Stefce Mirceski appears today for sentencing in relation to an offence of robbery of a particular victim who I need not name, committed at Rockdale on 30 March 2019 and immediately before and after the time of the robbery, inflicted actual bodily harm upon the victim. This offence to which he pleaded guilty is particularised as an offence contrary to s 95(1) Crimes Act 1900. It carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. There is no standard non-parole period. The prisoner has been in custody since his arrest on 5 April 2019.
When the prisoner committed the offence on 30 March 2019 he was subject to a bond granted to him at the Sutherland Local Court on 26 June 2018 in respect of an offence of possessing housebreaking implements committed on 21 April 2018. The learned Magistrate, Mr Walsh, sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 15 months but suspended it pursuant to the then operating s 12 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The commission of this offence of robbery is a breach of the condition of that s 12 bond that the prisoner is to be of good behaviour. There is no doubt, having regard to the then operating terms of s 98(3) of the Act, that the bond must be revoked because the Court cannot be satisfied that the failure by the prisoner to comply with the condition of the bond that he be of good behaviour was trivial, nor were there any reasons whatsoever for excusing the prisoner's failure to comply with the condition of that s 12 bond.
I have read the facts in relation to that offence. It is clear that, having regard to the fact that it is separate criminality, there will need to be a partial accumulation of the sentence I impose for the robbery matter upon the other sentence required to be imposed. That is, 15 months imprisonment for the offence committed in 2018 and dealt with in the Local Court. I should bear in mind in that regard, when I consider the issue of totality of criminality and the extent of accumulation, the fact that a relevant matter in the sentencing exercise for the robbery matter is that the prisoner was in breach of the conditional liberty granted to him in the Local Court. That is a substantial and significant aggravating factor under s 21A(2) of the Act.
In relation to the offence of robbery, to which I have referred, the prisoner was committed for sentence. He is entitled to a discount of 25% upon the otherwise appropriate sentence for the utilitarian benefit of the plea of guilty and there is no issue in respect of that matter by the parties.
With regard to the facts of the matter with which I am concerned, the prisoner was at a hotel on the Princes Highway at Rockdale on the evening of 20 March 2019, as was the victim. Apparently, they were both in the gaming area. However, in the period of time between 7.28pm and 7.54pm while the prisoner was under CCTV coverage there is no suggestion of any interplay or communication between the two people. The prisoner, having played a couple of separate poker machines, left the premises via what is described as the Princes Highway exit, walking down the Princes Highway southbound. The relevant premises, that is, the St George Tavern, is located in proximity to what is sometimes described as the Rockdale Six Ways where a large number of roads intersect the Princes Highway. The victim left the premises at 8.02pm and also walked southbound. The facts set out the course of her departure and her travels south of the tavern were covered by CCTV footage. The prisoner is first recorded by CCTV footage as walking in Keats Avenue, Rockdale, that is, along the same road as the victim, at about 8.03pm.
The facts reveal that a short time after that, the prisoner, running up behind the victim while the she was talking on her mobile phone, endeavoured to take her handbag from her. The action of pulling at the handbag caused the victim to fall backwards to the ground and hit her head, causing her pain to her head and to her upper back. The prisoner again endeavoured to pull the handbag from her, although the victim resisted this. Unable to obtain the handbag he grabbed her mobile phone, which is identified in the facts, and then fled the scene. All this captured on CCTV footage.
The victim reported the matter to Kogarah Police and was then taken to St George Hospital at Kogarah and treated for her injuries. She sustained a 4 x 5 centimetre haematoma with an overlaying abrasion to the back of her head, which oozed blood, and a 7 centimetre laceration to her right cheek, and an abrasion to her back. The facts reveal that the victim, who was born in 1961, was at the relevant time 58 years of age. The prisoner was born in September 1989.
The prisoner it would seem, was easily identified from the closed circuit television and was arrested at his parents' home on 5 April 2019 and has been in custody ever since.
It is clear from the facts available to the Court, that a relevant aggravating factor under s 21A(2) of the Act is that the victim was "vulnerable". She was alone in a darkened area, she was a person assailed from behind and had no warning of the approach of the prisoner. There is no dispute as to the fact that she was relevantly a vulnerable victim. The use of violence in the commission of the offence, to my mind, is reflected in the pleading of the circumstance of aggravation.
In this case the Crown very kindly addressed the Court to the guideline judgment of Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; (1999) 346 NSWLR 346 and others. In that judgment, now over 20 years old, the then learned Chief Justice, Spigelman CJ, at [162] set out what he described as common features of a category of case generally described as robbery type offences. Although it was a guideline judgment in respect of "armed robbery", many decisions since Henry have emphasised the fact that the guideline has relevance in respect of robbery cases generally. The Crown, in my view, in her written submissions went through particular criteria identified by the Chief Justice at [162] and fairly related the facts of the matter to the particular issues that he identified as common features of then described "armed robbery" offences.
I also point out that his Honour identified the fact that aggravating and mitigating factors would justify a sentence below or above the range as prior decisions of the Court have indicated and at [170] identified additional factors that could be taken into account. Included in those additional factors are the circumstances of the offending, including the vulnerability of the victim, and the use of actual force as relevant matters that arise here.
Of course in considering the guideline judgment of Henry, there are several points that need to be made from the wisdom of hindsight available to us in 2020. Firstly, the guideline judgment was handed down before the enactment of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. That did not come into force as law in this State until 2001, and the current form of s 21A of the Act did not come into force until some months, up to two years after the enactment of the Act. There was an early version of s 21A that bears no resemblance to the current section, which has itself, been amended over the years. Consequently, in sentencing offenders with regard to the Henry guideline, the Court is required to have regard to the relevant aggravating and/or mitigating factors that arise under s 21A(2) and (3) of the Act, as well as other matters that arise in the general consideration of the facts of the case and the character of the offending as provided for by s 21A(1) of the Act.
The second matter to draw to one's attention is of course the fact that subsequent decisions reflecting upon the application of guideline judgments, Henry being just one of the guideline judgments that was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal over the two or three years from 1999, is the fact that where a particular suggested range of sentence might apply to a particular category of offending, the Court has often said that the relevant guideline is precisely that; a "guideline" not a "tramline". In that context there are in fact the observations of the learned Chief Justice at [10] of Henry emphasising that even with the anticipated guideline that he was to outline, that sentencing was an individual exercise and that the justice of the individual case is of paramount importance, citing the observations of Mahoney ACJ in R v Lattouf (Unrep. CCANSW) 12 December 1996. There, the then Acting Chief Justice had noted amongst other things, whilst there were various interests the sentencing process must have regard to, paramount amongst those is the "achievement of justice in the individual case".
So far as aggravating factors are concerned, the vulnerability of the victim is an aggravating factor under s 21A(2). I do not conclude in the context of submissions made by the parties that the criminal history of the prisoner is an "aggravating factor" as it is understood in that particular subsection, although it is a criminal history that, as the Crown points out, does not entitle the prisoner to any leniency.
Another relevant matter to the assessment of the objective facts is the finding I make that the offence was "unplanned" and thus arises for consideration of the objective facts and the particular matters identified by the Crown in its helpful submissions by reference to the Henry guideline. That is a mitigating factor under s 21A(3). Learned counsel for the prisoner at one point in oral submissions, identified the offending as "spontaneous" or "impulsive".
I would describe the offending as relevantly "opportunistic". It is particularly pertinent to note, by reference to the facts, that the prisoner himself left the gaming area eight minutes before the victim and, in the absence of any evidence that the prisoner is a mind reader, it could not be concluded that the prisoner absented himself from the tavern to prepare himself to attack this particular victim. He had no knowledge of when she would leave the premises. I could not conclude further that he left the premises to wait for any person to leave the gaming area. For all he knew the next person to leave after him, could have been a rather large truck driver.
As I said, although not relevant to the assessment of the objective facts, the breach of conditional liberty, particularly of the character of a suspended sentence, is a serious matter in this case by reference to the range of conditional liberty that is anticipated, for example, by s 21A(2). I bear in mind however, as I have already pointed out, that I am required to revoke that good behaviour bond and in the context of what Simpson J said in the decision of Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58, the Court has to be cautious not to "double dip" when considering an aggravating factor in the context of imposing a sentence that might end up being partially accumulative on a breach of bond matter. Or, alternatively, a sentence to be served by way of balance of parole where there has been a breach of parole.
In this particular matter I have already referred to the criminal history of the prisoner not entitling him to any particular leniency. It is to be noted by reference to some evidence in the case that I will refer to shortly, the prisoner's criminal history starts in his early 20s after he had suffered a very serious head injury in 2010. It is interesting to note in that context that his first conviction was for a serious driving matter, that is either driving recklessly or in a manner dangerous to the public in September 2012. For that offence he was convicted and disqualified from holding a motor vehicle driver's licence for a year.
As his personal history available from the papers reveal, for a period of time afterwards the prisoner became a regular user of prohibited drugs. He has a conviction for possession of equipment for administering prohibited drugs in July 2014 for which he was modestly fined.
He has other convictions in 2015 arising out of his arrest in August 2014 for resisting police, escaping police custody, assaulting a police officer in the execution of his or her duty and being involved in a police pursuit. For those various offences he was sentenced to 300 hours community service in respect of four of the offences that appear on the criminal history with other offences taken into account. It is unclear whether those total hours were accumulative or concurrent with one another. In any event the prisoner just over a year later was called up to appear before the Court in respect of some breach in relation to those Community Service Orders and the period for completing them was extended.
He has other relatively minor convictions subsequent to his appearance in 2015. However, in October 2016 he committed two offences of breaking, entering and stealing, and an offence of goods in custody as it is described. He was sentenced in the Downing Centre Local Court on 27 July 2017 to 12 months imprisonment commencing March 2017, with a non-parole period of four months expiring in July 2017.
Subsequent to that he has the conviction to which I have referred at the Sutherland Local Court from June 2018, of having housebreaking implements, pincers as they are described in the short facts, in his possession, wandering the streets of Kogarah at 4 o'clock in the morning.
I have some character references from a family member by marriage, a neighbour and a friend of some years. These documents are not sophisticated documents. They are, if I could use the expression naïve character references, with no criticism of the referees. What emerges from that material is that, as the criminal history reveals, the prisoner before his motor vehicle accident in 2010 appeared to be a fairly happy-go-lucky, friendly, industrious young man, and that his personality changed significantly after his head injury. The referees variously attest to the positive side of his nature and I have taken their opinions into account. It is clear, by reference to the medical evidence, that there has been since 2010 a substantial change in the prisoner's attitude, his personality and his character.
The primary material for consideration in the defence case really is concerned with the head injury sustained in May 2010 and its sequelae. In this regard I have a great deal of either primary or confirmatory evidence, including a medical discharge summary from June 2010, a neurosurgeon's report from March 2011 and a neuropsychological report from Dr Travis Wearne, dated 31 March 2020. In my view that latter report is an excellent report of its type and it appears to me to review and summarise the source material available to the Court well. My understanding is in respect of the motor vehicle accident in 2010, the prisoner has not received any compensation. Or at least, not compensation significant enough to permit proper care and treatment up to the present time, which in the opinion of Dr Wearne the prisoner clearly needs.
I also have a report from Dr Bodel, who is a medico-legal advisor. He has qualifications as an orthopaedic specialist, generally preparing medico-legal reports for civil litigation. His report relates to another motor vehicle accident in 2011 where the prisoner suffered what I would loosely describe as whiplash type injuries. I have taken into account the contents of that report. It is not a significant matter in this sentencing exercise, but it is correct to say that having regard to the injuries identified by Dr Bodel, it would reflect some physical disability at the time of reporting which could continue up until the present time arising out of a collision which on the prisoner's version, was not his fault. Apparently he was not compensated in relation to that accident in circumstances not known to me.
I have psychological service notes from the Department of Corrective Services showing the prisoner has attended counselling sessions in June and October 2019. That material reflects a contemporaneous complaint of feelings of anxiety and depressive symptoms most likely reactive to his then current circumstances. The report reflected upon the prisoner's belief of a voice talking to him for a few months before a particular counselling session, although that voice was not giving him any command directions. The prisoner complained in one of the sessions that he did not have access to Valium, which apparently is not permitted in the custodial setting, which he said had increased his anxiety, and the report notes his referral to Justice Health for consideration of further medication. The outcome of that I am not aware.
There was no oral evidence from the prisoner, but in the context of the available evidence produced in documentary form, not objected to by the prosecution, the absence of oral evidence does not detract from what I see is the reliability of the psychological assessment by Dr Wearne particularly in the context of proven brain injury. I will come back to the detail of that evidence shortly.
On the material available to the Court, both counsel prepared excellent written submissions and I have taken those into account as well as the brief oral submissions made by the parties. The Crown properly reflects upon the character of the offending in much the same way as the defence. This is obviously not an offence at the low range of offending of its type, particularly having regard to the vulnerability of the victim and the injuries that she suffered amounting to actual bodily harm, which is of course an element of the offence. But it does not establish an additional "aggravating" factor of substantial harm.
I have already reflected upon the criminal history of the prisoner and his breach of conditional liberty. The offending with which I am now concerned could be described as quite "uncharacteristic", but at the same time it is an offence as the Crown correctly points out, that includes both the element of dishonesty and the element of violence towards the person, and by reference to his history the prisoner is no stranger to these type of offences. Although one must make allowance in this particular matter for the lack of planning.
The Crown properly refers the Court to s 3A of the Act which sets out purposes of sentencing required to be taken into account. Here, all the purposes of sentencing have some role to play. That is, the requirement for adequate punishment, requirement for consideration of general and personal deterrence, some requirement for consideration of the protection of the community from the offender, making him accountable for his actions and denouncing his conduct and recognising the harm done to the victim.
But also there is a requirement to promote his rehabilitation. In this matter one needs to have regard to the evidence concerning the head injury to the prisoner and would turn ones attention to the principles that are outlined in decisions such as DPP(Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194, particularly at [177]-[178]. There the then Chief Judge Common Law Division, McClellan J reflected upon, by reference to earlier authority, issues that are relevant in assessing an offender with a mental illness, disability or intellectual handicap that may be causally connected to the offending. Without dwelling upon the matter, those principles have been discussed in the context of conditions that are not causally connected to the offending in decisions such as a relatively recent decision of Kearsley v R [2017] NSWCCA 28. In this particular matter, by reference to the available evidence, it is not possible to conclude that the offending that I am concerned with was contributed to by the head injury suffered by the prisoner and its significant consequences.
However, it seems to me, based on the evidence, that it is clear that the significant consequences of his head injury have made him more vulnerable to drug use. It is correct to say, as the psychological report acknowledges from the history given by the prisoner himself, that the prisoner's introduction to amphetamines was through his association with a woman with whom he had a romantic relationship some years ago. However, it is clear on the basis of the analysis of Dr Wearne that the changes in his behaviour and his personality have made him more vulnerable to drug dependency.
I am mindful of course that drug use or drug dependency is not a mitigating factor in sentencing an offender for a robbery offence, or any offence for that matter. However, in the guideline judgment of Henry, to which I have made reference, Wood J, who himself was then the Chief Judge of the Common Law Division, discussed at [273] the relevance of drug dependency or use in sentencing an offender in respect of a robbery offence. Drug dependency or use may shed light on the objective criminality of the offending, reflecting upon matters such as the impulsivity of the offence or the extent of planning, and if established, although in this case the evidence is not clear, reflecting upon the state of mind or the capacity of the offender to exercise judgment. Drug dependency or use can also reflect upon subjective circumstances such as prospects of rehabilitation.
He noted that so far as subjective circumstances were concerned, drug addiction or drug dependency may reflect upon matters such as the prospects of recidivism and rehabilitation. He also identified drug dependency arising out of events beyond the control of a particular offender, noting amongst other circumstances where a person became drug dependent, that person was by reason of either mental or intellectual capacity, impaired, or their ability to exercise appropriate judgment or choice was incomplete. He also noted matters relating to offenders at the crossroads, although that is not this offender.
To come back to that penultimate point arising out of Wood J's observations, it is important to note in relation to this prisoner, these matters in addition to those I have already identified concerning the changes in the prisoner after his significant motor vehicle accident where he suffered severe head injury.
The prisoner, before his driving accident in 2010 was a drinker of alcohol and smoked some cannabis. However, as I pointed out earlier, from age 22 onwards he began to use amphetamines in circumstances commencing as I have outlined. He noted methamphetamine was, to use the psychologist's words, "protective against the negative impact of his brain injury", making him more "motivated and confident".
In relation to his presentation after the motor vehicle accident he had not suffered or experienced symptoms of depression prior to his brain injury, however, about the age of 22 he was prescribed antidepressant medication, described as Zoloft, which was changed to Valium from the age of 25. As I earlier indicated, the prisoner in the wider community finds Valium beneficial to him, however he is unable to obtain it in custody. He has been prescribed Avanza in custody with minimal effect.
His skull physically has not completely recovered since his craniotomy. In the context of the psychological assessment of the prisoner, assuming a pre-morbid low average range of intellectual accomplishment, the psychologist noted the prisoner's difficulties since his accident in executive skills, higher level attention, concentration and learning. He concluded in his report that the injury to the frontal lobe of the brain would affect the prisoner's abstract reasoning, impulse control and cognitive flexibility, concentration and attention. His cognitive difficulties are consistent with the long term cognitive outcomes of severe traumatic brain injury. The report noted that his subsequent behaviour and emotion dysregulation since the accident is consistent with injuries to the front of his brain. The psychologist opined that the substance use was in part,
''a symptom of his traumatic brain injury in that he has a reduced ability to control and regulate his behaviour, including his substance abuse, and this in turn exacerbates the difficulties he experiences because of his traumatic brain injury''.
Each of these matters need to be addressed to minimise the risk of recidivism. The psychologist opined that the prisoner was not "inherently unsocial", reflecting upon before his accident, his training and his employment, although he was not a good performer at school.
Thus, in the context of the observations of Wood CJ at CL and the particular matters identified by McClellan CJ at CL in De La Rosa, I have come to the conclusion in the context of fixing the appropriate sentence in relation to this matter, that I should give lesser, although obviously some weight, to general deterrence. I do not believe the condition of the prisoner requires greater weight to be given specific deterrence but I acknowledge that the custodial sentence that inevitably must be imposed upon this prisoner will weigh more heavily upon him because of psychological and physical disabilities arising from that motor vehicle accident ten years ago.
Another factor to be taken into account in the context of this sentencing exercise are his circumstances in custody arising out of the current COVID‑19 pandemic and the implications that has for people in custody. Although the prisoner did not give evidence, I did ask him in the context of making an enquiry into this aspect of the matter, whether he had been tested for COVID‑19, bearing in mind that he apparently was appearing before me from the Long Bay Gaol Hospital. He informed me that he had been placed in segregation a week before, after he had exhibited some symptoms, had been tested for the virus and at this point of time the tests have resulted in a negative finding.
Much was said at various points from the bar table about this issue, and I have taken into account what has been put by learned counsel for the prisoner and her helpful written submissions, although one aspect of her written submissions about his need to care for his elderly parents is not a matter of significance, as was conceded in oral submissions.
It is difficult for me to act upon some representations about issues of fact that were made from the bar table about the current circumstances of prisoners in custody. I should point out that I was told by learned counsel for the prisoner that one health professional at Long Bay Gaol Hospital had tested positive to the virus. But whether that is the tip of the iceberg, or not, I cannot say, and at the moment I cannot conclude that it has any particular implication for this prisoner.
However, certainly no one can assure me that all prisoners have been tested, nor all Correctional staff, and it has to be said that the risk of infection in a closed community such as a prison population or a prison hospital is very real, and certainly in the context of what is publicly known about coronavirus and its highly infectious or contagious character. I recounted to the parties of my experience last week of sentencing two men in custody via audio visual link where the Corrective Services authorities put the two men side by side in the one room. I had to separate them and deal with them separately notwithstanding the complications of the virtual courtroom, despite the fact that they were charged with the same offence. This was to maintain at least a modicum of social distancing, although clearly too late in their case.
Also, in relation to this matter, I bear in mind that before these proceedings could be concluded there was material provided to the Court by the Crown in another matter setting out proposals by the Department of Corrective Services to endeavour to eliminate or minimise the risks that arise from the current situation. I appreciate of course, custodial authorities are taking responsibility to try to minimise the risk of infection for inmates. But the detail of the material that I have taken into account in other sentencing proceedings provided by the Crown as to what Corrective Services would wish to achieve and the methods by which that will be pursued, does not provide any guarantee that all relevant steps will or can be taken and, of course, it is to be borne in mind the very different character of the Correctional community to the wider community for the purposes of enforcing social distancing.
So by reference to what was put by learned counsel for the prisoner in the context of some recent authorities, particularly in the Victorian authority of Brown v R [2020] VSCA 60, to which reference was made, I bear in mind the heightened concern that inmates must have in relation to the threat of infection, which is not irrelevant in this sentencing exercise.
It is the case, however, that I can be satisfied that whilst the current crisis continues, beginning in reality in our State in early to mid-March with no immediate end in sight, access to outside visits for the prisoner will be greatly curtailed or even eliminated perhaps, leading to greater isolation for this prisoner and other prisoners from the outside world. There will be greater isolation for prisoners from within the Correctional community too, with prisoners being locked in isolation, as the prisoner himself was on his own account, albeit that it was not sworn evidence. Obviously the proposals by the Department of Corrective Services to minimise contact between inmates will impact upon the movement of prisoners within Correctional centres. It will affect access to programs and perhaps restrict access to medical assistance in relation to underlying or inherent medical matters not directly connected to the virus.
With regard to mitigating factors pursuant to s 21A(3) of the Act, apart from the issue of lack of planning to which I have referred in the assessment of the objective facts, there are very few mitigating factors arising for this prisoner. A plea of guilty is a mitigating factor, but for that the prisoner received a discrete discount for the utilitarian benefit of the plea of guilty. The prisoner has expressed remorse to the psychologist, but his remorse is considered by his counsel to be not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the relevant subparagraph.
On balance I cannot conclude the prisoner is unlikely to re-offend nor has good prospects of rehabilitation. That does not mean however of course that promoting his rehabilitation is not a relevant purpose of sentencing as I earlier said.
He certainly needs counselling and other therapies for his brain injury, although these are matters that have existed for nearly ten years and it is correct that he has taken limited opportunity in the wider community to pursue these matters. He would need to seek assistance from a number of programs such as the NDIS and I accept in the circumstances that his access to relevant programs that can assist him, given his significant inherent issues, are more limited than they would be in the wider community, although it is also to be pointed out that the prisoner would appear to have some limitations upon his access to appropriate medication.
There are many authorities that deal with the issue of the treatment of medical conditions of particular prisoners. Obviously sentencing prisoners with physical and psychological issues is a relevant matter having regard to the appropriate evidence to consider in any sentencing exercise. Responsibility, however, for the provision of medical treatment is a matter for the Department of Corrective Services in conjunction with Justice Health, and I note in relation to this prisoner that he has had gall bladder surgery since he came into custody in April. There is no specific evidence of any particular hardship or penalty for the prisoner whilst in custody in respect of the treatment of his longstanding difficulties arising out of the head injury caused in 2010. The level of treatment and assistance in custody will no doubt be less than available in the wider community. However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary the Court must assume that essential medical treatment will be provided to him. It is clear that any specialised counselling and the like would be much more cogent in the wider community than in gaol.
In this particular matter, having regard to the submissions of counsel for the prisoner, this is not a marginal case where any suggested shortfall in treatment or absence of any particular programs would cause the Court to consider an alternative to full time custody. The real issue in the case is the length of time the prisoner must spend in custody, acknowledging the reality that the s 12 bond had to be revoked by regard to the terms of the repealed s 98 of the Act and also by regard to the effect on the principle of totality of sentencing, avoiding any double dipping that I earlier referred to. I particularly note what Hall J said in the 2009 decision of R v XX (2009) 195 ACRIMR 38, particularly at [52] of his judgment where he reflected upon a range of authorities pre-dating his judgment, setting out an appropriate approach to sentencing in circumstances where one is dealing with more than one offence in the exercise. The threshold pursuant to s 5 of the Act has been crossed, as was acknowledged in submissions by counsel for both the prisoner and for the Crown.
Notwithstanding previous imprisonments and breaches of conditional liberty in the past and on this occasion, and the absence of a Sentencing Assessment Report, I am prepared to make a finding of 'special circumstances' pursuant to s 44 of the Act. The substantial character of the prisoner's head injury and its impact upon his life is undeniable, and whatever the shortcomings of managing his life in the community, he needs an extended period of professional assistance in a range of ways, assuming that he is granted parole. He needs assistance to adjust to community living, and also to be guided as to appropriate counselling and other treatment which might assist him in avoiding the use of drugs and/or further offending.
One matter of hope in his case is that, in the context of the short character evidence to which I have referred, but particularly the absence of criminal convictions before he was 21 or 22, the prisoner could not be characterised as inherently having an antisocial personality or a predilection for dishonesty or violence. In fact, it seems that an early characteristic of his adult behaviour as reflected in the circumstances of the collision in 2010 when he drove into a telegraph pole, and his early criminal history, was his mismanagement of motor vehicles. As I have said, there is not a complete disconnect between the head injury that he suffered from that collision and his subsequent drug abuse which is clearly reflected in his criminal history and I have made due allowance for that.
Thus, having regard to all that has been put, I make the following orders: Mr Mirceski in relation to the s 12 bond of 26 June 2018; that is revoked. In respect of that matter you are sentenced to 15 months imprisonment to commence on 5 April 2019 expiring on 4 July 2020.
In respect of the robbery matter for which you have been committed for sentence you are convicted. You are sentenced to imprisonment by way of non-parole period of 18 months to commence 5 October 2019 expiring on 4 April 2021. I fix a balance of sentence of one year nine months imprisonment to expire on 4 January 2023.
The total sentence imposed upon you is three years nine months imprisonment to date from 5 April 2019 expiring on 4 January 2023 with a non-parole period of two years imprisonment expiring 4 April 2021.
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Decision last updated: 13 November 2020