17 I should record also that Mrs Eddy asserted that her mother would have had no intention of ending her own life. She loved seeing her grandchildren and a third child was due on about 17 April. Mrs Eddy said that her mother would often say "I'll go when my times' up, but it's not up yet."
18 Mrs Eddy also recounted one conversation with her mother in which the latter said that the Prisoner had suggested to his wife that they should take their own lives but her mother said she would never do that. On the other hand the Prisoner's daughter in law recounted one incident when the deceased had fallen out of bed and stated she was not going to be put in a home and that she had lived long enough and wanted to die. Mrs Nicol (junior) went on to say that 5 minutes later the deceased was OK and seemed to have been just voicing frustrations.
19 There was other evidence to the effect that the Prisoner and Mrs Nicol had indicated that they never wanted to be separated.
20 Despite the stresses the Prisoner must undoubtedly have been under at the time he gave the accounts to which I have referred, the evidence satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt that the Prisoner's attack on his wife was premeditated and with the intent to kill her and them himself.
21 I turn to other matters. The Prisoner has no criminal record, even for traffic matters. Until his retirement he worked for some 4 decades with General Motors Holden, achieving a position of some responsibility. He has the 2 children to whom I have referred, Mrs Eddy having for some years been substantially disabled by multiple sclerosis. But for the present offence he has led a blameless life.
22 I should recognise expressly that I have considered the terms of s3A and the requirements of s21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act although I do not regard it as necessary to extend these reasons by proceeding through the latter sections detailed provisions, or those which apply here, seriatim. I will mention only one, that in the circumstances as I am aware of them, the Prisoner has pleaded, or at least indicated his intention to plead, guilty to manslaughter at the first available opportunity and is entitled to the appropriate high credit for that.
23 The Prisoner's history, situation and the circumstances of his offending mean that three of the principal purposes of sentencing have no part to play in the determination of what I should do. There is no need for specific deterrence, no need to protect the community from him and no need for rehabilitation from any tendency towards criminal or other anti-social behaviour. Nothing I do could aid these common aspects of sentencing.
24 There remain however considerations of general deterrence and retribution. There is considerable scope for doubt as to how significant the former of these is in a situation such as this. One can be confident that few persons in the position of the Prisoner prior to his offence concern themselves with what a Court is likely to do if they fail.
25 I am also mindful of the principle that "in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or abnormality, general deterrence is a factor which should be given relatively less weight than in other cases because such an offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others." - R v Letteri (unreported CCA, 18 March 1992).
26 On the other hand, s23A has the effect of converting conduct that would otherwise be murder to manslaughter, not removing such conduct entirely from the criminal calendar and it cannot be said in that context that general deterrence has, as a general proposition, no part to play in the sentencing of offenders who come within the ambit of the section. I must give some weight to it.
27 Weight must also be given to the topic of retribution or, as I think is encompassed within that term, the community's entitlement to feel that justice has been done, particularly given the sanctity of human life. In that regard I need do no more than refer to R v Dawes [2004] NSWCCA 363 and the cases cited therein.
28 How those considerations are to be reflected in the sentence to be imposed is a far more difficult question. There can be no doubt that a full time custodial sentence on the Prisoner at his age and in his state of health would be likely to have a much, much greater impact than would a custodial sentence on a younger man. Dr Westmore and Professor Brodarty drew attention to difficulties that the Prisoner would face in a custodial setting. As was said in R v Burrell [2000] NSWCCA 262 at [27] "the realities of prison life are not overlooked in the sentencing discretion".
29 The Prisoner's age and health make periodic detention or community service practically impossible and both parties agreed that these were inappropriate.
30 On the other hand, the imposition of a bond or suspended sentence, in circumstances where one can predict with certainly that the risk of re-offending or other misbehaviour is zero, has about it elements of the proverbial slap on the wrist.
31 Yet undoubtedly some penalty is required. The Court cannot so deal with the Applicant that a message is sent to the community that old persons, even those suffering from an abnormality of mind and with an intention to kill themselves, can kill their partners with impunity. Given the Prisoner's situation, I do not regard any of the sentencing options available to me as satisfactory. Perhaps none could be devised that are.
32 Be that as it may, the best of the options available to me seems to be that urged by both parties, namely a sentence of imprisonment, suspended.
33 I am satisfied Mr Nicol that, your age and the fact that you have not previously been in custody amount to special circumstances and that I should vary the relativity of the non-parole and parole periods of the sentence.
34 Ronald Nicol, I sentence you to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 1 year, and a balance of term also of 1 year. I suspend execution of the sentence for a period of 2 years and direct that you be released from custody on condition that you enter a good behaviour bond for a period of 2 years.
35 I order that the Bond I have referred to be entered into at the Court Registry.
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