Thus a judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons. In other words, the process to be followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which, so long as it stands, entitles and obliges the persons between whom it intervenes, to observance of the rights and obligations that the application of law to facts has shown to exist.
The power given by s. 4 is not of that kind. Moreover, the character of the body on which the power is conferred may assist in determining whether the power is judicial or non-judicial: see Reg. v. Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Food Corporation [26] and Reg. v. Hegarty; Ex parte City of Salisbury [27] . The Commission, on which the power is conferred by s. 4, is not a judicial body.
1. (1925) 36 C.L.R. 442.
2. (1974) 130 C.L.R. 87.
3. (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, at p. 408.
4. (1970) 123 C.L.R., at pp. 416-417.
5. [1968] A.C. 356, at p. 384.
6. (1970) 123 C.L.R., at p. 396.
7. (1970) 123 C.L.R., at p. 374.
8. (1977) 138 C.L.R. 1, at p. 6.
9. (1981) 147 C.L.R. 617, at p. 628.