Submissions by the parties.
19 The Crown drew attention to the serious nature of the charge and the real psychological harm that may be suffered by a victim so young, a matter which his Honour recognised. The Crown then made the following submission:
"19. In the Crown submission, inter alia, in light of:
· the tender age of the complainant at the time;
· the fact that there was no plea and consequently the complainant was required to give evidence in the proceedings;
· the fact that the offence represented a gross breach of trust; and
· the assaults occurred within the family environment,
the inevitable conclusion is that the sentence that was imposed by Black DCJ was manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances and this Court should intervene."
20 In his Honour's remarks, as already mentioned, he addressed issues arising under s21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. He was obliged to identify both aggravating and mitigating factors. In respect of aggravating factors, his Honour said this: (ROS 4)
"First of all I am obliged to look at any aggravating factors, but I have to say that I do not see any there, because of course it is an element of the offence of which he was convicted, that he was in the position that he was and the child was of the age that she was."
21 The charge was brought under s61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900. Section 61(M) is in these terms:
" 61M Aggravated indecent assault
(1) Any person who assaults another person in circumstances of aggravation, and, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or in the presence of the other person, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
(2) Any person who assaults another person, and, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or in the presence of the other person, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years, if the other person is under the age of 10 years.
(3) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which:
(a) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons; or
(b) the alleged victim is under the age of 16 years; or
(c) the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender; or
(d) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability; or
(e) the alleged victim has a serious intellectual disability."
(emphasis in original)
22 Under s61M(2) the fact that the child is under the authority of a person who indecently assaults her is not an element of the offence. It is a matter to be taken into account under s21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which includes the following:
" 21A Aggravating, mitigating and other factors in sentencing
(2) Aggravating factors
(k) the offender abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim."
23 The statement by his Honour was therefore not correct. However, there can be no doubt that his Honour took account of Mr Newbigging's relationship with the complainant, as her stepfather.
24 The Crown drew attention to the authorities which suggested that, in offences of this sort, where general and personal deterrence are so important, the previous good character of an offender is of less importance (R v Rapley [1999] NSWCCA 302, per Handley JA, para 18-20; R v Levi (CCA (NSW), 15.5.97, per Sperling J)). However, these were cases where there were a number of convictions and a course of conduct towards the victim or victims. The offending behaviour was not capable of being regarded as an isolated lapse. However, Mr Newbigging, was convicted on one count only. There was no penetration. The act may be regarded as an isolated act of aberrant behaviour, to be seen in the context of his other life achievements and previous good character.
25 The respondent Counsel, in his submissions, drew attention to the exceptional nature of a Crown appeal (Griffith v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293). In R v Holder (1983) 3 NSWLR 245, Street CJ said this: (at 255)
"Whilst, as I have earlier said, the approach to the detection of error where the ground relied upon is manifest excess or manifest inadequacy is identical in both cases (cf per Isaacs J in Whittaker v The King ), it is frequently more difficult to detect error in the form of manifest inadequacy. Moreover, courts are understandably more ready to ascribe error where the ground is manifest excess than where the ground is manifest inadequacy."
26 Reference was also made to the useful statement of principle, in appeals such as this, by Hunt J in R v George Michael Morris (CCA (NSW), 10.3.89), where his Honour said this:
"It is, of course, important to make it clear that this Court will not interfere with a sentence imposed merely because it is of the view that that sentence is insufficient. It interferes only if it be shown that the sentencing judge was in error by acting on a wrong principle or by misunderstanding or wrongly assessing some salient feature of the evidence. That error may often appear only from the sentence itself, in that some sentences will be shown to be so inadequate as to manifest the existence of such an error by the judge. It is necessary to emphasise that, in the absence of a well demonstrated mistake, this Court should only increase sentences imposed by a judge in the exercise of his sentencing discretion in compelling cases."
27 In addition, the fact of double jeopardy is recognised, that having been sentenced once, the respondent is obliged to face the ordeal again, with the possibility, in the case of Mr Newbigging, that he may be ordered to return to gaol (cf R v Holder (supra) at 255).
28 Both parties drew attention to various decisions involving convictions under s61M(2). However, it was acknowledged that such cases do not provide much assistance. None involved a person convicted of a single count. All involved multiple offences, some of which included penetration.
29 The material placed before the sentencing Judge and before this Court included statistics from the Judicial Commission in respect of persons convicted under s61M(2). The Crown urged caution in respect of that material, first, because the sample of cases was small (thirteen), and secondly, because the section comprehends such a wide range of conduct. Without knowing the detail of each case the statistics may be misleading.
30 Whilst caution is required, the material does, we believe, furnish some guidance. The picture which emerges is not markedly different from the picture, such as it is, to be derived from cases where the offender was convicted of multiple offences, where at least one of the convictions was under s61M(2). The statistics suggest that 46% of offenders received either a fixed term or a non parole of 12 months or less. A further 31% received a fixed term or a non parole period of 2 years.
31 Whilst it may be said that a sentence of 18 months with a non parole period of 9 months was lenient, we do not believe that it can be said to have been manifestly inadequate. It was therefore appropriate that the Crown appeal should be dismissed.
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