15 Under ground 2, Mr Wraight argued that while the judge accepted that the complainants were paid for sexual contact, her Honour had apparently regarded this as merely an aggravating factor. Accordingly, the judge failed to attribute any mitigatory weight to the fact that the complainants had willingly engaged in sexual contact for money, and had erred in having done so. Alternatively, it was put that the judge simply failed to make sufficient specific findings on this issue, findings which were necessary in the circumstances. The appellant's account on this issue was relevant to factors such as his moral turpitude and the likelihood of re-offending. During the record of interview, the appellant had conceded that he initiated sexual contact with each complainant, but asserted that they subsequently sought to have intercourse with him, on the understanding that he would pay them in return. The prosecutor did not accept this in opening the facts at the plea. The appellant's version, it was argued, was, however, consistent with the form of the presentment, the conduct of the complainants, and the absence of any statement from the complainants rebutting his account. The judge, so the argument ran, failed to make sufficient findings on this issue or treated the matter as having no mitigatory relevance, and accordingly erred.
16 In response, Ms Cannon for the Crown argued that the complainants were both children who, even on the appellant's admissions in his record of interview, had initially been approached by him. He had exploited the girls' youth and financial vulnerability for his own sexual gratification. In doing so, he had played on their vulnerabilities and the blame remained with him. Far from engaging in provocative conduct, the complainants had been targeted by the appellant and their compliance did not mean that they engaged in the conduct willingly. It was submitted that the judge was entitled to find that even if the complainants offered sex for money, the appellant's conduct was quite unacceptable in exploiting their youth and financial vulnerability.
17 Before dealing with these submissions it is convenient to mention the submissions under ground 1, claiming manifest and breach of totality. Mr Wraight submitted that the individual sentences and total effective sentence were manifestly excessive, crushing and in breach of totality, in view of the appellant's admissions, his early pleas of guilty and remorse, his age (66 at sentencing), his lack of any other convictions and the fact that the complainants had willingly engaged in sexual contact for money. It was put that the total sentences and non-parole period were very heavy for a man of his age. He would have no working life upon release and had lost his partner, and it would be very difficult for him then to re-establish himself. The submission continued that the judge had placed excessive weight upon specific deterrence, a factor of much less significance having regard to the appellant's age and matters such as his plea of guilty and remorse. The submission ran that the sentence was closer to those imposed in serious cases of incest, rather than offending of the instant type.
18 Ms Cannon in response argued that the sentence, although stern, was within range. The judge had accepted that specific deterrence played a lesser role than otherwise might have been the case, due to factors such as the appellant's previous good history and age. However, her Honour was, it was submitted, entitled still to find that there was a real role for specific deterrence. Adequate weight had been given to the age of the appellant and the judge was required from count 3 onwards to sentence him as a serious sexual offender, the principal purpose of sentencing thereafter being the protection of the community. Ms Cannon submitted that the offending was predatory in nature and exploitative of inequality. The conduct was ongoing and there had been six months' overlap while the appellant was molesting both complainants. Furthermore, given the prevalence of this kind of exploitative and insidious offending against children, general deterrence was an important factor.
19 In my view there is nothing in ground 2. I see no similarity between this case and R. v. Nguyen[1], upon which Mr Wraight relied. Nguyen was aged 23 when he committed the offences in question, and the 14-year-old complainant in that case certainly consented to what occurred. In this case, however, the appellant was over 60 at the time of the offences and the victims were both 14-year-olds when the offending began, they were sexually exploited by the appellant and he was able to do so because of their obvious financial vulnerability. I would accept the submission of Ms Cannon for the Crown that the judge was entitled to find that even if, after the appellant's initial advances, the complainants offered sex for money, the appellant's conduct was unacceptable in exploiting their youth and financial vulnerability.
20 On the other hand, the total effective sentence imposed is, I think, manifestly excessive and crushing. The victims were, as I have said, young and financially exploited, the offences were serious, general deterrence was certainly important, and the appellant's conduct was ongoing, predatory and required appropriate condign punishment. On the other hand, the appellant was 66 when sentenced, had pleaded guilty at an early stage and had made substantial admissions which were particularly significant in that these were the only evidence in support of counts 13 and 14, the two representative counts on which the heaviest individual sentences were imposed. The appellant had no other convictions and had demonstrated remorse. I question whether, in all these circumstances, specific deterrence had a role of any real significance to play in sentencing. The present case is to be differentiated from those involving incest, where much higher sentences are commonly imposed. The appellant was a neighbour, not in a position of trust such as a parent, and he did not use any violence, although he certainly exploited the girls' youth and financial vulnerability.
21 It follows that in my view ground 1 has been made good and that the appeal should be allowed. I would leave standing each of the individual sentences imposed on counts 1 to 14 inclusive. In the case of counts 15 and 16, I would impose in each case sentences of 30 months' imprisonment, in lieu of the sentences imposed by the judge. In so far as cumulation is concerned, taking count 13 as the base sentence, I would order that six months of the sentences imposed on counts 1 and 12, the offences of committing an indecent act with a child which were in each case the first sexual advance to the victims, and nine months of the sentences imposed on counts 10 and 14, should be made cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 13, leading to a total effective sentence of six years and six months. Otherwise I would make no order for cumulation. I would impose a non-parole period of four years and six months.