R v Pierre MOSS

REMARKS ON SENTENCE 1This is a case where a man in charge of a girls' football team abused his position by exchanging inappropriate and offensive text messages with one of the team members. He was in his thirties and she was a 12 year old girl. 2The man was arrested and charged by the police for his behaviour and he pleaded guilty. I have to sentence him today. The prosecution says I should impose a prison sentence and place him on a register for the protection of children. The defence says that I should give him a good behaviour bond and that the law about the register does not apply to his offence. 3Judges need to give reasons for sentences they impose so I need to explain my reasoning first. I will set out the charge then give some detail about the behaviour that brought it about. It is important for judges to take into account not only the crime and what happened but also the personal circumstances of the offender. In this case there is a good deal of psychological and psychiatric evidence about the offender. 4I will then assess the arguments of the prosecution and the defence and finally I will give my decision about the kind of sentence I will impose and whether or not to place the offender on the register, then I will announce the sentence itself. 5The man's name is Pierre Moss. He has pleaded guilty to an offence under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The offence is using a carriage service in such a way that reasonable persons would regard that use as being menacing, harassing, or offensive. The conduct is alleged to have occurred between 11 August and 29 August 2011. The maximum penalty for the offence that Mr Moss has pleaded guilty to is 3 years imprisonment. I formally convict Pierre Moss of that offence. 6Next I will give some detail about what Mr Moss did which brought about the charge. A very convenient summary occurs in the written submissions of Ms G E Wright of counsel who appeared for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. In [20] of those submissions, which are part of exhibit A, she described the crime in the following terms, which I quote "The offending involved a large number of communications over more than two weeks. In the text messages, the offender was recorded as saying that he wished the child was 'way older' and that he wished she was his 'missus', referring to her on several occasions as 'gorgeous' and signing off numerous text messages with the 'x' sign to represent kisses. The offender made comments of a sexual nature, by referring to a sexual relationship with his wife and suggesting that he purchase the child 'a bunch of roses' and noting that he had 'flirted with an amazing girl' and 'could kiss [her] right now'. Later, he suggested that he 'call in' and give her 'a BIG cuddle hehe', saying he wished he could pick her up. He also referred to problems in his relationship with his wife, referring to her as 'that bitch' and asking if the child could offer a bed or if she had 'any ideas on a date for me'. At times the messages were sent after 10:00pm and into the early hours of the morning. For example at 23h18 on 20 August 2011, he texted 'just so you know im not near her. Im sleepin on sofa in dineing room'." 7Another source of information about the offending behaviour is also in exhibit A, that is what is called the statement of facts. That is an agreed account of the offending behaviour, the agreement being between the prosecution and the defence. It notes that the child - whose first name is Teaghan - was 12 years old at the time and the offender Mr Moss was 33. The context was that he was the coach of an under 14 girls' soccer team. The coach communicated with the team members' parents by means of text messages. He suggested that he exchange messages directly with Teaghan and that started to happen. Then the offensive texts occurred over the period, as I said, between 11 August and 29 August 2011. In all Mr Moss sent 206 text messages. Teaghan sent about 150. On at least 8 times text messages were sent after 10.00pm at night. She said that Mr Moss would usually but not always start the texting each day and was texting so often, she said, that "I did not want to answer my phone. I did not even want to go near my phone." 8The behaviour was limited to the exchange of texts and did not extend to face to face or personal inappropriate behaviour. Teaghan became progressively more uncomfortable with the text messages and on 29 August 2011 she approached the school counsellor and showed her the text messages. The counsellor immediately contacted the principal and Teaghan's mother. The Department of Community Services was also notified by the school. 9Teaghan's mother brought in the police who arrested Mr Moss on 20 September 2011. He was interviewed by the police. He acknowledged that he had done something wrong but confirmed that it had not extended beyond text messages and admitted that he had "texted a couple of those inappropriate messages". He acknowledged that he had "stuffed up, I've made a mistake." 10He said that he was mostly sending the texts to Teaghan when he was having issues with his home life. At the time that he was arrested Mr Moss said "Yeah. I knew this was coming. I know I crossed the line." 11He denied having feelings for the child or intending to pursue the friendship physically. 12It is hardly surprising that that criminal behaviour by Mr Moss had an impact on the child Teaghan. A victim impact statement has been provided by her mother which is also part of exhibit A. Her mother pointed to what her daughter had to endure: the police interview and loss of her phone which was taken as evidence. She added that "Teaghan is now very wary of men." 13She had to have counselling but her mother was not sure how it was going. She said the people at soccer managed to find out and that her daughter "lost a good friend from her team who no longer talks to her." She said that her daughter became worried that Mr Moss "would break into our house and steal her. She would not go to the shops for a long time without an adult for fear she might see him." 14That victim impact statement illustrates why this kind of behaviour which Mr Moss engaged in is made into a crime. It illustrates the kind of impact which his persistent conduct had on the young girl who was receiving his attention. 15I now turn to matters which are personal to Mr Moss. As I said there is a good deal of psychiatric and psychological material. Mr Moss was referred by his general practitioner to a psychiatrist Dr Esther Jesudason. In a report to Mr Moss' solicitor, which became exhibit 3, Dr Jesudason said that she had diagnosed Mr Moss with "Bipolar Disorder." She said that managing that condition would be treatment with medications and psychotherapy. She thought that his overall prognosis is good. 16Dr Jesudason in a report to Mr Moss' general practitioner observed that Mr Moss was "insightful and understood the nature of the charges. He was extremely remorseful. He reported that he had no intention or desire to sexually exploit the young girl and categorically denied any sexual intent or inappropriate behaviour." She confirmed the diagnosis of bipolar disorder adding "anxiety and moderate depression." She observed that "he may have had an untreated ADHD as a child." Of some concern in Dr Jesudason's report to Mr Moss' general practitioner was an account that he had told her that "the messages may have been considered boundary violations ie he may have overstood the mark as a coach but they were definitely not inappropriate or sexual." 17Mr Moss also saw a clinical psychologist. The clinical psychologist said that Mr Moss "is depressed and anxious and experiences severe anxiety attacks." He referred to Dr Jesudason's diagnosis of bipolar disorder. The psychologist's name is Dr John Sjostedt and in a report to Mr Moss' solicitor which became exhibit 2 he said the following - "Psychologically, Mr Moss, a quiet, reserved young man has a tendency towards impulsivity and impetuosity, as well as hyperactivity. He does not always think matters through thoroughly or completely before acting. If one combines the impulsivity of ADD/ADHD with the maniac phase of Bipolar Disorder then one can see how Mr Moss might act before thinking and send some 209 innocuous text messages over a period of months to a young thirteen to fourteen year old girl and not appreciate how that volume of text messages might look to others." He added that Mr Moss "can see and understand how that might look to others now, but at the time he sent the messages his marriage was in a very fraught state and he was very unhappy and grief stricken." I might add that I reject the reference to the text messages as being "innocuous" and the reference to the recipient being 13 to 14 years old is wrong. She was 12 at the time. Nevertheless Dr Sjostedt provides a significant description of Mr Moss' psychological condition at a relevant time. He believed that Mr Moss' "prognosis is good." 18Mr Moss was sent by his lawyers to the experienced forensic psychologist Anita Duffy who provided a report which became exhibit 3. Ms Duffy said that, from the description given to her by Mr Moss, "it appears that he was suffering depression which further immobilised him, increased his levels of unhappiness and made him more passive in his relationships such that he felt helpless to an initiate a separation from his wife." She said that "[i]t appears that his correspondence with young Teaghan Teal occurred at a particularly vulnerable period in his life, and was an outlet where he could express himself to a person who had been experiencing similar problems". She said that he "acknowledges now that he was most inappropriate in the choice of person in whom he could confide his problems". She added that he "bitterly regrets his actions now." She thought that Mr Moss "requires considerable professional intervention to deal with his psychological problems on a number of fronts." Ms Duffy recited some of the issues which were affecting Mr Moss in his life. He has been married twice. The first marriage lasted only a few years. He then formed a relationship with another woman whom he eventually married. That relationship was characterised by a good deal of violence. In fact Ms Duffy said that the "relationship with his wife appears to be the reverse of the single 'battered woman' syndrome, in that he was frequently assaulted by his wife and although he wanted to leave her he felt unable to do so." Issues occurred between them involving a pregnancy which resulted in either a stillbirth or a termination of the pregnancy and it was clear that Mr Moss had an adverse reaction to that event and it has affected him for some time. 19There is also a pre-sentence report from the New South Wales Probation and Parole Service. That report recorded that the author's enquiries "indicated that at the time of the offence Mr Moss was emotionally unstable." It referred to the unhappy relationship with his wife "who drank excessively." It noted that Mr Moss "showed what appeared to be genuine remorse over his involvement in this offence." The report said that he "did appear to have some insight into the impact his offending behaviour had on the victim." It noted that he "is still grieving the loss of his unborn child and has yet to come to terms with the breakdown of his marriage." It noted that he had seen a local psychologist on several occasions. An assessment from the same service placed Mr Moss in the moderate to low risk category relevant to other offenders. 20I will now refer to the points made by the prosecution and the defence in their arguments. Ms Wright refers to the importance of general deterrence in a case like this. That means that the sentence which a judge imposes for a crime like this must be such that other people who might be tempted to commit the same crime will be deterred from doing that because of the severity of the sentence. She says - "General deterrence is of particular significance in sentencing matters of this kind. Relevant to the need for a sentence serving the purposes of general deterrence is the difficulty in detecting such offending." 21Mr G Porter of counsel who appeared for Mr Moss in the proceedings took exception to some of the authorities which were relied upon by Ms Wright in making her general submission about general deterrence. But as I understand it, in oral submissions he acknowledged the significance of general deterrence in a case like this, like any case, but he made a submission which I will return to about general deterrence being modified in this case because of his client's mental condition. I accept that general deterrence subject to that further submission is a significant factor. 22Ms Wright reminded me of the provisions of s 17A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which provides that "a court shall not pass a sentence of imprisonment...unless the court, having considered all other available sentences, is satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate in the circumstances." 23I accept that submission and I accept the submission also made by her that the offence involved a breach of trust. As Ms Wright said, Mr Moss "was in a position of trust and relative authority with respect to the child and this is an aggravating feature of the offence." Obviously the parents of the children in the soccer team trusted a man such as Mr Moss to have their children in his care, but also - relevant to this case - trusted him in his communicating directly with the children who had direct access to him through the texting facility. He breached that trust significantly in this case. He was given the phone number which he could contact Teaghan on and abused that information which he was given. 24Ms Wright further argues that Mr Moss has shown a minimal degree of contrition. She points out that he did not give evidence in the sentence proceedings which is true. She points out that the evidence of contrition or remorse on his part appears in the psychological and psychiatric reports. She picked up the reference by the treating psychologist to the word "innocuous" in describing the behaviour. She submitted that the reports do not provide a sufficient basis for contrition to be taken into account. She referred also to the vehement denial by Mr Moss of any sexual motivation. 25Mr Porter on the other hand says that there is a good deal of evidence of contrition. He points to the references in the psychological, psychiatric and Probation Service reports about his client's attitude. I agree with Mr Porter in this regard. In particular the Probation and Parole officer who authored the report noted a degree of contrition and I infer that that person is experienced in making those observations. The psychiatrist in a report to the GP rather than to the solicitor noted Mr Moss' remorse about his behaviour. It does not carry the weight, as Ms Wright correctly observes, that it would carry if he had given evidence in the witness box but nevertheless it seems to me to be a good basis for me to conclude that Mr Moss is remorseful about what he has done. 26Ms Wright acknowledges that Mr Moss has pleaded guilty and that may be taken into account insofar as it has demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice. He is entitled to some discount in the sentence but she argues that 25 per cent which Mr Porter suggests is appropriate would be too high. 27Ms Wright argues that the only appropriate sentence is a custodial sentence given the seriousness of the offence and the importance of general deterrence. She notes that Mr Moss has no previous offences but I accept her submission that it was that factor which enabled him to be placed in the position of trust which he abused. Exhibit B is the form which he signed correctly saying before he was appointed that he had no previous convictions. That has less weight than it might otherwise have because he abused that trust. 28Ms Wright argues that there is no causal relationship or at least that the causal relationship is weak between Mr Moss' behaviour and his psychiatric condition. Mr Porter on the other hand points to the reports of Dr Sjostedt and I am inclined to accept Mr Porter's argument. Dr Sjostedt said that by reference to the impulsivity associated with his past condition and the manic phase of his current condition "one can see how Mr Moss might act before thinking". That to my mind demonstrates some causal connection between his condition and his offending behaviour. 29One also needs to take into account the circumstances of his marriage, his depression, all of which have been diagnosed by those qualified to make the diagnoses. Mr Porter referred me to what the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and other Courts have said about the significance of a psychological or psychiatric condition or, to put it in more general terms, the mental health of an offender. He correctly highlighted or summarised the ways which it can affect a sentence in the following way. Where a person's mental health "contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, the offender's moral culpability may be reduced." I accept that submission and I accept because of Dr Sjostedt's remarks that there is a causal relationship. 30He also pointed out that a person's mental health may have the "consequence that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed". I accept that submission. It reduces somewhat the impact of the general deterrence which Ms Wright has referred to. A custodial sentence if a person has to go to jail "may weigh more heavily on the person." I accept that submission as well. The psychiatric and psychological condition of Mr Moss is a relevant factor in all of those ways. 31As I said, Mr Porter suggested that the plea of guilty should result in a 25 per cent discount in his sentence. I do not accept that submission. I regard an appropriate discount as being one of 20 per cent. He first appeared charged in court on 20 October 2011. The police brief was served on him in January 2012 and his plea of guilty was about 5 months later on 22 June 2012. That does not attract what would be regarded as a top level discount but I would regard a 20 per cent discount as a fair assessment. 32I turn now, before coming to the sentence, to the question about whether Mr Moss should because of his conviction go on to a particular register. Ms Wright says that he should. Mr Porter says that he should not. The register is created under a New South Wales Act of Parliament called the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. As Ms Wright points out in her written submissions, the Act describes a "registrable person". It defines a registrable person in s 3A(1) relevantly as "a person whom a court has at any time...sentenced in respect of a registrable offence...". A "registrable offence" is also defined. It can be a Class 1 or Class 2 offence. Ms Wright says that this offence is a Class 2 offence. She argues that it falls within one of the many definitions of a Class 2 offence. The definition which she says applies is this: it is "an offence that involves an act of indecency against or in respect of a child, being an offence that is punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or more". Obviously the second part of the definition applies. It is the first part that is controversial. 33Ms Wright points out that the expression "act of indecency" is not defined in the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act but refers to two decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal where the expression is used and referred to authoritatively. In R v Manson, R v Stamenkovic (Court of Criminal Appeal, 17 February 1993, unreported) Gleeson CJ, when he was Chief Justice of New South Wales and with whom Clarke JA and Sully J agreed, said that "an indecent act is one which right-minded persons would consider to be contrary to community standards of decency." His Honour had just referred to a New Zealand case called Purves v Inglis (1915) 34 NZLR 1051 at 1053. Gleeson CJ went on to say that in the New Zealand case the following was said: "The word indecent has no definite legal meaning and it must be taken therefore in its modern and popular affectation. In the Standard Dictionary indecent is defined to be anything that is unbecoming or offensive to common propriety." 34Ms Wright referred to the fact that the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Eades v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2010) 77 NSWLR 173, [2010] NSWCA 241 adopted through Campbell JA - with whom Beazley JA as her Honour then was agreed - the description by Gleeson CJ of an "indecent act". Ms Wright went on to refer to s 473.4 of the Criminal Code which refers to the "matters to be taken into account in deciding for the purposes of this Part whether reasonable persons would regard particular material, or a particular use of a carriage service, as being, in all the circumstances, offensive". And those matters include the "standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults". She refers to the authorities which permit me to take into account the context of the Act including the surrounding circumstances. 35She says that the offence in the present case does, in the terms of the definition of a Class 2 offence, involve "an act of indecency against or in respect of a child". She says that a number of the messages involve a sexual nature. She also argues that the expression "in respect of" used in the definition of the offence "make it clear that the act of indecency in question need not involve physical contact with the child." I accept that submission. She points out that a person's purpose in communicating with the child is relevant although not decisive. I accept that. The authorities say as much. She points out that Mr Moss in this case "stated that he would have pursued a relationship with the child if she were his age". She went on to argue that the "content and number of the text messages sent to the child, and the time at which many of them were sent, are such as to meet the description of 'an act of indecency against or in respect of a child', being an act involving a child which right-minded persons would consider to be contrary to community standards of decency." 36Mr Porter, on the other hand, referred to another offence in a related section of the Criminal Code, namely s 474.27A which refers to indecent material being transmitted and defines "indecent" as meaning "indecent according to the standards of ordinary people". He says that the argument advanced by Ms Wright would capture behaviour far too broadly. He says that the definition of the offence that his client has been convicted of refers to "menacing, harassing or offensive" and there is no element of indecency. His argument is that looking at the definition of a Class 2 offence, it really requires indecency to be part of the offence or an element of the offence rather than a reference to behaviour. 37In my opinion this offence does involve an act of indecency in respect of a child. It is clear that the behaviour that Mr Moss engaged in would be regarded as "contrary to community standards of decency" and certainly - applying the quotation extracted by Gleeson CJ from Purvis v Inglis - "anything that is unbecoming or offensive to common propriety". In addition I accept the submission of Ms Wright when she refers to s 473.4 which directs me to take into account standards of "morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults". 38The content of a number of the exchanges, including the references to an interest in being in a relationship with the child were it not for her age and references to other matters, clearly leave me with no doubt that the behaviour involved an act of indecency. 39Finally I do not regard it as necessary that the act of indecency be an actual defined element of the offence. I think the act of indecency - referred to in the relevant definition of a Class 2 offence - is a reference to behaviour rather than a defined element. I note in this regard that the legislature in at least two other definitions specifies when certain conduct is to be an element of an offence. In the definition of a Class 1 offence contained in cl (g), it includes an "offence an element of which is an intention to commit" a particular kind of offence. 40In another definition of a Class 2 offence in cl (l) it refers to an offence "an element of which is an intention to commit an offence of a kind listed in this definition". The legislature, it seems to me, has made a distinction between behaviour and an element of an offence. So I have decided that Mr Moss is a registrable person because he has been convicted of a Class 2 offence. 41I turn now to the question of the kind of sentence that I will impose. I agree with Ms Wright that because of the seriousness of the offence and the need for some general deterrence, it should be a sentence of imprisonment. I do not accept Mr Porter's submission that a good behaviour bond would be sufficient. This is because the behaviour extended over a period of nearly three weeks. It has obviously had a significant impact on the child, Teaghan. However, because of the impact of the psychological and psychiatric evidence in the ways that I have mentioned, I regard it as appropriate for the sentence to be suspended and in due course I will suspend the prison sentence which I am about to impose. 42Although general deterrence is important, it is reduced somewhat because of the psychiatric evidence and psychological evidence in this case. I agree with Mr Porter that his client's prospects of rehabilitation are good and that he has already commenced to undertake that course. I have had regard to the comparable sentences helpfully provided by Ms Wright. Full-time custody in those sentences was imposed when, it seems to me, the behaviour was more serious or there was more than one offence. I am sentencing Mr Moss for just one offence. 43Given the seriousness of the offence I would regard an appropriate penalty as being one of 15 months imprisonment. I will discount that by 20 per cent because Mr Moss has facilitated the course of justice by pleading guilty. I therefore determine that an appropriate sentence is one of 12 months imprisonment. 44Now just before I impose that sentence and I'll just get counsel's help with the section. I note, returning to the registrable offence question, that one of the definitions of a Class 2 offence is under cl (k) "an offence under a law of a foreign jurisdiction that the regulations state as a Class 2 offence". Regulation 18 of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Regulation 2009 lists a number of offences against certain sections of the Criminal Code. Those offences include some of the offences in s 474 but do not include this offence which is under s 474.17 but to my mind that is not surprising because s 474.17 does not include, in terms, a reference to a child. The purposes of the definition of a Class 2 offence in cl (a) is widely defined to pick up the kind of behaviour, in my opinion, which happened to fall within s 474.17 in this case. Now you've referred to in your submissions - 20(1) is that right? A suspended sentence. WRIGHT: Subsection 1B your Honour, yes. HIS HONOUR: Yes good. Would you stand up Mr Moss. 45I sentence you to imprisonment for 12 months in respect of the offence that I have convicted you of and I direct by order that you be released upon giving security in respect of that offence as soon as you have given that security. Just have a seat Mr Moss. HIS HONOUR: Ms Wright, upon giving security of the kind referred to in s 20(1)(a) either forthwith or after he has served a specified - it is going to be forthwith, so I should add that. Do you require any security or not? WRIGHT: Your Honour is required to set an amount. I understand it's not actually payable. It's generally $500 or $1000, to the order of about $500. HIS HONOUR: $500, okay. Mr Porter, any - no? PORTER: Thank you, your Honour. 46I direct by order that you be released upon giving security in the amount of $500 forthwith. HIS HONOUR: Any other orders? WRIGHT: To be of good behaviour. HIS HONOUR: Do you have the Act? I normally bring it with me but for some reason I haven't. I had better look at the section. That's what I preach about to readers so I had better do it myself. Where does the good behaviour come in? WRIGHT: If I could be of assistance, generally the way it's expressed is sentence the person to imprisonment in respect of the offence for a period of 12 months, but direct by order that the person be released forthwith, self security in the sum of $500, on condition that he be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months. Your Honour will see s 19AC(1) requires the Court to make a recognisance release order in respect of a sentence of imprisonment that does not exceed 3 years, unless certain exceptions apply. Those exceptions do not apply in this case. So the recognisance release order, which is another way of saying good behaviour bond in the federal context, is worked into the suspended sentence order. HIS HONOUR: Thank you. 47I sentence Mr Moss to 12 months imprisonment. I direct by order that he be released forthwith upon giving self security by recognisance in the sum of $500 that he will comply with the condition that he will be of good behaviour for the period of 12 months. You are not asking for any reparation, restitution or compensation? WRIGHT: No, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Or pecuniary penalty or any other conditions? WRIGHT: No, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: I think I have now made the order, haven't I? WRIGHT: Yes. HIS HONOUR: I've got to explain that to Mr Moss and under that other Act, the Registration Act, we found that the Court has to - I think that s 4, he has to receive a notice from the Court, which I guess he gets downstairs. WRIGHT: I'm not able to assist actually, your Honour. PORTER: As I think I indicated last week in the State matters, they have the documents ready for the court. HIS HONOUR: I think that's right, the court has to do it. I don't think I start giving him a notice. PORTER: No, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: I am going to add something else to my reasons. 48I also took into account in fixing the sentence that Mr Moss would be subject to the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. Ms Wright referred me to the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in TMTW v R [2008] NSWCCA 50, and the judgment of Simpson J in that case, with whom McClellan CJ at CL and James J agreed, and I regard this as the kind of case which to a limited extent does involve some extra curial punishment. As her Honour said at [53], Mr Moss will be "for eight years...to be branded a sexual offender, to be known, at least to local police, in that capacity, and will be reminded of his crime, something he would, no doubt, prefer to put out of his mind. I do not regard this as entirely irrelevant." For the same reasons, I have given some weight to that factor. I return the Criminal Code. WRIGHT: Just one small matter, if I could respectfully ask, in your Honour's reasons where the word [name of child] appears, I am instructed there was a suppression order made-- HIS HONOUR: Is it a suppression order or is it protected by some legislation in the State? WRIGHT: Yes, there is legislation-- HIS HONOUR: Yes, and presumably it prevents the publication of the name of a victim? WRIGHT: Yes. HIS HONOUR: Is it Commonwealth legislation? WRIGHT: It's State legislation. HIS HONOUR: So the State legislation applies, picks up. What I normally do, and thank you for reminding me, I announce to the court when I have referred to the victim of - usually a sexual offence - that that name is referred to in court but is not to be repeated outside the court and indeed it is an offence to do so. I don't make an order; I just state the effect of the law. Does that sound right? WRIGHT: Yes, your Honour. Might the letter S be used in the transcript? HIS HONOUR: The transcript of the sentence I will order, and my associate and I will anonymise it. I sometimes use a pseudonym but I indicate to all those in court - I have referred to the victim of these offences. I have just referred to her as [name of child], and her full name is [name of child]. It is appropriate for that name to be uttered by me in court, and referred to in court, but it is against the law to mention that name to anybody outside the court who does not know about these proceedings, or to publish the name any further in connection with these proceedings. It is an offence. WRIGHT: Thank you, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Anything else I need to do - no? PORTER: No, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Mr Moss, I have convicted you of the offence. You have pleaded guilty. I have given you a gaol sentence. It is a 12 month gaol sentence, but I have suspended the sentence. I have suspended it on condition that you sign a document downstairs saying that you will behave yourself for the 12 months, you will stay out of trouble. You have got to promise to pay $500 if you do not stay out of trouble, and if you breach that and you get into trouble in some way - it does not have to be the same sort of behaviour; It could be a drink driving charge, or an assault charge - I do not think you will find yourself in trouble from what I have read about you, but you will have to come back before court and the suspended sentence may no longer be suspended, and you could end up in gaol. Do you understand that? OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: One other thing, Mr Moss. For the reasons that I have given you will go onto that register for the protection of children. Mr Porter will explain that more to you but there will be documents that you will be given downstairs in the registry as well. Do you understand that as well? OFFENDER: Yes, your Honour.