Accessory after the fact to murder
104The maximum penalty for accessory after the fact to murder is 25 years' imprisonment. There is no SNPP.
105Bruce Gall's act of hosing down the carport is the only act relied upon by the Crown in relation to the offence of accessory after the fact. Its effect was to assist his son to escape detection at least for a period since, had it remained in place, it would probably have led the neighbours or other visitors to report it to the police.
106Bruce Gall submitted that this offence, together with the offence of perverting the course of justice, which is considered further below, was one which, although not excusable, was an understandable act by a father who was devoted to, and concerned about this son, whom he knew to have just killed someone. This explanation can more readily be accepted as a "heat of the moment" instinctive act by a loyal father in respect of being an accessory than with respect to the offence of perverting the course of justice, which occurred two months later.
107Bruce Gall also submitted that the gravamen of the principal offence, whether it be murder or manslaughter, was not within the control of the accessory, and therefore he ought not be punished more severely by reason of his conviction for accessory after the fact to murder, than he would have been had Kevin Gall been convicted of manslaughter, notwithstanding that the maximum sentence for the former is 25 years and the maximum sentence for the latter is 5 years.
108Bruce Gall placed particular reliance on R v Rodriguez [2012] NSWSC 663 in which a father was convicted after trial of being an accessory after the fact to a manslaughter committed by his eldest son, who was never brought to trial because he left Australia a month after the events. The relevant assistance given by the offender was to collect the weapon that had been used to kill the victim from the person with whom it had been left after the killing. The offender then disposed of the knife, knowing that it had been used in the killing and intending to prevent his son from being brought to justice for that offence. Hidden J, who was satisfied of the offender's good character, imposed a sentence of imprisonment for two years which was wholly suspended. The offence of accessory after the fact to manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for 5 years.
109Cases involving accessories after the fact to murder embrace a wide range of offending. In some cases, the offender's conduct may be viewed as the product of any one or more of the following: fear, threats, emotional attachment, or dependence, or a misguided sense of loyalty. In the instant case, the factors motivating Bruce Gall were emotional attachment and a misguided sense of loyalty. I am not satisfied that he was fearful of his son, or that he was in any way dependent on his son, whether emotionally or otherwise.
110The maximum penalty is an indication of the relative seriousness with which the public, through Parliament, views this offence: R v Shankley [2003] NSWCCA 253, at [19] per Howie J. It would, in my view, be erroneous to disregard the distinction in maximum penalties, notwithstanding that the acts of the accessory are the same whether the principal offender is guilty of murder or manslaughter.
111Further, there are strong policy reasons for regarding the offence as a serious one. As Thomas JA observed in R v Hawken (1986) 27 A Crim R 32, at 38:
"...it is in the interests of the community that murderers should be completely isolated from support and deprived of assistance and that such crimes are not covered up."
112Nonetheless, Bruce Gall's act of hosing down the carport to remove what must have been substantial quantities of the deceased's blood was an act which was done shortly after he witnessed his son shoot the deceased. It was an isolated act in the context of this offence and the motivation, though misguided, was understandable.
113I take into account as an aggravating factor that the offence was committed in company: s 21A(2)(e).
114As mitigating factors, I take into account that the acts of Bruce Gall in hosing down the carport did not, to the extent that he was responding in a relatively short period of time to an event that was both violent and, as far as he was concerned, unexpected, form part of a planned or organised criminal activity (s 21A(3)(b)).