Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Accused)
File Number(s): 2021/232712
[2]
Two violent deaths
Shortly after 7:45 AM on Friday, 13 August 2021, police entered a home in Oberon, a town in the Central Tablelands of New South Wales, located a couple of hours from Sydney. There they were confronted by a horrific sight: the dead bodies of two older members of the local community, Mrs Susan Murray and her husband, Mr Glenn Murray, each bearing multiple stab wounds. Based on what the police observed, there could be no doubt that their lives had been violently brought to an end; nor could there be any doubt that the person or persons who had done that intended to kill them. On occasion in this judgment, I shall sometimes respectfully refer to one or both of Mr and Mrs Murray as "the deceased".
In fact, the identity of the solitary killer was already clear, founded at the least upon a bizarre confession that had been made a short time before, and of which the police had been promptly informed. His identity is also established before me by overwhelming, undisputed, and indisputable evidence: their son, the accused, Mr Graeme Leslie Murray, had committed the fatal acts.
The immediate background of that double tragedy is as follows. At the time, the accused was living on his own in the western suburbs of Sydney. He was unable to work, and limited in his movements, by way of lockdowns arising from the pandemic. As a result he was restless and bored. Despite having achieved a period of abstinence, he decided to return to crystal methylamphetamine, known more commonly in Australia as ice, a notoriously destructive and addictive prohibited drug, which he had previously been abusing for years. When he tried to obtain it, one friend talked him out of it, and the accused said that he would simply continue to abuse cannabis. Another so-called friend, however, was prepared to fulfil his request, and one can safely infer from a series of text messages that the accused returned to the drug ice on the evening of Monday, 9 August 2021.
After that, his state of mind began to deteriorate. And that process continued, even after both prohibited drugs had left his system, and at a time when he could not be said to be intoxicated by either of them.
By the morning of Thursday 12 August 2021, the accused was in distress. He requested to stay at the home of his estranged partner, Ms Melissa Flores. She understood immediately that he had returned to the drug, and flatly prohibited him from having contact with her, or their young son.
Eventually, on the same evening, the accused made the decision to travel in his motor vehicle from the western suburbs of Sydney to Oberon, contrary to the lockdown rules. His parents had made their home there, having retired from Penrith some years beforehand. On the way, he behaved bizarrely and frighteningly enough for road workers to call police more than once in the early hours of the morning. By the time the police arrived at that site, however, the accused had driven off.
One can infer from the evidentiary timeline, I think, that the accused arrived in the early hours, was welcomed by one or both of his parents, and everyone retired to bed. Shortly before dawn, however, a time when his parents were accustomed to have a cup of coffee to start the day, all three members of the family were awake, and the lives of two of them were brought to an end in the way that I have described.
After driving away from the family home, as I have said, the accused made a bizarre confession by telephone to a workmate. He also disposed of the knife used in the two killings, which he had obtained from his parents' kitchen. Shortly after that, the police contacted him by phone, and he was quickly arrested in Penrith. He gave police a number of contradictory versions of what had happened, including as to how he had suffered a significant injury to one of his hands. That is an injury that one can readily infer was self-inflicted during the fatal acts. Eventually, he exercised his right to silence, was charged with two counts of murder, and has been in custody ever since.
[3]
The trial, and resolution of its issues
That is the context in which a trial by judge alone commenced before me with the arraignment of the accused on the morning of Monday, 6 May 2024. The proceedings were appropriately concise, because the parties were agreed about a great deal.
For example, there was not the slightest dispute by the accused that his acts had directly caused the death of both of the deceased. I record immediately that I am satisfied of that beyond reasonable doubt.
It was also made clear that the primary defence relied upon by the accused was that, at the time of the killings, he was suffering from a mental health impairment of the kind that leads by way of statute to the special verdict of "act proven, but not criminally responsible". Every element of that defence, of course, needs to be established by the accused on the balance of probabilities.
In this trial, on the basis - for the time being at least - that my judgment in R v Murray [2024] NSWSC 503 delivered on Friday 3 May 2024 is binding, and on the further basis of the expert opinion evidence of an eminent forensic psychiatrist retained by the prosecution, the Crown accepted that the defence could be established on balance. Indeed, it was explained that an alternative, less formal procedure was not being adopted, simply so that the appeal rights of the Crown regarding my pre-trial judgment could be preserved.
Returning to background for a moment, and ranging more widely in time, the life of the accused had been problematic for years, before the central events under discussion. By that stage he was aged 46 years, having been born in February 1975. He had abused prohibited drugs from the early age of 14 or 15, had moved on to amphetamines before he was 21, had intersected with the criminal justice system regularly, had been incarcerated more than once, had been treated for mental problems repeatedly, and had, at the least, suffered from paranoid delusions of various kinds for a long time. Speaking generally about all of that, I think that I can take judicial notice of the fact that mentally troubled persons often use amphetamines because they superficially feel better as a result. In fact, however, the drug makes their mental state much worse. I also accept that drugs such as ice can, sometimes and in some people, lead to psychosis, which I translate into plain English as meaning being completely divorced from reality, a condition which then often resolves over weeks or months in the period after intoxication.
To give but one of many examples of the bizarre behaviour of the accused over the years: in 2019, he clambered onto the roof of a suburban funeral parlour, fell through it, was injured as a result, gathered up some items including - remarkably - the ashes of a dead person, and set them on fire. When the authorities arrived, he was found wandering through the interior of the building, his face covered with a T-shirt.
In short, there is no doubt that this man has had a drug problem for years, well before August 2021; it had damaged if not ruined his life; and he had also suffered from significant mental problems, again for years.
I turn to focus more closely now on the question of the mental state of the accused and its role in this trial. Each of the two forensic psychiatrists who expressed an opinion about that question on behalf of each legal team examined the accused personally, reflected on a great deal of written background material, answered a number of specific questions posed by lawyers, and expressed their opinions by way of a series of very reflective reports. They also agreed about much, and in fact only disagreed about two issues, as follows.
Professor Greenberg, qualified for the Crown, felt that a diagnosis of substance induced psychotic disorder was the most likely. Dr Dayalan, qualified for the defence, however, tended to favour the chronic and severe mental illness of schizophrenia, perhaps at a less fully revealed stage. Each of those opinions, I respectfully think, is perfectly justifiable, and the question is really a subjective matter of expert judgment. But as the parties agreed, it is not incumbent upon me to resolve that first disagreement, for reasons that I shall explain shortly.
As for the second disagreement, I resolve it in favour of the state of mind of the accused being more profoundly disturbed at the relevant time, rather than less; again, I shall explain that in a moment.
To explore areas of agreement and disagreement specifically: both experts considered that the accused was not intoxicated at the time of the killings, and proceeded on the basis that his mental state was not therefore the operating, physiological result of any substance.
Each expert considered that, at the time of the killings, the accused was suffering from a mental health impairment as defined in s 4(1) of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) (the Act).
Each expert also considered that the exception to that definition to be found in s 4(3) of the Act did not apply. In particular, Professor Greenberg did not ascribe the psychotic state of the accused on the morning of 13 August 2021 solely to the effect of the drug. For Dr Dayalan, the question did not arise, because of his diagnosis of schizophrenia.
In short, the unanimous expert opinion placed before me was that the accused suffered from a mental health impairment, as relevantly defined by Parliament, at the time of the killings.
Furthermore, as for s 28 of the Act, both experts considered that the accused was not in a position to reflect calmly upon the enormous moral wrongfulness of what he was doing. Indeed, Professor Greenberg for the Crown went further, and felt that the mental health impairment had an even more fundamental effect. He expressed the opinion that the accused did not really understand the nature and quality of his acts, when he ended the lives of his parents with the utmost brutality.
For those reasons, the unanimous expert opinion was that, at the time of the killings, the accused suffered from a mental health impairment, with the necessary consequences upon his thinking and feeling for the defence to be established, and for the special verdict of "act proven but not criminally responsible" to be returned on each count of murder.
As the tribunal of fact in this trial, I accept those propositions, for the following reasons.
On either expert psychiatric view, the accused suffered from the three kinds of disturbance required to establish the definition of a mental health impairment in s 4(1) of the Act. There is no evidence to the contrary, and not the slightest reason on my part to reject that unanimous position.
I accept that, on either view, the exception to the concept of a mental health impairment found in s 4(3)(a) is not established. Again, the expert evidence is all one way, and I have no reason whatsoever to find to the contrary.
Separately, I have reflected upon the permissive examples in s 4(2) of the Act in accordance with my earlier judgment, but they do not deflect me from my analysis.
Finally, I accept on balance the opinion of Professor Greenberg that the accused not only failed to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, but also did not truly appreciate what he was doing. I say that because of the evidence (from many sources) that the accused in truth loved his parents, was on very good terms with them, and indeed, as he himself said when arrested, regarded them as his "best friends".
It is also relevant I think that, when he was in a state of distress, it was to them that he drove for hours by night, I infer on the evidence seeking a place to stay, comfort, and company. In that regard, it is important to recall that the fatal weapon was obtained from the home in Oberon, and certainly not brought with the accused from Sydney.
Far from the fatal act being without motive, I accept on balance the possible thesis that there was a "floridly psychotic" belief on the part of the accused that his real parents had been kidnapped and secreted, that his mother was an evil impostor, and that the efforts of his father to save the life of Mrs Murray were merely the work of another malevolent replica. That utterly irrational possible motivation on his part could poignantly explain the determination and severity of the fatal attacks.
In other words, my opinion on balance is that the mind of the accused was so disordered, despite the drugs having left his body quite some time previously, that, far from harming his parents, it is possible that he believed that he was in the process of trying to save them.
In my opinion, the necessary physical elements of murder are unquestionably established. I am satisfied on balance that the elements of the primary defence, leading to the special verdict, are also established. Accordingly, I shall deliver the resultant verdict on both counts shortly.
[4]
Aspects of outcome of proceedings
Before I do so, however, I would like to make a few things clear, not just for those who love and honour the memory of both deceased, but also for members of the community generally who may listen to or read this judgment.
First, the conciseness of these proceedings is not the slightest suggestion that the trial, and the events underpinning it, are anything less than matters of the utmost gravity.
Secondly, as had been discussed throughout the trial, although the accused will be found not criminally responsible for his fatal actions, the result of that verdict is very different from an acquittal, whereby a person accused of a crime is found not guilty by a jury and simply leaves the dock and walks out of court to rejoin the community. There is not the slightest question of that here. As has been agreed between the Bar table and me, the result of these verdicts will be indefinite detention in a mental hospital or gaol, unless and until an expert tribunal is satisfied that the accused can be safely released.
Thirdly, the person who violently killed two innocent members of the community will be judged to have been not criminally responsible by the criminal justice system. But that outcome does not subtract for a moment from the senseless tragedy of the loss of two valued human lives. Indeed, one can reflect that the verdict actually supports the utter senselessness of it all.
Fourthly and finally, the experts are of the view that the accused was either schizophrenic, or that some other inherent mental state of his played its own role, above and beyond that of prohibited drugs. But on either view as I understand them, and in my own opinion, ice undoubtedly played some role here, just as it had, over many years in the past, played a deeply negative role in the mental state and life of the accused. If one needs an example of the damage that that prohibited substance does to Australian society, one need look no further than the facts of this case. I hope that the accused will reflect in the years ahead on his catastrophic decision to return to that substance in August 2021, for no reason other than simple boredom. I also hope that, perhaps, the so-called friend who supplied that pernicious substance to a man who had demonstrated significant mental disturbances for years might undertake a measure of reflection as well.
[5]
Verdicts
On the first count alleging the murder of Glenn Murray, I return a verdict against the accused, Graeme Leslie Murray, of act proven, but not criminally responsible.
On the second count alleging the murder of Susan Murray, I return a verdict against the accused, Graeme Leslie Murray, of act proven, but not criminally responsible.
[Short adjournment; victim impact statements marked as a single exhibit, and read.]
All of the victim impact statements will be promptly sent to the expert tribunal which, from now on, will be making the decisions about the control and care of Mr Murray, along with a full transcript of the proceedings and all other documents placed before me, including of course all psychiatric reports.
I make the following orders:
1. Mr Graeme Leslie Murray is to be detained at such place as may be determined from time to time by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
2. The Registrar of the Supreme Court must notify the Minister for Health, as soon as reasonably practicable, of the terms of this judgment and the orders made by me.
3. The Registrar must notify the Mental Health Review Tribunal and Justice Health, as soon as reasonably practicable, of the terms of this judgment and the orders made by me, and to provide those bodies with the following documentation:
(1) A copy of these reasons for verdict and my orders;
(2) A transcript of the entire proceedings;
(3) A copy of the exhibits tendered at trial; and
(4) A copy of all of the victim impact statements.
Permit me to say that I have never lost a loved one to violence, but over many years and in many roles in the criminal justice system, I believe that I have come to know something of the effect of such a death, quite apart from the profound direct loss of a human life.
I think of that effect perhaps as concentric circles, or ripples of pain, that just keeps spreading far, far beyond the deceased person or persons.
I conclude these proceedings by conveying to everyone who has suffered, is suffering, and will undoubtedly continue to suffer, as a result of this many-sided tragedy, the condolences of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
[6]
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Decision last updated: 09 May 2024