The Crown submission on the sentence appeal
49The grounds of appeal and the written submissions were settled by a Crown prosecutor who did not appear at the hearing.
50The written submissions were brief in the extreme. In seeking to persuade the Court that the individual sentences and the non-parole periods were manifestly inadequate, it was not submitted that any of the factual findings made by the sentencing judge favourable to the respondent were either unsupported by the evidence or findings not open to him. In addition, there was no separate challenge to his Honour's finding of special circumstances, and no submission from the Crown that an alteration of the statutory ratio in s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, based upon what his Honour found to be the respondent's need for assistance to ensure his reintegration into the community, was inappropriate when the respondent is a foreign national in Australia on a criminal justice visa. Neither did the Crown challenge the finding of special circumstances on the basis of a finding that the distance from his family, and that he has not previously served a jail sentence, could properly support an alteration in the statutory ratio between the head sentence and non-parole period.
51In the Crown's written submissions, the sentences were said to show manifest error by the disproportionate weight given to the respondent's subjective circumstances relative to the objective gravity of his offending and that, although the sentencing judge referred to the approach mandated by Muldrock v R [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120, insufficient regard was paid to the maximum penalty of life imprisonment on both the supply and conspiracy counts and, in respect of the former, that a standard non-parole period of 15 years applied.
52The senior Crown prosecutor who appeared on the hearing regarded himself as bound by the approach the Crown had articulated in the written submissions. For that reason, he did not seek to be heard on what appeared to me to be a number of questionable factual findings made in the respondent's favour concerning both the actual extent of his knowing involvement in the criminal organisation of which he admitted he was a member, evidenced by his conduct in Australia, and the circumstances of his arrest. I have already noted that his Honour's failure to find that the offending was part of a planned and organised criminal activity is contradicted by the agreed facts. In other respects, it seems to me his Honour failed to interrogate the agreed facts, and the inferences which might have been drawn from those facts, in assessing the respondent's role as a drug supplier and his account of himself to police, for example, the inferences which might have been drawn from the respondent's apparent familiarity with the Australian banking system and his trusted position in dealing with large quantities of cash.
53I accept that the facts were silent on a number of issues that might have better informed the respondent's role and the extent of his autonomy generally whilst active as a syndicate member in and around the city whether through design or oversight. I also accept that it is not for the sentencing judge to invite the Crown to tender evidence in support of its case on sentence, or to gainsay concessions made in the agreed facts, including, in this case, that the respondent's role was equivalent to that of a "mule" or "courier". On the other hand, where those findings are not challenged, the success of the Crown appeal against what are said to be manifestly inadequate sentences is necessarily limited to making good the argument that the sentences are so patently disproportionate to the gravity of the offending that the only conclusion open is that the sentencing discretion miscarried.
54In oral argument, senior counsel for the Crown submitted that the concession at the sentencing hearing that an order for full concurrency was open, did not relieve the sentencing judge of ensuring that the effective sentence ultimately imposed adequately comprehended the full extent of the respondent's admitted criminal offending. The Crown submitted that, despite the range of factors that his Honour considered operated to mitigate the objective seriousness of the offending, including the positive findings he made on the respondent's subjective case, an effective sentence of imprisonment for 9 years with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months fell so egregiously short of a proportionate sentence that this Court would find that the sentencing discretion miscarried.
55I accept that submission. I also accept that the position the Crown adopted at first instance on the question of accumulation or concurrency is a matter which might, in other circumstances, have resulted in the exercise of the residual discretion in the respondent's favour (see R v Robinson [2014] NSWCCA 12 at [57] - [63]). However, I am unable to come to the affirmative view that it should result in the Crown appeal being dismissed. In my view, the only conclusion open is that the sentencing discretion miscarried, resulting in sentences that were well below sentences that could be properly imposed for agreeing to supply or being knowingly concerned in the supply of large commercial quantities of prohibited drugs. The maximum penalty and standard non-parole period for the supply offence was not a mere formality, but a yardstick created by the legislature to guide sentencing courts. Against a standard non-parole period of 15 years, a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months cannot be justified even on the most favourable view of the respondent's criminal offending and his subjective case (see Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 27; 249 CLR 571 at [24]; R v RD [2014] NSWCCA 103 at [48], R v Booth [2014] NSWCCA 156 at [54]).
56That said, and not without some reluctance, I propose to preserve the order for concurrency. I also consider that I have no option but to move to re-sentence referable to the appointment of the respondent's role in the agreed facts as a "courier" in the criminal organisation despite that being what I regard as a demonstrably erroneous assessment of what the respondent was recruited to do, and what he agreed to do as a drug supplier, and what I have no doubt was his trusted role in dealing in the proceeds of that criminal activity.
57In light of the approach of the Crown on the hearing of the appeal, I am also prepared to preserve his Honour's favourable finding that the respondent had determined to withdraw from the criminal syndicate before he was arrested and that he had a subjective case that entitled him to some leniency. I am not, however, satisfied that there is any basis for a finding of special circumstances.
58After taking into account the proceeds offence in the imposition of the sentence on the supply count, I consider that a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period 7 years and 6 months should be imposed for that count, and that a sentence of 7 years with a non-parole period of 4 years and 4 months should be imposed for the conspiracy count, to be served wholly concurrently with the sentence on the supply count.
59The orders I propose are:
(1)Appeal allowed.
(2)The sentences imposed in the District Court on 12 June 2014 are quashed.
(3)In lieu thereof, the following sentences are imposed:
(a)For the supply count: Imprisonment for 10 years comprising a non-parole period of 7 years 6 months commencing on 30 October 2012 and expiring on 29 April 2020 with a balance of term of 2 years and 6 months expiring on 29 October 2022.
(b)For the conspiracy count: Imprisonment for 7 years comprising a non-parole period of 4 years 4 months commencing on 30 October 2012 and expiring on 29 February 2017 with a balance of term of 2 years and 8 months expiring on 29 October 2019.
60R A HULME J: I have no hesitation in agreeing with Fullerton J that the sentences imposed by Jeffreys DCJ are manifestly inadequate.
61The proposed new total term of imprisonment of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7 years 6 months is a modest result in resentencing but I agree with Fullerton J of the need to adopt such an approach for the reasons she has indicated.
62GARLING J: I agree with the orders proposed by Fullerton J and with her Honour's reasons.