R v Morley

Fact Finding

1. Morley put forward a suggested outline of facts. I have had regard to it, but I also have regard to the jury verdicts. As the trial judge it is for me to determine what facts I accept and what I reject. My findings must be consistent with the jury verdicts. Where a material fact is contested, it may not be acted upon for sentencing purposes unless it is established. The proof of such fact must occur in the context of the proceedings, namely an uncompleted criminal trial. It is fundamental that in any proceedings the accused cannot be obliged to prove a fact, but the criminal process does not cease to be accusatorial after the conviction is recorded and during the proceedings relevant to the determination of the sentence.
2. While I have to make my own assessment as part of an overall synthesis, as the High Court made clear in Olbrich v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54, matters of mitigation must be established on the balance of probabilities and matters of aggravation of penalty must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court also recognised that sometimes a sentencing Court must sentence according to what is known or agreed. The High Court made this point specifically; "The judge who is not satisfied of some matter urged in plea on behalf of the offender does not have to sentence the offender on the basis of that contention unless the prosecution prove the contrary beyond reasonable doubt," at [24].
3. There were some differences between the accounts of both complainants. It is obvious that the jury did not think those differences were so significant as to undermine the prosecution case. I have formed the same view. The experience of Courts over many years has shown that trauma suffered by a Complainant may affect people differently, and truthful and untruthful accounts of offences may contain differences. People do not remember all the details of a traumatic offence in the same way each time or in the same way as other participants. It is thus relatively common for there to be differences in various witness accounts of traumatic crimes; a matter which is now enshrined in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, s 294A. Where, however, a difference favours an offender, I will try to act on the most favourable finding available. Otherwise, and with few exceptions, I am prepared to accept the versions given by each Complainant as a proper factual basis to proceed to sentence.

Facts

1. Reviewing the objectively established evidence, I am left with this. It is not in serious dispute that each accused and each Complainant were methylamphetamine ice users. Morley would sell ice from his home, a two‑bedroom flat under a house in southern Wollongong in the suburb of Cringila which he shared with Clare, who, although it was not revealed at trial, he asserts was his partner at the time and continues to be his partner. Complainant 1 was a customer.
2. In early 2020 there was a shortage of the drug ice in the local area. Complainant 1 had a contact number for a supplier based in Sydney. He had been given that number by his friend, Complainant 2. Complainant 1 gave that number to Morley. Morley agreed to purchase 2 ounces (56 grams) of methylamphetamine from the Sydney dealer. A price was arranged. It is not quite clear whether it was for $5,000 or $9,000. That difference does not make an appreciable difference to the matters presently before the Court.
3. Suspicious, Morley insisted that Complainant 1 accompany him to Sydney when the deal was done. Late on 11 May 2020, Complainant 1 was picked up by Morley from near his home, and the two men, accompanied by Clare, drove to Western Sydney in a VW station wagon. They met the supplier at a designated location. A sample was handed over to Complainant 1 and smoked by Clare. Money was exchanged and a packet of white crystal supplied. The supplier left and the occupants of the VW headed south. On the way back to Wollongong it was discovered that they had not been supplied with the expected ice, but a similar quantity of what looked like bath salts. To use a colloquial term, they had been 'ripped off.' Police later recovered about 60 grams of white crystal in a packet in bedroom 1 of Morley and Clare's flat in Cringila.
4. Morley held Complainant 1 responsible for his loss. He wanted compensation. Complainant 1 had no money. He contacted Complainant 2, who he knew had just cashed out $10,000 of his superannuation using COVID‑related relaxation of superannuation rules. He asked Complainant 2 to meet him at the flat at Cringila. Complainant 2 said "no." They arranged to meet at the Cringila service station. The VW drove to the flat at Cringila, Clare got out and Walker got in. Walker is a large, heavily built man.
5. At the service station Walker got into Complainant 2's Citroen van and directed him to follow the VW to Cringila. After the cars were parked in the driveway, both complainants were told to go into the flat and sit down. There Morley, in the presence of Clare and Walker, made it clear to the complainants that they were responsible for the lost money and they would not be leaving until their debt was repaid. To reinforce that request, Morley and Walker using weapons struck the complainants on their legs and knees. Complainant 1 said Morley used the side of the blade of a tomahawk, and Walker used silver nunchucks (martial arts fighting sticks joined by a chain). A fingerprint impression and a DNA profile matching Walker's were later recovered from a silver nunchuck found in bedroom 1 at Cringila.
6. Complainant 2 said tomahawks were used. He told the jury he was frightened but it was not "that bad." He said physically it did not hurt. He later found a bruise at the site. Relatively soon after, he transferred $1,050 to an account nominated by Morley. That account belonged to Clare. Soon after, he rang his mother and had her transfer $2,500 from an account she held for him to Clare's account. He then offered those in the flat some ice he had purchased on the 11th.
7. Complainant 1 told the jury: "Morley hit me four times on the right knee. I think it was the third impact I felt something pop in my knee and I knew something was potentially fractured. I felt a click happen. Following that severe pain, noticed immediate swelling started to occur. Definitely knew something, some bad, that bad, bad that had happened."
8. The police photograph of the swollen knee was tendered at trial. Complainant 1 told the jury the pain and discomfort continued throughout the following day. He told the jury he had great difficulty that morning because of the injury to his knee, that he "tried to stretch out as best I could with my knee." As this assault occurred, Complainant 1 said that both Morley and Walker were saying things like, "How are you gonna sort it out?" He said Clare was present when this occurred. He said Morley was telling him to make phone calls, "Telling me to call my mum, call, well, like my family, and which I was simply saying, 'I'm not going. I don't have anyone to call.'"
9. Complainant 1 continued to refuse to pay any money or contact his family and ask them for payment. His phone was taken from him. He told the jury he kept explaining to them that he definitely was not going to be "calling my mum and asking for $9,000 at that time in the morning. I wouldn't be doing it during the day, let alone at that time." Later that phone was used so that Complainant 2 could call his mother in his stead. Complainant 1 said he was not allowed out of the storage area, although he was given some ice to smoke. Complainant 1 later came to think that Complainant 2 may have had something to do with the rip off. Complainant 2, on the other hand, blamed Complainant 1 for luring him to Cringila and getting him into this predicament. It was not the first time he had helped Complainant 1 out of difficulties arising from his drug use. He also resented the fact that he was still being held because Complainant 1 was not cooperating or making any effort to raise the funds demanded.
10. In the morning, Clare came to the storage area and handed both complainants water bottles and a burek (pastry). In the morning, Morley put the phone on loudspeaker so Complainant 1 could talk to his brother. He said, "Sorry, I, I fucked up. In a shit position. They want, they want nine grand which I don't expect you to pay."
11. Complainant 1 said most of the demands were made by Morley who came to the door to ask about the contacts on his phone. Walker, he said, did not come to the door. He said Ilievski "came to the door and would ask me how I was going to sort it out."
12. Complainant 1 told the Court, "The only point where Tara [Clare] really spoke was when she had enough of looking at us and told Ben [Walker] and Cheyne [Morley] to put us underneath the house."
13. Complainant 1 said that; "Later in the afternoon, after Cheyne and Ilo come to the door repeatedly asking how I was going to sort it out to no avail, Ben Walker came to the little hatch, opened it up". He said Walker told him to ""get the fuck out…get the fuck out the front…He'd kept asking me how I was going to come up with the money, when I was going to come back with the money. If not, if I didn't come back with the money and stuff, they were going to chop me up. If I went to the police, if my family went to the police, they were going to chop me and my family up."
14. As he passed the living room, he saw Clare, Ilievski and Complainant 2. Ilievski came outside as Walker was walking him outside.
15. When Walker had him out the front Morley "come running out really fast, grabbed a hold of my jumper and started hitting me at the side of the face." Walker stood to the side watching. He then told Morley to stop, as people passing might be able to see.
16. As a consequence, Complainant 1 suffered swelling, haemorrhaging, bruising and facial fractures, which were later treated in hospital.
17. Complainant 2 told me that when the assaults occurred in the living room and the demands were made of him, Clare was coming and going from the living room. At one stage she asked for "privacy." It was then both complainants were ordered into a large storage space at the rear of the unit under the floor of the home above. To access the space they had to step up and manoeuvre through a small door, or small hatch, set midway up the rear wall of the unit. That hatch was then locked behind them.
18. Complainant 2 said he was treated more leniently than Complainant 1 because he cooperated. He was allowed out at times to smoke cigarettes and ice and was allowed to get his notebook from the van. But after each outing he was told to return to the storage area and the door was closed behind him. "I always had to go back in." On one cigarette break he saw Ilievski in the lounge room. He said Ilievski later came to the door and told him, "that Cheyne would be happy with taking possession of my car as a down payment for the rest of the money and they would let me go."
19. He said "Clare also came to the door to ask Complainant 1 to make phone calls to get money." She gave them water and a pastry. Another man - presumably Eager - also came to the door. He said his phone had been taken but he was given it, and on request rang Complainant 1's mother and told her that her son was being taken. He told her, "I'm sicking of paying for Complainant 1's mess and that I've already paid up and gave them all the money that I have, and now that it's her turn to bloody clean up her son's mess." At first she thought he was joking.
20. Complainant 2 told the jury Complainant 1 made no efforts to arrange the money, so eventually he got over being in the space and gave in, signing his car over to Morley. When he said he would do this, he was let out of the space. He felt he had no option. This was about 3 to 4pm. He said when this was happening, Walker told Complainant 1 he could leave. Complainant 2 heard yelling out the front. He next saw Complainant 1 when they were both in the holding area at the police station. Documents relating to the Citroen were later found in bedroom 2 of the flat.
21. The complainants were detained for 14 to 15 hours. They were directed to the lounge room at Cringila at about 1am. Complainant 1 was released at 4pm; Complainant 2 about 5pm, although his conditions of detention were significantly reduced once he left the storage area. Most of the time they were kept in that restricted space. Only Complainant 2 was allowed some freedoms and breaks as a reward for arranging payments.
22. Complainant 1 suffered, as I have said, facial fractures. They required surgery; a plate and screw in the left zygomatic bone, and other facial bones. The knee had a joint fracture and a fusion; that is, liquid on the knee plus a cyst.
23. A quantity of methylamphetamine was found at the premises by police. Morley accepted his guilt to that offence when he was in the Local Court. It was placed on a 166 Criminal Procedure Act certificate to follow the indictable matters. During the course of sentencing proceedings, I indicated - given the sentence and the matters that I would take into account in formulating the relevant facts for the principal matters for sentence - that it would not be expedient to impose any penalty other than conviction for that matter, which will be dealt with pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
24. There are no Victim Impact Statements before the Court, but they do not mitigate. I heard the evidence of both complainants and I am aware of the factual circumstance which I have just summarised.

Objective seriousness - general principles

1. When offenders are involved in a joint criminal enterprise, this does not necessarily mean that each offender is sentenced on the basis their individual actions had the same objective criminality. There is a difference between objective criminality and criminal liability or responsibility. But, generally, a Court takes into account the period of detention, the nature of the advantage sought, the circumstances of the detention - which could include motive - whether there was any threat of violence, the presence of any weapon and its nature, any anguish, discomfort, violence or harm inflicted, the number of offences. Where an offence is committed in company, the Court takes into account the force of numbers deployed against the victim, and for the specially aggravated offence is relevant. The Court also has to take into account the nature and extent of any bodily harm inflicted.
2. Where the basis of the offender's liability for a kidnapping is a joint criminal enterprise, it is often difficult to draw a distinction between the offenders, but, as I have noted, the Court can draw a distinction between the role of offences; for example, (1), between the person who inflicts the violence and the person who is present and approves, if not encourages, that action, and, (2), between those who are a part of the planning and preparation. But there does not appear to be any significant planning or preparation here. It seems everything was done relatively spontaneously.
3. In taking into account objective seriousness, I have to be particularly careful, as Ms Akthar, who appeared for Morley at trial and on sentence, points out in her written submissions, where Courts are dealing with matter of aggravation and matters which are elements of an offence, a Court should not then go to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act s 2 and add those matters in again, and the Court must be conscious of not double counting.

Objective seriousness - specific findings

1. Here, so far as Mr Morley is concerned, I find that he was the instigator and the principal beneficiary. He used a weapon on Complainant 1 and he did so with some force. His object was to obtain financial gain. The loss was not either complainant's fault; it was Morley's, for not checking the product before the money was handed over. He caused injury to Complainant 1 on two occasions. On the first occasion that injury made Complainant 1 less able to resist.
2. It is accepted that the second assault was more serious, because more serious was the injury inflicted. I have regard to the nature of that injury. The detention occurred at Morley's home. He was aware that the space where the complainants were detained was both uncomfortable and confined. Threats continued throughout the period of the detention. He was aware, because he instigated contact, that the family of the complainants were involved. This was a continuing offence accompanied by a continued threat of further harm.
3. In many respects this was Morley's crime, and each of the others joined it. As to how and why they joined it, the facts are not clear. I do not have to resolve them. During the course of the incident, he showed no apparent concern for either complainant. He was aware Complainant 1 had been injured, but showed no concern. His parting gift was a gratuitous act of violence that caused serious injury.

Maximum Penalties

1. The maximum penalty for count 1 is 25 years imprisonment, s 86(3). For count 2, the alternate count, s 86(2)(a),it is 20 years imprisonment. Those maximum penalties are important guides to the exercise of my sentencing discretion.

COVID

1. Mr Morley spent, and will spend, his entire time in custody during the COVID pandemic. I do not ignore the impact of the COVID pandemic on prisoners. It has entered our gaols, and in his evidence today Morley told me that he has come down with COVID and that he was significantly affected by it. His only treatment was Panadol, "if he was lucky enough to get it." He did not see a doctor, but was dependent upon a nurse being available to him.
2. He tells me he has been locked down for many months of his time on remand, and I am well aware that difficulties he claims to have suffered have been supported by other prisoners and other evidence I have received and the Corrective Services' website. It is more difficult during the pandemic to provide services and meet the quarantine requirements necessary to attempt to contain contagion within the gaol. Some prisoners might be eligible for release to parole under special emergency measures. None have received such a benefit to date.
3. We all feel heightened anxiety and concerns about the pandemic, but prisoners have no control over their lives or who they associate with, so such concerns must be exacerbated. These are relevant factors that I will synthesise along with all other relevant matters.

Subjective Case

1. Morley's subjective case is made up in three parts. First, a letter written by Morley to the Court. Second, a report of a psychologist, Mr Borenstein. And thirdly, by evidence that Mr Morley gave this afternoon. I also have the benefit of parole reports and his criminal antecedents.
2. He was born in 1979. He came before the Children's Court. He has a record in the Local Court since 1998. There appears to be a gap after that until 2005- 2006. His first custodial sentence was imposed in 2006. Since then he has been repeatedly and regularly before the Court for relatively short periods. His offending involves offences of violence - mainly domestic violence related - but also drugs, driving, and dishonesty. He was before the Children's Court when he was 16, a matter to which I will soon refer. He was on parole when he committed this offence. He had only been released five weeks before. He served the balance of parole until November 2020, a period of approximately five months. He told me, and all the material before me indicates, that soon after he came out of gaol and entered his parole he was back on drugs.
3. I accept that his interaction with Community Corrections made parole supervision difficult, but all the material before me indicates that he thought he could deal with any drug problem by himself, or he was not, or he thought, didn't wish to deal with his drug problem. The fact that he was using drugs at the relevant time he committed these offences does not in any way mitigate, does not excuse. To a degree, it aggravates what occurred, because the fact that he was at all relevant times using illicit drugs means that he was less predictable in his behaviour, less rational in his behaviour, and less aware of the consequences of his behaviour; something I believe he now appreciates.
4. It is sad that as the Local Court allowed him a long period on parole, presumably so he could engage in much needed rehabilitation, he did not engage in it. He has been in custody since arrest on 13 May 2020. His breach report notes that while on parole he was not interested in programs and would not commit to ceasing drug use. That drug use has continued in gaol, as his custodial record indicates.
5. In his evidence today, Mr Morley took me through the letter which is exhibit 1. In it, he told me how having heard the evidence of both complainants and having reflected on what they say, he "gets it now" and what he did was wrong and inexcusable. He said at the time he felt sorry for the Complainants, particularly Complainant 2, but the version of events given by the Complainants was quite different from his own self-perception of what had occurred.
6. He was frank with me when I said, "well, you could have said that during the trial." He chose to take his chances, and the jury returned appropriate verdicts. He accepts now that what he did was seriously wrong. He uses at times the terms "embarrassing" and "sad". It was more than that. It was seriously criminal, as reflected by his actions, and on even a cursory glance at the maximum penalties provided.
7. He mentioned, as he did to Mr Borenstein, a tragic incident when he was detained at Keelong. He said he has never sought help in relation to that matter, and was fairly frank that he had not sought help until this time in custody so far as his drug problems were concerned. He summed up by saying he wished to express his wholehearted apology. I think he would accept this assessment, although the Complainants are not here to say, "too little too late, Mr Morley". But his acceptance of responsibility is at least the first step on the road towards rehabilitation, a matter I will take into account. And I accept that while he has belatedly expressed remorse, that regret and insight into his behaviour may also assist in his progress towards rehabilitation.
8. The background - as accepted by Mr George, who now appears for the Director of Public Prosecutions - set out in the reports and the evidence reveals some problems which would fall under the rubric, "deprivation as a child." Life was not easy for him. His father had demons, which he took out on those in the home. His mother tried to provide as much support as possible. It is clear that, for whatever reason, Morley had difficulties at school and was asked to leave in year 9. His one solace was his skill as a soccer player.
9. There was juvenile offending, and on one of those occasions he tells me, and on balance I am prepared to accept, he was the subject of a sexual assault at a Juvenile Detention Centre. It was only while serving on remand for this matter that he revealed that matter for the first time. He has not received any treatment for it. It is a matter that Mr Borenstein thought was significant, and I will refer to it in that context. He has instructed solicitors who are preparing matters following the royal commission into institutionalised sexual abuse of children. It is not the first time I have heard such evidence, and there is a sad but tragic correlation between offences committed against children and some of them resorting to drug use and losing trust in themselves and trust in the community.
10. I do not undervalue the impact of trauma on a child and continuing impact of trauma on a child. Even a single instance of sexual abuse can have a profound and highly detrimental effect on a child so assaulted: R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195 at [49]; R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56. Such trauma impacts are relevant by way of mitigation. On balance I am prepared to accept that they occurred.
11. A Court does not devalue the impact of these traumatic events. It is always relevant when it comes to assess an appropriate sentence. I am entitled to have regard to well-known fact as revealed by the Royal Commission that victims of sexual assault, particularly children, very frequently suffer long term and serious psychological consequences. Obviously a childhood experience does not excuse offending conduct, but they can have a continuing impact on the state of mind of a person, and they can, and do here, together with the background, as the Court in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 made clear, play some role when I come to assess moral responsibility for the offending.
12. When I come to assess the objective seriousness of an offence I have to be careful when having regard in matters such as this. I have to give proper weight to matters that are relevant to the moral culpability of the offender and their capacity to fully understand the consequences of their action; capacity, which has some genesis in the background to which I have already referred. Mr Borenstein in his report notes that on testing he has found that Mr Morley presents as cognitively intact and there is no suggestion of a serious psychiatric disorder, such as psychosis. But his questioning revealed symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder. Mr Borenstein postulates that they go back to the incident that happened at Keelong. There is no other history of trauma or abuse, although I note that, as Mr Morley accepts, that the significant increase in his offending behaviour was associated with his drug use and was also connected with the break-up of his first relationship at the relevant time.

Parity

1. I have regard to the sentences that I have imposed on the others. I said at the time I sentenced him that Walker was apparently subordinate to this offender. I do not resile from that conclusion. Walker had worse criminal antecedents and was on parole for more serious, offences. Like must be compared with like, and that includes having regard to personal circumstances and respective degrees of culpability. The principle is known as parity.
2. Proper application of the parity principle, however, does not mean that each offender is sentenced on the basis their individual actions had the same objective criminality. There can be reasons why one offender is more or less objectively culpable than the others. Each offender's role and what they did has to be assessed. Different circumstances and different criminal histories can justify a real difference in the term they will serve.
3. Here the significant difference is the role played by Morley. They include; the fact that he was the beneficiary, or sought to be the beneficiary, of the handover of money and the Citroen. That in relation to Complainant 1 he took the active role in assaulting him on two separate occasions. The extent of the injuries inflicted by Morley on Complainant 1.

Structure of the sentence

1. I have to structure the sentence to ensure that there is appropriate punishment for both matters, recognising that they although occurring over the same period, there were two distinct victims. I do not simply add one to the other. I have to formulate and evaluate, in a broad sense the overall criminality involved. There should be some relativity between the total criminality and the individual sentences that must be indicated. There is no discount for multiple offending, but I have to be careful that the purposes of punishment are not double counted, and that matters in common between the offenders are not double counted.
2. I have taken into account the fact the offence committed on parole, but in my view there must be some short period to reflect the fact that the offence was committed on parole. I will commence this sentence two months after he entered into custody to reflect that, taking care, because I have already taken into account an aggravating circumstance, the offence was committed on parole.
3. Until there was material put before me by the offender of acceptance of responsibility and his efforts to commence, if at all possible, drug rehabilitation while in custody, I was frankly not inclined to make any finding of special circumstances in this matter.
4. The minimum term he has to serve must properly reflect the gravity of his offending and the other purposes of sentencing: Simpson (2001) NSWCCA 534, but it is important to note that those offenders who do get supervised on parole generally take longer to commit new offences and commit fewer offences when released than those who are released unconditionally. Motivation is particularly important, particularly where long sentences are imposed. Too severe a sentence may result in a disproportionate level of punishment. That could operate to increase an offender's risk to community safety on release. And, it has to be said, that every time Morley has been released in the past, he has reoffended. So, I have to be very guarded in this finding. He has failed before. He is much older and hopefully wiser, and he will be by the time he is released.
5. The Court has to be careful that a prisoner does not become institutionalised by serving too long a sentence, and to appreciate the value of any steps underway. There is a risk that matters which can promote his rehabilitation might diminish, particularly if any hope of a normal life after the end of imprisonment is removed.
6. What is proportionate, however, can of course depend on the observer; whether they are a victim, the community, appeal court, or of course the offender.

Submissions

1. I have taken into account the appropriate concessions made by the Crown and the submissions that were made early on in relation to objective seriousness, by Mr Fox, the Crown Prosecutor who appeared at trial. I have taken into account the detailed submissions, both in writing and orally, put before me by Ms Akthar. I hope this judgment does justice to the industry and effort put into those submissions.

Synthesis

1. Synthesising all those matters. Morley is not to be punished for exercising his right to trial by jury, but he does not get the benefits that would have been extended had he pleaded guilty. Eager, who pleaded guilty early, did.
2. Morley's acceptance of responsibility, although late, helps me assess his prospects. I will not deny him appropriate leniency. He must be encouraged, and, if possible, assisted, in engaging in drug treatment, because it is clear from his record that if he does not get that help, he will continue to feed his addiction however he can.
3. I must identify the factors relevant to sentence and discuss their significance. Ultimately, I must make a value judgment as to the appropriate sentence having regard to all factors; the circumstances of the offending, the offending behaviour, the objective seriousness of the crimes, Morley's moral culpability and all his subjective circumstances. Not every matter can be fitted into neat categories, human behaviour and characteristics are too varied. I must synthesise all these matters into mathematics of units of punishment: Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629 18 -24; [2003] HCA 14.
4. What occurred was serious, two serious offences were committed; particularly so, so far as Complainant 1 is concerned. Two young men involved in the Wollongong drug scene were held for many, many hours. One of them was quite seriously injured. Demands were made that had a ripple effect on their families and through the community. Morley, to satisfy a debt that was not occasioned by the complainants - but frankly his own lack of insight into the Sydney dealer and the possibility of a rip off - sought to recover that 'debt' by taking the law into his own hands. And the consequences were profound; not just for his victim, but now for him.

Orders

1. For count 1 I indicate that a sentence of six years imprisonment.
2. For count 2, I indicate a sentence of three years and nine months imprisonment.
3. There will be a total sentence in this matter of seven years and three months imprisonment. The sentence starts on 13 July 2020, two months after Morley went into custody. He will be eligible for consideration for release to parole on 12 February 2025, after a period of four years and seven months. The Parole period is two years and eight months. The sentence expires 12 October 2027.
4. To repeat, four years seven months non-parole period, eligible release date 12 February 2025. Two years eight months parole period until 12 October 2027. Seven years three months, but a total effective sentence of seven years five months. In making allowance for my finding of special circumstances I took into account there was some accumulation. Approximately 65‑66% of this overall sentence is to be spent in custody
5. Section 10A for the drug matter.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 07 February 2023