R v McKenzie-McHarg [2008] VSCA 206

11 In my view the direction in this case concerning the 'uncharged acts' was not erroneous. The trial judge did refer to the evidence as 'uncharged acts' although he did so (as is clear from the passage quoted above) as a shorthand means of referring to that which the jury had previously heard described as such. Immediately after that description, however, his Honour identified the evidence described in that shorthand way. He went on to explain its reception as an exception to the normal rule about admissibility and that, for that reason, its reliance was what his Honour described, with emphasis, as being for a 'very restricted purpose'. His Honour went on, after the passage quoted above, to emphasise the importance for the jury to know how it could use this type of evidence and also how it was 'not permitted to use such evidence'. In that regard his Honour gave three specific directions making it quite clear that the evidence being referred to as 'uncharged acts' was not to be used in substitution for evidence of the events charged. The jury could have been in no doubt that proof of the 'uncharged acts' did 'not prove the offences with which [the applicant was] charged'. The latter offences could 'only be proved by admissible evidence which [established] each of the elements that [went] to make up the offence or offences' charged. It may, with the benefit of hindsight, often be possible to review a jury direction and consider how it might have been improved, but I do not regard the one given in this case to be incorrect.

12 One of the complaints made by the applicant about the charge was that his Honour was said to have erred in not emphasising to the jury that the permitted use of the evidence could only be made out if the jury were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence of the 'uncharged acts'. In fact the judge did say that they needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt about that evidence. In R v Best[3] Callaway JA said:

A jury does not have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of a piece of circumstantial evidence, or of a conclusion to be drawn from it, unless the inference of guilty of the offence that they are considering is based wholly on that evidence or conclusion or it constitutes an indispensable link in a chain of reasoning towards the inference of guilt.[4]

The trial judge in this case prudently, and in my view correctly, expressed the view that the jury needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the evidence of the 'uncharged acts'; no doubt because it, as a piece of circumstantial evidence, might form the basis of the inference of guilt of the offence or might constitute an indispensable link in a chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt. In any event, contrary to the argument, his Honour did say, and in my view made clear, that the jury needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence of what were described as 'uncharged acts'.

13 The second ground of appeal was that the trial judge materially misstated the complainant's evidence in giving his direction to the jury in relation to the first count charged against the applicant. The first count against him was of an indecent act in the presence of the complainant. In directing the jury on this count the trial judge described the complainant's evidence, adding '[n]ow that is what she says is the first specific event that occurred'. Her evidence was not explicitly that it was 'the first specific event' to have 'occurred' to her, although it might have been. It certainly was the first count charged against the applicant and it was the first specific incident she referred to when asked whether she could recall 'some specific incidences of him behaving' in a particular way to her. The description of this event by the trial judge as the complainant's evidence of 'the first specific event' is fairly to be read in the context of the charge as a whole as being to the first specific event referred to by the complainant.

14 The third ground of appeal also relates to the first count against the applicant. He maintained on appeal that the verdict on Count 1 is unsafe and unsatisfactory because, in addition to the first two grounds of appeal discussed above, R was alleged to have been present but could not be called as a witness, and also that the complainant had merely alleged that the applicant had done this a few times.

15 The test for whether a verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory depends upon whether, on the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.[5] In considering that question it must be borne in mind that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence and that it had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses. This trial depended upon the jury accepting or not accepting the complainant as a witness of truth. That point was made to the jury by the trial judge and by both counsel appearing at the trial. The jury were told to consider each count separately and that they could act on some, but not other, parts of her evidence. The jury asked for some of the evidence to be repeated to them and ultimately accepted the complainant as being truthful and reliable.

16 The complainant's evidence had been that the applicant had flashed his penis at her in the living room whilst R was on the couch. The three (that is, the applicant, the complainant and R) had been on the couch watching television when he went to the kitchen. The complainant was on the edge of the couch and could see directly into the kitchen. She looked up in his direction and saw that he had exposed himself to her. The trial judge gave a specific direction to the jury about R's unavailability as a witness. Specifically he directed them that the applicant had 'suffered a disadvantage or prejudice in not being able to elicit evidence from her'. In particular his Honour said that the jury was 'not permitted to speculate as to what she might have said'. His Honour emphasised that the jury should not speculate as to what she might have said but that their duty was to decide on the evidence before them. The evidence before the jury was, in my view, sufficient for them to conclude as they did. That is, they accepted the evidence of the complainant as being truthful, accurate and reliable.

17 The fourth ground of appeal raised much the same complaint in respect of Count 2. The second count related to an occasion when the complainant was in the study talking to R who was on the computer at the time. That count was that the complainant had been sitting on a bed behind R and that the accused was standing behind R also. The essence of the count was that the applicant had turned to the complainant exposing his penis to her in the presence of R. The evidence given by the accused in respect of these two events was given at about the same time in the proceedings. Her evidence was clear enough for the jury to reach its conclusions against the applicant and, as I have said, the jury asked for and were given access to the complainant's evidence during their deliberations.

18 The fifth ground of appeal concerned the verdict on Count 7. The applicant maintained that the verdict on Count 7 is unsafe and unsatisfactory as being fundamentally inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty on Count 6. These two counts related to events in the room of one of them applicant's two sons ('A') from a previous relationship who, by this time, was living in the house with the applicant. The complainant had given evidence of an occasion in which she had been asleep in A's room when he was not there. Her evidence of that occasion was that the applicant walked in, sat down on the bed, grabbed her wrists and started kissing her on the lips. Nothing else was said to have occurred on that occasions. She next recalled another occasion in A's room when he was asleep as well. Her evidence was that on that occasion the applicant came in and put his hands under the covers and rubbed her vagina on top of her pants. She was then asked whether that was a different occasion from the first occasion (referred to as the 'kiss occasion') and she added to her previous answer saying that it occurred on that occasion as well. The prosecutor then returned to the first occasion asking whether there was a touching of her vagina on that occasion. The response was that there was a touching above her clothing. In relation to that occasion she also said that he also touched her breasts above her clothing.

19 A fair reading of her evidence was that two inappropriate contacts were alleged on one occasion but only one contact on the other occasion. Count 6 had been an allegation that the applicant had begun rubbing the complainant's breasts over the top of her clothes while Count 7 was that he had rubbed the complainant on the top of her vagina over her clothes. There is no relevant inconsistency if there is a proper way by which the appellate court may reconcile the verdicts allowing it to conclude that the jury performed their function as required.[6] The jury's conviction on Count 7 is explicable as being an acceptance of that inappropriate touching on its own on one occasion or that the rubbing of the complainant's breasts might have had some other explanation.

20 The sixth ground of appeal concerned Count 9. The complainant's evidence on this count concerned an occasion after the applicant and his family had moved to the second residence. On that occasion his son A was said to have been on the computer in the main bedroom. The complainant had been looking at something A had been doing when the applicant walked in and brushed past her although there was about a space of some two metres he could use to get past without brushing her. In particular her evidence was that the applicant's genital area had come into contact with her bottom. The applicant's contention on appeal was that the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory because of the lack of corroborating evidence from A about this incident. He had been called to give evidence by the prosecutor, but neither the prosecutor nor counsel for the defence sought to ask any questions in respect of this incident. Nor is there any reason to assume, on the basis of the evidence given by the complainant, that he would have been able to give any relevant evidence in respect of the incident. I do not consider this ground to have been made out either.

[1] HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; (2008) 82 ALJR 723, [200] (Hayne J).

[2] [2008] HCA 16; (2008) 82 ALJR 723.

[3] [1998] 4 VR 603.

[5] M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487.

[6] Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348, 366-369 (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ).