14 His Honour found special circumstances within s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act in the applicant's need for "some life skills and education, and that needs to be supervised in some way". His Honour made this finding, notwithstanding that after special circumstances had been found in the applicant's favour when the applicant was sentenced on 3 December 1999, the applicant had abused the trust placed in him by that sentencing court by committing the further offence on 16 April 2002.
15 His Honour recommended that while on parole the applicant be permitted to attend a residential rehabilitation course such as that conducted by Odyssey House.
16 The only ground of appeal against sentence is that "the sentence is manifestly excessive, especially in the light of the custodial history of the applicant and with regard to the non-parole period."
17 In relation to both the total term of the sentence and the division of the total term into a non-parole period and the balance of the term, counsel for the applicant referred to the decision of this court in R v Brown [2000] NSWCCA 423, a decision of a two judge Bench consisting of Hulme and Barr JJ. In that case the applicant for leave to appeal had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years, consisting of a minimum term of eight years and an additional term of two years, for an offence of robbery whilst armed with a dangerous weapon and in company.
18 The leading judgment in R v Brown was given by Hulme J, with whose judgment Barr J agreed. In para 17 of Hulme J's judgment, his Honour said:
"However, although I think the applicant merited a long period of imprisonment and perhaps, in other circumstances, I would not have regarded this one as too long, following as closely as it did the applicant's prior period of incarceration, the view I have formed is that in the sentence imposed his Honour erred. While I appreciate the fact that the subject offence was committed on parole is an aggravating feature and I do not underestimate the weight to be given to the fact the weapon was loaded, eight years' minimum term for this offence, following so closely after a previous four and one half years of incarceration might, I think, fairly be described as crushing and manifestly excessive in the particular circumstances, given the overall period of incarceration and notwithstanding the intervention of the short period when the applicant was at large. I think also a period greater than two years should have been imposed by way of additional term when, subject to the views of the parole authorities, the applicant should be admitted to parole."
19 Counsel for the applicant very properly drew the court's attention to the subsequent decision of this court in R v Proud [2002] NSWCCA 219, a decision of a two judge bench consisting of Dowd J and Smart AJ.
In R v Proud Smart AJ said that the approach taken by the court in R v Brown ,
"requires considerable circumspection and is not necessarily one to be universally adopted. One has to be very careful that the result of such an approach does not culminate in inadequate sentences and non-parole periods which do not adequately reflect the criminality with which the court is faced."
20 I will respectfully adopt what Smart AJ said in Proud .
21 In my opinion, the overall sentence of seven years imposed by his Honour was clearly not manifestly excessive. The principal offence of robbery in company on 16 April 2002 was much more objectively serious than the type of offence of armed robbery described by the Chief Justice in
R v Henry , which the Chief Justice said should attract a term of imprisonment of four to five years. It was a serious circumstance of aggravation that the offence had been committed soon after the applicant had been released on parole under sentences for the same kind of offence. The sentencing judge would have been entitled to increase the sentence to some extent for the serious offence of robbery in company which was to be taken into account. The applicant's subjective features were not, in my opinion, such as to attract any leniency.
22 I turn to the submission that his Honour erred in not setting a longer period in which the applicant would be eligible for release on parole. His Honour did decide that he should find that there were special circumstances and his Honour imposed a sentence under which the balance of the term of the sentence exceeded one third of the non-parole period, although it is true that the period by which the balance of the term of the sentence exceeded one third of the non-parole period was quite short, being only three months.