R v Merhi

District Court of NSW|2020-09-30|Before: Mr P

Introduction

The accused was arraigned on 30 September 2020 in respect of four counts to which he pleaded 'not guilty'. Count 1 is an allegation of, between 1 January 2017 and 29 September 2017 at Galston, taking part in the manufacture of an indictable quantity of a prohibited drug, to wit, methylamphetamine; Count 2 an allegation of, at the same time and place, taking part in the manufacture of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug, to wit 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA) and Count 3 is an allegation of, at the same time and place, taking part in the manufacture of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug, to wit, Gamma butyrolactone (GBL), each offence being committed on the Crown case in the period of time up to 29 September 2017, the date of the arrest of the accused. Count 4 is an allegation of supply a prohibited drug, to wit cannabis leaf, between 1 January 2017 and 29 September 2017. All charges brought pursuant to the provisions of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 ("the Act" or "DMT")
The trial is one by Judge in accordance with the relevant provisions at ss 132 and 132A Criminal Procedure Act, 1986 with the consent of the Crown. The trial was delayed a few days after arraignment to permit counsel for the accused the opportunity to obtain instructions having come into the trial at short notice. Judgment was delayed by my requirement to sit in Wollongong for 2 weeks after submissions concluded on 16 October 2020.

The course of the trial

A large number of exhibits were tendered in the Crown case and the exhibit list for the trial is the annexed to this judgment. All exhibits have been taken into account in the consideration of the issues raised by the parties, although I need only refer to particular exhibits in the context of dealing with specific aspects of the evidence. The Crown case consisted of evidence, both oral and in a statement form, from various police officers who were involved in the execution of the search warrant on 29 September 2017 and the subsequent searches on that date and the following day, as well as the arrest of the accused on 3 January 2018 and the electronic interview that was conducted with him (Exhibit L). In relation to the electronic interview, the accused was accompanied by a solicitor and obviously had advice both from investigators and the solicitor as to his right to silence. The principal police witness was Detective Keary who gave evidence at various points of the trial, either producing or reading statements of police involved in various aspects of the investigation, producing transcripts of at the telephone intercepts operation conducted in September 2017 (Exhibit J - disc of telephone intercepts) or produced the results of downloads of Cellebrite examination of the two phones belonging to the accused, one (an iPhone 6) operated by him up until a few days before the police search as it was "pawned" on 26 September 2017 (Exhibits M3, M4 and P) and the extraction report relating to the Samsung telephone that the accused only operated on 30 September 2017 (Exhibits P1 and P2) which he had obtained from his mother. He received $300 for his iPhone. Another "extraction report" from his iPhone was tendered in cross examination of the accused (Exhibit R1), relating to exchanges of messages with a "Johnny" (Chaloub (sic)) who he admitted in evidence had given the accused the 'Shellite' tins or containers.
Mr Calacoci and Mr McIntyre gave evidence about their contact with the accused from the time (Mr Calacoci leased the hot houses and adjoining "green shed(s)") and their observations of the accused and his parent's property in 2017.
A significant witness in the Crown case was Dr Daniel Coghlan, a forensic chemist, who examined various photographs taken of the clandestine laboratory and related items, a video of the search of the rear shed and various certificates of analysis prepared by qualified people in respect of the analysis of chemicals and other items relevant to Counts 1 to 3. As a consequence of some evidence given by Dr Coghlan particularly in relation to a 1000 L plastic container that was found to have a percentage of MDMA within its waste material (Exhibit A3 - B045; the basis for the calculation of the quantity of MDMA relevant to Count 2) other experts were called relating to the analysis of the sample taken from that container and in relation to "sampling" procedures by a Crime Scene Officer directing other Crime Scene Officers who attended the "rear shed" on 30 September 2017 at the direction of the investigators. Dr Coghlan was recalled in respect of the issue of the reliability of the calculation of the quantity of MDMA found in the container directly relevant to Count 2 in the indictment. The botanist who examined the cannabis leaf also gave evidence, as with other scientists who tested samples.
The accused gave evidence in his case. There was one exhibit produced on the half of the accused; a letter to the accused from his brother George about police interest in the property (Exhibit 1). The accused commented upon a number of prosecution exhibits both in his evidence in chief and in cross-examination. I will come back to some of the detail of the evidence in the context of the submissions made by the parties upon that evidence. There were "admissions" in Exhibit K made by the accused pursuant to s.184 Evidence Act 1995 as to the integrity of the police search of the rear shed and the recording of the various 'finds' as a basis for Dr Coghlan's conclusions in most instances. Apart from evidence given by the accused about matters germane to the detail of the allegations brought by the Crown, the accused gave evidence of his background. He was one of five children to his parents, with three older brothers (one of whom was called George) and a younger sister, he had effectively grown up on the property which was used by his parents for agricultural purposes, initially as an orchard growing stone fruit, and then from about 2006/2007, when the greenhouses were completed at a cost of $1.5 million, growing vegetables including tomatoes hydroponically and by use of what he described as a "hanging gutter" system.
He and his father stepped away from growing tomatoes in about 2011/2012. He had an injury to his lower back and had to stop working and was on 'workers compensation' for three years. He became dependent on pain killers and used cannabis recreationally. Before that however, (he being 46 years of age at the time of giving evidence) he had been involved with and had a great deal of experience of working on the property in various ways, although he also had other employment away from the farm from time to time. He said he had been involved in hydroponic agriculture for 10 years and had a great deal of experience with pesticides, fungicides and herbicides. He had been in a relationship from which a child was born in 2012, but he was separated from the mother. Separation had a great emotional effect upon him. Apart from his interest in greenhouse and other fruit and vegetable agriculture, he also had an interest in exotic birds, particularly Macaws, which he acquired for breeding purposes, commencing that interest in about 2004. At the peak of his involvement with those birds he had 25 pairs, but in 2017 he said he had between 8 and 12, individual birds or pairs. He had paid $7000 at one time for a 'blue and gold' Macaw and on another occasion had paid $6000 for a 'scarlet' Macaw. These birds lived on a diet that was quite special, with pellets based upon material that came from overseas and also which included compressed vegetables and fresh fruit. As I understood his evidence he purchased containers and measuring jugs from the business 'People in Plastic', a manager of which gave evidence for the prosecution of some of his purchases in early 2017, for the purpose of storing and measuring out seed that he purchased for agricultural purposes as well as bird feed. He agreed in evidence that a number of items that were used apparently inside the "rear shed" by the person who leased it in 2017, belonged to him, but had been used without his permission and had been obtained by him for purposes associated with either agricultural work on the property or for storing food for his birds. He explained that invoices issued by 'People in Plastic' referred to him as 'Joe Murphy' because his surname, which is pronounced similarly to Murphy, had been misdescribed. This is an explanation which I accept bearing in mind that those same invoices have upon them the accused's mobile phone number.

Crown Address

Putting aside formal matters, the Crown identified the essential ingredients of Counts 1 to 3, the relevant quantities required for proof of an indictable quantity for methylamphetamine (5 g), a large commercial quantity of GBL (4 kg), and a large commercial quantity of MDMA (500 g). The Crown noted the terms of s 24 of the DMT Act, permitting, in respect of counts two and three, alternative verdicts of knowingly taking part in the manufacture of an indictable quantity of prohibited drugs. The Crown handed up during his address, a chronology of relevant events which is Exhibit S, as an "aide memoire".
With regard to the process of manufacture, the Crown submitted that the Agreed Facts (Exhibit K) in conjunction with Exhibits A3 and A4 and Dr Coghlan's evidence, establish beyond reasonable doubt that there were processes of manufacture relevant to Counts 1 to 3 occurring in the "rear shed" in 2017.
The real issue was whether the accused "knowingly took part in manufacture" in respect of those counts. Further, as the accused admitted he was in possession of the cannabis relevant to Count 4, had he discharged the onus on him to establish that he had the cannabis in his possession for purposes other than supply.
With regard to Counts 1-3 the Crown relied upon direct and circumstantial evidence.
With regard to circumstantial evidence the main matters identified by the Crown were: 1. The proximity of the accused's home to the rear shed and his opportunity to visit the "rear shed", 2. At all times he had one of the keys that could gain access to the "rear shed", 3. The accused was seen going into the rear shed by Mr Calococi (page 38, line 45) and saw two unidentified males outside the rear shed about three weeks before he noticed burnt grass, which he noticed between January and March 2017. 4. There were "burn" marks consistent with the manufacture of prohibited drugs or the disposal of waste product both behind the shed and in the western part of the property which should have been noticed by the accused. 5. Items found within the shed connected to the process of identification were identical to items purchased by the accused from 'People in Plastic' - Exhibits H1, 2, 3, 4. 6. A number of items used in the processes were admitted by the accused to be his (although used without his permission). 7. The accused denied ever going into the shed, but in Exhibit M5 communicated on two occasions that he had gone "to the shed", allowing for the fact that there were a number of sheds on the property only one could reasonably be visited that was the "rear shed" . The accused having no connection with the greenhouse and related structures for a number of years before 2017. The Crown relied upon admissions made by the accused at page 2 and 4 of Exhibit M5 indicating connection with the "rear shed". 8. The accused was in possession of 15 empty 'Shellite' cans which can be used as a solvent in the manufacture of prohibited drugs, a fact of which the accused was aware. 9. The accused was connected with the borrowing of a forklift at about the time that there was observed to be burning of grass on the western side of the property consistent with disposal of waste by the use of a forklift, arising from the evidence of Mr Calococi and messages sent by him on 14 and 19 March (Exhibit M3, page 2). 10. The accused was notified by his brother (Exhibit 1) of police investigations as early as April or May 2017. 11. The process of manufacture involved heavy equipment being brought to the shed in circumstances where it would be difficult not to notice being delivered or taken to the shed as the accused lived on the property. 12. The accused told a number of self-admitted "lies" to police in the course of the interview conducted on 3 January 2018, which included "lies" about the circumstances of being notified by his brother of the police investigation, not smelling chemicals when he went to the shed in response to his brother's letter, the origin of the 'Shellite' drums and the person from whom he purchased them, the circumstances of meeting the person who he claimed had leased the shed from him (contradicting that account by acknowledging in evidence that the person was someone referred to him by an associate).
In this latter regard, the Crown submitted that the accused also told a number of other lies when giving evidence. That is, lying to the court about the existence of any lease and the lack of knowledge of the identity of the person who used the shed. It was submitted that many of these matters went to the credibility of the accused as a witness. It was acknowledged that the Court could completely reject the accused's evidence upon the critical matters requiring proof by the Crown. It is also conceded that I would still need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the reliability and truthfulness of evidence relied upon by the Crown to prove his guilt even if the accused's critical evidence was rejected.
The Crown also identified the accused as a most unsatisfactory witness who in various ways was evasive, prevaricated it with his answers, or was otherwise untruthful.
With regard to the quantity of the MDMA pleaded in relation to Count 2, the Crown said that the Court could assume that there had been a proper process undertaken by the Crime Scene Officers because of their "usual practice". Whilst the expert forensic chemist acknowledged the variables involved (page 204 - 207) when he was recalled (particularly at page 346 - 347) he gave evidence that confirmed, notwithstanding those variables, the conclusion could still be reached beyond reasonable doubt that more than 500g of MDMA was to be found in the waste material. Otherwise it was the still open for the Court to return a "guilty" verdict in respect of the alternative count available under s24 of the Act.
As to Count 4, possession of the cannabis was admitted. The accused admitted supplying cannabis in September 2017 as recorded in the telephone intercepts (Exhibits J, J1). The accused had not discharged his onus in respect of that count because his explanations for possession were unworthy of acceptance and he was to be heard (in September 2017) arranging to sell cannabis to others in Exhibit J.

Defence Submissions

It was submitted that the accused has consistently denied knowledge of what was involved within the shed in relation to Counts 1-3 from the time he was first spoken to by police on 29 September 2017.
With regard to Count 4, the accused relied upon the evidence of Mr Indsto (p 341) concerning the quality of the cannabis leaf, the different types of cannabis and their effect, and the saleability of the cannabis leaf that was found by the police. Further, he relied upon the text message in Exhibit J1, on 9 September 2017, concerning not being able to find suitable marijuana and everyone being "out of stock" at the time that he had the cannabis in his possession. It was acknowledged that the accused was involved in small-time drug supply. But in September, bearing in mind he was in possession of the cannabis, he did not offer it for sale when he had the opportunity to do so. He had forgotten about it on his account and it was of poor quality.
With regard to Dr Coghlan's evidence in relation to the projected weights of drugs of particularly GBL and MDMA, counsel for the accused noted his evidence in paragraph 20 of Exhibit A1 as to the possibilities that might affect the accuracy of these estimations. They included the "quality of the materials" and the "skill of the operator" of which little or nothing was known.
In relation to the prohibited drug GBL it was submitted that it was a possibility that was reasonable, in the circumstances, that empty bags of pre-cursors were not full when they arrived at the premises, thus the calculations of the chemist from the physical evidence may be unreliable.
He particularly referred to p 195 lines 25 to 38 (relevant to GBL and MDMA) and p 202 from the transcript (lines 35 - 40) and p 204 (line 45) as particularly relevant to MDMA and the accuracy of the readings. So far as the estimate of the quantity of MDMA is concerned, he also referred to the evidence of Mr Paul the analyst at p 335 (lines 30 - 45). He submitted the Court could not be "sure" that the sample taken was indicative of the mass of liquid. As to the homogeneity of the liquid waste in the IBC 1000 litre container, he drew attention to Crime Scene Officer Watton's evidence that whilst he didn't see what was done and cannot give direct evidence of what was done, he relied upon his colleagues to act in accordance with their training. It was submitted there are difficulties in relying upon evidence of 'best practice' and the Court must be careful in the absence of direct evidence. With regard to his evidence of "homogenising" the waste material it was important to note his idea of what a "good stir" was. At page 361 he said it involved stirring for "a minute or two". Whereas Dr Coghlan had pointed out at p 348 the requirement for mechanical stirring, and also at p 348 pointed out that best practice would involve "multiple samples from different places". This definitely was not done. There was also evidence from the accused about the time and method of homogenising chemicals in agriculture of which he had experience
Furthermore, his calculation regarding production of purity by a factor of 10 would by definition take the purity level below 0.1, which suggests little value in the waste material.
With regard to the letter received by the accused from his brother (Exhibit 1), Counsel for the accused noted that the accused's version in the interview of speaking to his brother could be other than verbal communication, and his conduct on receiving the letter was consistent with not knowing. That is going down to the shed not seeing anything wrong and not reporting the matter to the police. If he was involved, or had knowledge of the activities in the "rear shed", given that he was put on notice of the police investigation, one would have thought that he would have taken steps to stop the production or remove items from the shed. There is no evidence of him taking any such steps. Or taking steps to move the production 'off site'.
The texts sent in Exhibit M5 relating to working "all night" and the like, had to be seen in the wider evidence of the absence of any fingerprints or DNA in places where they would be expected to be found if he had been working in the shed. He knew the importance of protecting his skin from chemicals from his agricultural experience, and therefore the significance of no DNA or fingerprints was enhanced. He submitted that it was implausible that the accused was working in the laboratory having regard to the physical evidence (see page 294 lines 25 - 45)
As to the Crown submission that the accused's account was implausible as to how he met the lessee and his contact with the shed, he noted that the accused was only seen going into the shed on the one occasion. It was conceded that the men that he was seen with by Mr Calacoci could have been the men who set up the lab which was consistent with the accused telling them not to touch his property inside the shed, and could have occurred before the laboratory was set up. There was no direct evidence of what he was doing inside the shed.
Any "lies" the accused told, it is submitted that these matters were only relevant to his credibility. The Court should take into account in assessing his demeanour and the detail of what he said in Exhibit L that it was his first police interview, he had no prior criminal convictions, did not understand the implications of being interviewed, took an unsophisticated approach to the interview, the interview was not on oath, he was nervous and was having tough times in his personal life.
As to the evidence concerning "People in Plastic" and their products it was noted that the woman who gave evidence said that they had 20,000 customers and the items bought could be used for agricultural use. Further, there was no way of determining that items identical to those found in the "rear shed" were the same items. The accused had said that he didn't know how to make drugs and the expert opinion was that people with a 'Year 10' education (similar to the accused's education) would not be able to perform the chemical tasks to manufacture drugs.
It was also noted the Crime Scene Officer said the site was "inactive" and that was a possibility that it could have been "transferred" from somewhere else.
Dealing with some of the circumstances identified by the Crown. With regard to "proximity" it was noted that other people were just as proximate and that the accused was only seen inside the shed once. It was submitted that the accused was fully occupied, like Mr Calococi, "working feverishly with his birds" and too busy to go to the shed.
As for Exhibit M5 (the text messages), bottom of p 2, where the accused discussed the risk of "going to gaol", it was submitted that the accused had explained what he was talking about in that message, about taking risks and alternatives such as going to gaol, at p 489 line 45 of the transcript where he said he was concerned about driving to Queensland, not anything to do with manufacturing drugs.
With regard to the use of the forklift it was submitted he did not know what the forklift was being used for, acknowledging though that he did organise it for use by the lessee of the shed.
It was submitted that if people were manufacturing drugs in the early hours of the morning it would be difficult for him to know what was happening if he was in bed or absent from his home.
In respect of the alleged lies told it was submitted that he was recounting from memory what he'd been told by his brother (see pages 409-14) and the smell of the chemicals, which he did not refer to in the record of interview was not significant. With regard to telephoning Recochem (Exhibit R) there is no direct evidence that he did ring that number, or that his account of how it appears on his phone is deliberately untruthful.
It was submitted that in his evidence in court he was "totally honest" about "the lies" he told police. It was submitted that just because his version does not agree with the Crown case does not make his version a "lie". He gave plausible explanations for his untruths and the evidence is not available as "consciousness of guilt".
As to Count 4, the accused has discharged the defence under s 29 of the Act given the fact that he had not used any of the cannabis in his possession at the time that he was selling and supplying other cannabis. Given the condition in which it was found, he had obviously "forgotten" about it. It was not suitable for sale in any event.
It was finally submitted that in respect of Counts 1-3 the Crown had not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was "knowingly" involved in the manufacture of prohibited drugs

LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED

The matters outlined below are primarily related to matters addressed upon. Not a great deal of attention was taken by the parties to legal issues as most legal issues appeared to be agreed amongst the parties at the end of the evidence, particularly on fundamental issues, although, of course, a number of legal issues arose during the trial. The legal principles set out below and elsewhere referred to in the judgment on discrete evidentiary matters have to be considered along with the rulings made in the course of the trial.

Onus and standard of proof of guilt

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused. That burden or onus rests with the prosecution throughout the trial in respect of matters regarding proof by the prosecution. The accused bears no onus of proof in respect of these matters. The accused is presumed to be innocent until such time as the prosecution can prove his guilt.
The prosecution must prove each and all essential ingredients of a relevant charge for consideration 'beyond reasonable doubt'. The accused bears no onus in relation to any matters requiring proof by the prosecution. If any reasonable doubt exists in relation to matters which the prosecution must prove, then I must acquit the accused. In this matter the accused gave evidence. He was under no obligation to give evidence, or prove anything. His evidence forms part of the totality of evidence upon which a determination of guilt, or otherwise, is made. If I reject his evidence in respect of particular matters relevant to proof of guilt in respect of any one of the counts I must still be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of matters required to be proved by the Crown from the remaining evidence that I accept relevant to those matters.

Elements of the Counts in the indictment In respect of Counts 1, 2 and 3 the prosecution must prove, in the context of the case that it has outlined that the accused, 1. took part in the manufacture of a prohibited drug by participating in any step, or causing any step to be taken, in the process of that manufacture, or provided the premises in which any such step in that process is taken, or suffered or permitted any such step in that process to be taken in premises of which he was the occupier or participated in its management. 2. On the relevant premises there was a process of manufacture of methylamphetamine (in respect of Count 1) MDMA (in respect of Count 2) and GBL (in respect of Count 3). 3. … 1. in respect of methylamphetamine manufacture concerned with Count 1, the prosecution must prove the manufacture of at least an indictable quantity, that is a quantity greater than 5g and less than 250g. 2. in respect of MDMA manufacture concerned with Count 2 the prosecution must prove the manufacture of a large commercial quantity , that is a quantity greater than 500g. 3. in respect of GBL manufacture concerned with Count 3, the Crown must prove manufacture of a large commercial quantity, that is a quantity greater than 4 kg.

As to Element 1 (above) the prosecution must prove that the accused "intentionally" did those acts in the knowledge that the "rear shed" was to be used for the manufacture of a prohibited drug (Siafakas v R [2016] NSWCCA 100 at [27]-[51]; [134]-[147]).
In respect of Count 4 the prosecution must prove that the accused, 1. possessed a prohibited drug, to wit cannabis leaf, 2. not less than the traffickable quantity of that prohibited drug (traffickable quantity of cannabis leaf being 300g).
It is a defence to this charge if the accused proves on the balance of probabilities that he had the prohibited drug in his possession otherwise than for supply. Here the accused admits possession of the relevant cannabis leaf. He admits knowledge of its presence on the property and intentionally exercised control and custody of it upon the property.

Trial by judge alone

The trial is a trial by judge alone in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (see s 132, 133 Criminal Procedure Act 1986). The election was made by the accused, consented to by the prosecution, on or before 21 September 2010. A trial by judge alone in accordance with the relevant provisions of s 132, 133 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 requires the trial judge not just to state bare principles of law that are applied and findings of fact that are made, but also to expose the "reasoning process" justifying the findings of fact and ultimately the verdict.
All principles of law which are relevant and required to be applied and considered should be identified in the judgment, including any necessary warnings that the trial judge is required to apply in the assessment of the evidence. Where particular warnings are applied a judge must state why, if appropriate and applicable and notwithstanding the appropriate warnings or the consequences of it, a particular verdict has been reached (Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250 (at 261-264)).

Lies as evidence of consciousness of guilt

The Crown submits that the accused told "lies" to investigating police during the course of their investigation, particularly in the electronic interview on 3 January 2018 and also told lies when giving evidence in the trial. A number of 'lies' in the electronic interview were admitted by the accused to be such in his evidence. These included, in no particular order of importance, claims in his interview, firstly, that on an occasion that he went down to the "rear shed' having been told there was a police investigation occurring he did not smell any chemicals, secondly, that he did not know the reason that the person who leased the "rear shed" approached him and thirdly, that he did not know the identity of the person who gave him the 'Shellite' containers. In evidence he admitted these versions were untrue. The Crown also submitted that the accused did not tell the truth in his interview with police and in evidence when he said he did not know the name of the person who leased the "rear shed" from him. In respect of these lies either admitted by the accused or demonstrated to be untrue by other evidence, the Crown submits that I should regard all those lies as evidence of consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused. Other untruths were submitted to be relevant to the assessment of his credibility.
In relation to this submission, I note that a lie is something that is said by a person that is untrue, knowing at the time of making the statement that it is untrue. However an untruth may be told without realisation of that fact that the time is not a lie. People can be mistaken or confused in recounting relevant events and if it a later time a witness realises that what he or she said was incorrect it does not transform the statement earlier made into a lie. Consideration of lies requires a careful approach in deciding their significance in any court case. However, a lie can be taken into account as evidence of the accused's guilt but cannot prove his guilt by itself. Proven lies in this context can be considered with other facts and circumstances in determining whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to rely upon lies as evidence of consciousness of guilt the Court must find, firstly, that the relevant lie relates to an issue that is relevant to the offence alleged against the accused as having been committed by him. It must relate to a significant circumstance or event connected to the alleged offences. The Crown submits that these lies are relevant because they go to the issue of the accused seeking to distance himself from the people involved in the manufacture of prohibited drugs, and/or distance himself from the knowledge of the fact that there were processes of manufacture occurring within the "rear shed". The Crown submits that lies of their character are relevant to proof of guilt in respect of Counts 1 to 3 in the indictment.
Secondly, I must find the reason the accused told a relevant lie was because he feared that telling the truth might reveal his guilt in relation to the charge or charges he now faces. That is, he feared that telling the truth would implicate him in the commission of the offences for which he is now on trial.
I am to remember that people do not always act rationally and that telling a lie may sometimes be explained in other ways. A person may have a reason for lying apart from trying to conceal his guilt. A lie may be told out of panic, to escape an unjust accusation, to protect some other person or to avoid a consequence unrelated to the offence. If I think that a relevant lie may have been told for some other reason other than to avoid being implicated in the commission of the offences for which the accused is now on trial, evidence of lies cannot be used as evidence of his guilt. In those circumstances it may be put aside in that regard and I should focus my attention upon the other evidence in the case. In this matter where untruths were admitted by the accused it is submitted on behalf of the accused having regard to his evidence that there were a number of reasons for him not telling the truth to the police, including events occurring on the accused's personal life, fear of being wrongly implicated in matters with which he had no connection, possible "repercussions", amongst other matters.
This Crown also submits that if these lies identified by it as evidence of "consciousness of guilt" are not available for that purpose, they are still relevant to the assessment of the accused's credibility as are other alleged untruths told by the accused either in his electronic interview or his evidence. If the court is satisfied that a lie has been told, that is I am satisfied that the accused said something that was untrue and at the time of making the relevant statement he knew it was untrue, I cannot use that fact in support of the conclusion that the accused is guilty. But the relevant lie can be taken into account in the assessment of the accused's credibility, both in relation to the versions that he gave the police when interviewed in January 2018 and/or in considering his evidence in the trial. If I was satisfied that the accused told a lie or lies then that all those matters can be considered as having a bearing upon whether I believe other things that the accused has said in his electronic interview and/or his evidence at trial.

Separate consideration of counts

Each count requires separate consideration by regard to the evidence relevant to that particular count. A finding of guilt in relation to one count does not necessarily mean that findings of guilt will follow in relation to other counts. In this matter the evidence and issues in relation to Count 4 are completely separate and apart from the relevant evidence in relation to Counts 1 to 3. These latter counts have much common evidence although matters such as identifying the precise process of manufacture occurring in the "rear shed" in relation to one particular prohibited drug can only be relevant in relation to the count concerned with that particular drug. Likewise specific evidence relating to quantities of particular prohibited drugs alleged to have been manufactured can only be relevant to the particular count concerned with that particular prohibited drug.
The Crown does not have to prove that the accused knew a particular prohibited drug was being manufactured in the "rear shed" (Siafakas v R [2016] NSWCCA 100 at [27]-[28] and [51]). But it must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was "knowingly take part in" the manufacture of a prohibited drug as defined in s 6 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985. Thus, the evidence in the trial concerned with the accused's knowledge and/or intentions in respect of activities in the "rear shed", including evidence concerning his connection with either precursors for manufacture of prohibited drugs and/or implements or objects used in the manufacture of prohibited drugs, is common to all three counts as is evidence of acts done by the accused to permit use of the "rear shed" by others and evidence of actions of the accused relating to the enforcement, supervision or execution of any agreement with persons having access to and making use of the interior of the "rear shed".

Circumstantial evidence

The Crown case in relation to Counts 1-3 is based upon direct and circumstantial evidence.
The defence also relies upon other circumstantial evidence as well as the direct evidence of the accused in his denials and as to relevant events and circumstances relied upon by the prosecution
My function as the judge of the facts in this case extends beyond coming to a conclusion as to whether you find that any particular fact has been established by the evidence. My function also extends to drawing reasonable inferences or conclusions from the facts I find established. "Inference" and "conclusion" mean the same thing.
In this case, the Crown relies partly upon "circumstantial evidence" to implicate the accused in respect of Counts 1-3 as being "knowingly take part in" the manufacture of prohibited drugs. In relying upon circumstantial evidence, the Crown asks me to find certain basic facts and then from those facts to draw a conclusion as to the existence of further facts on this issue. This is also the case in relation to establishing that a process of manufacturing prohibited drugs relevant to Counts 1, 2 and 3 were occurring in the "rear shed".
Circumstances relied upon by the Crown in relation to "knowingly take part in manufacture" (re Counts 1-3). In summary from the main matters from the evidence and submissions: 1. The expert evidence of Dr Coghlan in conjunction with the physical evidence (including results of prohibited drug analysis and/or analysis of precursors to particular types of prohibited drug manufacture) and the agreed facts (Exhibit K) demonstrate that three separate processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs occurred within the "rear shed" before the police search. 2. The accused had control of and access to the "rear shed" during the period of time that the processes of manufacture occurred. 3. The accused "leased" the "rear shed" to a person or persons who could have been the only people to have set up and conducted the processes of manufacture, apart from an immediate member of the accused's family. However, the only person regularly residing on the premises, the accused's mother, was not such a person (Exhibit N - tendered without objection), the accused's father was in a nursing home and the accused's brothers were not residing on the premises. 4. The accused met and knew the name of the person who leased the "rear shed". He had possession of documents of identification, a driver's licence and a Medicare card on his own admission. 5. The accused's residence was approximate to the "rear shed" (no more than 50m away) and he had ample opportunity over many months after the shed was leased (most likely in mid-January 2017 but before April 2017) to visit and inspect the shed. 6. The accused's bird cages which he regularly visited were even closer, no more than 30m from the "rear shed". 7. When the "rear shed" was leased the accused had property within it of value which he had taken the trouble to photograph in mid-January and which was not to be used by the lessee. 8. The accused was seen by the neighbour to go into the shed at the time that the neighbour identified two males outside the "rear shed" about three weeks before he noticed burnt grass behind the "rear shed" between January and March 2017. 9. There were burn marks in grass behind the "rear shed" and in the western area of the property that ought to have been noticed by the accused that are consistent with either the disposal of waste products from the manufacture of prohibited drugs (MDMA found in soil samples from behind the "rear shed"). 10. The accused's neighbour saw waste products coming out of a hose connected to the "rear shed" into the area where the burnt grass was seen. 11. The accused denied to police ever going into the "rear shed" after he leased it, but this claim was contradicted by communications to others in text messages (Exhibit M5) and by the observations of neighbours. 12. At the time of the police search of his family premises he was in possession of 15 'Shellite' containers, that chemical being a solvent connected to the manufacture of a prohibited drug. The accused knew it was "solvent". 13. The accused was involved in arranging the borrowing of a forklift used by neighbour about the time that burnt grass stains were seen on the western side of the property consistent with the disposal of caustic waste from a large container by the use of a forklift. 14. The accused was notified by his brother of police investigations as early as April or May 2017, but admitted not going inside the shed to investigate but smelling chemicals obviously not connected with agricultural use. 15. The processes of manufacture included the use of heavy equipment that would be difficult to take onto the property without the knowledge of the accused. 16. The accused told police in the course of the interview conducted on 3 January 2018 a number of lies which he admitted were lies. These lies are available as evidence of consciousness of guilt and were as follows: 1. No smelling chemicals when he went to the "rear shed" to investigate in response to his brother's letter (Exhibit 1) 2. Not knowing the identity of the person who gave him the 'Shellite' canisters 3. The circumstances of first contact with the person who leased the "rear shed". 1. More centrally, the accused both to police when spoken to on 29 September 2017, when interviewed by police on 3 January 2018 and in his evidence in the trial denied knowledge of the name of the person to whom he leased the "rear shed" and failed over many months of reflection to remember that name. This failure to remember the identity of that person, or to supply anything other than general information is incapable of acceptance as truthful, and must therefore be a lie reflecting consciousness of guilt on his part. This failure of memory as he describes it is central to his denial of guilt. 2. Further, in a related way, he in evidence gave excuses for not doing things because of fear of 'repercussions' which might only reasonably arise from disclosure of information which he knew would implicate persons concerned directly with the processes of manufacture. 3. Particular items found in the "rear shed" that were associated with processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs were identical to or very similar to particular items purchased by the accused on 14 February and 2 March 2017 from "People in Plastic".
There is a separate 'circumstantial evidence' aspect of the matter. In order to prove the accused's guilt in relation to Count 3 as to the existence of a "large commercial quantity" of GBL, the Crown relies upon the conclusion reached by Dr Coghlan by way of deduction having regard to the existence of unaccounted for quantities particular precursors, or packages for relevant precursors, for the manufacture of the prohibited drug GBL. Those matters are outlined in specific detail in the statement of Dr Coghlan in Exhibit A2. I will deal with the respective cases in relation to this aspect later.

Circumstances relied on by the accused in respect of "knowingly take part in manufacture"

In summary from the submissions of the accused in relation to knowledge of the processes of manufacture they include: 1. The accused has consistently denied knowledge of the existence of any processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs or agreeing to that manufacturing occurring in the "rear shed". 2. The accused conduct after receipt of his brother's letter was consistent with him not knowing or recently suspecting a process of manufacture of prohibited drugs. He had nothing to lose by reporting the matter to the police if he did not know, and if he did have knowledge of the processes of manufacture he did nothing either to stop production or to remove items from the shed in the knowledge that the police had an interest in the property. 3. In all the items that were examined particularly gloves found at the premises consistent with involvement in the processes of manufacture there was no DNA profile of the accused found on any item nor any fingerprints of the accused found on relevant items. 4. Being seen to go into the shed on only one occasion by the neighbour given the very approximate timing of that observation did not establish an occasion when any drug laboratory was set up. Given that there were other people present it was consistent with the accused showing people the property belonging to him that was not to be touched. 5. The purchase of items from "People in Plastic" by the accused, similar to or identical to those found inside the "rear shed" and used in processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs, was not necessarily consistent with knowledge of the processes of drug manufacture. The items found by police, if they are the same purchased by the accused, may have been used without his permission, could be purchased for innocent purposes such as matters related to storage for agricultural purposes or for storage and transfer of bird food from one place to another. In any event, the item purchased on 2 March 2017 was not delivered. 6. The site when inspected was "inactive" and the Crime Scene Officer agreed that there was a possibility that the laboratory set up could have been transferred from another site. 7. Any reference by the accused in communications concerning going into a shed could not necessarily refer to the "rear shed" as there were a number of sheds on the property to which the accused had access. 8. An alleged admission by the accused about taking risks and not wanting to go "to gaol" (Exhibit M5, p2) was explained by the accused as referring to refusing to drive up to Queensland at the request of a friend.
Where circumstantial evidence, such as here, is considered with direct evidence, no individual fact established can prove the guilt of the accused.
Where the Crown's case depends on circumstantial evidence, then the Court is asked to reason in a staged approach. The Crown first asks the Court to find certain basic facts established by the evidence. Those facts do not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Taken by themselves they cannot prove the guilt of the accused. The Court is then asked to infer or conclude from a combination of those established facts that a further fact or facts existed. The ultimate fact the Crown asks the Court to find based upon the basic facts established from the circumstantial evidence and the direct evidence is that an accused person is guilty of any particular offence charged.
A case based in part on circumstantial evidence may be just as convincing and reliable as a case based upon direct evidence. This will depend upon the number and nature of the basic facts relied upon by the Crown when considered as a whole (not individually or in isolation). It will depend upon whether all of the evidence leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the Crown has established the guilt of the accused. It is important that I approach a circumstantial case by considering and weighing, as a whole, all the facts I find established by the evidence. It is wrong to consider any particular fact in isolation and ask whether that fact proves the guilt of the accused, or whether there is any explanation for that particular fact or circumstance which is inconsistent with the accused's guilt.
The correct approach is first to determine what facts I find established by the evidence. Any particular fact to be taken into account by me does not need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt except here in two respects.
If such a conclusion does not reasonably arise in relation to a particular count in the indictment, then the Crown's circumstantial case fails because I am not satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Of course, it follows that I must find the accused "not guilty" of the relevant count to that evidence.
But if I find that such a conclusion is a reasonable one to draw, based upon a combination of those established facts then, before I can find the accused guilty I must determine whether there is any other reasonable conclusion arising from those facts that is inconsistent with the conclusion the Crown says is established. If there is any other reasonable conclusion arising from those facts that is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused the circumstantial case fails, because I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.
I understand that drawing a conclusion from one set of established facts to find that another fact is proved involves a logical and rational process of reasoning. I must not base my conclusion upon mere speculation, conjecture or supposition.
In order to satisfy the Court beyond reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt of a particular offence where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the Crown must first persuade me that the inference or conclusion it relies upon is a reasonable one to draw from the facts that I find established by the evidence. It then must prove to me that the only reasonable inference or conclusion that can be drawn from a consideration of all the established facts viewed as a whole is that the accused is guilty of the particular offence I am considering. In other words, the ultimate inferences to be drawn to prove particular elements of a particular charge are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. If a reasonable possibility exists inconsistent with guilt in relation to a matter requiring proof by the prosecution then the prosecution has failed to prove that matter beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, if there is any other reasonable conclusion open on those facts that is inconsistent with the conclusion the Crown asks me to find, then the Crown's case has failed in respect of the particular count I am considering.

Expert evidence

In this case witnesses has given opinion evidence upon matters relating to the character of the items seized from the "rear shed" and their relationship to matters requiring proof by the Crown, such as whether there were processes of manufacture to be found, whether there were prohibited drugs present, their quantity, quality and purity amongst other matters.
The opinions expressed constitute "expert opinion" and findings. An expert witness is a person who has specialised knowledge based on that person's training, study or experience. Unlike other witnesses, a witness with such specialised knowledge may express an opinion on matters within his or her particular area of expertise. Other witnesses may speak only as to facts, that is, what they saw or heard, and are not permitted to express their opinions.
Of course, the value of any expert opinion is very much dependent on the reliability and accuracy of the material which the expert used to reach his or her opinion including the reliability of any history given by the complainant. It is also dependent upon the degree to which the expert analysed the material upon which the opinion was based and the skill and experience brought to bear in formulating the opinion given. Experts can differ in the level and degree of their experience, training and study, yet each can still be an expert qualified to give an opinion where that opinion is based on that witness' specialised knowledge.
I should bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration, I do not accept the evidence of the expert I do not have to act upon it. This is particularly so where the facts upon which the opinion is based do not accord with the facts as I find them to be. I am also, to a degree, entitled to take into account my common sense and my own experiences if they are relevant to the issue upon which the expert evidence relates, but not displace uncontroverted opinions or opinions accepted as correct by the parties.
I should remember that the expert evidence relates only to part of the case, and that while it may be of assistance to me in reaching a verdict, I must reach my verdict having considered all the evidence. The opinion of the experts is not determinative of the guilt of the accused. It is part of the evidence relied upon to prove the guilt of the accused.
If an opinion is based upon facts which I am satisfied have been proved, or assumptions that I am satisfied are valid, then it is a matter for me to consider whether the opinion that is based upon those facts or assumptions is correct. On the other hand, if I decide that the facts have not been proved, or the assumptions are not valid, then any opinion based upon them is of no assistance because it has no foundation. If that is the case, the opinion should be disregarded.

Prior inconsistent statements

Prior inconsistent statements are statements made by a witness about relevant events before giving evidence that inconsistent with the evidence of the witness in the trial.
If there is an inconsistency between a previous statement and evidence in this Court, or an inconsistency between the accounts of different witnesses who observed the same event, that may be taken into account in either assessing the credibility of the particular witness in relation to that particular matter or in assessing the credibility of the witness generally. In considering such inconsistencies I may, if I am satisfied that there are inconsistencies, regard those matters as reflecting adversely upon the truthfulness of a particular witness. The significance of these matters in relation to a particular witness will depend upon the significance of the inconsistency, the number of inconsistencies and of course the significance of the witness in the case.
A 'recent invention' is a suggestion that something said in evidence has been made up, is false or unreliable because it was not mentioned or detailed beforehand when the witness had an opportunity to give a full account of relevant events. Whether such a matter is a 'recent invention' or not is a matter for the court to decide. Whether it reflects adversely upon the credibility and/or truthfulness of the witness again is a matter for the court.

Admissions

An admission is a representation made orally or in writing by a defendant in a criminal proceeding asserting facts, or a fact, relevant to the facts in issue in relation to the matter or matters with which he or she is charged.
An admission is a representation adverse to the interests of a defendant. But it may be inculpatory or exculpatory. An admission may not be a confession. It may inculpate a person on a minor or peripheral matter which is not of any significance or is not disputed, but if proven not is not necessarily consistent with guilt.
It may be an admission to the fact that does not of itself prove guilt, or of a matter that is entirely neutral in the case. It may be made either before, during or after the commission of a particular offence. Most admissions are made after relevant events giving rise to a particular event. An admission may be express or implied. But an "implied" admission will by its nature be equivocal in its meaning. It may have other meanings inconsistent with a meaning that constitutes an admission adverse to the interests of the person making the relevant admission.

Evidence of good character

The accused has adduced evidence to establish that he has no prior convictions, or charges, known to the police at the time of the search in late September 2017. There is other evidence available as to his background and upbringing. This evidence is not challenged by the prosecution and thus I should accept the fact that the accused is a person of good character in that he has no convictions previously. I am prepared to accept that he has worked industriously on his parent's property and cared greatly for his parents.
I am entitled to take evidence into account of an accused's good character in this respect, in favour of him on the question of whether the prosecution has proven the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that the accused is found to be a person of good character in a material respect is relevant to the likelihood of his having committed the offences alleged.
I can take into account the accused's good character by reasoning that such a person is unlikely to have committed the offences charged by the prosecution. Whether I reason in that way is a matter for me.
Further, I can use the fact that an accused is a person of good character in this respect to support his credibility in his denial of guilt. I may reason that a person of good character is less likely to lie or give a false account of his conduct in any interview he gave to the police. Whether I reason in that way is a matter for me to determine.
None of this means that good character provides the accused with some kind of defence. Evidence of good character is only one of a number of factors which I am to take into account in determining whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. What weight I give to the fact that the accused is a person of good character in a material respect is completely a matter for me. But I should take that fact into account in the ways I have indicated.

Re Counts 1-3 - Processes of manufacture of particular prohibited drugs

A starting point is the expert evidence that was given by Daniel Coghlan, a Forensic Chemist in the employ of the Department of Health, in relation to the issues of what if any processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs were conducted at the premises, particularly the "rear shed", what prohibited drugs were manufactured, what those processes involved, what quantities of particular prohibited drugs were manufactured and the bases of those calculations.
This witness was a thoughtful considered witness, whose qualifications to reach the conclusions he did in his two expert reports prepared pursuant to s.177 Evidence Act 1995 (Exhibits A1, A2) and in his evidence were not in doubt. Ultimately, having regard to the cross-examination of the witness, he was unshaken in respect of his respective opinions, but fairly made allowance for matters that were raised with him that he had not previously been expected to consider. His evidence on recall was of some assistance to the accused in respect of whether the prosecution has proven a relevantly "large commercial quantity" of MDMA was manufactured. The overall circumstances establish beyond reasonable doubt that there are, at various times before 29 September 2017, processes of manufacture in the "rear shed" consistent with what is alleged in Counts 1-3.
His oral evidence and his reports included consideration of photographic evidence of items seized in the course of the police investigations on 29 and 30 September 2017 (see Exhibits A3, A4), particularly the police examination of the "rear shed" and its environs, the search video (which was not tendered) and Analyst Certificates (Exhibits O, O1) regarding items seized, examined or sampled. It is clear from the detail of the police evidence of their respective examinations and searches, the records kept of items seized and inspected and the photographic evidence produced, for example in Exhibits A3 and A4, that the integrity of the search and examination of the "crime scene" was not compromised in any way. Those photographic exhibits reflect the accuracy of the description of them contained within the forensic chemist's reports. In fact in one particular instance handwritten markings on an item are misdescribed in the photographic exhibit but accurately described by the forensic chemist in his report.
There is no need to repeat chapter and verse the detail of his observations, examinations and findings having regard to the detail of his evidence and the relationship of his evidence to the physical evidence. Of course all this is to be considered in the context of what is clearly his extensive expertise having regard to his educational qualifications, his training and his specific experience. His key findings relevant to identifying processes of manufacture, the precursors required and found, were not seriously challenged.
One matter that emerged from the evidence of the Crime Scene Officer was a concession in cross-examination that it was "possible" that what he examined of the "laboratory" in the "rear shed" which he described as "inactive", had been "transferred" from elsewhere. As I understand the matter as it was submitted to me, I could act upon this "possibility" to conclude that there had been no process of manufacture occurring within the "rear shed". Or, to put it more accurately, I could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of such a matter given that possibility.
This was a matter that was not raised with the person best qualified to express an opinion about the matter. It is quite clear from Dr Coghlan's evidence, which I accept to be accurate and fair in all respects (subject to analysis of some of his conclusions as to weights of drugs manufactured), that the evidence available to him from the sampling, the video and the photographic record, represented a place where processes of manufacture had occurred. To the extent that there is some conflict between him and the Crime Scene Officer, I accept his evidence. The qualifications of the Crime Scene Officer to express an opinion about whether a particular laboratory had been transferred are not abundantly clear to me. In any event if there was a possibility that a "laboratory" concerned, it should be noted, with three different processes of drug manufacture, had been "transferred" from elsewhere, that did not mean necessarily that when transferred the processes of manufacture did not continue at the new location. In any event, if the submission is that no process of manufacture actually occurred within the "rear shed", there is ample evidence beyond the mere presence of the prohibited drugs and the means of manufacturing them of the processes of manufacture in all respects relating to Counts 1 to 3 occurring within the "rear shed". Including the use of items that belonged to the accused (he admitted a number were apparently used though without his consent) in the processes. Those items had been in the shed before it was leased to a third person.
There is also the evidence of used containers of pre-cursors within the shed. If someone had taken the trouble of moving processes of manufacture to the shed for storage one would scarcely expect to find empty or part empty containers of chemicals required for the manufacture of the various drugs. There was also present in the shed discarded rubber gloves and latex gloves consistent entirely with use of those items within the shed in the handling of chemicals for the purposes of manufacture. Further, there is the evidence of the completed product of manufacture such as the presence of the methylamphetamine relevant to establish an indictable quantity, the various remnants of MDMA and GBL on various items particularly items directly associated with manufacture. As well there is evidence of the presence of all relevant pre-cursors for manufacture and reaction vessels and other implements necessary for manufacture within the shed. One can never say that much of what was found within the shed had not been "transferred" from another place of manufacture. But that does not mean that this location, that is within the "rear shed", was not itself a place of manufacture. It was an ideal location. Secluded, on a large private property away from public gaze. The shed's contents may have represented an "inactive" manufacturing location, or a location for manufacture of prohibited drugs that had ceased to function as such, but the evidence is overwhelming that the process of manufacture of particular prohibited drugs as identified in the indictment had occurred within the shed. It is to be borne in mind that the processes identified within the shed may have existed there for up to 8 to 9 months before the police investigations in late September.
The evidence of Dr Coghlan was that the processes for manufacture of each of the prohibited drugs could only take hours, or up to a week to manufacture the MDMA. There was ample time for a number of processes to have occurred in respect of each of the prohibited drugs manufactured and for there to have even been a break of weeks or months between the last process and the police search.
I am unable to conclude how many processes of manufacture occurred in relation to a specific drug other than the fact there has been proven beyond reasonable doubt there was at least one process completed in relation to each of the three separate processes producing three separate prohibited drugs is particularised in Counts 1, 2 and 3.

Re: Count 1

With regard to Count 1 in the indictment, on the basis of Dr Coghlan's examinations, conclusions and related opinions, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that within the shed before the police search there had been undertaken a process of manufacture of methylamphetamine from ephedrine. This process involves the reaction of ephedrine with hypophosphorus acid and iodine.
By reference to the photographic evidence identified in his statement and in Exhibit A3 there was found from various items identified, and recovered from the "rear shed", the various chemical components required for the production of methylamphetamine, both within containers for the holding and/or handling of relevant chemicals and in containers or items directly concerned with the process of manufacture. There were also found various items that had attached to them or contained within them the prohibited drug methylamphetamine in distribution consistent with their presence being associated with a process of manufacture of that particular drug. This evidence was unchallenged in any event. A reflection of the fairness of the expert's assessment is that in his first report he left open a conclusion that there had been a manufacture of methylamphetamine from ephedrine consistent with quantity greater than an indictable quantity. The count I am considering alleges not less than an indictable quantity. The second expert report specifically addresses the precise quantities that can be calculated from the methylamphetamine and admixture located at the site, particularly in a plastic bag, a plastic jug, a plastic bottle, a plastic "cube" (like a container for water or petrol) and a plastic drum. By regard to the specific exhibits (that is the specific items photographed by investigating police and identified by the expert) the forensic chemist calculates the total amount of methylamphetamine present in the shed as 26.4g. That is based upon a calculation of the pure quantities of methylamphetamine after scientific measurement of the percentage of methylamphetamine within a particular substance or item including admixture. That finding is also unchallenged.

Re Count 2 - large commercial quantity

With regard to Count 2, again Dr Coghlan explained the process of manufacture of MDMA from Safrole, with the various steps leading to the production of MDMA and then various ways of extracting MDMA from the resultant admixture created by the process of manufacture. This evidence was not disputed and it need not be detailed. The forensic chemist concluded that this process of manufacture that is evidenced here involved the use of acetic acid, rather than formic acid, which is usually used. There was evidence of the presence of 11.226 kg of acetic acid, in a plastic container marked "Glacial Acetic", consistent with part of the contents of that container having been emptied. Further, in what he described as "Step Three" in the process of manufacture, there were alternative means of extracting MDMA from the chemical described as MD P2P. There was evidence of reducing agents, particularly aluminium and mercuric chloride, at the premises which can manufacture methylamine from nitromethane. There was also evidence of the presence of nitromethane in liquid of significant quantities within metal drums. Further there was evidence of the presence of manufactured MDMA in a plastic measuring jug, from swabs of stirring paddles and rods, a swab of a glass dish, a swab of a "pH meter pen" and from a sample of soil taken. MDMA was also found in various containers consistent with being recovered from a reaction mixture, including a bucket and a drum. Most importantly to the Crown case pleaded, it was found present in a 1000L hard plastic bulk or "IBC" container to which I have earlier referred which contained an "amber liquid" which was the basis for the calculation of a quantity of MDMA manufactured, from a percentage of the total mass of the contents. The quantity particularised to prove a "large commercial quantity" was located in that one container. There was also evidence of the existence of chemicals required for the purposes of extracting MDMA from liquid residue inside the "rear shed".
The forensic chemist concluded (at paragraph 15 of Exhibit A2), that the IBC container containing the amber fluid, which weighed 913,000g, contained 0.6% MDMA. His calculation was that that quantity amounted to 5.478 kg of MDMA, consistent with the size of the reaction vessel which is extensively photographed in Exhibit A4.
An important issue that arose in the course of the case was the question of whether the quantity of MDMA claimed by the Crown to be present in the 1000L container, which contained liquid waste product from a process of manufacture, was accurately measured or calculated.
The issue initially arose in the evidence of Dr Coghlan at first instance, requiring his recall and the calling of the Crime Scene Officer Steven Watton, who was the "lead" Crime Scene Officer at the inspection of the shed and related matters on 30 September 2017. He was assisted by two other Crime Scene Officers, Sarah Walker and Peter Lao. Of particular interest arising from Dr Coghlan's reports was the assessment of the contents of the IBC container referred to as 'BO45' in Exhibit A3, (the letter being a reference to where in the shed the container was found). The container was described by the Crime Scene team as an "IBC, 1000L container two thirds full of amber liquid" with a "brown sedimentary layer suspended in it". The evidence of Dr Coghlan on recall was that such a container of liquid, which he had not seen "in the flesh so to speak" but had seen from the photographs, needed to be "homogenised". That is, properly stirred up to enable a proper sample to be taken and that given the quantity of liquid it would also require more than one sample to be taken to get a "more accurate reading". The Crime Scene Officer who gave evidence did not "homogenise" the container, nor saw it being homogenised. Although he assumed that it had been. The Court cannot act upon assumptions in this situation. In any event however, his description of what was required to homogenise such a quantity did not accord with the more qualified expert, Dr Coghlan. The accused also gave evidence concerning the proper way to homogenise chemical mixtures in agriculture, not far distant from the effect of Dr Coghlan's evidence.
The Crime Scene Officer said that there were (or would have been) two samples taken, but one sample was taken to perform a presumptive test and the other was sent for analysis. It is quite clear from one of the witnesses specifically called on this topic that only one sample in a glass tube was tested for its purity of MDMA. The sampling and the evidence such as it is of the extent to which the containers contents were homogenised, is well below what could be relied upon for the purposes of being satisfied of the accuracy of the purity reading according to Dr Coghlan. Dr Coghlan specifically spoke of a number of samples required with such a volume of liquid. There was conflict in the evidence between the less qualified Crime Scene Officer and Dr Coghlan as to what was required to properly homogenise the contents of the container. The Crime Scene Officer thought a few minutes with an implement. Dr Coghlan believed a mechanical "stirring" over a much greater period of time. There is no evidence the Crime Scene Officers had the means to do the task properly. As I am required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is present a large commercial quantity, I could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the purity reading from which the quantity has been derived. Notwithstanding the submission of the prosecution as to a conservative re-calculation given the character of the liquid as waste, a determination as to weight of MDMA would be thereafter guesswork. It is likely that the quantity of MDMA was greater than the minimum required for a large commercial quantity. But of that I could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt without evidence of proper homogenising of such a large volume of liquid and adequate sampling being undertaken.

Re: Count 3 - Large commercial quantity

With regard to Count 3, and the prohibited drug identified as GBL, Dr Coghlan explained the process of manufacture of that prohibited drug from GABA. This is the process that he identifies as having taken place within the "rear shed" before the police search.
In respect of the process of manufacture of GBL it is also to be noted that an item found within the shed was a seven page typed document clearly setting out a "recipe" for the manufacture and production of GBL. Putting aside a personal note within the document in the first paragraph Dr Coghlan said that the content of the recipe could be found on the internet at a particular site he identified. This process involves the use of GABA, sodium nitrite and acid (such as hydrochloric acid). The evidence available is overwhelming to the presence of the relevant materials/chemicals required to produce GBL, the relevant equipment required to undertake that process of manufacture and the existence of residue or remnants of GBL consistent with past manufacture of that drug. The examination by police and the interpretation of that examination by the forensic chemist reveals quantities of "unaccounted" for chemicals that were used in the process of manufacture of GBL. The chemist observed from the search quantities of each of the relevant chemicals as well as relevant containers or production vessels that would be required to produce an estimated 7.9 kg of GBL.
When Dr Coghlan referred to "unaccounted" chemicals he was referring to packaging or containers for the relevant chemical found at the premises that were empty or interfered with consistent with use of the contents within the "rear shed". This evidence is to be considered in conjunction with the evidence of "manufactured" GBL. In relation to the manufacture of GBL he found evidence of 11.5 kg of sodium nitrite missing from what can be accepted as packaging for that particular chemical. I particularly note the fact that an unopened package of that chemical was found on the premises suggesting it was needed for a particular process of manufacture. Further there were empty packages of sufficient quantity of GABA (17.2 kg) needed, in company with 11.5 kg of sodium nitrite, to contribute to the chemical reaction leading to the manufacture of GBL, as described by the chemist. As well there was empty packaging or container for 20L of hydrochloric acid. This is essential to that process of manufacture. None of these chemicals could legitimately be used by the accused. In any event, he made no claim of ownership or use. The chemist further explained that to extract the GBL from the prepared solution (the drug being a liquid that is clear when separated from residue) it would have required for these quantities of ingredient, 220L of dichloromethane, a chemical that permits the separation of the GBL from the residue. There was found on the premises an empty 200L container of that chemical. All of these quantities of precursors are consistent with one process of manufacture sufficient to produce the yield estimated from the combination of unaccounted chemicals relevant to the process. That is, chemicals missing from their original packaging. This fact needs to be understood in the context of the existence of a process of manufacture with the relevant equipment being present to undertake that process as described by the forensic chemist. I accept the fact that there may be margin for error, with wastage, the expertise of the drug chemist unknown et cetera. The essential calculations of Dr Coghlan are not challenged. But the "prohibited drug chemist" or "cook," as such persons are sometimes described, had the type written "recipe" for the manufacture of GBL, which was found by police in the "rear shed" (Exhibit A3), to assist in the manufacture of GBL accurately. Having regard to what is a minimum quantity of a large commercial quantity, the evidence in the Crown case from the search, the recording and seizure of items, the examination by the forensic chemist and others and other matters detailed, they exclude the reasonable possibility that, having regard to the quantity of chemicals used, less than 4 kg of GBL was produced from the one process. I do not accept that there is a reasonable possibility that the "unaccounted" chemicals were used elsewhere or that they represent packaging that was interfered with or partly emptied elsewhere. The unused package of sodium nitrite contradicts that hypothesis in respect of the use of that particular precursor. The "rear shed" was the location of a "self-contained" process of manufacture.
It is to be borne in mind of course, consistent with what I have already said, that the manufactured drug was identified in a number of places including plastic vessels and drums associated with storage of the drug or associated with the process of manufacture. I note another chemical was found in conjunction with GBL which the forensic chemist was aware of but had not previously found in such a process of manufacture. This does not detract from or weaken the conclusion that the processed GBL found arose from a process of manufacture occurring on the premises. This conclusion of course takes into account the physical evidence of the location of various items within the shed associated with the process of manufacture of prohibited drugs including GBL.

"Knowingly take part in manufacture"

This requires drawing inferences as to the accused's knowledge and intentions beyond reasonable doubt.
These matters are to be considered and determined in the context of the following facts that I find established in the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt; 1. he had the means of access to the "rear shed", he had opportunity to visit the shed; 2. he permitted the use of the shed by the people or person who manufactured the drugs; 3. he and that person or persons, entered into some form of 'agreement' for the use of the shed; 4. he provided assistance in the use of a forklift to the 'lessee(s)' while the shed was "leased"; 5. the "rear shed" was a short walking distance from his residence and closer still to the bird cages where he worked frequently; 6. he held at all times one of the 2 keys for the padlock or lock for the shed; 7. he and his brother George had property inside and near the rear shed that was both valuable and might be used for time to time in tasks around the property, including caring for the accused's exotic birds; 8. in the absence of his father and brothers during 2017 he had the main responsibility for looking after that part of the property (the front third) not leased by Mr Calacoci; 9. he was aware of damage to grassed areas at the rear of the rear shed and to the west; 10. as at 29 September 2017 he was in possession of 15 empty containers or cans for the solvent "Shellite" which he knew could be used in the manufacture of prohibited drugs or a drug; 11. he was in financial difficulty from time to time during 2017.
I consider the accused's evidence as part of the totality of evidence in the case. I note the accused was under no obligation to give evidence, or give an interview to the police. The relationship of other evidence to the accused's account I consider below. Other facts were established arising from the accused's evidence, sometimes understood in conjunction with evidence in the Crown case, from admissions he made in relation to a number of matters.
The accused's evidence in chief touched upon a number of issues that I have already summarised in my overview of the case. The critical issues that arose from his evidence relevant to the specific matters relied upon by the Crown in respect of Counts 1 to 3 were; that he did not know there was a process of manufacture of prohibited drugs occurring in the "rear shed", he was not involved in supplying materials for any such process, nor did he permit such process to occur. His evidence was that from the time he leased the shed to the person he described to the police in the electronic interview on 3 January (at Q 195-260), he did not go into the "rear shed" until the time of the execution of the search warrant on 29 September 2017, or later.
The failure of the accused to remember the name of the person to whom he leased the shed at any time from 29 September 2017 until the present time is a critical matter for consideration. Then again he could have remained silent at all times and the Crown's case in my view could have proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis there was no reasonable possibility that his mother, his brothers or Mr Calacoci permitted the use of the shed for the process of manufacture therein. The accused's position on this matter was not aided by him not being able to produce the details that person supplied him in the form of the "agreement" he said that had been entered and/or the documents of identification that person provided to him. It may be possible that he lost those papers but it seemed an unlikely situation that he had no memory of the man. That he could not remember those details when the police arrived on 29 September 2017 is one thing, but considering he was interviewed extensively about the matter over three months later it is quite clear that he had made no effort to remember the name. He was not "trying to" in any event. Because he must have known at least one name. He told the police that he believed the relevant documents may be on the mobile phone that they had seized on 29 or 30 September 2017. This claim was untrue, but that is relevant only to the assessment of his credibility.
He obviously was at least mistaken at least as to which phone he was referring to. The evidence establishes that the accused only a few days before the police search (on 26/09/2017) had pawned the mobile phone (see Exhibit D) upon which it would be most likely that he had recorded the details of the agreement and the identification of the "lessee". That phone was seized by police on 4 October 2017 and after examination it held no record of those documents. Despite the fact the accused claimed that he took a lot of photographs and that he used his phone, or its capacity to record information, as a "diary" he made no record of the claimed documentation. Neither had the accused taken the time to record in his "contacts" on that phone the name and telephone number of the person to whom he had leased the "rear shed", despite the fact that the "agreement" must have had some of that information on it on the accused's version of the character of the "agreement". The Crown submits that the notion of a formal agreement in the manner described by the accused was a fabrication on the part of the accused, but there may have been some arrangement agreed to by the parties. This matter has to be considered by reference to the accused's account. On the accused's account he had no record or copy of the agreement that he entered into, yet he was able to retain and photograph (albeit on a different phone of more recent ownership) the letter from his brother warning of police investigations. He recorded many things on his phone to do with his daily life including photographing at the home of an "associate" the cans of 'Shellite'. It turned out that this friend of another "friend" (Joe Khoury) was well-known to the accused (that is "Johnny" Chaloub) for a period of over a year before the police search and for at least 5 months before he was given the 'Shellite' cans.
The claim that the phone seized from him by police on 30 September 2017 may have had a record of the agreement and related document of identification could not be true because that phone was only used by him on one day (30/09) and that was after the police commenced their search. He could not have found the relevant documents after the police commenced their search on 29 September 2017 then lost them again after 30 September 2017. He made no such claim. The documents he spoke of were not located on that phone either.
On examination of the account he gave to police on 3 January 2018 and his evidence in this trial it is quite clear that his lack of relevant memory or lack of recording of relevant information is, from his perspective, a very convenient situation. It is clear that he did not tell the truth to interviewing police about the circumstances of renting the shed. He told the interviewing police that the man who rented the shed had "just turned up" when he was mowing the lawn at his house one day. He said, "he just rocked up and… introduced himself. He said he is looking to rent out some storage… And then he said "I noticed you have some sheds… here… Would you be interested in renting one of them out for storage"?(Q195-200). He later said in the interview that the person said he was going to, "store equipment in there" but that he didn't ask what sort of equipment, "I didn't ask and he didn't say"… "I just said to him, "is it anything illegal?" And he said "no no"… And that's it… And the guy looked… presentable and respectable and I had no reason to doubt….. I was in a position where I could, I could use some money, so I saw it as an opportunity" (Q 239 - 244). He also said that the man agreed to pay $800 a month and that he paid one month's rent of $800, "but all I ever received was one month's worth (of rent)". (Q 208 - 211). He did not contact him about the outstanding rent. He said he (the accused) just, "hung around just waiting for him" (and he) "couldn't actually ring him". He wasn't sure of the period of time that he owed rent for. He said it was, "probably, a month or two" (Q212 -216).
At every level this version to police was implausible. He also said in his interview to police that he didn't try too hard to track him down having received the payment of rent for one month on time. It made no sense that he would not chase up the rent, bearing in mind his self-admitted dire financial position evidenced by him pawning his phone for $300 a few days before the police visited. Also noting he had no employment and was involved in very small time drug (cannabis) supply during September 2017. It turned out that in his evidence he admitted his account in the interview was untruthful.
As to the "true" circumstances of renting the "rear shed" he told the Court that he had rented the shed in the knowledge that it was to store consumables and various items of crockery, that he may have been owed money for rent for a period of up to 8 months, that he in fact could have been paid for more than one month, but was uncertain because "it was a long time ago" and that the person that signed the lease was not "a complete stranger".
He gave evidence that he in fact met that person through another person. Having put out "the word" through an associate that he wanted to lease part of the premises. When pressed in relation to these inconsistencies and recent inventions it was quite clear, as the Crown suggested to the accused, that he was making things up as he went along on this issue to try and explain away self-evident contradictions and inadequate explanations given for his lack of knowledge of the identity of the person who rented the "rear shed".
The transcript of the exchange between the Crown and the accused during cross-examination between pages 500-512, is very illustrative of his obfuscation and "unreliable memory". For example, as summarised above when the Crown Prosecutor was cross-examining him upon the answers he gave to the police in the electronic interview (Exhibit L and L1) regarding the circumstances of meeting the person who rented the "rear shed", he was asked by the Crown whether this person was a "total stranger". The accused replied, "virtually"…. "Not a complete stranger" (P 500 L6-11). This was the first time he had suggested that the person was not "unknown" to him. He could only remember the person who had referred the "lessee" to him in the vaguest terms, stating that he lived in the "Parramatta" area, without being able to identify a name or specific suburb. Either this was a recent invention or a deliberate attempt to distance himself from the people or persons responsible for activities in the shed.
If his evidence about his knowledge of the person renting the shed was untruthful or unreliable that was a matter in my view that displayed a consciousness of guilt because it was a central matter to his claim of disinterest in who the person was that rented the shed and what that person did, distancing himself from the occurrences in the "rear shed". At the very least, it reflected adversely upon his credibility in relation to his explanation for the renting of the shed and his knowledge of what was proposed to done inside the shed by the lessee. The accused did offer some explanations for confusion or a lack of memory on his part of key details as to the identity of the person who leased the shed, his explanations for the use of the shed and the inability of the accused to contact that person or provide details about him. He referred to the ill-health of his father, difficulties in a past relationship from which a child was born in 2012, his drug use, arguments he was having with his brothers and other matters. I do not accept any of these matters as providing any form of explanation for his convenient lapses of memory and the recent inventions in his evidence in the trial, or the contradictions between the account he gave the police in early 2018 and his evidence in the trial.
As earlier noted he recorded many things on his phone to do with his daily life including photographing at the home of an "associate", cans of 'Shellite'. It turned out that this friend of another friend (Joe Khoury) was well-known to the accused ("Johnny" Chaloub) for a period of over a year before the police search and for at least 5 months before he was given the 'Shellite' cans.
In his interview on 3 January 2018 he stated that he had not smelt chemicals coming from the shed until the police had opened up the shed on executing the warrant (Q256-260). This representation was untrue as he admitted in the trial. He also admitted that his claim of not knowing the name of the man who gave him the 'Shellite' containers was untrue. He gave evidence that he had in fact smelt chemicals coming from the shed when he received a letter from his brother telling him that police were investigating the manufacture of drugs on the property (about 3 weeks to a month before the police search) and, he went down to the shed to check it out. The person who gave him these cans was not someone unknown to him.
I point out, in the context of the assessment of his evidence in the trial, that in relation to a number of matters in cross-examination he admitted that he told lies to the investigating police either to protect others or to protect himself from others. He claimed that some lies were told because of fear of retribution from the person called "Johnny" (Chaloub (sic)). I do not believe those claims. They reflect adversely upon his credibility. They sit at odds with the extent of contact the accused had with "Johnny", the actions the accused admitted he took on behalf the person and particular messages sent to his friend Joe Khoury, which show amongst other things, a willingness to work "all night" either for "Johnny" or in some way connected with his interests and to travel up to his farm at a remote location well outside of Lithgow towards Mudgee at a place called Boogee (see Exhibit M3). As pointed out earlier, this is the person that the accused claimed he had obtained the empty 'Shellite' canisters or containers (15 in all) intending that they provide storage for fuel. This relationship was further exposed by the production of Exhibit R1; messages between the accused and "Johnny" for over a year before the police search. In that respect he claimed to have only known Johnny for "about" 8 or 9 months, meeting him through Khoury about the time of getting the 'Shellite' cans. I pointed out to him a message of a very friendly and personal nature from September 2016, months before he claimed he met him. He deliberately sought to misrepresent the character of this relationship in the context of a suspicion that "Johnny" was associated with the process of manufacture that this trial was concerned with.
Another significant matter withheld from investigating police, and only revealed in the course of his evidence in the trial, although to be fair it emerged in his evidence in chief, was the fact that his brother George had written to him in either "July" or "three or four weeks" before the police search (depending upon which version one accepts from the accused in his oral evidence), advising him of a police investigation of drug manufacture or production on the property and that his brother would be "disgusted" if he discovered that the accused was involved (Exhibit 1). This caused the accused to make his enquiries by going down to the "rear shed" but not going into the "rear shed" to investigate further. He admitted in evidence smelling a chemical smell (as earlier pointed out contrary to his account to the investigating police), but did nothing further. He had a key that unlocked the padlock or the lock for entry to the "rear shed". He said that there was only one other key to the "rear shed" when police executed the search warrant on 29 September 2017. That key was given to the "lessee" of the shed. The key in the possession of the accused gave the police access to the interior of the "rear shed" where the relevant processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs were discovered. The accused, before the police search, had the means to enter the shed. But on his own version he did not use them notwithstanding smelling "a chemical smell" and being put on notice by his brother of the police investigation. The terms of that letter emerged in cross examination when the prisoner revealed for the first time that he was in possession of the letter. It was in fact "stored" on his mobile phone in Court. I will deal with this matter later.
I understand the argument that having been put on notice by his brother of a police investigation if he had something to hide he would have done something about it. But on the other hand, bearing in mind the police had not attended upon the property, given that he said he waited 7-10 days before reading the letter after receipt, he just as equally could have been comfortable with the thought that, notwithstanding what his brother had written there was nothing for him to worry about. The reality is that having been put on notice by his brother, if in fact he was unaware of the manufacture of prohibited drugs inside the "rear shed", it is highly unlikely that he would go down to the shed, smell chemicals, but then do nothing about searching inside the shed. Not conducting any form of proper investigation (or possibly not doing anything at all) is entirely consistent in my view with him knowing that there was a process of manufacture of prohibited drugs inside the "rear shed" or permitting it to continue to occur and that there was nothing for him to investigate. His claim of going down there in response to his brother's letter and conducting the investigation that he admitted in his evidence in this Court. I cannot accept as truthful. I cannot accept his claims that these various worries and problems that he outlined in some way clouded his judgment or prevented him from taking action that he thought about, on his evidence in the trial, but chose not to take, that is contacting the police. If he had nothing to hide arising from a lack of knowledge of the purpose of the lease of the shed he had nothing to lose from getting in contact with the police to tell them about at least the chemical smell and invite an investigation. He was a person, at the time, with no criminal convictions.
As it turned out, on the second day of cross-examination with the cooperation of the accused, the letter was produced to the Court that the accused said came from his current mobile phone, an iPhone 8 that he has had for approximately 5 or 6 months before he gave evidence. It is clear on his evidence that he had not shown this document to his current legal representatives and thus they were unaware of its existence at the time of him giving evidence. In the context of the evidence of Senior Constable Saege, whose statement was read without objection early in the trial, I accept that officer contacted the accused's brother George in April 2017. Exhibit 1, the letter produced by the accused from George to the accused (it is addressed to "Joe" but is undated) opens with the typed words: "I received a call from a senior constable (sic) at Hornsby police station last week asking for permission to enter the farm and search the shed" (emphasis added).
The accused in evidence on the same day, but before the letter was produced to the court, had sought to in my view to deliberately downplay or minimise the period of time that he had to react to the letter from his brother of which he spoke about the day before. He suggested that when he received a letter he had not opened it for "a week or 10 days" in the context of receiving the letter three or four weeks before the police search. I do not accept the accused's evidence of when he received the letter. The terms of the letter suggests that it was written, and I believe I can safely assume sent, either in April or early May. Even allowing for the fact that it was sent from Perth and that would take some little time to get to Sydney, it seems clear, particularly having regard to the accused's recent inventions and prevarications in relation to this very issue, and his deliberate attempt in my view to downplay the significance of the letter, that he received the letter much earlier than he claimed in his evidence.
At Q 352 and following of Exhibit L1, the accused did volunteer that he had "spoken" to his brother George after the police officer suggested in a question that police from Hornsby had contacted his brother George in "July 2017". I have taken into account this inconsistency. But in light of the statement of Senior Constable Seage, I regard his evidence as more reliable than the hearsay representation in the question asked by the interviewing police officers on 3 January 2018 in Exhibit L. In any event, as cross-examination made clear, the accused gave an account that in material respects contradicted his evidence both as to the nature of his communication with his brother and as to his reaction to that communication. His evidence suggests a closer inspection of the shed (although he did not enter it) than he volunteered to the interviewing police in the interview. Neither version is acceptable. All these matters are assessed on the basis of reflecting adversely on his credibility in relation to the central issue for determination in relation to Counts 1- 3.
The cross examination demonstrated in a range of ways that the accused in the course of the police interview sought to distance himself deliberately from matters that could potentially implicate him in the activities the subject of the police investigation of which he was fully aware. It is to be borne in mind that at the time of the interview he was aware of the police search of the premises on the 29th and 30th of September, his then mobile phone had been seized by the police, as had many items located in the course of the police investigation, yet he was not interviewed for over three months after those searches. This was ample time for him to reflect upon the situation if, in fact, police were to question him about the matter, which he must have expected after the discoveries in late September 2017. It might be said that his greater exposition of his knowledge in a range of ways, as reflected in his evidence, is a measure of his honesty. He said on a number of occasions that if there were differences between his interview with the police and his evidence in the trial the reason was that he was giving evidence "on oath". I note that explanation. But as earlier outlined and as demonstrated for example in relation to this matter, when confronted with inconsistencies between versions, or when confronted with difficulties that arose from the evidence he gave in the court as they relate to his claimed lack of knowledge of the "people" who leased the shed, or in relation to matters relating to his awareness of "their" activities, he was most unconvincing as a witness.
Whilst on some matters he was a confident witness, but on issues directly concerned with whether he had knowledge of matters relevant to Counts 1-3 he prevaricated, did not answer questions directly, sometimes he rambled with explanations that were not worthy of acceptance. A very good example of that was his totally unacceptable explanation for his friendly text messages to "Johnny" reflected in Exhibit R1 which in tone contradicted his claims of being threatened and intimidated by that person in the months before. The so called threats of which he claimed he was fearful, when explained in re-examination, were not threats at all, but merely expressions of undirected anger. He provided no realistic basis for being fearful of "Johnny" or being in his thrall.
Returning to Exhibit 1, the tone of the letter suggests a degree of urgency and seriousness of the situation. Bearing in mind on the accused's own version he had not seen the people or person who leased the "rear shed" from him for some time, bearing in mind in his evidence he conceded that he could smell a chemical smell coming from inside the shed, bearing in mind that he had a key that could gain access to the shed, bearing in mind he was owed rent money and his dire financial situation; his failure to enter the shed and inspect the interior, on his version, is unbelievable conduct, unless he knew what was going on in the shed. Amongst other reasons, not having been in the shed for some months, the smell of chemicals that he was unfamiliar with should have alerted him to the need for some inspection to assure the safety of his own property and that of his brother George within the shed. He left many things in the shed when it was leased on the understanding that they would not be used on his version. There was also the safety of the shed itself. The accused in fact had taken the trouble of photographing the interior of the "rear shed" in mid-January 2017 as a record of what property he had within it prior to the shed being leased. There appears in that photograph to be quite a lot of valuable property. His evidence was that the agreement that he claimed he had in writing, which he had misplaced, in part dealt with the protection of his property within the shed.
The re-examination of the accused did not enhance the accused's credibility. In fact it detracted from it. For example, when re-examined about the failure to tell the police that he went down to the shed after the letter from his brother and he smelt a chemical smell, he said that one of the reasons he didn't tell the police the truth was because of what he described as possible "repercussions". He could not however tell the court what those "repercussions" were, other than "just getting in trouble, getting in trouble with the people renting the place". I pointed out to him that the interview was entirely private and in any event it was highly unlikely that the police would disclose to 3rd parties the detail of his interview, given the fact that they had no information as to who were the people or who was the person who had rented the "rear shed". It would seem even at this time three years later the police are unable to identify those persons. When asked about why he did not check on the "chemical smell" given the fact that he had personal property there he gave a most unconvincing explanation both in content and manner (P5 66 line 24-31).
As I pointed out earlier he also endeavoured in re-examination to distance himself from the man "Johnny", in my view deliberately seeking to paint a picture of a relationship of relatively short duration. He told me in re-examination that he had known "Johnny Chaloub (sic)".. "Eight, nine months" before September 2017. An exhibit produced in cross-examination of the accused (Exhibit R1) showed friendly communication on a knowing basis from "Johnny Lebanon" in September 2016, which the accused accepted was from the same "Johnny"". The message in its terms reflected an existing "friendship" or "relationship" at that time. The accused at every opportunity sought to either downplay the extent of his relationship with "Johnny", or he sought to justify the continuing relationship on the basis that he had been threatened and intimidated by that person because that person was a person whose moods changed dramatically. The accused volunteered that he believed the man had been diagnosed with "ADHD" when he was a child. As the Crown ably demonstrated in cross-examination of the accused by reference to Exhibit R1, there are was nothing intimidatory or threatening in any of the communications between the accused and "Johnny" between 2016 and at least July 2017. Nor, in fact, in Exhibit M3. The accused's messages were friendly and accommodating showing no reluctance to communicate or to assist. Likewise, the communications from "Johnny" were consistent with a friendly relationship. The accused sought to claim that religious texts sent by Johnny to the accused reflected his mood swings. When asked to demonstrate how that was so by reference to the text he was unable to do so. All those messages demonstrated, was Johnny's deep religiosity and a determination to communicate that to the accused.
Another feature of the evidence of the accused, supported by material produced in the Crown case, such as the various items shown in Exhibits A3 and A4, was that a large number of items belonging to the accused or at some point under the control of the accused which had been used in the various processes of manufacture. These included containers, measuring implements and drums. Of course, it is not essential to the Crown case to establish that the accused voluntarily permitted any chattels of his to be used in the process of manufacture. But the widespread use of various items belonging to him stands at odds with the claimed agreement with the lessee of the "rear shed" that the accused's personal property would not be interfered with by the lessee.
There is also the central issue of the initial claim of the accused that only one person approached him for the purposes of leasing the "rear shed". Frequently he referred to the "people" using the "rear shed" both in his interview with the police (Exhibit L) and in his evidence. In that regard the accused's initial position was effectively that from the time the shed was leased he did not see or have any contact with the lessee or lessees. Mr Calacoci saw 2 strangers standing outside the shed during daylight hours in April/May 2017. They appeared "Mediterranean" in appearance. He also, as earlier pointed out, claimed initially that he was only paid one month's rent (although that changed to "possibly" another month's rent during his evidence). Although the accused's evidence about the commencement of the lease is extremely rubbery it is open to conclude based upon photographs taken by the accused (dated by metadata from the accused's phone) and some concessions by the accused in his evidence that the lease of the "rear shed" commenced as early as January 2017 .
The accused's account is that he was both ignorant of, and disinterested in, what the lessee was doing with the "rear shed". In this regard Mr Calacoci gave some important evidence. He had an agreement related to his leasehold of the rear hothouses that he had access to a forklift which apparently was owned by the accused's family. There is evidence that the forklift in effect went missing at some point in 2017, while the "rear shed" was "leased", and that Mr Calacoci had to chase it up and almost demand its return on the basis that the accused's borrowing of the forklift was so unreasonable that he, Mr Calacoci, was not prepared to allow the accused to "borrow" the forklift again. This occurred as I understand the oral evidence in April/May 2017. In fact there is objective evidence of demands made for the return of the forklift from the accused by that lessee in May 2017. The accused in his interview with the police on 3 January 2018 admitted agreeing to a request by the unnamed lessee of the "rear shed" to borrow the forklift from a note that was left in the accused's letterbox. The accused claimed that he left a note on the door of the "rear shed" requesting from the lessee, the return of the forklift to Mr Calacoci, consistent with the evidence of that man that he was frustrated with the failure to return the forklift.
It seems very strange that bearing in mind the accused lived in a house barely 50 m or so from the "rear shed", making allowance for his claim that he spent a lot of time away from home staying in other people's houses such as his girlfriend's and the like, that the accused did not seek out the lessee of the rear shed personally to arrange the return of the forklift. Then, of course, there is the issue of what purpose was served by the lessee of the "rear shed" borrowing a forklift given what the accused claimed to police and this Court were the different explanations given to him by the lessee for the use of the "rear shed". That is, "consumables" or "crockery" or the like. This reflects in part the lack of credibility in the accused's evidence on the critical issues. There is evidence from the accused's drug dealing in cannabis (Exhibits J, J1) that he was not immune from staying up all hours of the night. If the "rear shed" was being used only at night, then he had the capacity to be aware of this either by reason of his nocturnal activities and/or his proximity to the shed.
There is the issue of the damage done on the western side of the property by unidentified chemicals, but consistent with waste chemicals from the processes of drug manufacture going on in the "rear shed". The suggestion was put to the accused that in fact that damage done to the grassed area to the west of the "rear shed", which in the aerial photographs is very noticeable and quite extensive, had been occasioned by the use of the forklift to dump waste material out of a large container such as the IBC containers that can be seen in a photograph taken by the accused in January 2017 in the "rear shed". They are identical to the "IBC" container in which was found the waste holding the quantity of MDMA relevant to Count 2. I asked the accused had he noticed that damage. He said whilst it was very noticeable with the aerial photographs, on the ground he did not notice it, notwithstanding at various times he had crops of 'taro' growing adjacent to the area. Mr Calacoci who had no direct interest in that area noticed it. I accept that the accused by reason of his family relationships and growing up on the property was a person well familiar with the processes of agriculture for which the property was used. The lessee of the hothouses told the Court that when he took over them the accused was very helpful in setting up the system of cultivation of cucumbers above the ground in a range of ways. In the context of his father being in a nursing home, his brothers living away from the farm, one would have thought, given the accused's familiarity with the use of the property, that he would be very astute to identify any damage to areas of the property that were cultivatable as no doubt that area was. In my view, as he did in so many instances, the accused sought on this matter to downplay or even deny knowledge of events occurring on the property that were associated with the manufacture of prohibited drugs, both within the shed and outside the shed.
There was as well, the evidence of damage to the grassed area on the northern side of the "rear shed" about which the accused was not perturbed, but clearly had been caused at the relevant time by the escape of contaminated liquid from inside the "rear shed" with no known explanation at the time. Mr Calacoci saw liquid coming from a hose that came out of the shed consistent with damaging the relevant area. Soil in that area was tested and was found to have MDMA in it.
Whenever an issue arose as to matters that might be expected to be within the knowledge of the accused about the activities in the "rear shed" or around the "rear shed" by the so-called "lessee" who, on one version, just appeared "out of the blue" and approached the accused while he was "mowing the lawn", the accused in his evidence and of course in his less inculpatory interview with the police, either sought to distance himself, feign ignorance or, as he clearly did when confronted with his admission of smelling chemicals in the "rear shed" having been put on notice of a police investigation into activities within the "rear shed", effectively "washed his hands of it". Indicating that he did not want to find out what was happening for fear of being implicated in "something". This last fall-back position in explaining his conduct, as he articulated in his evidence, reflected the fact that he did know what was going on inside the shed and not being able to do anything about removing the evidence, wanted to pretend that there was nothing there or that he should not involve himself. Obviously the accused did not have an understanding of the wide definition of "taking part in the manufacture of prohibited drugs" provided for in s.6 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, 1985. The issue of the relevance of "wilful blindness" to proof of guilt was not raised by either party so has not been considered.
In relation to the issue of untruths or lies told by the accused both out of Court and in Court there were quite a number, many of them significant in the context of the Crown case against the accused in respect of the issue of him "knowingly taking part" in the various processes of manufacture. As I point out at the end of this judgment not everything said by the accused was untruthful and there are a number of things said by him relevant to each of the charges that I accept. In part, in relation to counts 1 to 3, because he made a number of representations out of Court and in his evidence that were relevantly 'admissions' in respect of facts in issue in the case, although not necessarily wholly inculpatory.
Of the various matters identified by the Crown the three particular lies told by the accused in his record of interview I earlier identified could well qualify each in themselves as evidence of consciousness of guilt in the manner in which I have directed myself. But, I act upon them as being relevant only to the assessment of the credibility of the accused's account specifically in relation to relevant knowledge and awareness of matters concerning Counts 1 to 3.
There were some particular matters referred to in the Crown's address arising out of the evidence that I could not conclude were relevant lies. Whilst I do not accept the accused's evidence that he was in some way intimidated by "Johnny" I cannot conclude that he is untruthful when he denies that he rang Recochem, a chemical company capable of providing chemicals that could be precursors in the manufacture of particular prohibited drugs, or of a particular prohibited drug, despite the fact that there is evidence of a voice call being made to that business on the accused's phone in early May 2017. The accused's explanation as to the circumstances of the call is unlikely, given evidence that contradicts his claims as to the nature of his relationship with "Johnny", which I refer to elsewhere. But, in the circumstances, even rejecting his explanation, it may be that his phone was used by another person, even "Johnny", with his permission in circumstances where the accused was not aware of the character of the call.
As to out of Court and "in" Court lies on the same topic, the claim of the accused that he did not know the name of the person to whom he leased the shed, even the first name, is a claim that must be untrue for reasons I have set out above in part. The untruthfulness of that claim made on a number of occasions is further shown by the change in the accused's account of how it was that he came to first deal with the person who leased the shed. The vague references to a "person" or "people" in the same context, although not critical, to my mind confirms knowledge about the person or persons renting the shed more than the accused is prepared to disclose. In relation to this particular lie, that he does not know the name of the person who leased the shed (accompanied by a very vague and general description of that person inconsistent with having met the person, discussed the terms of the arrangement, and then entering into or settling an agreement with that person supported by documentations of identification), I conclude it is a deliberate lie (told repeatedly). It is relevant to the offences the Crown alleges the accused committed in relation to Counts 1 to 3 in respect of a significant circumstance connected with the alleged offences. It is a "lie" told because the accused feared that telling the truth might reveal his guilt in respect of the charges, it was told because he feared the truth of his knowledge of the identity of the person would implicate him in the commission of the offence for which he is now on trial. This is primarily so, apart from its real significance in the scheme of things, because the accused's position throughout has effectively been (to paraphrase his account): "I rented the shed to a person I didn't know and what he did after that I was disinterested in because he was a person with whom I had no connection and had no reason to be aware or familiar with his personal affairs". In other words, not knowing who the person was and having no connection with him was a justification for not making any enquiry about what he was doing in the shed because what he did was of no interest to the accused. Furthermore, not knowing who "he" was prevented the accused providing information that might lead the authorities to that person. If it was true it prevented the accused chasing up substantial rent owing, which is unlikely given his financial position.
I have considered the issue of whether the lie was told to prevent an unintended consequence or out of fear of retribution or repercussions. But I conclude that the accused's determination to maintain this lie, in the face of a strong Crown case and with no valid reason not to know a name, is a determined attempt to avoid implication, rather than avoid retribution.
One of the interesting features of the position of the accused about this matter is the fact, as he demonstrated emotionally in evidence when he discussed his father's health, that as the only son living on the property, I am assuming living with his parents most of his life (he certainly had never been in gaol before with no prior convictions), he claimed to be disinterested as to what was going on in the "rear shed" clearly at the risk of peril to his mother's welfare and the safety of the property. Drug laboratories are inherently unsafe. Explosions, fires, chemical spills (as occurred here) are commonplace. Having regard to the DNA evidence, the character of the equipment that must have been introduced to the "rear shed" (that is, not already there when the agreement was entered) and the character of the processes of manufacture would have required the work of at least more than one person from time to time.
The movements of these people, or this person, even at night could not have occurred without notice. The accused said he did not see any people coming and going, but Mr Calacoci saw two men who were strangers to him in the vicinity of the "rear shed" consistent with their connection to an ongoing or impending process of manufacture. They were there it would seem at the time that the accused was seen to enter the shed. Yet, the accused possessed no information or memory to explain their presence. The accused's account is, in effect, that he was oblivious to the activities within the "rear shed" and thus the comings and goings from the shed and activities related to the processes of manufacture such as the disposal of waste chemicals, or waste materials containing a prohibited drug, as occurred in the area to the west of the "rear shed" and at the rear of the "rear shed". This oblivious attitude of the accused sits at odds with the financial arrangement he made, on his version, the absence of proper payment to fulfil the agreement and the personal interest the accused must have had for the welfare of his family and his family's property. Also, his family had a commercial arrangement with Mr Calacoci which might have been imperilled by tell-tale signs such as what he claimed to be the smell of unusual "chemicals" coming from the shed, when he claimed he made the one visit to it to enquire as to what was going on. That account is frankly an unlikely account, because nothing he did afterwards is consistent with what he said he observed. His claim of not observing the damage to the land to the western side of the shed given photographic evidence of damage to that area well before the police executed the search warrant, in my view, is untruthful given the interest the accused must have had in the property. That is an issue only relevant to credibility of the accused's evidence.
With regard to his lack of interest in the goings-on around the "rear shed" I note that in closer proximity to it, than his own home were the bird cages I earlier described, approximately 25 to 30 metres from the "rear shed", with very expensive exotic birds which on his own account he visited regularly because of his considerable interest in their welfare and their considerable value to him. Although I could not conclude that he was at the property every day, it is quite clear that he had a much greater attachment to the property than he was prepared to concede given the need for him on a regular basis to care for the birds and attend to some of his smaller scale agricultural pursuits, such as growing taro in the area adjacent to where the burnt grass was shown in the aerial photographs taken by the police. Further, his lack of action on his claimed smelling of chemicals on the one occasion that he admitted visiting the shed for an inspection is difficult to understand, if the inspection occurred, given the potential risk to the welfare of his birds by those chemicals. Though I note this latter aspect of the matter was not the subject of questioning of him.
Even if the specific lie as to the identity of the 'lessee' I have identified is not available as evidence of consciousness of guilt, there are so many significant untruths told by the accused that in respect of central issues as to his denial of what the Crown's case otherwise is capable of proving, that the accused's denials of relevant matters are devoid of credibility. Only one person, having regard to all the other evidence, could have, at the very least, permitted the use of the "rear shed" for the purpose of manufacturing drugs and that was the accused. The suggestion that it is a reasonable possibility that other people were responsible with a connection with the property is without foundation and contrary to the accused's own admissions.
The accused's possession of a large quantity of "Shellite" containers links him to knowledge of the activities in the "rear shed". That he was to use them for an "innocent purpose" is neither here nor there. He told a deliberate lie to investigating police about the identity of the source of the cans and then lied to this Court as to the character of his relationship with that person as the Crown demonstrated in cross-examination. There is a probability that the containers came from the "rear shed". But the evidence by itself, or in conjunction with other evidence, is not sufficient to show that the accused physically took part in the manufacture of prohibited drugs. His purchase of plastic containers and a measuring jug to my mind is coincidental. They may have been used without the accused's permission.
In assessing the accused's credibility I have taken into account his "good character" as I have in relation to the issue of the likelihood of him having committed all and/or each of the offences charged. I have also taken into account the absence of potentially incriminating evidence in the house (apart from the "Shellite" cans which were not hidden) such as prohibited drugs, the subject of manufacture in the "rear shed". Further, although not raised in submissions, I have taken into account the absence of any evidence of "enrichment" or "indicia" of commercial supply of prohibited drugs in the possession of the accused.

Re: Count 4

I am satisfied the accused has discharged the onus upon him (s 29 DMT) and established on balance that the drugs were in his possession for purposes other than supply.
He maintained that he had obtained the cannabis for free, that it was of poor quality, that he had discarded it either in or outside the "rear shed" a short time after bringing it to the property about a year before the police search and that he had no intention of selling it or giving it to others. He said that in fact he had forgotten about it. In September 2017 when he was supplying cannabis to other people, as indicated by the telephone intercepts (Exhibit J), he said that cannabis was of a higher quality. Thus he did not consider it as something he could supply to others when he could not obtain cannabis from other sources. As to the quality of the cannabis, the botanist who issued the Analyst's Certificate (Exhibit O2), Mr Indsto, gave the contents of the bag a proper examination and was satisfied, having taken a representative sample for testing, that the cannabis was in an homogenous state, and although dry, had not deteriorated in quality. He said that it would take only several days to dry cannabis. He accepted that it was a "low grade" of drug by comparison to "head" or "floral structures". He accepted that leaf cannabis has a lower active ingredient than that found in cannabis "heads". Given the accused's personal use of cannabis (also reflected in Exhibit J) the failure to take the opportunity to use the cannabis leaf when he had the discussions about supplying cannabis to others is consistent with it not being considered appropriate for supply. I appreciate claiming that he "forgot" about it may be ostensibly inconsistent with this position. But given the quantity, that he may have forgotten about it reflected the low esteem in which it was held and/or the circumstances in which he claimed that he gained possession of it; ie. it was given away because it was not valuable or prized.
This reasoning, of course, reflects acceptance of parts of the accused's evidence. I am entitled to accept some and reject other parts of the accused's evidence, as I may, on rational grounds, with any witness. The reality is that the cannabis allegation is a far less serious charge than the other charges and it seems to the Court, having regard to the manner of giving evidence, that the accused realises that.

CONCLUSION

I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all the elements required to be established by the Crown in relation to Counts 1 and 3 have been established. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused provided the premises in which processes of manufacture of prohibited drugs occurred and permitted any such step in that process be taken in those premises (the "rear shed") in respect of which he participated in its management. I propose to find the accused "guilty" of those counts.
In respect of Count 2, whilst I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, on the same basis as set out above, knowingly took part in the manufacture of the prohibited drug MDMA. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown has established the manufacture of a large commercial quantity of the prohibited drug MDMA. Pursuant to s.24 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, 1985 I propose to find the accused "guilty" of an alternative charge available under the Act, of knowingly take part in the manufacture of not less than an indictable quantity of the prohibited drug MDMA, which is not less than 1.25g and not greater than 125g. In this regard I note the mathematics of Counsel for the accused and referencing the purity of MDMA in other waste products as demonstrating, given the volume of the material in the 1000L "IBC" container, that there must have been more than 1.25g of MDMA within that waste material. I have considered whether the evidence permits the finding of guilt in relation to a charge of taking part in the manufacture of a commercial quantity of the prohibited drug MDMA. However, the unsatisfactory state of the evidence relating to the sampling from the 1000 litre IBC container does not permit me to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the quantity of the prohibited drug was greater than 125g but less than 500g. I propose to find the accused "not guilty" of Count 4.

         Date        Tendering Party  Tendered Through        Description

EXHIBIT No. Tendered A1 06/10/2020 Crown A2 06/10/2020 Crown A3 08/10/2020 Crown A4 08/10/2020 Crown B 06/10/2020 Crown B1 06/10/2020 Crown C 06/10/2020 Crown C1 06/10/2020 Crown C2 06/01/2020 Crown D 06/10/2020 Crown E 06/10/2020 Crown E1 08/10/2020 Crown F 06/10/2020 Crown G 07/10/2020 Crown G1 07/10/2020 Crown G2 07/10/2020 Crown G3 07/10/2020 Crown H1 08/10/2020 Crown H2 08/10/2020 Crown H3 08/10/2020 Crown H4 08/10/2020 Crown H5 08/10/2020 Crown J 09/10/2020 Crown J1 09/10/2020 Crown K 09/10/2020 Crown L 09/10/2020 Crown L1 09/10/2020 Crown L2 09/10/2020 Crown M 12/10/2020 Crown M1 12/10/2020 Crown M2 12/10/2020 Crown M3 12/10/2020 Crown M4 12/10/2020 Crown M5 12/10/2020 Crown M6 13/10/2020 Crown N 12/10/2020 Crown O 13/10/2020 Crown O1 13/10/2020 Crown O2 13/10/2020 Crown O3 13/10/2020 Crown P 13/10/2020 Crown P1 13/10/2020 Crown P2 13/10/2020 Crown Q 13/10/2020 Crown R 15/10/2020 Crown R1 15/10/2020 Crown S 16/10/2020 Crown T 16/10/2020 Crown Expert certificate of Daniel Richard Coghlan dated 31 May 20129 Expert certificate of Daniel Richard Coghlan dated 19 July 2019 Daniel Richard Coghlan Folder containing expert report of witness Daniel Richard Coghlan Supplementary report of witness Aerial view of 1 Mansfield Road Galston 6 photographs taken from POLAIR of buildings on the property at 1 Mansfield Road Galston Salvatore Calacoci Photo of damage caused by runoff of liquid from shed Salvatore Calacoci Photos taken by witness of burnt areas of runoff Salvatore Calacoci 2 photos of bulk chemical containers similar to ones seen in shed on property DSC Timothy Keary Photo of tax invoice from the bedroom of Joseph Merhi DSC Timothy Keary Disc of search warrant being executed at 1 Mansfield Rd Galston 29-30/09/2017 DSC Timothy Keary Handwritten list of phone numbers found in accused's room during search DSC Luke Middleton Statement of witness dated 25/01/2019 Diedre Grace Tax invoice 00186353 from People in Plastics dated 14/02/2017 Diedre Grace Website catalogue description of items on invoice 00186353 Diedre Grace Tax invoice 00186355 from People in Plastics dated 02/03/2017 Diedre Grace Website catalogue description of items on invoice 00186355 Photo of clear plastic measuring jug found in shed 3 photos of 100L black plastic drum found in shed 2 photos of 200L blue plastic drum 60% full found in shed 2 photos of 200L blue plastic drum 75% full found in shed Statement of DSC Ziebots dated 24/11/2020 DSC Timothy Keary Disc of edited phone calls from Joseph Merhi's phone DSC Timothy Keary Transcript of phone calls from Joseph Merhi's phone Admissions document signed and dated 07/10/2020 DSC Timothy Keary Disc of ERISP of accused dated 03/01/2018 DSC Timothy Keary Transcript of ERISP of accused dated 03/01/2018 DSC Timothy Keary Photos shown during ERISP of the accused DSC Timothy Keary Statement of Leonardo Castro dated 20/07/2020 DSC Timothy Keary Photo of Iphone 6 seized from Cash Stop Merrylands DSC Timothy Keary USB containing Cellebrite download from Joseph Merhi's Iphone 6 DSC Timothy Keary Cellebrite extraction report from Iphone 6 on 24/09/2018 DSC Timothy Keary Cellebrite extraction report of messages between accused and George Merhi, Joe Spare, Joe Khoury and Sam Calicoci DSC Timothy Keary Cellebrite extraction report of messages between Joe Merhi and Joe Khoury USB containing Cellebrite download of Iphone 6 (EX M3) DSC Timothy Keary Statement of Josephine Merhi dated 22/12/2017 Matthew Paul Analysist's Certificate of witness dated 08/01/2019 Matthew Paul Analysist's Certificate of witness dated 05/07/2019 James Indsto Analysist's Certificate of witness dated 13/10/2017 Steven Watton 'Clan Lab' Job Summary dated 30/09/2017 DSC Timothy Keary Pawn slip from Cash Stop Merrylands for I phone 6S Plus DSC Timothy Keary Cellebrite Extraction Report from Samsung GT phone belonging to accused Disc of Cellebrite analysis of Samsung GT phone belonging to accused DSC Timothy Keary Letter from Fair trading re: registration of rental agreement Joseph Merhi 3 business related documents for Recochem Inc Joseph Merhi Extraction report from accused's phone 24/09/2018 Merhi Chronology document Photos of bag of cannabis leaf found during search of the rear shed

1 15/10/2020 Defence Joseph Merhi Copy of letter sent from George Merhi to accused re: phone call from Hornsby police

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