And later, at [28] of the decision in R v Hearne :-
"It takes no great maturity to appreciate in the course of planning, for example, an armed robbery or other instance of violence, that such activities infringe the rights of others in a way that no civilised society can tolerate."
51 Furthermore, as Hunt CJ at CL said, with the concurrence of the other members of the Court, in Hawkins (1993) 67 A Crim R 64 at 66:-
"… even for children considerations of general deterrence are not to be ignored completely. And, where a youth conducts himself violently in the way an adult might conduct himself, and commits a crime of considerable gravity, the protective function of the criminal courts would cease to operate unless deterrence and retribution remained significant considerations in sentencing that youth: Pham (1991) 55 A Crim R 128 at 135; Allam (Unreported, CCA, 13 April 1993)"
52 Experience in this Court demonstrates that it is a regrettable fact of modern life in New South Wales that violent offences of the nature of those committed by the Applicant are not infrequently committed by persons of the Applicant's general age group. Furthermore, so common are violent attacks on innocent victims with a view to obtaining money that there is a demonstrated need to ensure that sentences for the offences are not unduly lenient.
53 Given his youth and background, rehabilitation of the Applicant merits particular consideration. It is by no means obvious that that will be facilitated by a shorter rather than longer time in custody. In saying that I do not forget the opinion expressed in the Duffy Barrier Robilliard report to the effect that "the longer LLM remains in custody, the greater his exposure to unhelpful attitudes, behaviours and associates and that placing him in the adult prison population would probably cause even greater damage". However the Applicant seems to have managed to find sufficient of these attitudes, behaviours and associates outside custody to make it both necessary and desirable to incarcerate him for a substantial period and I could not conclude that the risk of contamination from other inmates at Juvenile Detention Centres would increase to any significant extent if he spends more than the minimum necessary time there.
54 The argument for not sending him to an adult gaol is stronger. However again I find it impossible to believe that the Applicant has not learnt enough undesirable behaviour and standards to make this argument of little weight. I suspect much may also depend on what adult gaol the Applicant is in due course sent to and one must recognise that that event may not occur until the Applicant is 21 i.e. on 31 January 2007 when he will have 15 months of his non-parole period left to serve and when, one may hope, he will have learnt the error of his ways.
55 It is impossible to disagree with the recommendation of the author of the Duffy Barrier Robilliard report that after his release, the Applicant receive "a lengthy period of monitoring, support and supervision" but there is little point in that unless the Applicant is prepared to accept it and changes to his method of life. His conduct since he was sentenced in April 2001 gives no confidence that he yet has. And if he is easily influenced (by others) as Duffy Barrier Robilliard suggest, it is as well that he have the chance to be influenced by the restrictions of custody for a longer rather than a shorter period. If the Applicant is prepared to change, then either the non-parole periods fixed by Judge O'Reilly or the 1 year and 8 months which is one third of the non-parole periods fixed should be a sufficiently "lengthy period of monitoring, support and supervision".
56 By comparison with the statutory provisions against which the Applicant has offended, and application of first principles of sentencing which require the Court to take account of the need for general deterrence, deterrence of the Applicant, his need for rehabilitation, retribution and protection of society, I am of the view that the non-parole portions of the sentences imposed by Judge O'Reilly are not manifestly excessive.
57 In reaching this conclusion I have not ignored the fact that, pursuant to s54A et seq of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act a standard non-parole period has been fixed for offences under s98 of the Crimes Act and that the period prescribed is 7 years, and that his Honour considered the Applicant entitled to a discount of 25% or possibly a little higher, for his plea. His Honour did not expressly find that the Applicant's offence fell "in the middle of the range of objective seriousness" for offences of its type but a comparison of the 5 years he selected and "a little higher" than 25% suggests he may well have held that view. Of course, in the selection of a starting point in respect of the first count, his Honour was required to have regard to numerous other matters beside the objective seriousness of the relevant offence.
58 That my view that the sentence imposed in respect of the first count is not manifestly excessive is correct is demonstrated by a comparison with this Court's decision in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346. In that case this Court indicated, as a guideline for cases of armed robbery having the characteristics there described (at 380), a sentence falling between 4 and 5 years in its total term was appropriate. Although there are obvious differences between the circumstances envisaged in that case and the offence involving Mr Chang, most of those differences are not to the advantage of the Applicant. He has a substantial criminal record, he was on conditional liberty at the time, and I do not regard the violence exhibited towards Mr Chang as "limited". His offence carries a maximum penalty of 25 years while that under consideration in R v Henry rendered the offender liable for only 20 years imprisonment and Judge O'Reilly was also required to take account of 5 matters on a Form 1 - matters which, as I have said, were sufficiently serious as to require some appreciable increase in the sentence otherwise appropriate. By comparison with the case of R v Henry, I regard the 5 years non-parole period imposed for the offence involving Mr Chang as within the proper exercise of Judge O'Reilly's sentencing discretion.
59 The matter is a fortiori in the case of the offence involving Dr Lee where in addition to the factors I have mentioned (except that the Form 1 had only 1 not 5 offences on it), the nature of the offending and the sustained period of threatened violence were both significantly worse than in the typical situation contemplated in R v Henry.
60 It is to be observed also that the Applicant's sentences were, apart from a minor part of one parole period, made wholly concurrent. Given the seriousness of each offence and the fact that they were entirely separate, there was in fact no justification for his Honour adopting this lenient course which has the effect (subject to the variation in the parole period) of not punishing the Applicant at all for one of his very serious offences. For completeness, I should perhaps add that I have reflected on the possibility that the co-incidence in the length of the non-parole periods is an indication that his Honour in determining on the periods he set for each offence took into account in breach of the principles for which R v Pearce [1998] 194 CLR 610 stands as authority, the totality of the Applicant's criminality. However when one has regard to his Honour's remarks made at the time of announcing the sentences and to their length, I am not persuaded that he did.
61 In short, I do not regard the non-parole portions of the sentences imposed on the Applicant as manifestly excessive.
62 However, it is clearly apparent from Judge O'Reilly's remarks quoted near the start of these Reasons that the balance of the term of each sentence does not accord with what his Honour intended, viz. that it should be one-third of the non-parole periods, i.e. 1 year and 8 months. While I do not regard the periods fixed by his Honour in this respect as manifestly excessive, nor making the total sentences so, those periods are the product of error and should be corrected. In the circumstances of this case I do not regard the provisions of s6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act as militating against that conclusion.
63 As expressed, the fourth ground of appeal fails but there are errors which require correction.