentencing is not a purely logical exercise and the troublesome nature of the sentencing discretion arises in large measure from the unavoidable difficulty in giving weight to each of the purposes of punishment therein described as four in total, now eight in total when one has regard to s 3A of the Act, which was promulgated 11 years after Veen (No 2) was decided.
It is also the case, I have taken into account the sentence imposed by the Magistrate recently. The criminality upon which she sentenced the prisoner was intimately involved with the offending with which I am concerned reflected by the fact that the sentence imposed by her Honour was for an offence as I have earlier pointed out that was on a Form 1 that was to be taken into account in sentencing the prisoner in respect of the first Form 1 of those provided by the Crown. Thus I turn to the sentencing of the prisoner, I will not ask you to stand, I am sorry to have kept everybody so long.
In respect of the offence of 'obtain financial advantage dishonestly' which has the H number that finishes 925, and is sequence 2, taking into account the matters on the Form 1a, the prisoner is convicted. He is sentenced to two years nine months imprisonment to commence from 24 February 2015 and on my calculation to expire on 23 November 2017.
In respect of sequence 1 of the same H number, that is, in effect the first offence in time of obtain financial advantage dishonestly, the offender is convicted and sentenced to two years and three months imprisonment to commence from 24 February 2015 and to expire on 23 May 2017.
In respect of the offence of 'obtain financial advantage dishonestly' which requires taking into account matters of Form 1b, that is, the H number finishing 744 sequence 1, the offender is convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment to commence on 24 May 2015 and to expire on 23 May 2018.
I pause for a moment to point out, of course, in sentencing the offender to that offence as with the next sequence number to a lesser extent, I bear in mind that that offence was committed subsequent to the commission of the first two offences for which I have imposed sentences. That sentence, of course, takes into account the matters on the Form 1.
In relation to the offence with the H number finishing 915, sequence 1, this is an offence as I have earlier indicated of 'obtain financial advantage dishonestly', the offender is convicted and sentenced to two years three months imprisonment to commence from 24 February 2015 and to expire on 23 May 2017.
In relation to the offence with the H number finishing 156, sequence 1, that is, 'possessing identification information to commit an indictable offence', the offender is convicted and sentenced to two years three months imprisonment to commence on 24 May 2016 and to expire on 23 August 2018.
In relation to sequence 156 sequence 2, the offender is convicted and sentenced to two years three months imprisonment to commence on 24 May 2016 and to expire on 23 August 2018.
In relation to the last offence for sentence which carries the maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment, taking into account the matters on Form 1c this is the H number finishing 156, sequence 3, the prisoner is convicted. He is sentenced to three years six months imprisonment to date from 24 February 2017 and to expire on 23 August 2020. In relation to sentence I fix a non-parole period of one and a half years to commence from 24 February 2017 and to expire on 23 August 2018.
On my calculation that is a total sentence of five and a half years imprisonment with a non-parole period of three and a half years to expire on 23 August 2018, approximately 18 months hence. The prisoner will be eligible for release to parole on 23 August 2018, that will be a matter for the Parole Authority.
Mr Rahme, do you understand the sentence I have imposed?
OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Your minimum term is three and a half years to date from the date you came into custody. You will be eligible to release to parole on 23 August next year and then you will have a balance of sentence of two years which reflects several findings of special circumstances. But whether you are released to parole will be a matter for the Parole Authority.
OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Crown, any technical matters from you?
RAFIQ: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Any technical matters from you, Mr Howell?
HOWELL: No, your Honour, there is not.
HIS HONOUR: Sorry to keep you all so long. If we had been able to start at 2 o'clock we would have finished much sooner. Do you want to quickly speak to your client, the officers need to take him down to the truck and no doubt wish to get him away, do you wish to quickly speak to him or not?
HOWELL: Yes, please.
[3]
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Decision last updated: 14 June 2017